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Abstract
In this project I analyze the roles that notions of viruses and immunities and their
figurations play within the narrative discourse of speculative fiction. Focusing on a series of
texts from twentieth- and twenty-first century American fiction, I seek to examine the ways
in which the dialectical confrontation between infection and immunity is explored, reified, or
challenged on a narrative level. The terms “virus” and “immunity,” so intrinsic to life
sciences, have come into use to describe specific micro-organisms and biological processes
only within the last 150 years. Yet these terms possess a significantly longer history in
political, legalistic, and philosophical discourses. As such, their use in describing biological
activities is always, at some level, a cultivated form of narrative. Central to my discussion is
what I call “narrative immunity,” the sense that the narrative perspective within a text acts as
an immunizing factor against the threat of viral contamination. Narrative immunity is a way
of constructing, within a literary world undergoing a cataclysmic structural event (as is often
the case in the plots of viral outbreak), a space and identity of familiarity and recognition for
the reader. As such, looking at how immunity and infection are narrated within fiction, I
posit, allows us to gain an understanding of how discourses of biopolitics germinate and
develop along narrative lines.
Through a reading of Jack London, William S. Burroughs, Samuel R. Delany, and
Colson Whitehead, I argue that narrative immunity may be deployed in a variety of
ideological ways, and that it can support both reactionary impulses and radical liberatory
projects. What I argue throughout is that an understanding of how viral infection and immune
defense are encoded within the narrative logic of a text allows us a means of grasping the
biopolitical constructivism that frequently informs cultural production.
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Introduction
“As a biological concept, the cell is surely overdetermined to a considerable
degree”
(Georges Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist)
“The power of the viral image came from its simultaneous invocation of
disgust and fascination, the mundane and the mystical”
(Priscilla Wald, Contagious)
“Pasteur knew how important it was to keep the plain people thrilled about
microbe hunting—it was the drama of science that they can understand”
(Paul de Kruif, Microbe Hunters)
In 1926, Paul de Kruif, a microbiologist who had assisted the American novelist
Sinclair Lewis in writing Arrowsmith (1925), the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel about the
life of an idealistic young biologist, published his own non-fiction account of a canon of
medical heroes who made legible the microbial world. Titled Microbe Hunters, de Kruif
depicted a Manichean world of “immensely small assassins” and the noble “death
fighters” who sought to find and eradicate them (3). Profiling such medical luminaries as
Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, Walter Reed, and Paul Ehrlich, and written in a breathless,
bombastic style, de Kruif details a progressive narrative of entities that, in spite of their
microscopic size, prove to be “much more efficient murderers than the guillotine or the
cannon of Waterloo” (57). The power of these beings is held in check only by those
figures possessed of a singular curiosity and ingenuity: “to-day we demand with a great
hue and cry more laboratories, more microbe hunters, better paid searchers to free us
from the diseases that scourge us. How futile! For progress, God must send us a few more
infernal marvelous searchers of the kind of Robert Koch” (124). What Microbe Hunters
returns to again and again is the idea that scientific discovery is a narrative, and that
science is both a war with deadly creatures and an ameliorating tale of making visible
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(and, therefore, comprehensible) the world around us. It is no accident that de Kruif
begins his heroic litany with Anton van Leeuwenhoek, the seventeenth-century inventor
of the microscope. For de Kruif, it was Leeuwenhoek who had first “stolen upon and
peeped into a fantastic sub-visible world of little things, creatures that had lived, had
bred, had battled, had died, completely hidden from and unknown to all men from the
beginning of time” (11).
This rhetoric recurs in his chapter on Elie Metchnikoff, the first scientist to
formulate a theory of “natural immunity,” the belief that the body possessed microorganisms of its own to defend itself against foreign invaders. In words remarkably
similar to those describing Leeuwenhoek’s journey, de Kruif extols how Metchnikoff
“had peeped prettily into a thrilling, deadly struggle on a tiny scale, he had spied upon the
up till now completely mysterious way in which certain living creatures defend
themselves against their would-be assassins” (216). A few pages later, de Kruif makes
this idea of science as a narrative explicit when he remarks that “[Metchnikoff’s] theory
of immunity—it would be better to call it an exciting romance, rather than a theory—
this story we that we are immune because of a kind of battle royal between our own
phagocytes and marauding microbes, this yarn had thrown the searchers of Europe into
an uproar” (220-221). War, discovery, and storytelling become synonymous in de Kruif’s
historiographic method, and he repeatedly underscores that viral outbreaks and
immunities are accepted and considered as a narrative style. Yet it is really only one story
that de Kruif tells over and over again: the triumph of science and discovery over the
fears of the unknown and superstitions of the unlearned. De Kruif casts the history of
microbiology as a teleology, in accord with Pasteur’s observation that “[i]t is within the
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power of man to make parasitic maladies disappear from the face of the earth” (qtd. in
124). Echoing Pasteur, de Kruif concludes his lengthy exegesis with this optimistic
proclamation: “[i]t is as sure as the sun following the dawn of to-morrow that there will
be other microbe hunters to mold other magic bullets, surer, safer, bullets to wipe out for
always the most malignant microbes of which this history has told” (358). The story may
not be finished, but it is moving toward a definitive conclusion.
My project is formulated in response to how de Kruif (and others) see the
narrative shape of viral outbreak and immunity. If viruses and immunities can be
represented in narrative terms, I seek to gain a better understanding of how these
narratives can be deployed and interrogated. Briefly put, this work attempts to think
through a series of questions: how does twentieth and twenty-first-century American
literature read and interpret infection and immunity? How does (speculative) literature
prime us to consider questions about viruses, immunities, and the embodiments and
environments that are shaped by these visions? In what follows, I wish to trace some of
the subsequent questions that have developed from this original quandary, and think
through some of the critical and theoretical responses to these ideas. Viruses offer a
wealth of political, medical, philosophical, economic, and existential questions, and I
wish to insert the literary into this company. How does literature seek to understand how
viruses and those afflicted by such infections? How are we meant to narratively,
formally, and thematically recognize these questions and what answers (or non-answers)
does literature provide? What practices are involved in reading viruses, and how can we
consider the role of narrative in disseminating these ideas? To begin with these
examinations, I suggest that speculative literature foregrounds the narrative body as the
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primary site of investigation into the notion of contamination and immunity. That is, the
body is not just a material object, but one that is always mobilized in order to organize a
narrative. By emphasizing the narratological aspect of viral narrative, this project
endeavours to explore the ways that spaces and subjectivities become shaped and
reshaped by microbial contamination.

A Brief History of the Virus
Viruses—as biological organisms and as conceptual frameworks—become more
peculiar the longer one looks at them. The virus is an exemplar of what Timothy Morton
calls the “strange stranger,” the thing or identity that becomes more enigmatic, withdraws
further from our sense of categorical understanding, the more we engage and recognize it:
“[t]he strange stranger is not just the ‘other’—the ‘self’ is the other. Since there is no
(solid, lasting, independent, single) self, we are the strange stranger: ‘I is an other’”
(Ecological Thought 87). The strange stranger deconstructs the concepts of clearly
defined bodies and boundaries between the imaginaries of self and other, creating a
bleeding effect of flowing materialities. Such are the feelings and qualities raised by the
material manifestation of the virus. Or so we desire. Viruses, as most scientists and
thinkers observe, are neither alive nor not-alive—they exist along a strange continuum
that possesses characteristics beholden to what we would consider life and that which
falls outside its categories. Viruses are strands of RNA encased within a protein shell that
allows them to enter other organisms. Lacking a DNA component, viruses therefore lack
the ability to reproduce themselves—they require the machinery of other cells in order to
successfully produce future iterations. Viruses behave in ways similar to life and yet are
denied a key component in what makes life. This seemingly paradoxical positioning has
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led to innumerable fascinated proclamations about how viruses disrupt the simplistic
border determinations of life and death, forcing us to rethink such fundamental
ontological categories through more supple criteria.
Within the scope of biochemistry and medicine, viruses are a relatively “new”
discovery, even though their effects have been felt for millennia. Diseases like polio,
smallpox, and yellow fever, have long ravaged human and non-human populations, but it
has been little over a hundred years since viruses were understood as organisms and less
than a century since scientists were first able to visually confirm their existence. Indeed,
initially there was much confusion about what a virus actually was. While the
bacteriological revolution of the late-nineteenth century, heralded by Louis Pasteur,
Robert Koch, and others helped to identify the existence of bacteria and prove their
reproductive generation, still smaller particles were unable to be located. In 1879,
tobacco crops in the Netherlands were devastated by an unknown disease.1 In an attempt
to uncover the cause, Dutch scientist Martinus Willem Beijerinck, studying a disease
affecting tobacco plants, applied Koch’s filtration principles only to find that plants still
were affected by a disease—something far smaller than a bacterium.2 Beijerinck referred

1

Early attempts to diagnose this illness were performed by scientists Adolph Mayer and Dmitri Ivanovsky
at different points. Both were able to figure out that the cause of the plant sickness was not due to bacteria,
but were unable to say positively what organism was causing the infection (see Zimmer 4 for Mayer, and
Flint 10 for Ivanovsky’s experiments). Ivanovsky is sometimes attributed the honour of first postulating the
existence of viruses, but scientists have since noted that Ivanovsky “assumed that his infectious liquid was
caused by a defect in his porcelain filter,” and that “he did not identify the tobacco mosaic disease pathogen
as a distinctive agent” (Wendell and Valens 24; Flint 11).
2
Viruses are exponentially smaller organisms than bacteria. Stanley and Valens suggest that “[t]he volume
of the average [bacterial] germ is perhaps 10,000 times as great as that of the average virus” (95). To
underline this point further, Stanley and Valens explain that “the millimeter is a convenient measure for
camera lenses, the micron for living cells and the millimicron for viruses—or 1000 millimicrons to a
micron (and 1 000 000 millimicrons in a millimeter)” (18).
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to the sickness affecting these plants as the tobacco mosaic virus, and believed the cause
to be what he termed a “contagious living fluid” (Zimmer 4; Stanley and Valens 23). The
idea of an organism smaller than a bacterium would remain controversial until Wendell
Stanley provided an image of a virus in 1935 with the aid of an electron microscope,
which magnified material to a much greater degree than previously possible. Wendell
was able to disprove Beijerinck’s “contagious living fluid” thesis, demonstrating that
viruses consisted of proteins, and possessed a crystalline structure (Wendell and Valens
24-25; Flint 12). Rather than put to rest the question of what viruses are, however, the
making-visible of the virus only confronted scientists (and the public) with a greater
number of complex questions. As science writer Carl Zimmer notes, the question over
what makes viruses continues to this day: in 1998 Bernard La Scola discovered that the
ostensible bacterium called “Bradfordcoccus” was, in fact, a giant virus, far larger than
any virus heretofore recognized, as well as possessed of more genes than it was believed
possible. In other words, the Bradfordoccus, now renamed the mimivirus, “had broken
the cardinal rules for being a virus” (90, 91).
In literature on viruses—whether scientific, popular, or figurative—one will
inevitably encounter the conundrum: are viruses alive? Wendell Stanley and Evans
Valens describe the organisms as existing in “the twilight zone of life, midway between
living and nonliving” (23). Eula Biss comments that viruses, while “not exactly
inanimate” are also “not, strictly speaking, alive” (31).3 Laura Diehl summarizes the

Similar sentiments are shared by Timothy Morton, who remarks that “[v]iruses are structurally
incomplete. Like Coleridge’s Life-in-Death, they are neither alive nor nonalive in a commonsensical way”
(Ecological Thought 67), Wald, who writes of how viruses “existed on—and seemed to define—the border
between the living and nonliving” (158).
3
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beliefs of scientists when Stanley’s images of the virus crystals were made public: “[i]f
viruses were infectious agents that multiplied like parasites, yet could be crystallized like
‘dead’ chemicals, then were they alive or not alive?” (94).4 This question has proved
endlessly fascinating to thinkers and writers, since viruses seem to display a conceptual
undecidability at the heart of contemporary thoughts of life—viruses can be seen as
Jacques Derrida’s pharmakon, both life and nonlife at once, cleaving into the heart of
such a fundamental categorization an awesome uncertainty.
Yet, as Zimmer points out, considering whether viruses definitively are or are not
alive is perhaps not the proper question: “it may be more useful to think about how
viruses and other organisms form a continuum. We humans are an inextricable blend of
mammal and virus. Remove our virus-derived genes, and we would be unable to
reproduce” (93).5 Bodies are inextricably entangled with viruses; our reproducibility and
agency, our material facticity is owed to viruses. Our embodied operations, and our
environments, depend upon this productive enmeshment. It is important, then, to consider
how viruses and immunities are embodied—given a material dimension. This
organization allows us to think about how bodies, microbes, and environments intersect

The textbook Principles of Virology offers a more stoic account of viruses, noting that they “can be
viewed as microbes that exist in two phases: an inanimate phase, the virion; and a multiplying phase in an
infected cell” (18). The writers go on to add that describers of viruses often attribute “life,” “actions,” and
“motives” to these cells, and that these “anthropomorphic characterizations are inaccurate and also quite
misleading. Infected cells and hosts respond in many ways after infection, but viruses are passive agents,
totally at the mercy of their environments. Therefore viruses cannot employ, ensure, synthesize, exhibit,
display, destroy, deploy, depend, reprogram, avoid, retain, evade, exploit, generate, etc.” (18).
5
As Flint et al. reinforce, “[e]very cell in our body contains viral DNA. Human endogenous retroviruses,
and elements thereof, make up about 5 to 8% of our DNA” (4). In a more poetic vein, Biss notes that “[o]ur
own adaptive immune system, the branch of our immune system that develops long-lasting immunity, is
thought to have borrowed its essential technology from the DNA of a virus. … This technology was viral
technology before it was ours” (31-32).
4
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and intra-act with one another to create not just new visions of materiality, but
subsequent orderings of communities, political affiliations, and ecological concerns, and
how such material elements create the building blocks for narrative considerations of
such biological forces.

Acculturating Viruses and Immunities
The way that the virus has shaped American culture and politics, in particular, is
interesting to track. In a sense it may be counterproductive to yoke the idea of viruses so
tightly to a national space, as viruses spill across arbitrarily erected human boundaries.
Yet, while it is certainly true that viruses do not particularly care about borders, it is
equally true that border-makers and -maintainers care very deeply about viruses. In that
regard, American cultural and political production returns ceaselessly to the drama
enacted by narratives of infection and immunity. Cotton Mather’s The Angel of Bethesda
(1724) is paradigmatic in this regard. The text, which advocates for inoculation and
explores his beliefs in a sub-visible world of vital actants, is the “first medical book
published in the American colonies” (Silverstein 13). Mather’s account of the world is
both remarkably prescient and extremely speculative: he writes,
Every Part of Matter is Peopled. Every Green Leaf swarms with Inhabitants. The
Surfaces of Animals are covered with other Animals. Yea, the most Solid Bodies,
even Marble itself, have innumerable Cells, which are crouded with imperceptible
Inmates As there are Infinite Numbers of these, which Microscopes bring to our
View, so there may be inconceivable Myriads yet Smaller than these which no
glasses have yet reach’d unto. (qtd. in Cohen 64)
Not only is medical literature inaugurated in the United States as a response to viral
infection, and not only does Mather’s understanding anticipate microbiological
discoveries 150 years in the future, but I would contend that his Puritan prose is
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profoundly speculative. Mather’s penetrating vision estranges the world and
recontextualizes it around a vision of a depthlessly tangible world.
But Mather was not merely philosophizing; his ideas about infection and
protection developed from a very real situation involving epidemic disease and its wider
cultural framing. While British doctor Edward Jenner is often credited with discovering a
defense against the smallpox virus through the act of inoculation, the idea of developing
an acquired immunity to the disease through measured exposure had long been in
practice throughout the world.6 In 1721 a smallpox epidemic broke out in Boston, and
amid the disease a vociferous debate erupted between those pledged to exploring
vaccination as an option and those vehemently opposed to it. This outbreak, and the
resulting responses to it, would become vital in informing the ways that disease and
defense are thought of as they relate to American narrative.7 Perhaps most intriguingly,
the roles typically assigned in more recent debates over vaccination were, in this instance,
reversed: the religious Mather was the most ardent supporter of vaccinating the citizens
of Boston, while the city’s medical establishment almost uniformly opposed such a
response. Robert Tindol remarks how Mather’s pleas for inoculation were predicated on

Jenner biographer Robert Fisher notes “[m]ost writers agree that [the concept of vaccinating against
smallpox] was imported to Constantinople late in the seventeenth century by Circassian traders carrying
goods from China and Persia,” adding that “[v]ariolation was … practiced in China and India” long before
Jenner popularized it in England, “albeit by sniffing dust from the scabs on drying smallpox lesions rather
than by inoculation.” He further remarks that “[t]he great Arab physician, Avicenna [980-1037], has been
credited with the discovery of the technique, but there is no hard evidence” (15). In terms of its
apprehension by literary figures, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762) wrote of variolation practiced
in Istanbul during a 1717 outbreak to a friend in England (Baxby 22), while the French satirist Voltaire
penned an essay titled “On Inoculation” in response to a 1723 outbreak of smallpox in Paris wherein he
castigates French superstition toward the practice of inoculation while valorizing the English for their
attempts to do so (see 63-71).
7
The authoritative text on the smallpox epidemic of 1721 and the wider socio-political implications it had
on early American life is Stephen Coss’s The Fever of 1721.
6
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his religious understanding of community and that science provided a means of obeying
the will of God: “Mather’s enjoinder for the community to embrace inoculations to defeat
the devil was not so much to gain a victory in a specific time as to establish a timeless
errand in which American righteousness would defeat all temporal setbacks. If such is the
case, then one naturally would fight the smallpox epidemic just as one would fight off
marauding Indians” (10).8 American exceptionalism is encoded into Mather’s
sermonizing on inoculation; it is immunity that will create the holy character of the
Puritan race destined to inhabit God’s kingdom. Science becomes the means of better
embodying the imprimatur of the lord for Mather. The Boston doctors’ rejection of
Mather’s urgings, meanwhile, derived from their belief in his violation of discursive
bounds: Mather was a preacher pushing his way into secular matters of which he had no
knowledge or expertise. The medical faction, led by doctor William Douglass, portrayed
themselves as “members of an elite medical profession” who “represented the beginning
of a drive to create a more exclusive medical establishment” (Sivils 40). Here, too, we
can detect the discourse of expertise as a means of understanding and directing the body.
The fact that the doctors’ objections to smallpox vaccination as dangerous only
underscores the contingency of such roles.9 One final important element in response to
this epidemic is the role of racial relations in understanding immunization. Mather’s

Mather had, in the 1690s, remarked on the eradication of Indigenous peoples as part of God’s plan: “the
woods were almost cleared of these pernicious creatures, to make room for a better growth” (qtd. in Clark
202). The majority of deaths caused by the European colonization of the Americas can be attributed to
microbial infections for which Europeans had developed immunities to over centuries, while Indigenous
peoples, unexposed to such contagions, had no defenses against (see Clark 195-197; Diamond 210-212).
9
Sivils claims that “Douglass opposed the practice of inoculation not because he thought it was ineffective,
but because he resented the meddling of the clergy, namely Cotton Mather, in matters best left to those
trained in medicine” (43). Thus, the objection to inoculation during the 1721 smallpox epidemic stems less
from scientific than political reasons.
8
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source for the efficacy of vaccination against smallpox came from his slave, Onesimus,
who showed Mather the vaccination scar he had on his arm and explained the process of
inserting a small amount of smallpox tissue into a healthy body in order to provoke an
immune response (Tindol 4). Mather and his pro-inoculation supporter, Dr. Zabdiel
Bolyston, would narrate Onesimus’s account in their pamphlet Some Account of What is
Said of Inoculating or Transplating the Small Pox (1721) as part of their attempt to
persuade the citizens and physicians of Boston into accepting the vaccination proposition.
This testimony is part of an intentional rhetorical strategy: “Boylston and Mather include
[Onesimus’s] brief narrative in the ‘plainly, brokenly, and blunderingly’ style that they
credit as undeniably honest” (Sivils 47).10 Mather’s knowledge of inoculation is at least
partly informed by the system of slavery so essential in structuring the United States, and
the narrative of immunity draws some of its epistemic power from this system. What
Mather and the 1721 smallpox epidemic demonstrate, above all, is that narratives of
disease invariably intersect with larger social systems of discourse, and can be used in
ways to organize and reorganize such stories.
As Eula Biss strikingly puts it at the beginning of her memoir On Immunity
(2014), “[i]mmunity is a myth” (6). The idea that there is the possibility of creating a
completely self-protected sphere of safety is a story we tell ourselves, one that is proven
to be insufficient time and again. This myth of the enveloped and protected singular
identity can become solipsistic and dangerous, especially when compared to the way that

Kenneth Silverman notes that Mather and Boylston follow up Onesimus’s account more official
discourse from established physicians because they were “aware that Onesimus’ folkish narrative would
not be persuasive enough” (qtd. in Sivils 48).
10
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immunity is predicated upon bodies in common rather than in isolation. Yet the term is a
borrowed one, taken from older legalistic discourse.11 As Antoinette Settler notes, the
first usage of “immunity” in a medical context was in 14th-century Europe (qtd. in
Silverstein 3), but literature’s employment of the term to think through medical relations
has a head-start of several hundred years: “poetic license permitted the Roman Marcus
Annaeus Lucanus (39-65 AD) to use the word immunes in his epic poem ‘Pharsalia,’ to
describe the famous resistance to snakebite of the Psylii tribe of North Africa” (3; see
also Esposito, Immunitas 7). The term derives from the Latin “immunitas,” which is the
“negative or privative term whose meaning derives from what it negates or lacks, namely,
the munus” (Esposito, Immunitas 5). The root “munus,” per Esposito, refers to obligation
and responsibility, as well as a kind of gift (Communitas xiii). Thus, the immune, defined
here in terms of legal or political exception, is the person who is outside the obligations
and rules that create the conditions for a group of people: “what counts in defining the
concept is exemption from the obligation to the munus” (Immunitas 5). As Esposito
notes, “the true antonym of immunitas may not be the absent munus, but rather the
communitas of those who support it by being its bearers” (6). As Ed Cohen notes in A
Body Worth Defending (2009), the usage of the concept of immunity to describe the way
the body defends itself against intrusive outsiders is almost entirely accidental. Drawing
on the microbiologist Elie Metchnikoff, Cohen recounts how the scientist, while
examining cells through his microscope, exclaimed that “a new thought flashed across
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As scientist Arthur Silverstein notes at the beginning of his authoritative tome A History of Immunology
(2009), “[t]he Latin words immunitas and immunis have their origin in the legal concept of an exemption:
initially in ancient Rome they described the exemption of an individual from service or duty, and later in
the Middle Ages the exemption of the Church and its properties and personnel from civilian control” (3).
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my brain. It struck me that similar cells might serve in defense of the organism against
intruders” (1, italics in original). The concept of the body as a battlefield, with the host
organism waging a defense against intrusive microbes, is a metaphor with massive
staying power, and comes to define the concept of how bodies work against disease.
Thus, the concept of immunity had been well-established in the rhetoric of
politics and legalism when it was borrowed to describe the operations of biology. When
Metchnikoff utilized the principles of invasion and defense to conceptualize how bodies
work, he also set up a horizon for the epistemology of thinking through how bodies and
illnesses operate. As Cohen notes, “immunity is not a natural choice of images for our
ability to live as organisms among other organisms of various sizes and scales—nor is
defense, for that matter. Instead, both terms derive from the ways that Western legal and
political thinking accounts for the complex, difficult, and at times violent manner that
humans live among other humans” (3). Biss similarly observes that “[o]ur understanding
of immunity remains remarkably dependent on metaphor, even at its most technical
level” (55).12 Drawing on the concept of herd immunity, Biss notes that vaccinating the
body against illness is really about “how it affects the collective body of a community”
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To provide another example: In 1901, German microbiologist Paul Ehrlich theorized the concept of
“horror autotoxicus,” or, “the horror of becoming toxic to yourself” (E. Martin 134). In spite of the
ominous intonations of such a term, Ehrlich brought up the concept as a hypothetical; he in fact believed
that such auto-toxicity, the turning of the immune system against itself, was an impossibility. “[T]he
organism,” he wrote, “possesses certain contrivances by means of which the immunity reaction, so easily
produced by all kinds of cells, is prevented from acting against the organism’s own elements” (qtd. in
Silverstein 155). In Ehrlich’s conception of the development of the immune system—one Silverstein calls
“Darwinian” (171)—the body develops to a point of increasing health and defense, one that cannot be
turned against it. Such a belief, claims Silverstein, was built on a “teleologic appeal,” one which “deni[ed]
that some biological price might be exacted for the benefits that antibodies endow upon the individual
organism” (171). While the discovery of autoimmune diseases in the twentieth century, such as lupus,
would force a reconsideration of Ehrlich’s postulation, the literary effect of his conception of “horror
autotoxicus” remains a powerful one.
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(19). Thus, the idea of herd immunity “now seems implausible only if we think of our
bodies as inherently disconnected from other bodies. Which, of course, we do” (20).
Biss’s final sentence is significant: while it is understood that the concept of the “immune
system” is an imperfect metaphor13 that describes a much more complex and mysterious
operation, and while we understand that our bodies are not pure organisms arrayed
against a world of malignant, infectious microbes, the mythology persists. More than just
representing a misguided and outmoded belief, however, immunity has come to dominate
the American way of thinking politically about biological life.
In 1793 an outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia, then temporarily serving as
the nascent nation’s capital, killed five thousand citizens and caused thousands more to
flee; “[f]or a century afterwards,” notes J.H. Powell, “the fearful disease remained an
annual threat for people in many states and towns to dread, and every year they
remembered the great Philadelphia plague as the worst, the most frightening, the very
classic of plagues” (xvii). Following along the lines of Powell’s portentous description,
the outbreak is perhaps best captured in Charles Brockden Brown’s 1799 gothic novel
Arthur Mervyn, which is set against the backdrop of the plague-ravaged city. As Leslie
Fiedler remarks, “[o]nly when [Brown] describes something monstrous and extraordinary
like a city under pestilence, do his descriptions approach the ‘reality’ of the realists”
(155). The fantastical literature of the gothic becomes suddenly mimetic when it is linked

As Cohen aptly remarks, “[t]he longer I work on this project, the less I understand why it seems obvious
to us to use a complex legal and political concept to describe how we coexist as organisms. Taken at face
value, immunity has little to recommend it as an organismic possibility; indeed, once called to our
attention, it seems hard not to notice that the trope only works as catachresis” (14). For Cohen, the body’s
operations and the method of legal-political exemption are so distinct that their attempt at resemblance is
almost non-existent. Thus, we could think of Metchnikoff’s revelatory metaphor as either poor literary
analysis, or, if we were being charitable, a particularly brilliant example of cognitive estrangement.
13
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with an outbreak of a virus; the implication of Fiedler’s words is that connections with
the virus estrange us from our mundane sense of reality. The continued outbreaks of
smallpox throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth led to American
health officials across the country advocating for comprehensive programs of—
sometimes enforced—vaccination, which, in Michael Willrich’s words, “sparked one of
the most important civil liberties struggles of the twentieth century” over the idea of the
government’s right to vaccinate its citizens (14).14
The twentieth century, the dawn of the discipline of virology, further intensified
the spillage of such discourses into the realm of American social life. The scientific
developments of bacteriology and virology unfold in parallel to reception and reaction
based in popular culture—as Wald notes, “[t]he discoveries of bacteriology did not
emerge through the pure culture of the laboratory,” but influenced and shaped by the
wider culture (19).15 This intersection of scientific and cultural discourse has been a

As Biss notes, the term “conscientious objector,” which now commonly applies to anti-war positions,
originated as a term used to describe people opposed to receiving smallpox vaccinations on grounds that it
violated their civil rights (118). This conceptual mobility further reinforces how the discourses of immunity
and conflict are enfolded into one another, which I discuss at greater length below.
15
Curiously, in spite of the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, responsible for the deaths of approximately
550 000 Americans and anywhere between 20 and 40 million people worldwide (Crosby 207),
contemporary popular culture’s engagements with the pandemic are almost nonexistent. Katherine Anne
Porter’s modernist novella Pale Horse, Pale Rider (1939) is one of the few accounts of the flu’s effects on
American lives. Porter herself was stricken with the flu, which killed her fiancé, and the novella’s
characters of Miranda and Adam are thinly fictionalized versions of these real-life events. In addition,
Thomas Wolfe’s autobiographical Look Homeward, Angel (1929) involves a chapter where protagonist
Eugene Grant’s brother (the novel’s stand-in for Wolfe’s brother Benjamin) is felled by the virus. Crosby
notes that Porter and Wolfe were able to write about the flu directly because “it struck too close to their
hearts ever to be forgotten” (317). Elizabeth Outka responds to Crosby’s suggestion with an interesting
reading of canonical modernist texts such as T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) and Virginia Woolf’s Mrs.
Dalloway (1925). For Outka, the flu’s appearance at the tail end of the First World War meant that the two
events became conflated for survivors, and thus the “[m]odernist literary corpses … always potentially
have (at least) a double meaning, signifying not simply the war dead, but also those dead in the flu” (939).
More recent works of fiction, such as Thomas Mullen’s The Last Town on Earth (2005) and Myla
Goldberg’s Wickett’s Remedy (2006) have attempted to create retrospective narratives about the outbreak
(see Belling).
14

16

continually informative one. Laura Diehl notes how politicians and thinkers of the 1920s
raised the specter of genetics in their calls for curbing immigration to the United States:
“eugenicists … conflated infection with miscegenation, exploiting invasion fears to
conceptualize the boundary between healthy and sick bodies, between subjects of Empire
and those subjected to Empire” (87).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the rise of antibacterial drugs led to a
decrease in the fear of the quotidian germs that had so vexed the imaginations and bodies
of Americans at the beginning of the twentieth century (Tomes 13). Yet in the place of
bacteria the virus came to serve as a more-than-adequate substitute: the increasingly
public knowledge of the world of viruses, and the increasing amounts of money poured
by the American government into research and development for scientific purposes, led
to a new fascination with microbes, and a new anxiety. With the post-War political
sphere divided into a Manichean conflict between capitalism and communism, the
cultural understanding of biological concepts became tinged with suspicion: there was a
“conceptual exchange between virology and Cold War politics. As viruses became
increasingly sinister and wily, sneaking into cells and assuming control of their
mechanisms, external agents, such as Communists, became viral, threatening to corrupt
the dissemination of information as they infiltrated the nerve center of the state” (Wald
158-159). American popular culture, such as Robert A. Heinlein’s The Puppet Masters
(1951), Jack Finney’s The Body Snatchers (1954) (and its popular film adaptation, Don
Siegel’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers [1956]), and the Howard Hawks-produced The
Thing from Another World (1951) (based on John W. Campbell Jr.’s 1938 novella “Who
Goes There?”) all depict American life under attack by insidious, mutating viral

17

organisms that reach from America’s imperial outposts (such as the Alaskan scientific
station in The Thing from Another World) right to the idyllic and idealized center of
American life (the rural suburb of Santa Mira, California in Finney’s novel and Siegel’s
film). The bio-logic of the virus proved particularly malleable, and easily modulated from
a fascinated discovery in the 1930s into a fear of external contagion during the early
decades of the Cold War.16
Interestingly, by the 1970s, the idea of the virus had receded into the background
of the Cold War American imaginary. As medical historian Alfred W. Crosby notes, “[i]n
1969 the Surgeon General of the United States, William H. Stewart, assured us that we
had left infectious disease behind in our dust. Three years later, in the final edition of the
classic Natural History of Infectious Disease, author and Nobel laureate Mcfarlane
Burnet concluded that ‘the most likely forecast about the future of infectious disease is
that it will be very dull’” (qtd. in Crosby xi; see also Wald 25). There exists, in such
formulations, the idea of an immune American culture, a progressive narrative whereby
the foundational myths of the American nation can be left behind in the post-war liberal
consensus.17 Such illusions of a post-viral age were shattered by the epidemic of
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the early 1980s and the subsequent

Kirsten Ostherr’s survey of the intersections of biopolitics and mass media in American culture makes
the contention that, due to the invisible nature of microbial agents, films like Invasion of the Body
Snatchers and other 1950s alien invasion films helped to grant an imagery (and, therefore, a grammar) to
the logic of disease outbreak (80). Such recurrent imagery helps to reinforce certain ideological narratives,
too.
17
It is worthwhile to note that, it is in this “viral void” of the 1970s that the field of medical humanities
begins its inception—Jones et al. note that it was this decade that saw a growing academic interest in in the
intersections between literature and medicine (2). Likewise, Heather Houser (about whom I will discuss
more below) begins her thinking of the “ecosickness” novel in the 1970s, as the environmental movement
increasingly enters the forefront of American political activism.
16
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revelation that the disease was caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in
1983, a viral infection that continues to impact millions of lives throughout the world. I
will discuss the cultural legacy of HIV/AIDS writing in greater detail in Chapter Three,
but it suffices here to say that, in spite of de Kruif’s positivist ideology of progressive
immunity, the reality of microbial diseases often belies the simplistic mythologies of
infection and protection.
Entering the twenty-first century, the viral has become an almost ubiquitous
sociocultural artifact. From the omnipresence of the virus as a tool in narrative fiction
(such as malignant and omnipotent computer infections, or the omnipresent zombie,
which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter Four) to the popularization of the term
“viral” to describe “videos that gain popularity by being shared and recommended
through online word of mouth” (France et al. 20),18 to the periodic appearances of novel
viral outbreaks (i.e., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS] threat of 2003, the 2009
H1N1 flu pandemic, and the brief but highly visible fear of Ebola in 2014) viruses
circulate the cultural imagination of the United States in a myriad of real and abstract,
biological and metaphorical fashions. Viruses have evolved not only alongside the
biological body, but American culture’s understandings and uses of the virus to explore,
explain, and define itself.
In my consideration of the virus in both epidemiological and cultural terms, I
draw heavily upon Priscilla Wald’s path-defining work in Contagious (2008). There,
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France et al. empirical analysis of the online popularity of videos complicates this somewhat basic
explanation, suggesting that there are multiple types of videos that could be described as “viral” (from
“initial viral,” to “delayed viral,” to a more erratic “polynomial viral” [20]).
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Wald rigorously traces what she terms the “outbreak narrative,” a narrative constantly
“evolving” but following a series of tropes, fashioning a “formulaic plot that begins with
the identification of an emerging infection, includes discussion of the global networks
throughout which it travels, and chronicles the epidemiological work that ends with its
containment” (2). In identifying the repertoire of stylistic devices used to illustrate,
dramatize, and make sense of infectious disease outbreaks, Wald makes clear that science
and culture overlap to mutually produce, reinforce, and hierarchize the stories that do
(and do not) get told about disease outbreaks. These narratives draw upon and support
cultural myths in order to make themselves intelligible; “epidemiological narrative,”
Wald asserts, “is, like the microscope, a technology” (19), and diseases are just as much a
narratological tool as they are an “epidemiological fact” (2). Indeed, Wald cites virologist
Philip Mortimer who admits as much, explaining that “[a]n outbreak … like a story,
should have a coherent plot” (qtd. in Wald 19). As for what that plot is composed of,
Wald sees it in terms of myth, which she glosses as “an explanatory story that is not
specifically authored, but emerges from a group as an expression of the origins and terms
of its collective identity” (9). Narratives about disease are ways for a nation’s authors to
construct stories about themselves, their identities, and the constitutive character of their
territory or domain. Disease narrative is thus one of the most potent tools in exploring the
concept of a nation or population.19

And a particularly long-lived one. Wald points as far back as Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, and
Sophocles’s Oedipus the King as examples of stories about disease being used to explore the boundaries of
identity and community (11).
19
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While Wald’s examination of this idea—moving from the turn-of-the-century
social realist writing of authors like Jacob Riis and the mythologizing of Mary Mallon
into the plague-spreading “Typhoid Mary” to the demonization of AIDS victims and the
1990s’ obsession with contagion in films like Outbreak (1994)—is extremely thorough, I
find that the outbreak narrative expresses only one way of thinking about the possibilities
of disease epidemics as a narrative tool. The outbreak narrative provides an elegant and
linear epistemological and narrative tool. But the virus, that enchantingly enigmatic
figure beloved of poststructuralist thought, resists such a linear unfolding. The point of
this project, then, is to expand on Wald’s work by outlining some of the contours that
stories about viruses and immunities can potentially take, specifically in the American
tradition of speculative fiction.

On “Virality”
Indeed, if Wald’s thinking about what viruses are has been confined to the
singular vision of the outbreak narrative, then the reception of the troublesome microbe
by poststructuralist critics has had the opposite problem. In their special issue on the
concept of the viral, Jasbir Puar and Patricia Clough use “viral” as a way of thinking
about the metaphoric logic of the virus in the contemporary age of global capital.
Remarking that “[t]he ‘viral’ has come to describe a form of communication and
transmission in and across varying domains: the biological, the cultural, the financial, the
political, the linguistic, the technical, and the computational,” Puar and Clough note that
“the viral has itself gone viral” (13). This introduction—and the subsequent special
issue—expertly trace the ways in which the term “viral” has come to diagnose a cultural
condition, a means of conceptualizing and understanding the age of networked, global
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neoliberalism, a more pungently aggressive metaphor than Zygmunt Bauman’s “liquid
modernity.” There is none of the idyllic, calming sense of flow here—the viral age is one
of substance-less speed, the privileging of the reorienting hijack, and the need to
proliferate endlessly. In this sense, Puar and Clough are completely correct.
Yet this reading does not sit entirely well with me. As Puar and Clough go on to
note, the “viral” and the “virus” are not coterminous with one another—“the
characteristics of the virus, we would argue, serve as a threshold, a horizon against and
alongside which virality takes its action” (14). The biological entity of the virus serves as
the map onto which the larger discursive characteristics of twenty-first century Western
society can be explored through. Yet in doing so, the biological, the embodied, the
material seems to be relegated to the background. While several articles in the special
issue—including the issue’s epilogue, a reprinting of Donna Haraway’s seminal feministposthumanist text “A Manifesto for Cyborgs”—seem to place the body at the center of
the analyses of viral systems and institutions, the morphing of the virus into virality
seems to mitigate its material dimension. Virality treats politics, economics, aesthetics,
language, and bodies as all operating on the same logic of “replication without
reproduction, without fidelity, without durability …. [the] generative differentiation that
is repeated” (Puar and Clough 14). Bodies become indistinguishable from the systems
that control them—a metonymic similitude results from the ways in which the body and
the speculative economy of global capitalism (for example) operate. I am uncomfortable
with this all-purpose metaphor that connects such disparate ideas together.
This is not to say that Puar and Clough and their contributors are the only scholars
engaged in such an action. Recent work by scholars such as Thierry Bardini, Eugene

22

Thacker, Alexander Galloway, Jussi Parikka, and Tony D. Sampson all take this potent
figurative language of virality and utilize toward expansive and productive ends. Bardini,
for instance, in Junkware, describes “the virus … is the entity of choice, not only for a
molecular biology that it helped build, but for today’s ontology and ethics, and hence for
a current metaphysics,” adding that “the virus is the master trope of ‘postmodern
culture’” (2, 179). Sampson, meanwhile, in his book Virality, draws on the work of
Deleuze and French sociologist Gabriel Tarde in order to articulate a theory of crowds.
For Sampson, virality explicitly becomes a project for thinking through the concept of
affect, describing virality as both the mobilization of sophisticated forms of biopolitical
social control, but also possibilities for revolutionary social change “located in the
accidents and spontaneities of desire” (5, 6).20 Jussi Parikka, in his history of the
development of computer viruses, explores how the development of discourses of
computer viruses are analogically linked to themes about bodies, and therefore operate
along biopolitically ordained lines (see 120), while Thacker and Galloway, in The
Exploit, employ the virus as a means of thinking through the contemporary security state
apparatus, drawing an explicit analogical relationship between biological microbes and
computer programs, noting that both “exploit the normal functioning of their host
systems to produce more copies of themselves. Viruses are life exploiting life” (83).

Interestingly, Sampson identifies his project as “an ontological investigation of contagious relationality
intended to probe outside the generality of metaphors and analogies” (3). Sampson suggests that the
biological thinking of virality narrows it to thin discussion of how things are like viral infection, while an
investigation into the mobility of affect provides a stronger basis for thinking through the flow of desire and
intention amid groups of people. While this project contends almost exactly the opposite, I find Sampson’s
full-throated defense of distinguishing “virality” from “the virus” to be a useful one. I will discuss
Sampson’s theories in greater detail in Chapter Four.
20
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Such texts echo the fascination of 1980s poststructuralist thinkers with the
conceptual malleability of the virus. Jean Baudrillard’s nihilistic vision of postmodern
culture, for instance, sees it as quintessentially viral in nature: “[v]iral attack is the
pathology of the closed circuit, of the integrated circuit, of promiscuity and of the chain
reaction—in a broad and metaphorical sense, a pathology of incest. He who lives by the
same shall die by the same. The absence of otherness secretes another, intangible
otherness: the absolute other of the virus” (Transparency 65). In a less fatalistic key,
Jacques Derrida evinces an evident fascination with the latitude of the virus as a
deconstructive concept. In On Spirit he notes “the virus that obsesses, not to say invades
everything I write. Neither animal nor nonanimal, organic or inorganic, living or dead,
this potential invader is like a computer virus. It is lodged in a process of writing, reading
and interpretation” (qtd. in Wills 105). In a later interview with Peter Brunette and David
Wills, Derrida reiterates and sharpens this point, noting that the virus forms “the matrix
of all I have done since I began writing” (12).21 In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari further rhapsodize the concept of virality by aligning it with their
concept of the rhizome: a non-hierarchical, non-stratified representation of
interrelationality. Deleuze and Guattari marvel at how the virus “can take flight, move
into the cells of an entirely different species, but not without bringing with it ‘genetic
information’ from the first host,” concluding that “[w]e form a rhizome with our viruses,
or rather our viruses cause us to form rhizomes with other animals” (10). While Deleuze
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Beyond its utility as a particularly elastic metaphor, however, Derrida does not seem to consider viruses
themselves. As Esposito is right to note, the concept of biopolitics “is utterly extraneous to [Derrida’s]
thought” (“Interview” 53).
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and Guattari’s formulation appears to be more linked to the biological understanding of
viruses, in opposition to Baudrillard’s and Derrida’s more expansive visions, it is still
considered as a trope or mobile signifier for a greater project of dissolving the bonds of
epistemological structuring. Virality therefore becomes a metonym that helps to draw
affinities between massively variegated systems of discourse. In so doing, I find that it
can abstract the body, placing it along nexuses that are undifferentiated. In this way, the
viral becomes the sign par excellence of neoliberal capitalist exchange: the viral (if not
the virus) becomes the standard by which various institutions and systems are thought of.
With the late-capitalist subject pinballing between the extremes of viral economics, viral
media, viral political structures, it seems as though that embodied subject becomes lost
amid the narrativizing powers of the viral itself.

The Materialist Turn
In opposition to this concept of “virality,” indebted as it is to the linguistic turn in
critical theory, I am interested in the way that contemporary critical philosophers have
attempted to grapple with the concept of the material, and how these theorizations of the
material’s existence and action can be accounted for in the virus. Rather than reduce the
virus to an undifferentiated adaptable metonym, material thinking perhaps offers a
stronger avenue to consider its presence.
The vanguard of this emphasis on the importance of objects as material within a
universe of embodiments in perpetual becoming are Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour.
Latour’s work in the history and philosophy of science continually underscores the ways
in which social relations characterize certain statements about epistemology and
ontology. His most common image is that of the black box, a shorthand for any concept
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whose inner workings are too complicated to explain with brevity. Instead of explaining
the laborious processes that go into the construction of such black boxes (an example
Latour uses is the double-helix structure of DNA, which was agonized over by
generations of scientists, and is now accepted as uncontroversial fact), we make use of
such short-hand in order to provide reliable output about elements of science (see Science
in Action 1-7). Latour is not interested in denying the veracity of such black boxes;
instead, he is interested in, as he puts it, opening them up, looking inside and seeing how
larger social discourses and ideologies are involved in the consensus-building of
scientific fact. His work in The Pasteurization of France (1984) examines this interest in
how such conceptual schema are developed in reference to infection and immunity.
Latour seeks to challenge the narrative of the “discovery” of bacteriology and the
canonization of Louis Pasteur as the singular genius who shifted the paradigm of
nineteenth-century scientific thought. Rather, Latour focuses on the specifically social
engines that not only power scientific discovery, but allow them to become understood as
indisputable fact. “We would like science to be free of war and politics,” he writes, but
such segregation of discourse is a fantasy: “what is it that watches over health? Medicine.
And what does medicine itself depend on? The sciences. And what are the sciences in
turn made up of? Money” (10-11). The real story of bacteriology, for Latour, is not a
linear narrative of scientists in the dark fumbling toward some kind of truth, but rather
how social forces and actors are mobilized toward such seemingly uncontroversial
positions. And what is implicit in Latour’s analysis is how narrative is used in shaping
such societal reorganizations: “[n]o one, toward the end of the [nineteenth] century, could
do without contagion in connecting men, plants, and animals” (37). What was so
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effective about Pasteur and his acolytes in triumphing over their scientific rivals was that
the bacteriological explanation offered a compelling narrative about the way society is
organized and operates. The presence of microbes as the causative agent behind
disease—as opposed to the more nebulous and vague etiology of the hygienists, whereby
“[i]llness … can be caused by almost anything. … Everything must be considered”
(20)—offered a vision of society with a clear causal chain. It also suggested, per Latour’s
reading, the possibility of new kinds of social interaction. The explanation of microbial
agency behind disease implicitly promised that, were such meddling organisms halted in
their action, a person would be granted unfettered access to certain relations: “[a]fter the
Pasteurians have invaded surgery, only then will the surgeon be alone with his patient.
After we have found a method of pasteurizing beer, then the brewer will be able to have
nothing but economic relations with his customers” (39). Bacteriology’s reshaping of
science and the wider society is, in part, a means of reorganizing the way that social
relations are narrated, and what kind of interactions are made visible by such
interventions. Latour’s work in thinking through these ideas is vital in demonstrating the
discursive interlinkages of science and culture, the ways that a good story affects aspects
of health, embodiment, and identity.
Haraway, like Latour, is interested in the social strategies of discourse that are
instrumental in shaping the facticity of science, and uses the concepts of disease and
immunity in order to explore these terms. Where Latour focuses much of his attention on
the beginnings of microbiological thinking in the nineteenth century, however, Haraway
is more interested in the rise of post-Second World War biomedical discourse in the
United States. “‘Science says’ is represented as a univocal language,” Haraway writes,
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but an analysis of the discourse of science reveals “a barely contained and inharmonious
heterogeneity” (Simians 204). Haraway’s critique of science is also fueled by an interest
in opening up the black box, in demonstrating the ways in which science is influenced by
other realms of knowledge production. Usefully, while Latour looks at infection,
Haraway’s focus centers on the concept of immunity. Reading immunity as “both an
iconic myth object in high-technology culture and a subject of research and clinical
practice of the first importance” (205), Haraway identifies the way this configuration
operates as both a transhistorical notion of protection and a deeply historicized scientific
object that is continually refined and redeployed. The purpose of such examinations of
science is to critique the notion of a “perspectiveless perspective” (Alaimo, Exposed 7),
the idea that scientific discourse is somehow uninflected by larger ideological formations.
Stating some form of objective truth is not what Haraway is interested in; indeed, such an
action would simply replicate the ideologically charged belief in a neutral and nonsubjective scientific truth. Instead, such thinking has shaped responses to ideas such as
health and disease in discernibly political ways. Instead, Haraway’s research is motivated
by a desire to “turn the discourse suggested by [immunologists] into an
oppositional/alternative/liberatory approach” (Simians 220), a way of using these
scientific discourses as ways of articulating subjectivities and collectivities ignored or
effaced by dominant scientific discourse. While Latour is interested in tracing the
historical structuring of science, Haraway sees a utility in reworking these configurations
toward a radically liberatory politics.
What separates Latour and Haraway from being exemplars of the
poststructuralist turn that suggests the predominance and inescapability of language is
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that, for the two of them, the materiality of societies, and indeed, of the microbes that are
narrated by those societies, are very real entities. In her essay “Situated Knowledges,” for
instance, Haraway argues for the “granting the status of agent/actor to the ‘objects’ of the
world. Actors come in many and wonderful forms” (Simians 198). Haraway thus rejects a
subject/object divide in favour of a vision of actors engaged in a series of enmeshed and
material engagements. Likewise, Latour’s “actor network theory”22 emphasizes the role
of relationality as opposed to any concrete sense of identity: “an actor-network is what is
made to act by a large star-shaped web of mediators flowing in and out of it. It is made to
exist by its many ties: attachments are first, actors are second” (Reassembling the Social
217). In such a configuration, metaphysical distinctions between objects and subjects are
of little importance; what matters, for Latour, is how such concatenations of materials
form into extant and functioning systems, and how said systems become interwoven with
others. Where Latour aptly de-emphasizes the focus on metaphysical categorizations in
favour of thinking through extant materiality and the way such relationships create
functioning systems, Haraway makes such a project a cultural and political one: it is
through this materialist understanding of identity that politics are formed and can be
reshaped.
The work of Haraway and Latour has been fundamental in informing the thought
of subjectivity beyond the narrow limitations of the human. Of all such “posthuman”
theory, Cary Wolfe’s is likely the most powerfully realized in terms of its attempts
engage with the conceptual work that goes into such a philosophy. Cultivating an archive

A term he did not invent, and one he wryly laments as being “so awkward, so confusing, so meaningless
that it deserves to be kept” (Reassembling the Social 9).
22
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from the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida, the second-order systems theory of Niklas
Luhmann,23 and the work of biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Valera, Wolfe
develops a rigorous conceptualization of posthumanism that is predicated upon the
rethinking of how forms of embodiment are central to the concept of philosophy and
language. Arguing that posthumanism
comes both before and after humanism: before in the sense that it names the
embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just its biological but
also its technological world, the prosthetic coevolution of the human animal with
the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms …. But it comes after in
the sense that posthumanism names a historical moment in which the decentering
of the human by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic
networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points
toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms … (xv-xvi)
For Wolfe, posthumanism24 is a methodological approach that brackets the concept of
humanism and, drawing on affinities of systems theory and poststructuralism to trouble
the binary operations that hypostasize humanist philosophy, is the best way of inculcating
a richer and more just approach to thinking through the deployment of the “human” and
the “nonhuman” in literary and philosophical models. Wolfe’s thorough investigation of
the autopoietic nature of complex systems and how they work to efface the

Luhmann’s systems-theory is differentiated from “first-order” systems theory popularized in the post-war
period by thinkers like Norbert Weiner, John von Neumann, Gregory Bateson, and others. First-order
systems theory, also known as cybernetics, is predicated upon the role informatic patterns play in shaping
systems. As defined by Bruce Clarke and Mark Hansen, cybernetics was largely uninterested in the
materiality of objects studied, but rather focused on the immaterial element of informational patterns. Thus,
this early form of systems theory “marks a shift away from the building blocks of phenomena … to the
form of behaviors, what things do and how they are observed” (3). By way of contrast, second-order
systems theory offers a “new level of attention to the media of its forms, or, more concretely, to the
environments and the embodiments of systems” (5). As Wolfe astutely notes, while systems theory has
received a chilly reception in America for its perceived “social Darwinism” (3), it is in fact analogically
complemenatary to the deconstructive project of Derrida—systems theory “does not occlude … but rather
begins with difference” (14).
24
Wolfe clearly prefers “posthumanism” to “posthuman” (120). The former term emphasizes not the end of
an era of a particular instatiation of human embodiment, but the ideological tools and concepts that are used
to render that image smooth and naturalized.
23
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“system/environment” border in favour of a continually recursive and self-(re)producing
network lays out a compelling picture of how bodies and environments interact and
construct one another, and how this image of embodiments will allow for a more nuanced
thinking of this ambivalent construction.
Yet where I want to push Wolfe’s theorization a bit further comes when he thinks
about the so-called “viral logic” that characterizes the thinking of Derrida and Luhmann
(xviii). In thinking through this second-order systems theory, Wolfe explicitly refers to
these thinkers as exploring a method that is “in fact ‘viral,’ in the specific sense of a
mutational logic of the trace structure of any notational form, any semiotic system, that
exceeds and encompasses the boundary not just between human and animal but also
between the living or organic and the mechanical or technical” (xviii). Wolfe deploys the
term viral in a slippery fashion, as he metonymically defines such thinking as
“mutational, viral, or parasitic,” and later explicitly notes the metaphorization when he
refers to “this new logic [that] itself virally infects (or deconstructs, if you like)” (xxi).
For Wolfe, the concept of the viral is a handy metaphor that vividly illustrates a system of
philosophical thought, a synonym for the Derrida’s philosophical project (and one that
Derrida himself endorses). But in thinking through the concept of embodiment and
materiality, I don’t want to leave the virus only in the realm of the metaphorical, the
vehicle that enables the rethinking of the human being. I wish to expand on Wolfe’s
explicitly animal studies project to engage with how literature thinks about viruses. It is
my contention that viruses possess a particular materiality that literary thinkers attempt to
explore. More than just being a metaphor to think through the slipperiness or malleability
of concepts, viruses are an extant factor in life, and their material embodiment within
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speculative fiction occasions authors to think through a dialectics of embodiment.
Understanding identities and ecologies is not accomplished through the use of the
metaphor of virality, but its particular formal and representational characteristics within
the literary universe.
“Apparently humanism is alive and well, despite reports of its demise,” Wolfe
wryly notes in the introduction to What is Posthumanism? I take him at his word, and
seek to think about how discourses of humanism and posthumanism become entangled in
the literature of viral outbreak, which so potently dramatizes these collisions of
competing visions. Too often posthumanism is utilized as a shorthand for a kind of
utopian escape from the narrow ideological strictures of humanism. Yet, as I explore
throughout these chapters, visions of viral outbreak, immune bodies, and possibilities for
postapocalyptic, post-infectious bodies and collectivities are subject to similarly
reactionary or exclusive limitations. In Chapter Two, for instance, I examine how
William S. Burroughs’s extremely post-human idea of embodiment and subjectivity is
ultimately predicated on a misogynist vision of performative masculinity. This is not to
deride posthumanism as a useless field of inquiry, but to suggest that even ways of
radically rethinking identity, embodiment, and collectivity are not freed from ideological
constraints. We may never have been human, but the continued purchase that such a
signifier (empty though it may be) has in speculative fiction suggests grappling with this
idea instead of simply consigning it to the wastebasket of history.
The recent academic interest in “new materialism” has continued to develop the
work of Haraway and Latour in fascinating ways, drawing attention to the ways
materialism is a highly politicized concept and how a need to understand the lability of
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the material shapes these narratives. New materialist thinkers—particularly Jane Bennett,
Mel Chen, Stacy Alaimo, and Heather Houser, as well as Haraway in her more recent
work—are engaged by the means by which subject/object dualisms collapse in processes
of becoming. This materialist turn emphasizes the entanglements of subjects and objects
and the epistemological work that comes from thinking outside of these hierarchical
binaries. Instead of fetishizing’s the object’s unknowability, new materialist thinkers
inflect the assemblages that develop from these productive connections. In doing so, new
materialist thinkers are able to push for an ethical approach emphasizing feminist,
posthumanist, ecocritical, and other radical politics that appear in the dissolution of these
binary oppositions.
Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010) offers one of the clearest examples of this
approach. Drawing on a diverse archive of thinkers, from Lucretius and Spinoza to
Thoreau and Deleuze, Bennett rejects the “onto-theological” binaries that separate human
beings from nonhuman figures, favouring instead a Latourian approach that highlights all
matter as “actants” that offer possibilities of entangling with one another and provoking a
rethinking of causality and agency. Challenging the model of action that privileges “a
doer (an agent) behind a deed” and instead offering the concept of “a doing and an
effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage” (28), Bennett provides a clear meditation
on how to think through action, relationality, and existence in a world teeming with vital
sources of potential action. In Animacies (2012), meanwhile, Mel Chen suggests the term
“animacy,” or the degree of an object’s vitality, to think through the relations of
materiality that do not conform to reductive binary oppositions (2). The concept of
animacy allows Chen to examine not only the ways that such dualisms are troubled, but
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also diagnose ways in which “insults that refer to humans as abjected matter or as less
than human … cannily assert human status as a requisite” (13). For Chen, animacy is a
method of thinking through how hierarchies of subjectivities are organized, and also how
a more capacious engagement with how we think about levels and interactions of
animacy can develop new political and social bonds. Haraway’s most recent output,
Staying with the Trouble (2016), argues that the cataclysm of climate change demands
neither a retreat into “awful edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures,” but rather
“making oddkin,” developing networks and lines of connection where before those
possibilities seemed unthinkable. As Haraway forcefully puts it, “[w]e become-with each
other or not at all” (4). The ethical response to disaster is to become ingenious, to think in
ways which anthropocentric ideologies have disallowed or negated. Haraway’s
boundlessly ranging view of the possibilities of sympoiesis—a natural outgrowth of
symbiosis and opposed to the more myopic view of “autopoiesis”—suggest a method of
contextual expansion to embrace within its ever-shifting borders the inhabitants of a
context.25 Be it a familiar “companion species” of animal, inanimate objects, or bacteria,
Haraway sees the possibilities of sympoiesis as endless self-creation. Using Lynn
Margulis’s conception of symbiosis as a philosophical model,26 Haraway seeks to

Virologist Marilyn Roossinck notes that, in spite of the positive connotation of the word “symbiosis,” in
a scientific context “symbiosis actually encompasses several different relationships, including antagonism,
commensalism, and mutualism” (99-100). Roossinck, who wishes to push back against the image of viruses
as solely dangerous and threatening microbes, explores throughout her article how these various
relationships have had significant benefits to life on earth (108).
26
Margulis is a notable bacteriologist whose work challenges the self/nonself model so often deployed in
scientific discourse. In Dazzle Gradually, a collaborative work with her son, Dorion Sagan, the two put
forth the idea of a “microbial consciousness,” an awareness of the necessity of microbes in organizing and
maintaining life (37). They posit that, “[w]ithout microbes, life’s essential processes would quickly grind to
a halt” (31), and attempt to translate this biological understanding of microbial necessity into philosophical
and cultural models of self and society. “Scrutinizing life at the microscopic level,” they write, “is like
25
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highlight the interpenetration of micro-organisms with subjective selves. In a literally
ecstatic utopian vision, Haraway writes of how “[c]ritters interpenetrate one another, loop
around and through one another, eat each other, get indigestion, and partially digest and
partially assimilate one another, and thereby establish sympoietic arrangements that are
otherwise known as cells, organisms, and ecological assemblages” (58). In Staying with
the Trouble, Haraway develops the materialist approaches of Bennett and Chen into an
heuristic for building these new connectivities.
Stacy Alaimo’s ecofeminist work, which she encapsulates in the memorable
phrase of “trans-corporeality,” perhaps most clearly explores the ideas of enmeshment
with different kinds of materiality, and importantly thinks about how these ideas relate to
narrative and art. Describing the trans-corporeal as the recognition that “the human is
always intermeshed with the more-than-human world,” Alaimo “underlines the extent to
which the substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from ‘the environment’”
(Bodily Natures 2). This kind of thinking—influenced by major ecofeminist critics such
as Haraway, Karen Barad, and Evelyn Fox Keller—explores a boundary-breaking
philosophy whereby understanding the radical openness to the shifting conceptual
structures of bodily composition and ecological organization mutually organize and
structure each other. By examining these myriad contaminations in philosophical,
literary, and legal history, Alaimo pushes for an epistemological reconfiguration of life

moving ever closer to a pointillist painting by Georges Seurat: the seemingly solid figures of humans, dogs,
and trees, on close inspection, turn out to be made up of innumerable tiny dots and dashes, each with its
own living attributes of color, density, and form” (46). Such a conception of the individual, microcosmic
elements being required to understanding the grander forms and processes of a society is a clear influence
on Haraway’s philosophy.
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and social interaction,27 whereby “environmentalism, human health, and social justice
cannot be severed” (22). For Alaimo, we are all “toxic bodies” (22), infected and affected
by a flow of materiality beyond our control or knowledge. Rather than retreating into a
reactionary false sense of security by erecting contentious (and fictional) barriers, we
must think about and embrace our position as profoundly toxic.
Heather Houser, in her book Ecosickness in Contemporary U.S. Fiction (2014),28
builds on Alaimo’s trans-corporeal approach: Houser’s project arrives out of a rejection
of a clear, linear narrative—of which Wald’s outbreak storyline is paradigmatic—asking
instead “what happens when artists abandon quests for etiology as the driving force of
their narratives” in favour of more atmospheric depictions of “human bodies enmeshed in
their environments” (2). Houser is interested in the way that “lines of connection” are
formed between environments and bodies that are mapped through the literary
investigation of illness. In this ingenious conception, bodies become “stages” to enact
dramas of encounter that link them to wider environmental concerns (10). Houser draws
on the affective work of thinkers like Brian Massumi, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Silvan
Thompkins, and Charles Altieri to suggest that bodies and landscapes undergo a
continual series of reshapings. Literature, in its detailed attention to characters’ emotions

Or, to utilize the terminology of Barad that Alaimo employs throughout her study, “intra-action,” which,
in Barad’s words, “signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual
‘interaction,’ which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the
notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through their
intra-action” (33). Barad characterizes her approach as one of “agential realism,” which has much in
common with Latour’s philosophy.
28
Houser distinguishes her notion of “sickness” from ideas of “disease” and “illness”: whereas the former
concept implies a specific kind of material agent (a microbial figure) that can be read as the causal agent of
an impairment, “illness” refers to the self-reflective concept of the absence of health that a patient feels.
Houser’s utilization of “sickness” as opposed to “illness” because it “emphasize[s] the relational dimension
of dysfunction to a contemporary narrative” (11).
27
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and the way that objects and situations are filled with symbolic significance, becomes a
privileged space for thinking through the connections of bodies to spaces. Houser’s mode
of thinking through the affective ways in which (sick) bodies and environments operate
in a continual process of construction and engagement offers literary studies far greater
possibilities of exploration and analysis.
Where I disagree with both Houser and Alaimo, as well as Haraway, is in their
implicit or explicit claim that such a posthuman and environmental epistemology
necessarily promotes a radical ethics. Alaimo writes that “[a] posthuman environmental
ethics denies the human the sense of separation from the interconnected, mutually
constitutive actions of material reality” (Bodily Natures 157). Likewise, Houser explains
that, in the “coconstitutive worlds” of the human and the “more-than-human” that such
narratives emphasize “produce ethical and political adjustments bearing on the fate of
bodily and planetary vitality” (3, 15). My examination of microbial infections and how
they are rendered through American speculative fiction to produce specific embodiments
and environments leads me to a more ambivalent conclusion: while this ecological
awareness is certainly possible, it can also reinforce chauvinistic positions privileging the
access to health and land of certain subjects over others (this will be the central focus of
this project’s first chapter). In examining the ways that immunity becomes a narrative
(and narratological) unit of such writing, many of these stories lack such clear ethical
imperatives. It is not that writers like Jack London or William S. Burroughs conform to
strict dualistic readings of nature/humanity in their work; rather, they embody some of
the most vivid literary engagement with thinking about material embodiment and transcorporeality. This engagement, however, allows them the space to further entrench their
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own ideological thinking on race and gender.29 In other words, while trans-corporeality
and ecosickness offer precise analyses on how engagements with the “natural world”
formulate a powerful literary and epistemological re-engagement with notions of material
embodiment, these literary experiments are not innately radical or liberatory. I believe
that thinking through how these conservative or reactionary impulses arise alongside such
deformations and deconstructions of human materialities and subjectivities helps us to
better understand about the deployment of health, embodiment, and ecology in literature
as an ideologically inflected space.
Perhaps what most clearly articulates this project’s divergence from new
materialist and ecofeminist thinking develops from an emphasis on immunity.30 In my
own examination of American literature and its engagements with bodies and
environments rendered through the lens of viral infection, I find that immunity is the
concept that most stands out. The narrative voices I consider in each chapter do not
emanate from those who are themselves sick, but rather from subjects who are viewing

Houser’s ethical position is influenced by her decision to focus on post-1970 American fiction, selecting
literature possessed of a greater environmental consciousness. As Houser notes, the “advanced conditions”
and greater awareness of the post-Second World War technoscience that “draws together environmentalist
and biomedical discourses” is what “distinguish[es] post-1970 ecosickness fiction from its antecedents” (5,
9). Likewise, as Houser is not specifically focused on microbial infections, but a broader concept of
sickness (from the exploration of the neurological condition of Capgras syndrome in Richard Powers’s The
Echo Maker to the variety of physical and mental illnesses that affect the characters in David Foster
Wallace’s Infinite Jest), this time frame makes sense. My more expansive timeframe in this project is due
in large part to the popularization of the germ theory of disease at the dawn of the twentieth century and its
impact on literature and culture (see especially Tomes 57-62).
30
Houser, for instance, is uninterested in immunity: whether people are directly suffering from a sickness,
or a healthy person bearing witness to illness (as in her first chapter, which examines two AIDS
narratives—one from poet David Wojnarowicz, ill with the disease, and the other from Jan Zita Grover, a
nurse who does not have HIV but worked in a hospital with HIV/AIDS patients), everyone is implicated in
the paradigm of ecosickness. Meanwhile, Haraway’s vision of sympoiesis promotes visions of an animality
where “[t]o be animal is to become-with bacteria (and, no doubt, viruses and many other sorts of critters; a
basic aspect of sympoiesis is its expandable set of players” (65). Yet for all of this intoxicating vision of
how to become-with the microbe (or, at least, bacteria; viruses remain more of a hypothetical for Haraway
[see 62]), it is unclear how one could become-with viral entities.
29
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the effects that diseases have on communities and landscapes. The immunity of the
speaker is the constant among these figures.31 Immunity is a vital concept in thinking
through the ways that ecosickness can operate, and how in literature it plays out: if a
person (or character) is unable to be infected (if not affected) by the diseases that connect
bodies to landscapes, then how does this in turn shift the understanding of ecology and
embodiment? How are these interrelated concepts yoked together through the gaze of a
“healthy” narrator? The result is a far more ambiguous rendering of identity and
materiality than the ethical imperatives of Haraway, Wolfe, Houser, and Alaimo would
imply. In order to think through immunity’s prevalence in contemporary understandings
of the body, however, it is first necessary to explore in greater detail how the discourse of
immunity acts as an expression of political power.

Biopolitics: The Immunization of Life Itself
Philosopher Georges Canguilhem was quite correct when he perceived that
“[p]olitical philosophy seems to dominate biological theory” (171). In the last three
decades, biopolitics has come to serve as one of the most popular concepts—or, less
charitably, buzzwords—of contemporary theory and philosophy. Derived from Michel
Foucault’s—a student of Canguilhem’s—lecture series “Society Must Be Defended” and
the final chapter of the first volume of his The History of Sexuality,32 biopolitics (and its
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One could raise the objection that this is not the case for William S. Burroughs, whose insistence on the
virality of language would seem to implicate any speaker as a particularly profligate infector. While
Burroughs’s elastic troping of viruses to encompass everything from addiction to language would certainly
suggest that his narrative voices (who often don’t possess enough bandwidth to be considered “characters”)
are sick, the point of Chapter Two is to demonstrate the ways Burroughs attempts to recode the viral
aspects of literature and culture toward an immunizing discourse.
32
It should be noted, however, that Foucault did not invent the term “biopolitics.” In Roberto Esposito’s
exhaustive study of biopolitical thinking in philosophy, he traces the term to Swedish thinker Rudolph
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etymological twin and shadow, “biopower”) is the “politicization of biology” (Campbell
vii), the opening of the concept of “life itself” into the arena of political power and
control. Foucault charts biopolitics as emerging out of the shift away from the absolute
monarchy of the sovereign and toward the modern liberal-democratic nation-state. For
Foucault, the sovereign power over life and death gives way to a more precise and subtle
continuum of control. In Foucault’s famous formulation, sovereign power “took life and
let live. And now we have the emergence of a [bio]power that I would call the power of
regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die” (“Society”
247). With an eye to viewing “population” as a vital entity which needed to be cultivated
and protected, the operations of power became subtler and more minute. This movement
develops from the epistemic shift away from seeing individuals as subjects of a specific
sovereign to a more encompassing view of “life in general” (History 142). This can be
considered not just a change in the way power works over life, but an expansion thereof:
as Foucault notes, the power of execution wielded by the sovereign, “has tended to be no
longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite,
reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on
generating forces” (136). This catalogue of enumerated powers belonging to a
biopolitical regime takes the health of an entire population of a nation-state,33 a series of

Kjellen, who made use of it in a 1916 volume entitled The State as Form of Life (Bios 16). Likewise, he
notes that Foucault debuts the term “biopolitics” in a 1974 lecture in Rio, where Foucault states “for
capitalist society it is the biopolitical that is important before everything else; the biological, the somatic,
the corporeal. The body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy” (qtd. in Bios 27). While
Esposito dismisses these sentences, saying that this initial articulation “doesn’t have much importance”
(27), I think that Foucault’s clear centering of the body as the chief concern of such a regime of power is
worthwhile to keep in mind under increasingly complex exposition on what “biopolitics” entails.
33
Which can also be considered as the formulation of race and racism, as Foucault examines in his lectures.
This idea of how the nation’s population is considered a race leads to Foucault to note that “[w]ars are no
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strategies utilized to maintain the well-being of life as an abstracted mass and norm.
Biopolitics thus supplants the dualistic power of sovereignty, introducing ever more
supple mechanisms of control meant to encourage the growth of life of the acceptable
life-form while making sure to destroy the threatening figure.
Foucault’s early analyses of biopolitics remain fruitfully and frustratingly
abridged; his subsequent lecture series, Security, Territory, and Population, begins with
some illuminating remarks on biopolitics, but he quickly shifts to thinking about the role
of population and governmentality, and the next lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics,
despite its promising title, largely revolves around a historical working-through of
neoliberalism.34 While Foucault’s research interests moved elsewhere, his formulations
on biopolitics sparked a massive amount of interest from generations of scholars.
Thinkers like Giorgio Agamben (whom I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Two), Paolo
Virno, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri provide illuminating exegeses on
Foucault’s premises. However, the thinker who deals most clearly with Foucault’s
implicit question of why “biopolitics continually threaten[s] to be reversed into
thanatopolitics” is Roberto Esposito (Bios 39). In his book Bios (2004), Esposito

longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence
of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life
necessity; massacres have become vital” (History 137). The seeming paradox of a power apparatus
dedicated to the maintenance and flourishing of life that has also produced the fact that “wars were never as
bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century” (136) can be logically satisfied only through this
idea of state racism and the idea of acceptable life. The examination of how totalitarian regimes of power
are predicated upon biopower will be developed in far greater detail by Agamben, Esposito, Heller,
Campbell, Hardt and Negri, and Lifton.
34
Christopher Breu contends that, in spite of this seeming divergence from the title topic, The Birth of
Biopolitics does intriguingly suggest that the privatization of public welfare institutions is the high-water
mark of biopolitics: capitalization upon the body is the logical endpoint for this power relationship (15).
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productively builds on Foucault’s biopolitical genealogy,35 and notes a key conceptual
absence in his thinking. Esposito is animated by the way that Foucault attempts to
temporalize regimes of power, and the difficulties the French thinker has in separating
them. As Esposito notes, for Foucault “biopolitics is primarily that which is not
sovereignty. More than having its own source of light, biopolitics is illuminated by the
twilight of something that precedes it, by sovereignty’s advance into the shadows” (33).
Through a detailed reading of Foucault’s lectures in “Society Must Be Defended” and
Security, Territory, Population, Esposito traces Foucault’s hesitations in organizing his
thinking—sometimes biopolitics appears to be a clear temporal break with sovereign
power, while at other times “[Foucault] returns it to a logic of copresence” (40). There is
a constitutive element in Foucault’s diagnosis of power missing, in other words; “[i]t is as
if between the two models, sovereignty and biopolitics, there passes a relation at once
more secret and essential, one that is irreducible to both the category of analogy and to
that of contiguity” (40). That relation, as Esposito defines it, is the paradigm of
immuninization, a logic that helps the philosopher to link together Foucault’s thought on
biopower and sovereignty.
Immunity is the key to thinking through regimes of power and identity, as
Esposito suggests. And it is this complex history of immunity in systems of thought that
allows for a rich analysis of how bodies and politics intersect. Esposito’s primary

35

A term Foucault specifically invokes at the outset of his investigation into biopower. In the first lecture in
“Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault draws upon Nietzsche’s concept of “genealogy,” which Foucault
defines as an “antiscience” that brings together scientific knowledge with local understandings in order to
struggle against hegemonic discourse (8-10). This Nietzschean-Foucauldian concept of genealogy shares
much in common with the Benjaminian notion of dialectics that inform this project, the arranging of
constellations of concepts to bring together new and striking kinds of thought.
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intervention in thinking through immunity’s operation within the West is his assertion
that we are able to understand immunity and community as mutually constitutive: “the
category of immunity is inseparable from that of community: as its inverse mode, it
cannot be eliminated” (Immunitas 16). There is no way to single out either of these
diversions of the munus from one another—they each limn the other and, together,
provide the contours of contemporary social thought. “Immunity,” then, as Esposito
claims, “is the internal limit which cuts across community, folding it back on itself in a
form that is both constitutive and exclusionary: immunity constitutes or reconstitutes
community precisely by negating it” (9). Community can only operate with the principle
of immunity, and there is no way of thinking outside of the immunitary discourse that has
developed around the social and philosophical functions of the West.
But what are we to do with this knowledge? Esposito offers perhaps his most
intriguing analysis when he suggests that “[d]isease and antidote, poison and cure, potion
and counter-potion: the pharmakon is not a substance but rather a non-substance, a nonidentity, a non-essence” (Immunitas 127). What immunitary biopolitics is, then, Esposito
implies, is a perspective. The pharmakon offers a means of thinking through the
dialectical relationality of identity formation in the crucible of illness. Indeed, this would
align with Nikolas Rose’s crucial insight that “[b]iopower is more a perspective than a
concept: it brings into view a whole range of more or less rationalized attempts by
different authorities to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence”
(54).36
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Indeed, thinking outside of immunity is not what interests Esposito. Rather, his intention is to think of
how immunity, which is so often employed toward entropic and self-destruction ends, can instead be the
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Moreover, the dialectical character of immunity and community is not one that
exists along a meta-binary axis, but one that is likewise fraught and complicated. For
Esposito, the revelation of immunity as a perspectival figuration “overturns [the]
prevailing interpretation [of immunity]. From this perspective, nothing remains of the
incompatibility between self and other. The other is the form the self takes where inside
intersects with outside, the proper with the common, immunity with community”
(Immunitas 171). Neither term can ever triumph over the other: the possibility of a
perfectly self-consistent, protected sphere is as much of a fantasy as a borderless, flowing
community unimpeded by the blockages of immunity.37 Thus, if immunity remains a
foundational element of any kind of socius, the question should be how to think about the
ways that the discourse of immunity gets employed among a group. What matters, for
Esposito, is a perspectival shift: the interpretative work of immunity involves reaching
the point where the two interrelated terms of the munus hold each other together toward
productive, as opposed to destructive, ends.

basis for a positive biopolitics; “[t]he fact that the genetic heterogeneity of the fetus rather than its genetic
similarity is what encourages the mother’s immune system to accept it means that the immune system
cannot be reduced to the simple function of rejecting all things foreign” (Immunitas 18). This point is also
made, with less philosophical emphasis, by Biss, who notes that “[t]he cells that form the outer layer of the
placenta for a human fetus bind to each other using a gene that originated, long ago, from a virus” (31), and
by Morton, who states with characteristic ostentation that “you are here today reading this partly owing to a
virus in your mother’s DNA that may have prevented her from spontaneously aborting you” (35). Each
thinker zeroes on in a different element of this biological process, but the point is that viruses are not the
irrevocable other, but something far uncannier.
37
As Esposito notes, “[i]t is logically impossible to extend a right to all without emptying it of meaning as
a right. If it were extended to everyone, it would no longer even be perceived as such. Not being proper to
anyone, it would no longer be a right but perhaps, at most, a fact” (Immunitas 24). Here Esposito is
referring specifically to law, the structure which binds together community. In other words, from the very
outset, community is riven with constitutive gaps. Rather than attempting to eliminate them, Esposito is
interesting in forcing a shift in perspective to consider how these gaps can operate within the community.
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Ironically, however, in this shift to the singularity of embodiment, Esposito ends
up abstracting the very concept he seeks to liberate from the province of the biopolitical.
In order to fully dismantle the autoimmune teleology that characterizes Nazism, Esposito
urges that “we shouldn’t limit ourselves to skirting Nazi semantics, or for that matter
confronting it from the outside,” but rather to “overtun them and to turn them inside out”
(Bios 157). Esposito thus engages in a project whereby the foundational elements of Nazi
biopolitics are reworked toward a positive valence. This biopolitics would see the shared
singularity of life in “a being that is both singular and communal, generic and specific,
and undifferentiated and different, not only devoid of spirit, but a flesh that doesn’t even
have a body” (167). Thus, from Immunitas, which envisions a potential way of rethinking
the logic of immunity from the perspective of embodiment, in Bios Esposito instead
articulates a reworking of bodies to end the immunitary logic that dictates the biopolitical
regime. Esposito’s approach, while comprehensive, feels disconnected from any kind of
lived reality, emphasizing an idealized flesh over the bodies that inhabit the biopolitical
world. Esposito is wary of the individual that underpins liberal-humanist philosophy,
seeing how the liberal state’s increasingly biopolitical purview immunizes an
increasingly small group of people from “precarity.” Janell Watson’s astute critique of
Esposito’s grappling with biopolitics makes clear the issues with this approach. For
Esposito, “the affirmative community is incompatible with the individual autonomous
subject” (Watson n. pag.). Yet the political problems with this articulation are evident:
“[p]aradoxically, while the negative community offers protection, the affirmative
community exposes everyone to risk” (n. pag.). As I explore through the speculative
literature on virus and immunity, this undifferentiated articulation is only fitfully
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possible. Concepts of immunity, sovereignty, and self-identificatory differentiation
predominate throughout the plagues that ravage these texts. Viruses offer a window into
thinking about the contours of material embodiment, and relations of subjectivities to
environments and communities, but the submergence of these categories of liberal
humanism are not so easily done away with.
To this end, Chrisotpher Breu’s work in Insistence of the Material has been key to
this study. Breu expertly links together the archives of biopolitics, new materialism, and
American fiction to “theorize and attend to the material in the era of biopolitics” while
also remaining aware of “language’s limits in doing so” (2). For Breu, literary fiction in
the second half of the twentieth century shifted toward considering the material well in
advance of the current academic scholarship on the topic (5-6). Breu thus grapples with a
central tension of this approach: how the material is composed through a linguistic
medium. Rather than examine only how the material is subordinated to a linguistic
representation, however, Breu is interested in how authors (including William S.
Burroughs, the subject of my second chapter) of post-Second World War American
fiction mobilize the medium of fiction toward exploring the depiction and management of
the body within a sociopolitical framework that takes the concept of “life itself” as its key
subject of interest.
Expanding on Breu’s work, I wish to suggest that, through American speculative
fiction dramatizing contagious outbreaks, we are able to pick up on key ideas of infection
and immunity, and the specific kinds of embodiments that these concepts take on in a
literary sphere. It is my contention—indebted to Breu’s—that fiction is fascinated with
exploring the biopolitical, and that viral literature does offer us a means of understanding
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these ideas. How does literature give (literal) shape to these conceptual frameworks?
Furthermore, what do such embodiments entail for the project of thinking about
aesthetics, (eco)politics, and social relations? I find Breu’s titular insistence upon the way
that literature engages with the biopolitical questions of materiality a persuasive one, and
wish to extend his critique beyond his own frame of “late-capitalist literature” of the postwar era (27) to encapsulate the age of the germ that stretches from the end of the
nineteenth century to the present day. While Breu is interested in the “postwar period of
biopolitics and biopolitical production as a core organizing principle of everyday life, in
which the body and subjectivity are immediate products of the process of economic
production (rather than adjuncts to it)” (26), I find that a similar analytical approach can
be extracted from thinking through the twentieth century’s long fascination with viral
outbreak, with the newly minted concept of the immune system of defense, and with the
dialectical processes that such nascent biological processes embody.
While Breu focuses on post-war literature in general, Sherryl Vint helpfully points
to science fiction as specifically a means of connecting biopolitics and posthumanism
within an aesthetic purview. Vint notes that science fiction and biopolitics are linked
together in their mutual focus on embodiments and technologies of power. “Under
biopolitics,” Vint explains, “life itself becomes the object of political governance, and
political governance becomes the practice of seeing the biological life of individuals and
species. Technoscience, sf speculation and biopolitical practice converge in this context”
(161). Vint argues convincingly that, as “life itself” and the management thereof becomes
more complex, distributed, and wrapped up in the exercise of power, the more “[t]he
tools of sf are crucial for helping us understand and—ideally—intervene in this reality”
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(165). It is in speculative fiction that we are able to most clearly apprehend means of
thinking about embodiments that expand or explode the concept of the “human,” while
also demonstrating how these concepts are delimited by wider political and ideological
projects that we can enfold within the concept of “biopolitics.”

A Note on Terminology
Throughout this introduction, as well as the wider project, I make use of the term
“speculative fiction” (hereafter shortened to “sf”) to refer to the texts I examine. This
term is met with some contention in the field of science fiction studies. “Speculative” has
often been seen as a way of making respectable the often marginalized genre of science
fiction. Notably, Margaret Atwood ignited a debate over these generic definitions when
she referred to her 2003 novel Oryx and Crake as “a speculative fiction, not a science
fiction proper,” citing her text’s lack of “intergalactic space travel … teleportation …
Martians,” and other such flashy signifiers of sf (qtd. in P.L. Thomas 2).38 In invoking
the term “speculative fiction,” I do not mean to enforce a boundary between speculative
and science fiction reproduced by Atwood, or segregate fantasy fiction and science
fiction (as does prominent sf critic Darko Suvin).39 I offer two justifications for this

As Thomas recounts, Atwood’s dismissal of sf prompted a reply from renowned sf and fantasy writer
Ursula K. Le Guin, who wrote that “[Atwood] doesn’t want the literary bigots to shove her into the literary
ghetto.” This response provoked a measured reply from Atwood, who accepted that her hardline distinction
between science fiction and speculative fiction may not hold up, and that “what Le Guin means by ‘science
fiction’ is what I mean by ‘speculative fiction,’ and what she means by ‘fantasy’ would include some of
what I mean by ‘science fiction.’ … When it comes to genres, the borders are increasingly undefined” (78). This episode makes clear, to me, that “speculative” is the most generous and encompassing term for
exploring these intersecting textual approaches.
39
In his Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (1979), Suvin describes fantasy as “anti-cognitive” escapism,
lacking the qualities of cognition and estrangement (discussed further below) that characterize “true” sf
(37).
38
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decision. The first is purely practical: not every text discussed in this project would fall
under the banner of “science fiction.” While Samuel Delany is best known for his genreredefining work in science fiction (from his early Babel-17 [1968] to the experimental
Dhalgren [1975] to later works such as Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand [1983]),
the two texts that I look at do not possess any of the traditional science-fictional settings
of alien or alternate worlds, or futuristic settings. Indeed, the first of his works I explore,
The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals, from his collection Escape from Nevèrÿon (1984), is
largely set in his pre-Atlantean world of Nevèrÿon, populated by barbarian warlords,
ominous sorcerers, dragons, and other common features of sword-and-sorcery fantasy.
Likewise, his novel The Mad Man (1994), while possessing several nonmimetic
characteristics, such as the fantastical monster that appears at the novel’s beginning (ix),
adheres to the setting, plot, and characters typical of literary realism. Thus, to
characterize this project as science-fictional would be to misapply this terminology, while
“speculative fiction” better encapsulates the strange visions of these authors. On a more
critical note, however, I think that “science fiction,” with its implicit refiguration of how
science can reformulate thinking of identity and ecology, to be somewhat constraining.
As noted above, Delany’s novella The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals moves between a
fictitious past and the present day in order to think analogically about the cultural
reception of plague outbreaks. In other words, it is not always necessary to look into the
future in order to situate ideas about the present; the past (especially as the religious and
unscientific fantasy envisioned by Delany) offers the same critical and dialectical tools
for thinking through these concepts just as well. I follow Jason Haslam who suggests that
the designation “sf” (or “SF,” as he writes it)
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can stand as an abbreviation for any number of generic or modal categories:
science fiction, speculative fiction, science fantasy, science fiction and/or fantasy,
scientific fictions …. I use ‘SF’ as a term because it can encompass so many of
the categories listed above, all of which identify different examples of non-realist
narrative: forms that do not rely for the creation of meaning primarily on a
‘purely’ mimetic relationship between material reality and narrative fiction. (2-3)
The most important method for “sf,” in the polysemy of its signifiers, is the possibility of
narratively breaking with a recognizable mimetic fidelity in order to better explore the
nuances of how material concepts are thought, and how they hold out the possibility for
change.

The Speculation of Fiction
With this terminological flexibility in mind, it is now incumbent to think about
what sf as a literary methodology is capable of accomplishing. As Paul Kincaid writes,
there is no “unique, common thread” capable of defining sf. Instead, we should take sf to
be comprised of a series of “family resemblances” as opposed to works constructed
around a singular expression of ideas (qtd. in Rieder 16). In other words, there is no
unifying content around science fiction; however, form is another matter. Wald argues
that the outbreak narrative is an exemplary example of a myth: “an explanatory story that
is not specifically authored, but emerges from a group as an expression of the origins and
terms of its collective identity” (9). The outbreak narrative, and its cultural iterations,
Wald suggests, “offer myths for the contemporary moment” (10). But the relationship
between myth and sf is perhaps not so easily situated, and in responding to Wald’s vision
of the “outbreak narrative,” I wish to consider how the narratological properties of
speculative fiction as a genre work against Wald’s claim. Darko Suvin, for example, in
his genre-defining study Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (1979), responds harshly to
this notion of myth, describing it as “diametrically opposed to the cognitive approach [of
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sf] since it conceives of human relations as fixed and supernaturally determined” (19).
Myth, for Suvin, “is oriented toward constants,” and is thus “a conservative force, a
guarantee of the status quo” (40, 48). For Suvin, fiction can offer different types of
responses to the totalization of myth, but it is sf that is most radically capable of
challenging it, since it “illuminate[s] such relations by creating a radically or significantly
different formal framework” (31). In his famous description of sf as the literature of
“cognitive estrangement,” Suvin argues that this genre challenges the everyday structure
and description of the world by presenting it in an unfamiliar and altered context (hence,
estrangement40), but also a cognitive element predicated upon a historically materialist
understanding of the world: “SF sees the norms of any age, including emphatically its
own, as unique, changeable, and therefore subject to a cognitive view” (19). Myth, for
Suvin, is a reactionary form of storytelling, a mode of adhering to a static view of the
world that upholds the organizing logics of a community. SF, by contrast, through its
cognitive estrangement, offers a way of alienating those familiar structures of being,
while still adhering to the principles and structures of a time period, rather than inventing
an entirely dissimilar universe. Still, Wald is certainly right in noting the “outbreak
narrative” as a kind of myth, one that is mobilized to erect and reinforce the borders
between communities, to protect a sense of identity and collectivity at the expense of
another. I wish to extend that observation by attending to the ways these authors and texts
envision embodiment, to suggest that a more complex and multifaceted series of

Suvin explains that this term develops from Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky’s “defamiliarization”
and from German avant-garde artist Bertolt Brecht’s notion of the “Verfremdungseffekt,” or
“estrangement-effect” (18).
40
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narratives can be told alongside (or in opposition to) the myth of outbreak and
containment. Indeed, I argue in my second chapter that the work of William S. Burroughs
is more than just a subsection of the outbreak literature of the 1950s in the wake of the
Cold War and the popularization of viruses—it is a means of imagining materiality in an
age of viruses. The effect of his kaleidoscopic trilogy is far more than a renegotiation of a
familiar story of infected and immune.
Carl Freedman responds to Suvin’s work in his Critical Theory and Science
Fiction (2000) by arguing that each of his titular terms is synonymous with the other (xv).
Critical theory—in the sense of a rigorously dialectical mode of apprehending the
world—is what science fiction does (and vice-versa). These methods of thinking through
sf involve apprehending the dialectical character of both, which Freedman, in a postHegelian, Marxist (read: materialist) vein, glosses as examining historical mutability,
material reproducibility, and utopian possibility (xvi, 32). Rejecting a static and
hegemonic myth, sf is radically involved in thinking through how bodies exist and are
understood in history, and how they can be both understood within contemporary
frameworks of knowledge, and radically disconnected from them. Following Suvin,
Freedman emphasizes the estranging effect of sf, while modifying Suvin’s reworking the
latter’s concept of “cognitive” into a more expansive “cognition effect,”41 whereby the
cognition “is not any epistemological judgment external to the text itself on the

China Miéville responds to both Suvin’s and Freedman’s contention that fantasy is excluded from the
privileged space of “sf” due to its lack of “cognitive” character or “cognition effect.” For Miéville, rather
than being an anti-cognitive genre, fantasy’s “unreality function,” its radical alterity, in fact offers a more
refined estranging effect (244). As Haslam elaborates, the real “novum” of sf literature “does not
necessarily rely on the extrapolative science of the text, but rather on the alacrity of the reader’s ability to
move into a space of hesitation, the willingness to accept unreality as reality and vice versa” (10).
41
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rationality or irrationality of the [the text’s] imaginings but rather … the attitude of the
text itself to the kind of estrangements being performed” (18).42 Freedman’s cognition
effect is less concerned with actualities than with the means by which a discursive
framework is constructed around a narrative event. Thus, Freedman’s more critical and
less dogmatic approach to sf categorization allows for more imaginative visions of
viruses and immunities to enter into his schema: while zombies and extraterrestrial viral
gangsters may be “ideally impossible” (Suvin 83), within the formal structure of the
narrative they are accepted as possible, enabling one to refocus the body as the locus of
thinking.
Indeed, as Vint suggests, the content of viral narratives, like “vampirism and
zombies … images of genetic mutation and viral contamination” among others (165),
serves as a means of accessing and exploring the biopolitical organization of
sociopolitical power in the West. In extending Vint’s analysis, I suggest that thinking
about the formal characteristics of viral sf is important to examining how the body and
the institutions into which it is enmeshed become theorized. If we consider sf as a
literature predicated around a dialectical engagement proposing estranging principles
meant to be held in tension with our lived existence, then we can add a further dimension
to Vint’s reading. Not only on the level of its thematic content, but at the level of form,
the narration of virus outbreaks in American prose fiction attempts to engage critically

Freedman provides as an example Isaac Asimov’s short story “The Dying Night” (1956), which is
premised upon Mercury’s rotation being matched precisely to its orbit around the sun, thus producing
places on the planet that are permanently enshrouded by night. While at the time Asimov composed the
story such an idea was scientifically plausible, future discoveries disproved this hypothesis (Freedman 18).
Freedman suggests that, under Suvin’s stricter criteria of “cognition,” Asimov’s story would be disqualified
from the category of sf, while Freedman’s more expansive “cognition effect” would allow the story to
maintain its place as sf since within the fictional universe, for it is still “cognitively valid” (18).
42
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with the structural ideologies and effects of biopolitics. Sf and biopolitics are tightly
linked to one another, and a formal analysis of how literature attempts to narrate the
material changes and contingencies of bodies, communities, and environments reveals to
us the contours of such power operations.
This apprehension returns us to an analysis of the specifically literary and
narrative character of virus fictions, a way of thinking through the particularity of literary
iteration, whereby the content and the form of an aesthetic work must be comprehended
together, as a unity in opposition to a discontinuous series of discrete parts. What I wish
to suggest is that literary criticism attending to the narrative character of the body (both
as infected and protected) is particularly fruitful when applied to narratives about viruses
and immunities. These fictions all place at the center of their aesthetic concern bodies
undergoing extraordinary transformations, and in turn transforming the larger institutions
into which these bodies are imbricated. Attending to the narrative structure of sf novels,
to their dialectical bodies, allows us to think clearly about the biopolitical regime where
life itself has become the locus of political operations, and to think through how these
systems and ideas are predicated upon transitory ideology, logics of shifting domination,
and glimpses of potentially radical freedom. What sf literature does when its object is the
virus, then, is mobilize the images of infection and defense doubly: the virus is clearly
deployed metaphorically to illustrate questions of social ills that the authors see (the
question of immigration and American identity for London, or the idea of postmodern
global capitalism for Whitehead). Yet the virus cannot be understood simply as an
“objective correlative,” as T.S. Eliot defines it—“a set of objects, a situation, a chain of
events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external
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facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately
evoked” (145). What is interesting about narratives of viruses is that, beyond the
metaphor, these stories are indeed quite literally about viruses. The microbe is at once a
metaphor and a means of thinking through material embodiments and environments. This
double articulation of viruses and immunities is useful in thinking through its dialectical
character.

Narrating the Body
If narratology can be broadly defined as “the ensemble of theories of narratives,
narrative texts, images, spectacles, events; cultural artifacts that ‘tell a story’” (Bal 3),
then one would imagine the role of the body to be of central importance to such and
discipline. Yet, “[d]espite the excitement that the body has generated in literary and
cultural criticism,” writes Daniel Punday, “it has had almost no impact on narratology”
(2). Indeed, for all of narratology’s interest in the qualities of fabula (or elements), the
levels of narration that can exist and overlap within a story, and the forms that narrators
and narrations can take, the body is often presumed to be a relatively stable concept. The
major names of contemporary narratology—such as Mieke Bal and Seymour Chatman—
have, in Punday’s words, “a complete lack of interest in the body as a narratological
category” (3).43
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Of course, this is not to say that narratology has never taken on consideration of the body as an object of
study. Punday cites Deirdre Lynch and Mark Seltzer as two important critics who continually foreground
the body as a fundamental narratological element. Lynch, for instance, is important for stressing how our
understanding of character has a historical development to it that is shaped by the discursive construction of
the body, while Seltzer looks at the way American naturalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
focus on the narratives of individual bodies to illustrate issues of identity and economy during the
industrialization of the nation (8-9). Punday also draws on feminist narratologists such as Susan Lanser and
Robyn Warhol and their attention to the ways gender is involved in the construction of character, but
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Punday seeks, therefore, to turn narratological thinking toward how the body
shapes and determines what can be told within a story. His idea of “corporeal
narratology” focuses on “how the body contributes to our ways of speaking about and
analyzing narrative” (viii, ix). Punday, arguing that “narratology is perhaps the discipline
within literary theory that has most aggressively sought out transhistorical and
transcultural patterns and dynamics” (186), pushes instead for a rigorously historicized
concept of embodiment and how that image is folded into contemporary forms of
narrative art (chiefly, the novel). In Punday’s own words, narratology as a discipline
“depends upon modern conceptions of the body” (11). Working through how novels of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries use bodies to organize structural elements such as
plot, setting, and character, Punday offers a compelling reading of how the materiality of
the body is utilized to limn the structural features of narrative prose, and how we must
engage with these depictions of bodies in order to understand the horizons of what can be
narrated and by whom.
Of particular interest to me is how biopolitical Punday’s narratological work is.
While he never uses the term himself, his conception of the historical mutability of
embodiment certainly augurs a means of thinking about how “life itself” becomes the
process of not just political, but aesthetic apprehension, as well. Looking at how scientific
theories of “embryology” and dissection in the seventeenth century came to see the body
as a series of material elements as opposed to a cosmic paradigm, Punday concludes that
“[m]odern scientific study of the body, then, marks a fundamental transition in the way

suggests that “these feminist narratologists have remained interested in questions of ‘how’ rather than
‘what,’” not fully focusing on the construction of the body as a narrative unit (4-5).
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that the body is made meaningful, and especially implies that we must give up the
symbolic qualities attributed to the surface of the human form” (39). Echoing Foucault,
Punday notes that the regimes of power moved from an understanding of material
surfaces to material depths, and this corresponded in an alteration of the narration of such
frangible corpuses. Indeed, Punday’s archive is notably familiar, drawing on Foucault,
Haraway, and Judith Butler to underscore the re-orientation of the body within wider
cultural discourse. He points to Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” to demonstrate the
way in which new narratives about embodiment and cultural belonging occur—for
Haraway “[t]he cyborg is not merely a new ‘origin myth’ but rather an image of origins
as themselves constructed in the process of narration, a process that Haraway rightly
recognizes runs directly counter to all of our biological assumptions about physical
identity and human reproduction” (49). For Punday, the body and its narrations are
inextricably co-constituted (190), and thus we must think about how technologies of
biopower are mobilized toward thinking through the structural characteristics of prose
fiction.
Perhaps the most striking note of Punday’s book is his notion that “the unruly
body is not a natural thing … but rather a discursive object very much constructed to
make sense in light of the general body to which it is contrasted” (100). But who or
where do we gain access to this “general body,” which is just as ontologically unstable as
those unruly bodies that Punday explores?44 I wish to suggest that it is at the level of

Punday’s examples include Lucius Apuleuis’s The Golden Ass, Samuel Richardson’s distinction between
male and female bodies in Pamela, and Beloved’s temporally disconnected body in Toni Morrison’s
Beloved.
44
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narrative that such a body is supplied; in other words, that the voices of these texts offer
us a kind of narrative immunity. Punday’s implicitly biopolitical narratology can be
wedded to more recent explorations in that field, particularly those of Esposito and
Cohen, to suggest that the narrative operates as a kind of immune function within these
texts. The fabula of these texts—the events and the actors who perform them—are able to
be conveyed to us only through the paradigm of a voice unaffected by the crises of
transformation ongoing.45
One way we can detect this narrative immunity is to place Esposito and Punday
into conversation with one another. Challenging Foucault’s description of biopolitics as a
radical break with the logic of sovereignty, Esposito asserts that “sovereignty isn’t before
or after biopolitics, but cuts across the entire horizon, furnishing the most powerful
response to the modern problem of the self-preservation of life” (Bios 57). Central to this
figuration of sovereign biopolitics is Thomas Hobbes. Esposito reads Hobbes’s Leviathan
(1651) and its expostulation of sovereignty and civil society as an enactment of this
paradigm of immunity, extended from the legalistic and into an undifferentiated plane
where life and politics are intersected:
[i]f life is abandoned to its internal powers, to its natural dynamics, human life is
destined to self-destruct because it carries within itself something that ineluctably
places it in contradiction with itself. Accordingly, in order to save itself, life needs
to step out from itself and constitute a transcendental point from which it receives
orders and shelter. … Nor does this mean that the category of life in the modern
period replaces that of politics, with progressive depoliticization as its result. On
the contrary, once the centrality of life is established, it is precisely politics that is
awarded the responsibility for saving life, but—and here is the decisive point in
the structure of the immunity paradigm—it occurs through an antinomic dispositif
that proceeds via the activation of its contrary. In order to be saved, life has to
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This is not to suggest, of course, that all fiction about viruses must come from the narrative positioning of
an immune person. This is an idea I will return to in the Conclusion.
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give up something that is integral to itself … namely, the acquisitive desire for
everything that places itself in the path of a deadly reprisal. (58-59)
For Esposito, Hobbes inaugurates biopolitical thinking, and the Leviathan (particularly
the famous frontspiece of the first edition of the treatise) conceptualizes this immunitary
logic. Hobbes’s Leviathan is a means of immunizing the body politic by way of selfdefense. As Cohen remarks, Hobbes and other thinkers like him see “modern
embodiment as an essentially defensive posture through which the fortress body fends off
the marauding tendencies of hostile enemies” (67). The immune body is the one that
remains sovereign, and the one that must serve as the locus of biopolitical management.
In an analogical key, Punday too takes Hobbes as representative of a paradigm shift in
institutional epistemology. For Punday, however, the Leviathan is a way of rethinking the
narrations of embodiment. Hobbes’s “body politic,” Punday contends, “describes … an
imaginary position from which the whole of the nation can be narrated” (160). Here is
precisely where we can see the operations of narrative and biopolitics fold in on each
other: the body politic, the anthromorphized conception of the nation as materially
encased and instantiated, offers a way of thinking about how the general body both
regulates its own health through an immunity principle of self-defense, and, more
importantly, narrates this logic in the key of a defense of health against the
encroachments of debilitating illness. Thus, as Punday correctly notes, “Leviathan … is
precisely the project of escaping the limitations of the body by turning to the
disembodiment of reading. But this disembodiment in turn is possible only through the
metaphor of another body that acts out the events that no one individual can see—the
body politic” (162). In other words, the means of narrating a body is predicated around a

59

relationship with a sovereign political structure, one that operates on the principle of
immunity.
Thus, in combining the biopolitical insights of Esposito and Cohen with Punday’s
“corporeal narratology,” we can gain a valuable perspective on how biopolitics possesses
an operant function within the realm of aesthetics too. The level of narrative, with this
understanding of the modern body, works as the “general body,” immune from the
infectious spread occurring at the level of action within the text and able to convey a
sense of normativity to the reader. The narrator manages the reader’s engagement with
the infection at the level of text, utilizing the unruly body as a means of exploring this
relationship of bodies to viruses. The narrative becomes another bastion for which the
province of biopolitics extends its managerial reach.
By opting to focus on a series of texts across a plethora of decades and literary
styles within the United States, I wish to show that this principle of narrative immunity is
not subject to any one specific kind of narratological discourse. Indeed, the naturalism of
Jack London appears to offer a mimetic illustration of viral outbreak, whereas William S.
Burroughs’s extreme literary experimentation presents something more akin to Brian
Richardson’s conception of “unnatural narrative,” an antimimetic poetics (xvii).46 The
flexibility of narrative immunity with respect to various styles and practices of
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Richardson takes care, in his book Unnatural Narrative (2015), to differentiate his conception of the
unnatural from the identically named theory proffered by Jan Alber. Richardson notes that “[f]or Alber, a
narrative is unnatural if it contains events that are physically or logically impossible” (13), echoing
Freedman’s critique of Suvin’s narrow conception of the cognitive. Indeed, Richardson suggests that most
speculative fiction is entirely “natural,” due to its mimetic and/or conventional aspects (10-11). For
instance, Richardson believes that fiction about impossible things (for instance, zombies) can be related in a
narrative felicitous to mimesis, which indeed is what Colson Whitehead’s Zone One—the subject of my
fourth chapter—does.
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storytelling suggests that the biopolitical concept of sovereign-immunity possesses an
artistic resilience: the immune figure can be represented and narrated across a variety of
potential frames. Rather, the encounter with the virus opens a space in each narrative—
irrespective of its mimetic or (un)natural character—to examine the mutability of the
virus and its sibling concept of immunity. The virus is incorporated and explicated within
the framework of various narrative approaches, but in each case it provokes the narrative
voice to foreground and interpretatively work through embodiment and the political
frameworks that organize and limit such thoughts. In this sense, it is necessary to
examine a specifically sf approach to formal analysis.
This project would seem to then be about the content, the thematic of the virus as
it is expressed through a variety of authors over the period of a century. And yet, I find
myself attracted to a mixture of genre study and narratological understanding of prose as
a means of engaging with how narratives about viruses are formulated. In thinking about
viruses and literature, one cannot turn away from the cultural and historical projects
going on around these concepts of microbial nature, human health, epidemiology, and
other related discourses. It is imperative to historicize the workings of the literary within
the wider cultural context—this is what Wald expertly performs in her discussion of the
“outbreak narrative.” Yet in her expansive study of how film, literature, social criticism,
scientific study, and memoir intersect, there is no differentiation between the aesthetic
and the sociological: all become variations on the theme of outbreak and containment. In
my emphasis on the literary, I wish to underline the ways in which literature apprehends
bodies in a biopolitical era, and how a formal (this is to say, dialectical) approach to
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reading the virus allows us to grasp a way of thinking about the political, cultural, and
aesthetic investments and ideologies that are mapped out across bodies in this approach.
In addition to the formal level, however, sf literature is certainly about how the
representation of content also offers a means of reading embodiment. I am taken by Jason
Haslam’s notion that sf is about “self-reflexive modelling” of identities, a mirror through
which these potential, speculative subjectivities can be cast (1). Haslam writes that “SF
… becomes a meta-tool for analysing the ways in which we can, if not transcend, then
transform ideologies of identity surrounding such concepts as gender and race” (12). In a
clever play on words, Haslam notes that “SF is best defined as ‘signs fiction’: but given
that the Latin word for mirror, speculum, shares a root with speculative, perhaps the most
accurate expression of SF falls between the two: ‘specular fictions’” (18). Haslam’s way
of presenting sf as an analytical tool for exploring how embodiments (and ideologies of
embodiment) are inscribed, reinforced, and/or deconstructed, offers an appealing method
of thinking about the viral as a reading practice. Once again, the viral’s doublearticulation of bodies, both for discussing larger social issues and also as more literally
apprehended discussions of the morphology of embodiment, thrust the body into the front
of this specular surface. Speculative fiction is a mirror. It envisions a way in which an
identity inhabits a space. And like a mirror, it bends and warps the shape of both the
identity and the space, reshaping its look to be something askew. Above all, what a
mirror does is provide a frame, a series of edges or boundary lines in which to consider
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the scope of these newly considered subjects and ecologies. The speculative mirror is not
boundless; it is literally bounded up.47

The Shape of the Project
In Chapter One, I look at Jack London’s short fictions about microbial outbreak
and the corresponding collapse of civilization. London’s work has often been read as a
paradigm of engaging with a concept of American masculine identity, particularly with
reference to his animal fictions. I wish to expand this view to take into account microbial
entities, which evidently fascinated London, even as a scientific language for viruses did
not yet exist. In examining two short texts—“The Unparalleled Invasion” (1910) and The
Scarlet Plague (1912)—I show how London conceives of a “microbial sublime,” a quasimystical vision of germ-like purity that redeems both an imperiled masculine identity and
the frontier mythology of the United States at the outset of the twentieth century. In
thinking about London’s less popular speculative fiction, I want to think about how his
naturalist rendering of the fantastical constructs a mythology of a “natural” masculinity at
a formal level. Through romanticized depictions of biological warfare and apocalyptic
destruction, London’s speculations create a redeemed American frontier worthy of
inhabitation by the virile, hetero-patriarchal white male so idealized throughout London’s
career.
While London explores a very literal manifestation of viral outbreak and the
narrative of immunity that is constructed around such an event, my subsequent chapters
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Thus, the role of gender, and especially the fact that the four chapters of this project are both written by
men and feature male characters or perspectives as narrators, is another important aspect to consider. This
is another avenue that I take up in the Conclusion.
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will look at how this narrative form accustoms itself to more figurative viral
engagements. Chapter Two moves ahead to consider the work of the poet laureate of the
virus, William S. Burroughs. Burroughs’s evident fascination with the concept of the
virus makes it his master-metaphor for all his fictions from Naked Lunch (1959) to The
Ticket That Exploded (1966). Burroughs, a consummate biopolitical thinker and writer, is
interested in the ways that the materiality of the flesh becomes subsumed by the
dominion of discourse and narration. In his novels, Burroughs literalizes this relationship
by having language become viral, invading and hijacking the vulnerable body.
Ultimately, Burroughs seeks a new way to narrate the flesh, one that avoids the parasitic
relationship that conventional stories offer. Through his famous techniques of literary
experimentation, the cut-up and fold-in methods, Burroughs’s novels seek an egress from
the mutually assured logic of a virus/immunity binary, and the possibility of giving a
literary space for this new flesh.
Chapter Three looks at Samuel R. Delany’s fictions of HIV/AIDS, and the way
Delany employs the tools of speculative fiction to discuss this real disease. Delany’s
writing on AIDS—from The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals (1984) to The Mad Man
(1994)—offer a way of thinking about how viral narratives shape spaces and identities,
and how those borders can be manipulated to allow for queer spaces to exist. In his
former tale, Delany charts the ways in which the discursive borders of disease and
infection are impossible to transcend; in the latter, he thinks about how these lines that
equate bodies and territories can be reworked to optimistically foreground the queer male
bodies and spaces that have been coded as toxic. Formally speaking, Delany’s fascination
with “paraliterature,” the modes and genres considered inferior to “literary fiction” (such
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as science fiction, fantasy, pornography, and others) are combined and juxtaposed
throughout these texts. Delany brings together sword-and-sorcery fantasy, pornographic
excess, and documentary realist modes of narration to bear as frames considering the
limitations of narration to fully define and explain embodiments as signified under an
epidemic. Delany’s quasi-mimetic, quasi-fantastical narratives provide a topology to
think through how queer male identity and urban space can be reclaimed from the
degenerative discourses that mainstream American society scripts in the era of AIDS.
Chapter Four moves us, appropriately, to the apocalypse. At the end of the world
we encounter that most enduring of all virus narratives—the zombie outbreak story.
While versions of zombie pandemics are everywhere in popular culture, I examine how
the threat of the undead is focused on the ways that community is narrated. If the
immunitary principle of biopolitics is inscribed so totally into our politics and social lives
(and, as I contend, our narratives), then perhaps it is only the unstoppable deluge of the
infected creatures that provides a means of escaping this logic; it is the zombie that offers
the radical promise of community. In examining Colson Whitehead’s zombie satire Zone
One (2011), I look at the ways American late capitalist society has become affectively
and narratively exhausted, and how it is the zombie invasion that promises the final end
to an immunitary society. Whitehead’s satirical text imagines an America recovering
from an undead outbreak in much the same way it envisions a return from the Great
Recession of 2008: with a zealous dedication to the status quo. The survivors of this
cataclysm fully invest themselves in the “American Phoenix”—a PR-strategy-cumprovisional-government that promises the country will return to exactly the way it was
before the arrival of the zombies. Whitehead demonstrates how exhausted late capitalist
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narratives of progress have become, where the end-point of history has been definitively
reached. The zombies that triumph at the novel’s end offer not an end to narrative
altogether, but the beginning of a new narrative that we do not have the tools yet to
shape. Whitehead’s negative utopia-to-come brings with it an end to the immunitary
principle of social organization, and with it the end of our knowledge of storytelling.
My conclusion briefly examines the ways that narrative perspective and gender
can be further explored in future work. Each of the main chapters of this project examines
a text written by a male author and involves a male narrator (or narrative voice) who is
unaffected by the viral outbreak. Thus, I will briefly consider ways in which narratives
that involve a character who is sick, as well as narratives of viruses and immunities that
are told from non-male perspectives, are necessary components in figuring the next steps
of this project.
Viruses in speculative literature involve bringing together multiple different
discursive perspectives and reading practices centered on the overdetermined body. As
biological secrets about microbial life, infectious potential, and the interactions of viruses
and immune systems become further integrated into popular knowledge, examining the
narrative qualities of these fictions is necessary. Virus narratives provide us a means of
thinking dialectically about these interactions and the effects these have on politics, social
organization, and ecology. The concept of the immune (masculine) narrative voice that
pervades each text further allows us to think about how the formal structures of
narratology impact the ways that biopolitical conceptions of bodies and environments are
displayed and understood. The virus becomes that speculative mirror through which we
glimpse at fantastical (and abjected) potential embodiments within environments. But
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these visions are inevitably shaped and ordered by ideological conceptions of what
constitutes a healthy body and community; they become a “funhouse mirror” (Haslam 1)
through which we need to understand the ideological work that goes into such a reflective
(and reflexive) construction. Thus, to paraphrase Paul (or, to keep faithful to the sf
genealogy I trace, Philip K. Dick): we see but through a microbe darkly.
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Chapter 1

1

The Thinning of the West: Jack London’s Microbial Sublime
“Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the
vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing
conditions”
(Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in
American History”)
One of the most remarkable biopolitical documents of the early twentieth century

is Jack London’s short essay “Stalking the Pestilence” (1914), in which London examines
the military preparedness of the United States, especially as it relates to measures taken to
control against disease, or what London terms “[m]odern war” (Reports 162). Opening
his essay with the portentous intonation that “[i]n all the long red history of war, disease
has stalked at the heels of armies” (160), London praises the surgeons and medical
personnel of the armed forces in combatting disease outbreaks and injuries in order to
keep the army in a state of vigilant maintenance.48 He writes rapturously of the medical
discourse that keeps America’s fighting force (particularly its occupying armies) at a state
of readiness; indeed, the doctors often displace the soldiers as the martial heroes, for
London, referring to surgeons as “pioneers” and writing that “[m]odern war of men
against men on the field of battle is now preceded by micro-organic war on the part of
our surgeons before our every men depart for the front” (164, 162).

London notes that “our army surgeons, wise in tropical diseases from their service in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Panama, and the Philippines, are not apprehensive of any grave epidemics in Mexico” (161). This passage
points to the beginning of American imperial adventurism at the end of the nineteenth century, where, in
the Spanish-American War (1898-1902), the United States captured colonial territory held by the Spanish
empire as well as territory not belonging to any imperial power, while the reference to Mexico points to
America’s involvement in the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), an intervention which London supported.
For more detail on London’s enthusiasm for American intervention in the Mexican Revolution, and his
break with other left-wing socialists for this support, see Taylor.
48

68

“The United States was the first country to inoculate its soldiers and sailors
against typhoid,” London states and, in perhaps the most visceral passage in the entire
essay, he recounts in graphic detail this means of acquired immunity. It is worth quoting
London at length here:
The inoculation is a fairly simple matter. The serum is hypodermically injected
into the arm in a series of three injections … In the way, the injectee becomes a
sort of peripatetic graveyard. The first injection puts into his blood the nicely dead
carcasses of some 500,000,000 micro-organisms along with all their virtues of
deadness which bring about a change in the constitution of the blood that makes it
resistant to future invasions of full-powered, malignant typhoid micro-organisms.
… In short, when his body has become the living cemetery of half a billion more
dead bodies than there are live humans in the world, he has become so noxious to
the particularly noxious and infective typhoid that he may be classed a positive
immune. (162)
The most notable aspect of this process is the highly material and violent terms in which
London renders it. The body becomes a mobile crypt, interring within itself uncountable
numbers of microbe “carcasses.” It is through the accumulation of the dead that one
becomes more powerful, more healthy and able to fully engage in the strenuous activities
of empire-building and maintenance. The joyous tone in which London discusses this
method of immunization—he comments immediately afterward that “I have had the
pleasure of reducing my nonimmunity of 100 per cent to zero per cent” (162, emphasis
added)—suggests a violent destruction of a kind of bare life (is microbial life the barest
life of all?) to effect a glorious purification of the body and to ensure its readiness to
inhabit an ecology taken by martial strength. The practitioner of medicine is an integral
part of the project of constructing both a strong and martial individual identity and nation.
The end of this essay makes such a connection explicit. In spite of his awed tone
toward the discipline of the United States’ doctors, London makes sure to advise that
“[a]s long as individuals in a wild country—say the head hunters and cannibals of the
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Solomon Islands—carry killing weapons, even a philosopher, traveling among them,
would be wise to go armed. Neither algebraic equations nor high ethical arguments are
efficacious to a kinky headed man-eater with an appetite” (171). For London, every
encounter is fraught with the potential for annihilatory violence, and science must always
be wed to force. “As with individuals, so with nations,” London continues. “As long as
certain nations go armed in a wild and savage world, just so long must the enlightened
nations go armed” (172). Thus, as individuals are dangerous, violent, and perhaps
disease-ridden, so too are “unenlightened” nation-states, and it is the duty of those
enlightened powers to subdue these threats through whatever means available.
“Stalking the Pestilence” is a concatenation of several ideas and themes that
London finds fascinating: his obsession with violence, his belief in the interrelationship
of bodies and ecologies, his focus on physical exertion as the healthiest means of
preserving both the individual and the nation, and his interest in science,49 particularly
the nascent science of microbiology. These concepts and themes all mutually inform and
support one another, and the associate cluster they define also informs several of
London’s short fictions. While London is most often considered to be a writer of
adventure tales in the Alaskan Klondike or on the seas—or “a rowdy hack who produced
some popular adventure stories for ‘boy-men,’” among those less charitable (Labor,
London xi)—his contributions to speculative fiction—and, for the purposes of this
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In a letter to John M. Wright a year before his death, London remarks how, in his younger years he
“destroyed this Pantheon” of classical history “and built a new Pantheon in which I began by inscribing
names such as David Starr Jordan, as Herbert Spencer, as Huxley, as Darwin, as Tyndall, etc. etc.” (Letters
3:1498). Mary Lawlor notes that one of the courses London took while enrolled at the University of
California in 1896 was a survey course taught by popular social Darwinist thinker David Starr Jordan on
writers “including Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer” (113).
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chapter, narratives of apocalyptic germ outbreaks—have occasioned only intermittent
discussion.50 This chapter endeavours to examine how the enigmatic role of the microbe
comes to play a significant part in two of London’s shorter works, his notorious 1910
short story “The Unparalleled Invasion,” and the often-overlooked novella The Scarlet
Plague (1912).51 I argue that these texts demonstrate a kind of “proto-viral” fiction—
while science is only newly aware of the existence of bacterial microbes, and can only
hypothesize about the existence of viral organisms (scientists are aware that there are
particles smaller than bacteria, but will not be able to positively identify and visually
apprehend these organisms until the 1930s with aid of electron microscopes)—London
writes about the microbe and its sub-visible yet civilization-upending power with an awe
that borders on the religious. London’s “microcosmic sublime,” as I term it, becomes a
means for the author to explore and organize several of his other recurrent interests, such
as the strength of the individual and the nation, the masculine compulsion for domination
and control,52 and the belief in a restorative violence. London’s literary rendering of the
microbe, both in his fictional and non-fictional work, creates a biopolitical fantasy that

Clarice Stasz has put forward the argument that London’s sf literature forms not only a significant
fraction of his total output, but also is as worthy of consideration as his more famous works (qtd. in M.
Martin 21). John Hay, Michael Keith Schoenecke, Michael Martin, and David Raney are all more recent
scholars who have paid particular attention to London’s sf narratives and argued for their importance in
both the author’s own canon and in the wider canon of twentieth-century American fiction.
51
These are not the only infection narratives written by London. His early tale “The Plague Ship” (1897)
deals with an outbreak of yellow fever about a steamship headed to port in San Francisco, and the resultant
social collapse-in-miniature that results, while “Yah! Yah! Yah!” (1909) offers a less speculative tale of
British merchants using measles as a biological weapon against an island of Indigenous peoples in the
South Pacific.
52
As Jonathan Auerbach astutely notes, “manhood itself would increasingly come to reside for London in
his body, the corporeal source for his authority and integrity as a writer” (8). I am interested, in the pages
that follow, in tracing how that masculine embodiment is both complicated and legitimated in London’s
writing through appeals to microbiology.
50
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allows for worlds to be completely re-ordered and shaped according to the power of the
immune, who are the proper inheritors and inhabitants of the spaces, both domestic and
foreign, that fall under the purview of the imperial United States.

1.1

The Frontier and the Border
Jack London’s whole life was spent locating, defining, and enforcing boundaries

and borders. In a letter to his friend Cloudsley Johns, London muses on the differences
between race and species:
Do you know that the physiologists say that the difference between the highest
forms of man and the lowest forms of man is greater than the difference between
the lowest forms of man and the highest forms of the rest of the vertrebrates? [sic]
This being so (and it is so), where are you to draw the line? (qtd. in Bruni 90)
His concluding question to Johns is filled with a rhetorical anxiety of a border displaced,
a revelation of the precarious existence of such boundaries. This is a question that recurs
throughout London’s intellectual labours. In the novel White Fang (1906), Weedon Scott
states that “we must draw the line somewhere” (244) after the titular wolf attacks one of
Scott’s employees. Though the wolf’s spirited aggression makes White Fang a coveted
animal for Scott to own, when that violence crosses species lines, it must be rigidly
policed. In another letter, London extends this anxiety about borders to questions of race,
he asks “Where am I to draw the line? At the white. … Let Mr. White meet another white
hemmed in by dangers from the other colors—these whites will not need to know each
other—but they will hear the call of blood and stand back to back” (qtd. in Raney 422).
As much as his fiction is invested in the affinities between species, London’s work is also
heavily involved in maintaining boundaries, and depicting as catastrophic the
consequences when these borders are breached. It is the same logic that informs the
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famous “Law of Club and Fang” in The Call of the Wild, his version of a Spencerian
“survival of the fittest” that is enacted through aggressive encounter with other beings.53
With the scientific discoveries of the microbial world, London discovers another
extension of these immutable laws of nature and how they reflect onto the sociocultural
organization of the United States. In essence, London uses microbiological knowledge
(or at least semi-knowledge) in order to explore and reinforce his racial and cultural
beliefs, and to erect and enforce boundaries that cannot be transgressed.
The first, and most palpable of these boundary lines is the geographical frontier
that fired the imagination and ideology of American life for centuries. In the late
nineteenth century, the work of Frederick Jackson Turner and Theodore Roosevelt was
vital in memorializing the frontier as a necessary space of American masculinity
vanishing amid industrial expansion. Writing that “[f]or nearly three centuries the
dominant fact of American life has been expansion” (74), Turner, in his famous essay
“The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893), identifies the frontier as
the space where a uniquely American cultural identity is formed, one distinct from the
European models of history. The 1890 federal census marked a closing of the frontier as
an existing space, and this prompted Turner to eulogize this locale as a constitutive
feature of American life (37). The frontier, which Turner famously terms the “meeting
point between savagery and civilization” (38), is the mobile space between the inhabited
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London was particularly enamoured with the Spencerian strain of evolution. He owned several books
written by Spencer (see Hamilton 156-158), and, in a letter to Cloudsley Johns, London remarks that
“Spencer’s First Principles alone, leaving out all the rest of his work, has done for more mankind, and
through the ages will have done far more for mankind than a thousand books like Nicholas Nickleby, Hard
Cash, Book of Snobs, and Uncle Tom’s Cabin” (qtd. in Hamilton 156). In a later letter to Johns, London
wrote “I am trying to assimilate Spencer’s philosophy just now, so there is a chance that I may yet attain to
happiness” (Letters 1:204).
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urban sphere and the completely depopulated wilderness. As Mary Lawlor notes,
Jackson’s invocation of the frontier does not “distin[guish] between a physical and a
conceptual meaning of wilderness: the frontier is as much a state of mind for Turner as it
is anything else” (44). The frontier is thus the liminal space of an American dialectics: a
zone where citizens of the country bring to heel the untouched space of “pure nature” but
are themselves transformed in the process into something else entirely. Turner describes
this frontier space as a “crucible” that forges the American identity, yet that identity did
not include the Indigenous inhabitants of the land before European colonization. Indeed,
if the frontier was a place for the struggle to develop an American identity, it was often
(both literally and mythologically) a struggle against Indigenous peoples, consigned to
manifestations of the untamed and uncivilized wilderness. As Richard Slotkin notes,
“[t]he compleat ‘American’ of the Myth [of the Frontier] was one who had defeated and
freed himself from both the ‘savage’ of the western wilderness and the metropolitan
regime of authoritarian politics and class privilege” (Gunfighter Nation 11). With such
emphasis placed on the frontier as the specific ecology (both literally and figuratively) of
American identity, it is no wonder that the vanishing of the frontier in the 1890s is of
such crucial historical importance for Turner. His closing words in the essay are
tempered, noting that “the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period
of American history”; yet it is clear that, for Turner, this cessation is unprecedented and
ominous (62).54

Yet as Slotkin points out, “[a]s a material entity, the Frontier was far from closed” at the time of Turner’s
writing, and the following three decades (1890-1920) would result in some of the most productive public
cultivation of these frontier lands in the American west (Gunfighter Nation 30). The distinction comes,
Slotkin notes, from the previous era, marked by individualist entrepreneurial cultivation of the frontier
54
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Turner’s examination of the frontier is matched in influence only by that of
Theodore Roosevelt, whose writings and speeches throughout the 1880s and 1890s cast
the frontier in an even more sanctified location of white masculinity.55 In his four-volume
history The Winning of the West (1885-1894), Roosevelt seeks to give a totalizing
account of the spread of a superior white race. Starting with the emergence of the Teutons
on the borders of the Roman Empire and moving to the American skirmishes with
various Indigenous tribes throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Roosevelt
describes a genealogy promoting a narrative of conquest and civilization (see Slotkin,
Gunfighter Nation 42-51). Where Turner’s approach “marginalizes the role of violence in
the development of the Frontier” (55), focusing instead on the struggle against the
elemental forces of an untamed wilderness, Roosevelt’s mythology casts this settlement
in explicitly violent martial terms: the four volumes comprise an exhaustive description
of wars and skirmishes between military and “the original savage owners of the soil”
(3:128). His heroes are “[r]ough, masterful, lawless … neither daunted by the prowess of

(which Turner triumphed) and the growing power of monopoly capitalism in controlling these spaces and
their resources (31).
55
Slotkin adds that, despite their ideological affinities, the frontiersmen that Turner and Roosevelt exalt are
very different characters. Turner was interested in looking at the frontier as a material figuration, “in which
abstractions like ‘American values’ and ‘national character’ would be related to the concrete matter of land
acquisition and cultural production” thus, the chief figures of Turner’s frontier thesis are farmers, whom he
valourizes not as individual figures, but as a mass force (Gunfighter Nation 32, 33). Roosevelt, on the other
hand, possessed a more politically expedient reading: “the end product of the Frontier is the production of a
new kind of ruling class,” and whose emblematic representatives are “aristocrats and military
professionals” (50-51, 36). Likewise, London himself is of a different political affiliation than either Turner
or Roosevelt. London identified as a socialist throughout his life, and indeed resigned from the Socialist
Party of the United States in 1916 due to “its lack of fire and fight, and its loss of emphasis on the class
struggle” (Radical Jack London 263). Speaking of the ways in which his fierce class consciousness and his
racial prejudices often uncomfortably collided, Jonah Raskin sees London as representing “in a grand and
magnificent way, the contradictions inherent in the socialist ideal” (49). That Roosevelt, Turner, and
London could have such varying political positions and still be united in their consideration of land toward
some ideal of American identity suggests the central role such thinking had in ideologies of masculinity in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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the red warriors whose wrath they braved, nor awed by the displeasure of the
Government whose solemn engagements they violated” (4:32). The Winning of the West
is an ode to the belief in a rejuvenating violence that forges the character of its users and
the nation to which they belong. It is this theme of physical striving and the
interconnectedness of individuals and nations that Roosevelt recapitulates in his most
famous speech, “The Strenuous Life,” delivered in Chicago in 1899. In it Roosevelt
argues that “the life of toil and effort, of labor and strife” is necessary to the healthy
development of both individuals and nations (1). For Roosevelt, the physicality of the
strenuous life is something that will create a robust, virile, and vital nation of men.56
Indeed, to object to the project of the strenuous life is a kind of “race suicide,” the
damning of the white American type to degeneration and death (9). Roosevelt’s speech
not only recapitulates the points he discussed in The Winning of the West, it also
manipulates the scope of the frontier into the imperial project of which Roosevelt was
one of the most significant supporters.57 As Slotkin notes, Roosevelt’s advocacy for
vigilant war against “savages” extends beyond the domestic space of the United States
and toward the wider world stage. Thus, rhetorical substitutions are employed to fit the
wider geopolitical situation into the familiar images and narratives about the frontier:
“[a]pplying the Frontier Myth to the imperial project begins with a metaphoric extension
of Frontier categories to a new situation in which Asians become figurative Apaches”
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Roosevelt specifically genders the nation thusly. As he explains, it is the duty of patriotic men to be
active and physical in their labours, while the healthiest and best place for women is as eager housewives,
supporting and maintaining the domestic space (3-4).
57
Roosevelt, along with Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge, was one of the primary proponents of
imperialist expansionism, and would be one of the vital figures in reshaping the foreign policy of the
Republican Party in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (see Kinzer).
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(Gunfighter Nation 53). While both Roosevelt’s speech and Slotkin’s analysis are
concerned with the question of the American war with Spain taking place in Cuba and the
Philippines, as well as the question in Congress as to whether the nation should seize and
colonize Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, and Guam (see Kinzer 50-59; Wong, Racial
Reconstruction 11), this expansion of the American frontier onto the global stage once
again allows for the renewal of the racial and ecological project of developing an
enduring “American” identity and culture.
The ideological importance of the frontier depends upon what Slotkin memorably
terms “regeneration through violence” (Gunfighter Nation 12). If Turner and Roosevelt
are the speakers for the idealism of the frontier, Slotkin is the primary analyst of the
destruction and brutality that necessarily underpins such an expansionist project. Slotkin
makes the claim that “[t]he Myth of the Frontier is arguably the longest-lived of
American myths,” its interpretative power stretching from the colonial era to the present
day (Fatal Environment 15). Since the frontier has been the organizing principle of
American sociopolitical life, then the effects of American culture—“a national identity, a
democratic polity, an ever-expanding economy, and a phenomenally dynamic and
‘progressive’ civilization”—are predicated upon “the conquest of the wilderness and the
subjugation or displacement of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it”
(Gunfighter Nation 10). Thus, the frontier myth operates on violent conquest, and so it
frames this violence as a necessity toward achieving this unique identity: “[t]he original
ideological task of the Myth was to explain and justify the establishment of the American
colonies,” as well as each subsequent expansion of the American national boundary (10).
The frontier as a space is suffused with carnage, a place where the established laws that
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characterize the safe havens of “civilization” are forged but have no purchase. The
narrative of the frontier is one where the material gains and comforts of a society are
underwritten by a continually renewed violence. It is little wonder that such an
ideological space appealed to Jack London. If, as Turner contends, the frontier as an
actually existing space was foreclosed at the end of the nineteenth century, then the
ideological ecology of the frontier only increased in persuasive power for those who
believed in it. And if “[i]n each stage of its development, the Myth of the Frontier relates
its achievement of ‘progress’ to a particular form or scenario of violence” (Slotkin,
Gunfighter Nation 11), then the closed frontier can only be reopened—in speculation, at
least—through spectacular acts of destruction.
The second border is less visible, but just as ideologically invested as that of the
frontier. London’s relatively short life (1876-1916) occurred during a paradigm shift in
the way disease was understood by both experts and the public. This era has been called
the “‘golden age’ of microbiology” (Booss and August 6), a time when rapid
technological advancements and experimental procedures disproved the belief of illness
resulting from miasmatic environmental emanations. The work of scientists like Louis
Pasteur, Robert Koch, Adolph Mayer, and Elie Metchnikoff, among others, established
the link between infectious illness and microbial entities. This new “germ theory of
disease” asserted that diseases were caused by microbial organisms rather than by
ambient environmental effects, and that these microbes developed linearly from
previously existing germs, rather than “spontaneously” entering into existence, as had
been argued (see Tomes 33). The new understanding of epidemiology is summed up by
the 1885 American periodical Popular Science Monthly, which triumphantly announced
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“[t]he germ theory appeals to the average mind, it is something tangible; it may be hunted
down, captured, colored, and looked at through a microscope, and then in all its varieties,
it can be held directly responsible for so much damage” (qtd. in Tomes 7). Made visible
and legible, these microbes became manageable.
And yet, while bacteria had been made visible, other diseases—rabies, yellow
fever, polio—remained elusive and unseen despite thorough epidemiological work.
Scientists had mapped the vectors of infection and devised successful vaccines for these
illnesses, but the biological characteristics of these infectious agents remained a
mystery—literally too small to see. Pasteur voiced his frustration when researching the
elusive cause of rabies: “rabies has not been isolated yet, but judging by analogy we must
believe in its existence” (qtd. in van Kammen 4). The originary agent remains invisible,
detectable only retrospectively, in its ravaging effects.
The horizon of scientific vision was extended but was not total, and this
incomplete awareness of a new world provoked a new concern. As John Tyndall, an early
microbiologist, notes, “[w]e have been struck by invisible scourges, we have fallen to
ambushes, and it is only today that the light of science is reaching those terrible
oppressors” (qtd. in Latour, Pasteurization 10). The specter of these agents who remain
elusive in spite of the shining light of new science provides an interestingly spectral
character to this social organization. As Bruno Latour lays out in his Reassembling the
Social, the concept of the social is not an essential, pre-existing structure to which various
historical groupings conform. Rather, the social is a constantly recreated connection
between groups of actors (36). Each new relation creates a new society, and it is the work
of critics to discern the traces of these new societies, rather than prescribing a one-size-
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fits-all description. In Latour’s theorization of the world, existence is tied particularly to
action: in order for a thing to exist, it must have an effect on the things to which it is
connected (53). Thus, the viral microbe in the early twentieth century is a kind of
Latourian actor par excellence: We can only trace the virus in its after-effects, the visible
marks it leaves on its victims, the ruins of the societies that fall under its contagious logic.
Tyndall’s reports about this new microbial world were often “a curious mix of the
familiar and the awesome” (Tomes 39), and this dual feeling of both awe and fear match
how this concept enters into the popular culture consciousness at the time: the United
States was gripped by what Nancy Tomes terms “the gospel of germs,” an anxiety about
“bodies of the ill, as well as the objects they touched” and their “capacity to spread
disease,” and this anxiety propelled public health officials and civilian reformers to
engage in practices of hygienic maintenance (56, 64).58 Thus, with the filtering of the
microbiological into popular culture awareness, the organization of the social and the
effect of a sub-visible world had become completely reinscribed, and the power of this
old but only newly glimpsed actor became a new frontier of knowledge.
These discoveries, and the frustrating limits of microbiological science, would
have been of significant interest to London. John Bruni identifies London and his
naturalist contemporaries as “scientifically literate” thinkers who were exposed to and
developed an educated perception on the matters of popular science in America (3).
Likewise, Eric Carl Link suggests that London and fellow early-twentieth century

In fact, as Tomes notes, the “gospel of germs” changed with the times—the initial wave, at the end of the
nineteenth century, was focused primarily “sanitarian” in character, focused on hygienic sterility, while in
the early twentieth century the focus shifts to how bodies and objects are precariously interconnected with
one another (92).
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naturalist writers were obsessed with the questions of biology, genetics, and inheritance
(2-3)59 And, as biographer Andrew Sinclair remarks, London himself harboured “secret
fears of contamination by disease” (qtd. in Raney 400). Clearly his work in “Stalking the
Pestilence,” with its veneration of immunity and doctors, was meant to give voice to his
interest in such scientific pursuits. What is irritating for Pasteur becomes instead
invigorating for London, for the inability to gaze upon these microcosmic entities leaves
intact a sublime aspect of nature’s power. London’s speculative fictions thus serve as a
valuable counterpoint to the outbreak narrative because they intentionally lack closure.
Between the ideology of the frontier as the uniquely American space, and the
concomitant anxiety that the frontier was disappearing under an industrial capitalist order
friendly to big business and immigration, as well a nascent understanding of a world of
active and powerful germs, we can see how London’s speculative fiction sees these
problems as mutually informing one another. Charles L. Crow claims that London’s
primary literary obsession was “to find a way of living in harmony with the landscape”
(46). If Crow’s characterization is apt, then London’s speculative narratives of microbial
infection in fact extend the scope of his naturalist style and perspective:60 he depicts a

Link suggests that naturalist and speculative fiction share a fundamental question in common: “what can
science tell us about the human condition and the relationship between humans and their environment?”
(3, emphasis in original).
60
American literary naturalism is the mode or style of writing in which Jack London is canonically
accepted. Donald Pizer’s definition of naturalism as a literary mode that “usually unites detailed
documentation of the more sensationalistic aspects of experience with heavily ideological (often
allegorical) themes, the burden of these themes being the demonstration that man is more circumscribed
than ordinarily assumed” (xi), and particularly that the characters of these fictions exist within a “closed
and destructive mechanistic and Darwinian world of struggle in which it was assumed most Americans
functioned” (qtd. in M. Martin 26) remain the clearest descriptors. As Charles Child Walcutt asserts,
London’s use of “scientific determinism, Darwinism, the Spencerian philosophy of evolution, and
Marxism, all of which in some way reflect the anti-supernaturalism and anti-traditionalism of a presumably
scientific approach to human affairs,” which “renounce the free will and ethical responsibility that underlay
the classic novel of manners” are what “place London in the naturalistic movement” (44). James Lundquist
59
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world where the political animal is necessarily dependent on unforeseen evolutionary
chance, and a place where the microbes come to represent a new area of the ecological
space that human beings must become aware of in order to persist in the world. If the
frontier is a space necessary for the virile white male subject to assert himself and prove
his worth (as well as to inhabit a “pure” and “natural” space as opposed to a degraded
urban sphere polluted by both materials and the presence of other bodies), then instead of
engaging in nostalgic reminisces of a place that has disappeared forever (as Turner’s
essay seems to suggest has happened to the frontier), it is necessary to rejuvenate the
space. When the space has been returned to its original “wilderness,” deprived of the
masses of people subsisting on the land, then both the American subject and the ecology
will be healed. Thus, London’s fantasies are future-oriented rather than backwardlooking, and they are accomplished through a communion with a kind of scientific
divinity: an agency invisible but present, whose operations are mysterious but whose
effects are unmistakable, and whose power is unchallenged—a microbial sublime.

1.2

The Microbial Sublime

When the titular wolf of White Fang is captured by human beings, London’s
narrator muses on the power and persuasion of the numinous realm as it relates to
humans and animals. While the latter “find their gods in the living flesh, solid to the

adds that London’s naturalism, while still predicated on structures of “determinism,” differs from
contemporaries like Theodore Dreiser and Frank Norris in that “man and animals are similar in most
aspects of behavior because all species must live under the Law of Life, which is to say they are all subject
to the processes of evolution” (100). For London, then, biology supersedes the sociopolitical structures that
interest other American naturalists. Michael J. Martin, in his discussion of The Scarlet Plague, ties
London’s naturalistic style into the speculative content of the novel, suggesting that the formal qualities of
naturalism can be applied to the non-mimetic content of the novel. Thus, as Martin suggests, sf is not
beholden to any one mode or genre of literary form or style.
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touch, occupying earth-space and requiring time for the accomplishment of their ends and
their existence,” the gods of humanity “are of the unseen and the overguessed, vapors and
mists of fancy eluding the garmenture of reality … intangible outcroppings of self into
the realm of spirit” (130-1). For humanity, the greatest wonder is in what cannot be
detected by the eye, that which exists in the realm of the numinous. Into this space,
London uses a working knowledge of the biological science at the time while constantly
underlining the limits of this science in understanding sub-microscopic particles. What
answers science cannot furnish, the microbial sublime can by appealing to fantasies of
identity, power, and violence. London’s microbial sublime thus becomes a crucible for
reworking older mythologies of masculinity, subjectivity, and ecology under the veneer
of scientific fact.
I am calling London’s proto-viral fiction a depiction of the “microbial sublime”
because of its fascinated, rather than repulsed, attempt to gesture toward the world of the
invisibly small. While we have a tendency to think of the sublime as the unaccountably
vast, Edmund Burke makes reference toward the other scalar direction as well: “as the
great extreme of dimension is sublime, so the last extreme of littleness is in some
measure sublime likewise” (108, emphasis added). Burke’s minor clarification here, that
the very small is “in some measure” sublime hints that we still tend to think of vastness
as superior to the tiny. Furthermore, Burke urges us to “push our discoveries yet
downward … [f]or division must be infinite as well as addition; because the idea of a
perfect unity can no more be arrived at, than that of a complete whole, to which nothing
may be added” (109), and we are left with the sense of a singular, microcosmically small
organism existing in the pureness of unity. London’s vision differs from Burke’s
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directionality: he is not concerned about the organism as it exists in theoretical
wholeness, but the interconnection of microbial organisms and how they are connected to
the world of human beings. Burke’s thought experiment of reduction beyond the
vanishing point is an abstraction beyond London’s purview. The microbial sublime of
Jack London is the idea of embeddedness within a massively expanded horizon of the
world that we cannot extricate ourselves from. As Timothy Morton says, “[v]ery large
finitude is harder to deal with than an abstract, ideal infinity …. Actuality presents us
with disturbingly large finitudes. Quantity humiliates” (Ecological Thought 40). Rather
than Kant’s infinite mathematical sublime, the microcosmic world presents a human
quasi-observer with the paradox of a massively vast atomic universe.61
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. refers to the sublime as “a shock of imaginative
expansion, a complex of recoil and recuperation of self-consciousness coping with
phenomena suddenly perceived to be too great to comprehend” (146). This description
also captures London’s proto-viral investigations of a world he cannot fully excavate,
even if the actual material invokes the obverse of the science-fictional sublime, the
grotesque. As Csicsery-Ronay Jr. writes of that element of sf, “[s]cientific materialism
has disciplined this mythological imagination by expanding the range of what can be
considered normal in creation. As anomalies are discovered—salamander, platypus,
virus, pulsar—they become occasions for extending the power to explain nature’s rational
rules of creation” (195). Yet, while London’s fictions, I argue, are interested in grappling
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Yet while Morton goes on to say that this revelation effectively jars the human subject from its privileged
position at the top of the world’s hierarchy, and instead forces us to consider our embedded among a
universe of forces and intensities, this chapter will show that such an understanding of the microbial can be
used to reaffirm and reinforce existing stereotypes and mythologies.
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with the world of the virus, which has so typically been rendered in speculative narratives
as the place of uncontrollable and catastrophic mutability, London fixates more on the
human’s ability to apprehend this new world that has been discovered.62 Indeed, the
grotesque is ultimately “the realization that objects that appear familiar and under control
are actually undergoing surprising transformations” (146), a notion that resonates with
London’s contention that humans fundamentally do not understand the nature of viruses,
nor do we have them under control. London’s fiction is engaged in revealing how the
virus opens our minds to realms of accessibility. The concept of the viral in literature is
often read in terms of disgust and the grotesque, a chaotic materiality that we are
ineluctably tied to. By emphasizing the absence of full knowledge or understanding of
what constitutes a virus, and with only the vague and incomplete discoveries of germ
theory and bacteriology, London mobilizes the lack of knowledge as a frontier for a
sublime grasp of a physical world far vaster than we could have anticipated. Yet in
rendering these worlds as full of a sublime wonder at invisible particles, London
emphasizes the catastrophic violence wrought by such virulent germs. The fascination
toward a depthless nature is juxtaposed with images of destruction and death on massive
scales. Thus the microbial sublime becomes, in London’s fiction, a way of imagining new
figurations and narrations of bodies destroyed and identities rehabilitated.

Csicsery-Ronay Jr. is not unaware of this process of translation, writing by way of example “[t]he
platypus has been a grotesque freak of nature, as well as a sublime demonstration of evolutionary principle”
(147). What is interesting to me is that, in my conception of American literature, the process moves in the
other direction: the more familiar we become with viruses, the more grotesque they appear. The following
chapter on Burroughs will examine this idea in greater detail.
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1.3

After the Outbreak: Contingency and Immunity in The
Scarlet Plague

In a letter penned during his voyage of the South Seas, London writes to a friend
that “[w]e of the white race are the survivors … in the war with micro-organisms …. We
who are alive are the immune, the fit – the ones best constituted to live in a world of
hostile micro-organisms” (Cruise of the Snark 170). Yet in spite of this confidence in his
non-fiction writing, London’s proto-viral narratives reveal a greater ambiguity in this
belief. In the two stories examined in this chapter, London engages in substantial
engagements with the concept of the microbial sublime, depicting an awe-inspiring,
overwhelming violent agency that completely reshapes the landscapes and populations of
the world. But rather than being an unequivocally rejuvenating force,63 the power of the
microbial sublime can destroy that vision of humanity London wishes to redeem, as The
Scarlet Plague clearly illustrates.
The Scarlet Plague offers London’s meditation on the ideas of ecology, immune
inheritance, and the power of narration in a world ineluctably reshaped by a contagious
outbreak. Set in the year 2073, the story depicts the enfeebled “Granser”—formerly
James Howard Smith, a literature professor at the University of California, Berkeley—
who is “the only person alive to-day that lived” during the apocalyptic outbreak of the
“Scarlet Death” of 2013. Granser, accompanied by three “grandsons” of various
surviving tribes—Edwin, Hoo-Hoo-, and Hare-Lip—attempts to explain to them the

As is the case in Fergus Hume’s novel The Year of Miracle (1891), where a catastrophic plague that
wipes out the population of London is ultimately seen as a boon, for “what with socialism, anarchy, war,
famine, and Heaven knows only what, it’s a bad look-out for the twentieth century,” but with the
intervention of the plague and the restarting of a civil society, “the twentieth century began its career under
the happiest auspices” (qtd. in Raney 398).
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advanced civilization that existed prior to the plague and the suddenness and totality of
the collapse of human civilization brought on by the plague’s spread. Amid this tale,
which only fitfully interests the boys, Granser reflects on the enormity of loss and tries to
imagine how human civilization will reconstitute itself. The prospects, for Granser, are
rather bleak, and he fatalistically concludes that it will be “the same old story over and
over” (Fragments 196).
While critically dismissed at the time of its publication,64 the novella, which
London referred to in a letter as a “pseudo-scientific tale” (qtd. in Raney 398), has more
recently attracted scholarly attention due to what is seen as it being an exemplar of trends
in American speculative fiction. John Hay describes the novella as “continu[ing] to
theorize the Last Man theme for the twentieth century” (357), a subject that had been
popularized in works like Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) and H.G. Wells’s The
Time Machine (1895), while Michael J. Martin sees the framework of an elderly figure
attempting to retain some pre-apocalyptic meaning in the aftermath of catastrophe as a
strain of American naturalist storytelling that extends to Cormac McCarthy’s The Road
(2006). David L. Raney, meanwhile, pays particular attention to the novella’s
emplotment of outbreak and civilizational collapse to suggest that London explores “that
period’s debate over complicated issues of class- and race-mixing,” and how “the new
science of microbiology, with its emphasis on contact and borders, met the needs of a
particular historical moment” (392). In thinking of its contributions to the particularly

H.L. Mencken, a defender of London’s, notably derided The Scarlet Plague as “little more than garrulous
notes” rather than a developed narrative of its own (qtd. in M. Martin 21). Raney discusses in greater detail
the critical dismissal the novella initially received (see 398-399).
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speculative character that the frontier had developed into by the early twentieth century, I
argue that The Scarlet Plague represents London’s interest in a regenerated ecological
and existential topography for “the human race” (as exemplified through white men) to
rebuild, as well as his anxieties over the uncontrolled power of the microbial sublime, and
the disastrous consequences of unchecked evolutionary events. The Scarlet Plague
renders bare the contradictions and ambiguities of London’s beliefs in civilization,
violence, and power.
This ambivalence is most clearly registered by the lack of any utopian ideation in
the novella. The post-outbreak world is almost wholly depopulated, and Granser
estimates that “the present population of the world between three hundred and fifty to
four hundred,” hardly optimistic prospects for a triumphant reconstruction of the world
that once was (194). Yet the pre-collapse society upon which Granser reflects with
nostalgic affection is also dystopian, albeit in a different fashion. This United States was
a place of a rigid class hierarchy, the wealthy represented by the “Board of Industrial
Magnates … the dozen men who ruled the world,” and a servile class of ironically named
“freemen” (163, 167).65 While this pre-collapse America was a place of material plenty
(the boys register their wonder at Granser’s previous occupation as a professor, a job that
allows him to “just talk, talk, talk!” instead of hunt and gather food [166]), it was also
disastrously overpopulated. By 2010, just before the outbreak, Granser informs the boys
that the world’s population was eight billion, and the population of San Francisco alone

This bifurcated class structure has echoes both with Wells’s The Time Machine and its ethereal Eloi and
brutish Morlocks (see Hay 361), as well as London’s own novel The Iron Heel (1908), in which America is
ruled by an Oligarchy that is violently opposed by various waves of working-class revolutionaries.
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was four million (166). He then interrupts his own narrative to explain the concept of
large numbers to the bewildered boys: “like sand on the beach,” Granser tells them, “each
grand of sand a man, or woman, or child” (166). Using a series of props to represent large
numbers, “[t]he boys’ eyes ranged along from the teeth and from hand to hand, down
through the pebbles and sand-grains to Edwin’s fingers. And back again they ranged
along the ascending series in the effort to grasp such inconceivable numbers” (166). The
estranging effect of accumulation here is meant to concretize the enormity of this threat,
and London makes sure to underscore the cataclysmic ecological effects this
overpopulation had: “[t]he land was not now as it is then,” Granser explains, “[i]t was all
cleared of trees and brush, and it was cultivated. The food for millions of mouths was
growing, ripening, and going to waste” (185). Indeed, Granser further asserts that these
numbers were indirectly responsible for the plague: “[t]he easier it was to get food, the
more men there were; and the more men there were, the more thickly were they packed
together on the earth; and the more thickly they were packed, the more new kinds of
germs and diseases” (170). As the United States became a fully industrialized nation, it
succeeded in both reifying a capitalist hegemony and providing enough sustenance to
maintain a massive population. And in this demographic explosion, the frontier, both as a
physical space and an ideological ideal, vanished amid the masses of flesh. As both a
socialist and a Darwinian (or Spencerian), the rapacity of capitalism is repugnant to
London, and it inevitably produced an overfed, entropic nation doomed to be destroyed.

89

And so, when a new mutation of germs—known as the “Scarlet Death” because
of the characteristic rash that appears on the faces of its victims (172)66—arrives, this
precariously balanced society collapses almost instantly. The plague turns pandemic
within weeks, managing to infect the entirety of the country (and apparently the entire
world) and is completely terminal (174). When the Scarlet Death infects Berkeley, “[a]ll
law and order had ceased … Murder and robbery and drunkenness were everywhere”
(175). The plague levels the hierarchical bonds of advanced capitalist society, but leaves
in its wake pure anarchy. This is seen when Granser describes the looters in Berkeley as
those of the freemen class: “[i]n the midst of our civilization, down in our slums and
labor-ghettos, we had bred a race of barbarians, of savages; and now, in the time of our
calamity, they turned upon us like the wild beasts they were and destroyed us” (179).
Here again we can register London’s ambiguity: he clearly indicts the capitalist order that
has produced the Board of Magnates and the freemen, but he sees in this latter group no
redeeming qualities of civilization—like the Scarlet Death, they are a force of
undifferentiated destruction.
While Raney finds in The Scarlet Plague London at his most ambivalent, unable
to reconcile his belief in the physical striving of the working classes and contempt for
professional intellectuals with his belief in “civilization” and higher ideals to separate
“men” from “savages” (403), the novella does nonetheless depict one section of society
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Critics note the affinity of the description between the plague—and the apocalyptic tone of the novella
more generally—and Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Masque of the Red Death” (1842). London was a selfprofessed admirer of Poe and considered him a literary forebear (see Lundquist 170), and London initially
considered titling the work “The Scarlet Death” (Raney 398).
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as unambiguously valorous: bacteriologists.67 Throughout the narrative, Granser praises
these scientists, referring to them as “heroes” and to the boys as “goatherds” and people
who “fought all the sicknesses and destroyed them, just as you boys fight the wolves
away from your goats” (172, 170, 169). These scientists are responsible for the greatest
advances in human development for Granser, even as their profession retains the martial
mastery that characterizes the physicality so prized by London. Just as the wilderness and
its manifestations are tamed by London’s manly repertoire of protagonists (John
Thornton in The Call of the Wild, Weedon Scott in White Fang, Wolf Larsen in The Sea
Wolf), so too do bacteriologists extend this kind of heroic settlement into the realm of
microcosmic wilderness. Yet even they prove to be no match for the Scarlet Death
because of the overpopulated state of the world: Granser states that a German
bacteriologist named Hoffmeyer is believed to have discovered a means of inoculation,
but immediately follows it up by stating, “[t]hat was the last word, to this day, that we of
America ever received from Europe. If Hoffmeyer discovered this serum, it was too late”
(175). Bacteriologists are London’s paragons of masculine virtue in the novella, but even
they cannot reshape the structures of society by virtue of their will.
The plague’s sudden and total destruction of a seemingly powerful civilization
recalls H.G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1895), with its discussion of the
bacteriological world both as metaphor (the novel opens with the comparison between the
unsuspecting human beings about to be invaded by the Martians—“[w]ith infinite
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While Raney does not spend much time discussing the role of bacteriologists in the novella, he is correct
in noting how the beliefs of bacteriology provide a solution to some of London’s questions: “[g]erm theory
allowed London to have his intellectual cake and eat it, reconciling after a fashion the warring claims of
evolution and revolution” (427).
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complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs, serene in their
assurance of their empire over matter. It is possible that the infusoria under the
microscope do the same” [51]), and later, as the saviour of the occupied human race,
whose victory comes about not through any martial supremacy, but due to immunity (“by
virtue of this natural selection of our kind we have developed resisting power; to no
germs do we succumb without a struggle. … But there are no bacteria on Mars, and
directly these invaders arrived, directly they drank and fed, our microscopic allies began
to work their overthrow” [184]). Humanity and microbes exist in a mutually productive
(at least at the level of species) symbiosis in Wells’s narrative, a familiar ecology that the
imperial Martians disrupt and, in so doing, bring about their own destruction. Yet
London’s novella lacks Wells’s sympoetic optimism: while Wells’s narrator speaks with
assurance about the connection between humans and bacteria, and the conditions of
Martian ecology, the characters of The Scarlet Plague are confounded by the microbial
world’s mysteries:
You see, the micro-organic world remained a mystery to the end. They
[bacteriologists] knew there was such a world, and that from time to time armies
of new germs emerged from it to kill men. And that was all they knew about it.
For all they knew, in that invisible micro-organic world there might be as many
different kinds of germs as there are grains of sand on this beach. And also, in that
same invisible world it might well bethat new kinds of germs came to be. It might
be there that life originated. (170, emphasis added)
Unlike the assured rhetoric that accompanies Wells’s scientific narrator, Granser’s lecture
on the origins of the plague underscores the persistent uncertainty of the origins of the
microbial world (and, by extension, the origin of life itself on Earth). Scientists are aware
of its existence, but they cannot understand its full extent. Narrating the effect of the
Scarlet Death is not possible. Indeed, Granser’s description of the plague emphasizes this
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impossibility, noting that “[n]o sooner was a person dead than the body seemed to fall to
pieces, to fly apart, to melt away even as you looked at it” (172). The body literally
disintegrates, refusing to be apprehended beyond its momentary engagement with the
infection. And this is a universal condition, for as soon as “the scarlet rash appeared on a
person’s face, that person was marked by death. There was never a known case of
recovery” (174). The only ones who can speak of the Scarlet Death are the survivors, the
immune, those who were not “marked by death.” The plague is totalizing in its reach, and
cannot be narrated from the other side. Moreover, the viral world acts beyond the ken of
its human observers. Bacteriologists are unable to penetrate further into the microcosmic
world, to find the viruses that are orders of magnitude smaller than visible bacteria. The
microcosmos provides another frontier that London’s human protagonists are unable even
to envision. Therein lies the sublimity: the promise of a frontier that cannot yet be
apprehended, but one that still offers promising new worlds to explore (and, potentially,
conquer).
The post-apocalyptic world, a world without bacteriologists, is likewise a space of
deep uncertainty for London. The world itself seems to be in a state of recovery: the
novella opens with an image of an empowered nature, with “what once had been the
embankment of a railroad” now overgrown, “[t]he forest on either side swelled up the
slopes of the embankment and crested across it in a green wave of trees and bushes”
(156), and Granser later explains to the boys that “when the hand of man was removed,
the wild vegetation smothered and destroyed practically all the domesticated vegetation”
(187). Animals, too, recover from the meddling of human beings, with dogs, “always a
social animal,” freed from the individuated domestication as pets, now “com[ing]
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together and run[ning] in packs,” killing off the unfit kinds of breeds and turning into
“medium-sized wolfish” creatures (186).68 Here London colourfully depicts a Spencerian
“survival of the fittest,” with only the hardiest flora and fauna capable of inhabiting the
post-Scarlet Death world.
Yet at the level of human beings, the outcome is depicted in less restorative terms.
The most powerful man in this new world is a man known as “Chauffeur,” so named for
his profession in the pre-plague world. Granser possesses nothing but contempt for
Chauffeur, describing him as “a perfect brute—the most abhorrent man I have ever
known” (188). Granser’s repeated attacks on Chauffeur’s character emphasize the class
distinctions between them: he calls Chauffeur “common,” a “servant,” and “wholly
devoid of the finer instincts and chivalrous promptings of a cultured soul” (163, 190). It
is only Chauffeur’s physical prowess that allows him to become a power in the postapocalypse. In what Granser considers to be Chauffeur’s most repugnant act, he takes the
aristocrat Vesta Van Warden as a captive wife and forces her into a life of domestic
labour and child-rearing while he serves as chieftain of one of the few extant tribes of
human community left in America. The way Granser narrates this union is significant:
“you cannot understand the awfulness of the situation. The Chauffeur was a servant,
understand, a servant … [Vesta Van Warden] was a lord of life, both by birth and
marriage. … And, in the days before the plague, the slightest contact with such as he
would have been pollution” (190, emphasis added). The tendency to segregate peoples

In one of the only figurative descriptions of contagion in the novella, Granser speaks of “a veritable
plague of dogs” in the post-plague world (186). The idea that the dogs work like a plague, combined with
Granser’s later discussion of the contagious connection between Chauffeur and Vesta Van Warden (see
below) suggests that the violent power of men, animals, and microbes all possess some innately
“masculine” quality.
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according to class in pre-plague America extends to rhetorical descriptions as well, and
Granser sees these violations as contaminative in the same way that the plague is.
Chauffeur, in his virile and violent masculinity, is representative of the same reordering
power as the Scarlet Death itself. And this reordered world is one of opportunity for the
previously oppressed freemen; as Chauffeur tells Granser, “you had your day before the
plague … but this is my day, and a damned good day it is” (191).69
Raney makes the persuasive case that The Scarlet Plague can be read as a
celebratory narrative of racial regeneration along the frontier, for even though there
appears to be no common ground between the timid intellectual Granser and the powerful
but boorish Chauffeur, they possess a shared connection in a racial-cultural heritage:
“[t]he one attribute that survives the ravages of pestilence is culture, which for London
was not accrued but intrinsic and, finally, Anglo-Saxon” (419-420). Certainly, the novella
itself seems to point to this outcome, with Granser speaking of “a new climb toward
civilization” now that the plague is gone and the survivors have proven themselves hardy,
“a new Aryan drift around the world” (Fragments 194).
Raney, like other scholars who examine the novella, turns to the pastoral image in
the closing pages, reading it as an allegorical potential for the return of the dominant
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It is at these moments in the novella where the narrative voice and Granser as the narrator within the
fictional universe appears to be at odds with one another. Granser’s contempt for Chauffeur, as seen when
the former says that “[a]ll [Chauffeur] could talk about was motor-cars, machinery, gasoline, and garages,”
his vaunted portrayal of Vesta as “the perfect flower of generations of the highest culture this planet has
ever produced” his eulogizing for “[w]e, who mastered the planet—its earth, and sea, and sky—and who
were as very gods, now live in primitive savagery” (191, 189, 194), suggest that he is not meant to be taken
as wholly reliable or sympathetic, that his nostalgic longings for his privileged class position are meant to
be interrogated. As Hay suggests, The Scarlet Plague offers one of the most rounded depictions of
characters in London’s bibliography: although we are certainly not meant to side with Chauffeur (whom
readers are only told about by Granser, and never encounter outside of his narration), Granser himself
“elicits neither pity nor praise” (363). The complexity of narrative within The Scarlet Plague, and the way
London engages with narrative unreliability, will be discussed in greater detail momentarily.
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human figure.70 In this final scene, Granser and Edwin see “a small herd of wild horses”
gathered on the beach, “led by a beautiful stallion” (196). Granser remarks that this is the
“[f]irst time I ever seen ‘em on the beach” (197), suggesting that a process of
domestication and recivilization may finally be occurring. The stallion is clearly meant to
symbolize Edwin, the only one of Granser’s charges who shows any interest in his story,
as well as any interest in intellectual pursuits (Hoo-Hoo and Hare-Lip, by contrast, exalt
in fantasies of becoming witch-doctors with magic powers; Edwin, however, is enchanted
by Granser’s story of gunpowder and wishes to attain knowledge of its scientific
properties [196]). The ending seems to suggest that, while the majority of the human
remnant may be violent and small-minded—“true savages,” as Granser calls the young
boys (160)—there still exist great men like Edwin to redeem and advance the race once
more. As Michael Martin suggests, “Edwin’s presence throughout the novel and stronger
connection to Granser does suggest that the future world may not be as hopeless as it now
seems” (32), that Edwin offers a potential for a reinvigorated life. In a more cynical
context, Raney dismisses Granser’s own ambivalent reaction to the arrival of the horses
and states that “[d]espite London’s hesitations it seems clear enough where that trail
leads” (428)—to an Anglo-Saxon American utopia.71 However, I would like to advance
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See also M. Martin 31.
Other critics would quibble with the “American” adjective: for Hay, The Scarlet Plague illustrates a
“radically postnational environment,” and further suggests that the plague’s among the Scarlet Death’s
victims is imperial power, for “[t]he United States of America has not been succeeded by any other
dominant people; the star of empire has not merely passed westward” as is feared in “The Unparalleled
Invasion” (368). Yet Granser’s summation that “[w]e, who mastered the planet—its earth, and sea, and
sky—and who were as very gods, now live in primitive savagery along the water courses of this California
country” (194) suggests that American landscape and identity are still tied very much to these remnants. Of
note too are the names of the tribes of surviving tribes: while the most powerful are called “Chauffeur”
after the name of their patriarch, the remaining tribes are all geographically named—“Santa Rosa,” “Utah,”
“Los Angelito,” and “Carmelito” (193, 194).
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another reading: Granser sees in this arrival of horses not a triumphant image of a reenergized society, but rather the result of “the mountain lions getting thicker and thicker
and driving ‘em down” (197). The Darwinian landscape of this post-cataclysmic America
means these horses are driven by fear of a gathering and encroaching wilderness.
Likewise, Granser’s gloomy meditation at the end of the novella seems to take this
potential for regeneration into account:
[T]he same old story over and over. Man will increase, and men will fight. … Just
as the old civilization passed, so will the new. It may take fifty thousand years to
build, but it will pass. All things pass. Only remain cosmic force and matter, ever
in flux, ever acting and reacting and realizing only the eternal types—the priest,
the soldier, and the kind. … Some will fight, some will rule, some will pray; and
all the rest will toil and suffer sore while on their bleeding carcasses is reared
again, and yet again, without end, the amazing beauty and surpassing wonder of
the world. It were just as well that I destroyed those cave-stored books—whether
they remain or perish, all their old truths will be discovered, their old lies lived
and handed down. (196)
Granser’s fatalistic musings—which see humanity as trapped within inescapable cycles
of growth, violence, and collapse—mitigate the possibility of any kind of utopian
cessation of history. The beauty of the returned frontier wilderness is not enough because
the larger structures to which it will become the material of myth are unchanged. The
state of the world is too fragile, too subject to factors that exist beyond the purview of
humanity.
This fear of the contingent is most precisely explored in the musings on immunity
that crop up throughout The Scarlet Plague. In perhaps the most significant passage of
the novella, Granser attempts to explain how he survived the Scarlet Death
Of the four hundred that sought shelter in the Chemistry Building, and of the
forty-seven that began the march, I alone remained … Why this should be so
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there is no explaining. I did not catch the plague, that is all. I was immune. I was
merely the only lucky man in a million. (185, emphasis added)72
Rather than surviving through an evolutionary imperative, Granser is spared from the
contagion for undetermined reasons. This echoes an element of Darwinian evolutionary
theory ignored in Spencer’s survival-of-the-fittest teleology: the intervention of
unpredictable, chance events that radically alter an evolutionary landscape.73 The Scarlet
Plague thus points toward individualism as a kind of pure contingency: Granser is left to
carry on the human race for reasons that exist beyond understanding, but are clearly not
related to one’s inherent fitness in a landscape.
Such an understanding of immunity is repeated when Granser considers how the
despised Chauffeur also survived the contagion: “[w]hy the plague germs spared him I
can never understand. It would seem, in spite of our old metaphysical notions about
absolute justice, there is no moral justice in the universe” (188, emphasis added). There is
no discernible order in this universe, no way to predict who is most able or ready to
survive the plague. Raney’s suggestion that it is Granser’s and Chauffeur’s shared AngloSaxon heritage that ensures their survival is also suspect—among the four hundred
survivors Granser knows of, he refers to the leader of a fellow tribe as Lopez, whom he
says “was descended from the ancient Mexicans and was very black” (194). The Scarlet
Death undermines the Spencerian notion of a racialized hierarchy best biologically able

Granser’s wonderment recalls that of Defoe’s narrator in A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), who
catalogues the catastrophic death toll the bubonic plague while noting that “there were many wonderful
Deliverances of Persons from Infection, and Deliverances of Persons when Infected, which intimate
singular and remarkable Providence ... and I esteem my own Deliverance to be one next to miraculous, and
do record it in thankfulness” (170).
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Lawrence Berkove points to an earlier London story, “A Relic of the Pliocene” (1901) as an example of
this same principle: the dogs of the narrator are stomped to death by the sudden appearance of a mammoth,
which intercedes on the natural course of evolution (“Evolution” 248).
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to endure the ravages of microbes—a Darwinian contingency is what Granser (and the
reader) is left to contemplate. Lawrence Berkove refers to Granser as one of the “random
survivors” of the plague (“Evolution” 251), which seems more accurate than Raney’s
reading of racial regeneration: the infection is undiscriminating in its reach, and the racial
makeup of the world, prior to London’s own musings about Anglo-Saxon immunity, are
no added protection.
This uncertainty and anxiety extend to the level of narrative as well.
Unsurprisingly, the children—all of whom were born decades after the Scarlet Death and
the subsequent societal collapse—don’t speak English but rather a rough approximation.
The narrative voice intervenes in the text to inform the reader that “[Edwin] did not
exactly utter these words, but something that remotely resembled them and that was more
guttural and explosive” (159). Even Granser, the last remnant of the pre-apocalyptic
intelligentsia, has lost the power of that language: the narrator describes Granser’s words
as “approximately an English that had gone through a corrupt bath of usage,” and later
explains that “[e]ven the speech of Granser was so corrupt that were it put down literally
it would be almost so much nonsense to the reader” (164). It is only when Granser begins
reminiscing about the plague that his language is modified, that “[w]hen he got into the
full swing of babbling to himself, [his speech] slowly purged itself into pure English”
(164). Narration about infection requires a purgative, purified English language, and the
narrative must intervene within the scene in order to correct the rough and degraded
pidgin of Granser and the boys. This signals London’s most furtive realization about the
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unchecked power of infection: when the power to narrate disease becomes compromised,
the infection has won.74
The Scarlet Plague thus demonstrates London’s fascination with the concept of
the microbial world as a potential reinvigoration of a corrupt and decayed America that
he witnessed at the start of the twentieth century. Yet the novella is also rife with
ambivalences and anxieties about the character, shape, and sustainability of the
cataclysm’s survivors. The workings of germs and the qualities of natural immunity are
far too mysterious to be accounted for, and the result is a disordered collection of bodies
and a damaged quality of narration. If the microbial sublime is meant to offer a chance of
American regeneration for London, then its apocalyptic violence must be harnessed and
directed by human hands toward a dehumanized enemy.

1.4

Weaponizing the Microbial in “The Unparalleled
Invasion”

As the frontier closed, the space of purely American values was considered to be
imperiled by another pressure: overpopulation, the product of lax immigration laws.
Immigrants from east Asian countries—and particularly among them China—were seen
as having invaded the shores of the American nation. Chinese immigration into
California had begun in 1848 and continued steadily, and the resulting anxieties and
conflicts demonstrated a split between the factions of American capital and labour. In
1868 the United States Congress ratified the Burlingame Treaty, which “encouraged
Chinese ‘coolies’ (a source of cheap labor) to enter the country to help construct the
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An alternative reading would be that the narrative voice of the story is recounting an event at some point
long after Granser’s own story, when a recognizable English language has been recovered.
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Pacific railroads” (Tatsumi 68). Corporate America saw in Chinese bodies a useful and
inexpensive source to both instantiate their resource empires and to disempower the
labour movements taking root in the west. In response, white labour unions took aim at
the Chinese as parasitic organisms depriving white workers of needed jobs and pay (see
Hsu 98-103). Increasingly, the nation backed nativist, anti-Chinese xenophobia which
soon made its way into law. Draconian measures were passed through Congress for the
next twenty years, such as the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, which denied Chinese
immigrants the right to naturalized citizenship and placed a ten-year ban on new
labourers entering the country, an act renewed and extended in 1902 and 1904 (Lee 9495).75 Likewise, the 1892 Geary Act “effectively criminalized all Chinese laborers in the
United States by requiring them to register and carry photographic identification cards
proving they were legal citizens” (Hsu 78-79), one of the first acts of governmentally
ordained biopolitical monitoring.
Despite the sweep of these legal measures, they did little to quell the fears and
hostility of white Americans, which were exacerbated by the rhetorical link between
Chinese identity and infectious illness. Nayan Shah describes how the Chinatowns
throughout California were deemed “laborator[ies] of infection” and “permanent site[s]
of urban sickness,” while Asian bodies themselves were seen as generators of illness: in
1877, the San Francisco public health committee “denounc[ed] the Chinese as the very
embodiment of sickness” (1-2, 22). The settlement of Chinese citizens in America was

It was not until 1943, during the height of the Second World War and America’s alliance with Chiang
Kai-shek’s Chinese forces against the occupying Japanese, that the passage of the Magnuson Act, also
known as the “Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act,” finally removed these original laws from federal statutes
(Lee 256).
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read as a contamination of national character; the frontier was sick, and the Chinese were
the infecting agent.76
Perhaps not surprisingly, in “The Strenuous Life” Theodore Roosevelt contrasts
the hypothetical strenuous nation (being, of course, the United States), with that of an
archetype of indolent decadence: the empire of China. Roosevelt exhorts: “[w]e cannot, if
we would, play the part of China, and be content to rot by inches in ignoble ease within
our borders, taking no interest in what goes beyond them” (6). In this example, Roosevelt
categorizes China as a place of stultified decadence and decay—a state secure in its
physical boundaries and thereby submitted to an entropic fate of disintegrating within this
space. China, for Roosevelt, does not enact strenuous living, does not utilize the bodies
that comprise the subjects of its empire toward the cleansing and regenerative process of
strife (whether laborious or martial). In Roosevelt’s fantastical conception, China is a sick
nation because its national project is not one of conquest and domestication of the wild,
and while Roosevelt does not directly comment upon Chinese immigration to America in
the speech, the implication that this existence is corrupting America’s shores remains
implicit.
Jack London’s interest in China mingles Roosevelt’s contempt with an increased
level of fear and paranoia. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), London

In dealing with the complex racial politics that characterize London’s writing and life, Andrew Furer
concludes that non-Anglo-Saxon people provoke fear and hatred in London most acutely when they are
considered as part of an abstracted mass. Furer notes that, in London’s later novel The House of Pride
(1912), and stories published in the same volume, such as “Chun Ah Chun” and “Koolau the Leper,” the
“fear of the Yellow Peril almost entirely disappears. When London gives Asian and other non-white
characters individuality accompanied by exceptional ability, his anxiety dissolves into admiration” (163).
In other words, when an individual is drawn out from his or her racial background, made immune against
the contamination of threatening materiality, fear is replaced by respect.
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travelled to Japan and Korea to serve as a war correspondent for the San Francisco
Examiner, and briefly visited China during this time (Reports 3). Upon returning to
California, London would go on to pen the alarmist articles “The Yellow Peril” (1905)
and “If Japan Wakens China” (1909) that fretted over the possibility of disastrous and
destructive wars to come through “race-adventure” (Reports 360). The threat, as London
perceives it, comes from Japan, which defeated the vast Russian empire in the war,
becoming the predominant military power in the Pacific. Possessing “the finest machines
and systems of destruction the Caucasian mind has devised,” the Japanese are a
“rejuvenescent … race” with wider imperial ambitions (346). The Japanese, as
beneficiaries of Western material progress, are in a privileged position with respect to the
rest of East Asia.77 Yet London ultimately does not fear the “forty-five million Japanese
in the world” (360), seeing the empire as too small to truly threaten Western hegemony.
Rather, London dreads “the four hundred millions of yellow men [China] should the little
brown man [Japan] undertake their management” (346). While London contends that the
West and the Chinese possess no means of communicating with one another, Japan is
able to translate the technologies and institutions of modernity which the Anglo-Saxon
race has developed into tools comprehensible to the Chinese mind. The Japanese can do
this, in London’s racial ordering, because “they [the Japanese and Chinese] diverged

In “The Unparalleled Invasion,” London—through his narrator Walt Mervin—will elaborate on this idea,
describing the Japanese as “the freak and paradox among Eastern peoples,” as they are capable of
intuitively understanding and communicating not only with other Asians, but with the occulted Western
mind as well (110). Mervin is baffled by this receptivity of the Japanese, stating that there is “no explaining
this peculiar openness of Japan to the alien culture of the West. As well might be explained any biological
sport in the animal kingdom” (110). In both his fiction and non-fiction accounts, the Japanese are incapable
of developing their own materials and expertise, but only the secondary inheritors of true Western
ingenuity.
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from a common root, an ancient Mongol stock. There have been changes, differentiations
brought about by diverse conditions and infusions of other blood; but down at the bottom
of their being, twisted into the fibres of them, is a heritage in common—a sameness in
kind that has not been obliterated” (345).78 The similitude of race is ultimately what
allows for communication between groups, and Japan’s ability to translate the inventions
of the West is alarming. Claiming that the Chinese are “not dead to new ideas, new
methods, new systems,” and that “[u]nder a capable management he can be made to do
anything” (345), London sees a deadly spread of information—the Japanese receive the
expertise and knowledge of the West, and in turn are able to translate this to China, who
will then, with their significant population, threaten the stability of the Western imperial
world and its holdings.79
The recurrent image employed throughout these essays is that of sleep and
wakefulness. London describes China as a political entity long dormant, not “dead” but
only slumbering (345), and the threat of this empire’s awakening will signal the end of
the era of white supremacy. It is not only China that sleeps, however; London writes that
the nations of the West “are dreaming as all race-adventurers have dreamed” (360-361).

This explanation is repeated verbatim in “The Unparalleled Invasion” (111). Such recapitulation would
lend credence to the theory that London intended for his speculative tale to be understood as sincere as
opposed to satirical.
79
London ends his essay by noting that, while materials and knowledges are products of a race and are thus
“interchangeable,” the “soul stuff,” or essence of each race, that fires these endeavours, cannot be
repackaged (Reports 348). It is this untranslatability of the essential characteristic of the “Saxon,” which
London glosses as containing “a certain integrity, a sternness of conscience, a melancholy responsibility of
life, a sympathy and comradeship and warm human feel, which is ours, indubitably ours, and which we
cannot teach to the Oriental as we would teach logarithms or the trajectory of projectiles” (348) that
London sees as preserving hope against the threat of Chinese or Japanese power. Even though these nations
may gain access to and mastery of Western ideas and weapons, London believes that the innate qualities
that led to these discoveries is what will preserve his own race.
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And it is this dream of unchallenged supremacy that worries London, for in that sleeping
state, the vigorous action of the strenuous life has given way to fantasies of security. He
ends his article “If Japan Wakens China” with a powerful China on the verge of waking
up, while “[w]e are still dreaming” (361).
“The Unparalleled Invasion” picks up directly where London’s articles of warning
leave off. The story, narrated as a fragment of a future textbook by historian Walt
Mervin, recounts the central geopolitical conflict of the twentieth century staged between
“the world and China” (109).80 The latter, described as being “rejuvenescent, fruitful, and
militant,” experiences a rapid modernization thanks to the intervention of the Japanese
empire, allowing China’s population to increase exponentially and to harness
contemporary technologies. This empire, which the narrator repeatedly refers to as a
nation “awakened” (109, 110, 112, 113), threatens the hegemony of the imperial nations
of Europe and North America, and prompts increasingly desperate martial responses from
these nations. When conventional means of conquest fail—France’s navy ineffectually
batters China’s coasts, while China “withdrew like a turtle into her shell” (114), and its
attempts to invade the Chinese mainland fail when its expeditionary force is “swallowed

Much of the criticism around “The Unparalleled Invasion” has to do with whether or not the story is an
uncritical instance of “yellow peril” fiction, or a slyly satirical takedown of such racial panic literature.
Patrick L. Sharp presents the former opinion, arguing that the story “London’s future-war story was
consistent with the rampant anti-Asian bigotry of his time” and that “this story was fanning the flames of
race hatred” in the United States (104). Berkove, on the other hand, makes the case that the short story is in
fact a critique of unchecked American manifest destiny (“Parallax” 33-39). Metraux offers a similarly
ironic reading of the text, and Edlie Wong refers to “The Unparalleled Invasion” as a “darkly ironic” twist
on the Chinese invasion genre (“Future Tense”516). John N. Swift offers a synthesis of these readings,
suggesting that, while it is quite possible to read the story as a “darkly Swiftean satire, a critique of racist
technology,” it nonetheless reinforces stereotypes about the ontological differences between Asians and
Caucasians, and reflects the values of racial difference of American culture at the time (67). As Swift aptly
notes, the scientist who devises the biological warfare solution to the Chinese empire is named Jacobus
Laningdale, who shares the same initials with the story’s author (67).
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up in China’s cavernous maw” (114)—the American scientist Jacobus Laningdale
proposes a different tactic: bombarding China with every available type of “bacteria, and
germs, and microbes, and bacilli” (118). This avenue of attack proves successful, and the
Chinese population of “a billion souls” is wiped out within months (120). The plaguedestroyed Chinese empire, its population erased and its territory turned into a “howling
wilderness” (120), becomes the site of a new frontier expansion, one that proceeds
“according to the democratic American programme” (120). “China had laughed at war,”
the narrator Mervin explains, “and war she was getting, but it was ultra-modern war,
twentieth century war, the war of the scientist and the laboratory, the war of Jacobus
Laningdale” (119). It is with up-to-date knowledge and mastery of the microbial that the
Western powers are able to quash a racial threat and re-establish an imperial equilibrium.
“The Unparalleled Invasion” is representative of the “yellow peril” fiction81 that
dominated Anglo-American popular culture at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of
the twentieth centuries. With growing immigration from East Asian countries into the
United States beginning in the 1840s, and exacerbated by Japan’s victory in the RussoJapanese War in 1905, the United States came to view Asians as an undifferentiated and
hostile race threatening the destruction of its sovereignty and capture of its land (Tatsumi
66). As Edlie Wong notes, “[b]y the final decades of the twentieth century, the notion of
an Asiatic threat was well established in U.S. culture, in part through the popularization
and propagation of Yellow Peril fears in visual and print media” (Racial Reconstruction

The term itself derives from M.P. Shiel’s novel The Yellow Danger (1899), which “coined the term
‘yellow peril’ and popularized its use” (Tatsumi 68). Shiel’s novel also involves germ warfare as a
“solution” to this irresolvable problem, and London’s short story clearly borrows from its predecessor
(Wong, Racial Reconstruction 153).
81

106

14). An off-shoot of the popular subgenre of “future war” fiction, speculative narratives
that retrospectively imagine catastrophic, world-changing conflicts predicated on
Darwinian notions of struggle and competition (see I.F. Clarke 49), “yellow peril” fiction
particularly depicted an apocalyptic race war between “white” nations and an
undifferentiated Asian menace (typically China or Japan). These narratives of
catastrophic race war thus yoke together older mythologies of the purifying violence of
frontier conflict within new scientific discoveries. The result is that the frontier becomes
the site of a sanctioned biopolitical violence necessary for the racial survival of white
America. In “Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault famously suggests that the movement
from a regime of sovereign power to a regime of biopower requires thinking in “racist”
terms, or, more precisely, thinking “the break between what must live and what must die”
(254). When political communities are organized around an understanding of race with
particularly inherited characteristics and traditions, rather than around subjects under the
rule of a sovereign, then violent conflict is inevitable, as war is no longer seen as a
political but rather a hygienic action—“the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it
results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological
threat to and the improvement of the species or race” (256). This racist ethos is also at the
heart of the frontier myth’s regenerative violence, for as Slotkin notes, the core of this
ideology is the belief in “savage war,” an apocalyptic total-war to make the land
habitable for one group or another, a conflict that is coded in explicitly racial binaries of
“wilderness/civilization, Indian/White” (Gunfighter Nation 12, 14).82 If the scope of
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There are obvious echoes here with the expansionist policy of the United States in the eighteenth century
of spreading smallpox to Native populations. The tactic of using biological agents as weapons of
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biopolitics, as Foucault explains it, is “massifying, that is directed not at the man-as-body
but at man-as-species” (“Society” 243), then the frontier becomes the location for the
genocidal explosion of biopolitical management, turning the frontier into an Agambenesque “zone of indistinction” where a racialized and threatening form of life is rendered
as a medical threat and sterilized. “Yellow peril” fiction, then, is particularly engaged in
the transmigration of older myths into new discursive modes of racial organization.
The opening of “The Unparalleled Invasion” reiterates London’s belief that there
is an impossible barrier between racial communication: “between [the West] and China
was no common psychological speech” (110). Americans and Chinese are incapable of
conversing with one another; they cannot produce any form of diplomatic dialogue
necessary for delicate geopolitical relations, or even on a simple narrative level. The
attempt to narrate Chinese subjects, as opposed to a “massified” Chinese body, becomes
an impossibility. For London, China and its citizens cannot be understood by the Western
mind and are therefore of no consideration beyond their appearance as an essentialized
and unchanging material presence, one that threatens the physical and ideological borders
of American hegemony.
Where Roosevelt invokes China as an example of an inactive nation, London
turns this seeming passivity into a looming threat and angle of attack against the rest of
the world. Throughout “The Unparalleled Invasion,” China is described as a distressingly
productive nation. Indeed, Mervin claims that China’s power comes from “the fecundity

imperialist expansion can be traced back in the United States at least to the Seven Years’ War, where
American general Jeffrey Amherst suggested the use of smallpox against Native peoples along in the Ohio
territory. Writing to a subordinate, Amherst recommends “Small Pox,” saying “We must … Use Every
Stratagem in our power to Reduce them” (qtd. in Shannon 135).
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of her loins” (113). Unsurprisingly, then, China is turned into a collective entity and is
feminized, as the nation is referred to as “she” throughout the narrative. This depiction of
China is one a kind of monstrous feminine, as its productive capacities are seen as a kind
of infection threatening the stability of the imperially managed world. Its industrialization
does not bolster its military capabilities—the country has a militia in place of a trained
army, and “[h]er navy was so small that it was the laughing stock of the entire world”
(113). The feminized China refuses to compete in the masculine sphere of martial
prowess. Instead, China carries out its expansion by other means: not through arms, but
bodies. The citizens of the nation “spill[ ] over the boundaries of her Empire,” taking
control of colonies belonging to the French, British, and Russian powers. “China sent
down an army of militia-soldiers a million strong. Behind them came the wives and sons
and daughters and relatives, with their personal household luggage, in a second army”
(114). Instead of engaging in a bloody test of wills between at the interface of the
frontier, China displaces that boundary line, overrunning not only established Western
colonial boundaries, but also the boundaries separating the martial and the domestic. As
Mervin explains, China’s means of territorial accumulation occurs in three waves: “[f]irst
came the immigration … Next came the clash of arms and the brushing away of all
opposition by a monster army of militia-soldiers, followed by their families and
household luggage. And finally came their settling down as colonists in the conquered
territory” (114-115). This China disorders the rules of conquest, smothering the conflict
so necessary to healthy nation-maintenance between the surreptitious act of immigration
and the image of families and their “household luggage” turning territory into a home.
China is an empire without imperial ambitions, a power paradoxically mobilizing inertia
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in order to entropically absorb the territory around it; it is an alien power that does not
resemble the actions and developments of the Western powers, and this is what
particularly makes it so threatening and horrifying to Mervin.
The statisticians of the West examine China’s birth rate with a kind of horror:
Burchaldter called attention to the fact that there were more Chinese in
existence than white-skinned people. He performed a simple sum in
arithmetic. He added together the populations of the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, England, France,
Germany, Italy, Austria, European Russia, and all Scandinavia. The result
was 495,000,000. And the population of China overtopped this
tremendous total by 5,000,000. Burchaldter’s figures went around the
world, and the world shivered. (113)83
Later in the story, the scientist comes to the startling revelation that his “simple
arithmetic” was incorrect, and that “[t]here were two Chinese for every white-skinned
human in the world, Burchaldter announced, and the world trembled” (115). The
collectivizing of the non-Chinese world into singular embodied reactions of shivering and
trembling not only highlights the dualism of this story, but also places the conflict on
purely material, embodied terms. The power of China is thus its ability to crowd out the
world through a profusion of an undifferentiated mass of flesh, one that Mervin renders
in terms of abject horror: “[t]here was no way to dam up the over-spilling monstrous
flood of life” (116).
China’s method of acquisition is thus accomplished not through spectacles of
destruction but through absorption, infiltrating and mutating the colonial makeup. As
Mervin notes, “China had entertained no dreams of conquest. The Chinese was not an

London performs this same racial arithmetic in “If Japan Wakens China.” There he notes that the
combined white people of the world are outnumbered by the combined populations of China and Japan
(Reports 360). As this article was composed the year before “The Unparalleled Invasion,” it is clear that
these conclusions which so startled London prove to be the predicates for his speculative imaginings.
83
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imperial race. It was industrious, thrifty, and peace-loving” (114). The power of bodily
production that China possesses thus is not made for martial conquest but for
displacement of other bodies. Indeed, furthering the sexualization of the nation, “[China]
welcomed invasion” (116), as London’s narrator unsubtly puts it. As Shah notes, the
image of Asian women in California at the time was that of the syphilitic prostitutes who,
in the words of a contemporary physician, were “saturated” with diseases and whose
infected bodies “haunt the [white] client, his spouse, and his progeny with venereal
infection” (107, 89). The Chinese nation is a diseased and promiscuous body, whose
every geopolitical action is rendered as contaminating Western health.
If China is the devouring mother, the children it produces are depicted as a
singular mass. In the story, Mervin gravely intones that America already nurtures an
infection: “[f]irst came Chinese immigration (or, rather, it was already there, having
come slowly and insidiously during the previous years)” (114). In this narrative rendering
of Chinese bodies, it is possible to read both the historical fears of Asian immigration in
the nineteenth century, and London’s own non-fictional writings on the Chinese. In “The
Yellow Peril,” London’s remarks on the Chinese have to deal entirely with their
embodiment—he refers to them (personified as a representative “he”) as “the perfect type
of industry” and “an indefatigable worker,” whose “[w]ork is the breath of his nostrils. It
is his solution to existence” (343, 345). And yet, in spite of the almost mechanistic love
of labour that the Chinese population possesses, the country is unable to become a world
power because “his government is set, crystallized” in its traditions and unwilling to
modernize for fear of jeopardizing their own power and prestige (345).
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As Eric Hayot notes, China was seen at the time as enacting “relentless
reproduction of its own social and governmental form” (33). Reproduction without
differentiation: China is read as a kind of virus illustrated in the figure of the “coolie,” a
derogatory term for Asian labourers. The coolie operates as a border-crossing figure for
London, an abject outward appearance disguising a sinister agenda of foreign power.
These bodies are meaningful not as individuals, but as representatives: Li Fang Twung,
the spokesman for the Chinese Emperor, and the text’s only named Chinese character,
taunts the American government to “[d]estroy, as you have threatened … the ten million
coolies we have forced upon your shores—why, the amount scarcely equals half our
excess birth rate for a year” (116). The coolie body is another vector of Chinese
contagion, a replaceable but omnipresent figure threatening the capability of the
labouring white body.
The figure of the labouring body complicates the idea of animacy: there is a kind
of hyper-productivity applied to this figuration, one that trumps the abilities of the white
male. Such fears develop Mel Y. Chen’s work on “animacy,” in which “the fragile
division between animate and inanimate—that is, beyond human and animal—is
relentlessly produced and policed and maps important political consequences of that
distinction” (2). The way that bodies are considered to be animated are hierarchized
within biopolitical paradigms. Interestingly, Chen focuses on images of the Chinese
labourer’s figuration as a rat in 19th-century caricatures, demonstrating “the logic of
similarity between rats and Chinese people to stir up fears of infection, invoking not only
a similarity but a consanguinity” (110), with the rat suggesting a kind of lesser animacy,
something not as fully living as a human being. Chen’s analysis is no doubt correct, yet in
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similar images from the era we can detect another kind of anxiety. The coolie-as-octopus,
depicted in G. Frederick Keller’s caricature for Wasp Magazine in 1882, juxtaposes the
hyper-productivity of the Asian body in comparison to the idleness of the disenfranchised
white labourers (see Hsu 101). As Hsuan Hsu notes of this image, the effect leads one to
see Chinese bodes as “multiple, swarming, or grotesquely combined bodies, rather than
as individual subjects” (101-102). Thus, between these two infamous caricatures of
Chinese coolie labourers, we can see how multiple the fear of the Chinese body is. To
these readings I would add that, while Keller’s cartoon is used to connect Chinese labour
to the monopolist corporations dominating the American west, it is possible here to detect
a note of panic: that the Chinese body may be more productively powerful than the
American male can hope to achieve.
Of course, a body’s productive capabilities does not alone imply a superiority on
the animacy hierarchy, for such ability can still be suborned to the racist logics of
domination, as Chen well notes (10-11). However, London’s paranoid racial taxonomies
provide a means of empowering this hyper-productive body. The intervention of the
Japanese that London fantasizes about in his essays is reiterated in “The Unparalleled
Invasion,” with Japan seeking to increase its imperial span and “awakening” China to
modern technologies and ideologies. In an infectious transfer, Japan receives the
inventive gifts of the Western world and in turn passes them on to China, which puts
them to use and becomes a daunting power. The labouring capacity that London sees in
Chinese bodies, married to the acquired inventions and ideas of the West, means that
China’s animacy possesses the potential to topple the racial and social hierarchy that sees
white Western powers as indomitable. Once more, London resorts to the figurative
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language of infection to describe this fear: “China rejuvenescent! It was only but a step to
China rampant” (112).
Like a virus hijacking the replicative machinery of an organism’s cell to
reproduce itself endlessly, China’s acquisition of Western technology makes the
reproductive power of a global health threat. But of course, that description is only
analogical: China reproduces as though it were a virus, relying on the logic of similarity.
As Tatsumi notes, one of the features of later “yellow peril” fiction involved “the
exemplary future-war imperative, ‘Don’t act until a virus is slaughtered by another
virus’” (70). Narratives of race war with Asia operate on tropes of replication and
expansion, and the main weapon in an Anglo-American arsenal is the microbe. London
illustrates the limits of such metaphorical association in the end of his story, where the
associative infection of China encounters the actual American pandemics. Jacobus
Laningdale’s suggestion to bombard China with every possible contagious illness places
China’s reproductive capabilities into conflict with the destructive potential of the
outbreak. London’s aesthetic shift registers this distinction. Swift describes London’s
story as biopower met with biopower: “the West appropriately responds to the plague of
uncontrollable reproduction with the managed bio-technology of germ warfare” (61).
Certainly, this is the case in the deployment of the world’s accumulated armies to
surround China. While the Chinese expect a hopeless invasion by the rest of the world:
“[a]fter all this enormous preparation, there was no invasion,” to which Mervin notes that
“[s]he [China] could not understand” (117). While China may not be a military power, it
understands the established rules of military conquest and is able to beat the colonial
empires based on changing these tactics. Yet the Chinese government does not
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understand that the mobilized armies and fleets of the West are not an invasion force, but
a quarantine line erected to contain the soon-to-be-infected population. The armies ensure
that China is fully isolated from the rest of the world, and that its population is contained:
“[t]he slaughter of the mad hosts on the boundaries was stupendous,” Mervin exclaims,
“[t]ime and again the guarding line was drawn back twenty or thirty miles to escape the
contagion” (119). China’s entire populace is consigned to an infected agent, and so the
principles of biopolitical management are employed to sequester and control the plague.
The body of the racial other is described in visceral terms meant to evoke disgust
and anxiety: China’s wave of immigrant-conquerors are described by Mervin as an “overspilling monstrous flood of life” (116), and its citizens described only in the aggregate as
a “chattering yellow populace” (117). The actual contagious diseases, by contrast, are
rendered in a more ethereal register: the airships that convey the infectious arsenal are
described as “tiny dot[s] of black” in the sky, while the shells themselves are “strange,
harmless … tubes of fragile glass” that “shattered into thousands of fragments on the
streets and house-tops” (117). The frangible imagery and euphonic flow of these images
emphasizes the seemingly effervescent quality of the biological agents, the glass
operating like the protein coating that protects the core of real viruses. “[T]here was
nothing deadly about these tubes of glass,” Mervin assures the reader, and twice repeats
the refrain “[n]othing happened” after these delicate containers break. Only “one or two
thought they saw some mosquitoes fly out” of the tubes (118): these possibly glimpsed
insects remain the only palpable trace of presence. At the moment of contamination, the
descriptions shift from surging, repulsive materialism to ghostly, imperceptible
impressions.
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The story breaks off at this moment of infection,84 registering a temporal gap
between the moment of the attack and its grisly aftermath. Again, London’s naturalism
precludes an engagement with narrative encounters with infection. The voice of the
narrative, embodied through the academic persona of Mervin, is insulated from this
contaminating encounter, and there is potential for any other narrative to arise. The
microbial sublime is a fait accompli—as soon as the germs are released, there is only one
possible end to the story, and so Mervin’s historical encounter jumps over the moment of
infection to its genocidal aftermath. On the day of the surreptitious bombardment, Mervin
refers to the “the imperial city” of Peking filled with “eleven millions” of people, the
streets teeming with life (117). The narrative shifts to a quick paragraph describing the
presence of the airships all over China, and then abruptly returns to Peking “six weeks
later” where the reader would now, per Mervin, “have looked in vain for the eleven
million inhabitants. Some few of them he would have found, a few hundred thousand
perhaps, their carcasses festering in the houses and the deserted streets, and piled high in
the abandoned death wagons” (118). This narrative prolepsis allows the reader to
contemplate the awe-full power of these diseases that an etiological narrative would
render visible and thus, in some way, understandable. Instead, this gap signals an almost
mystical process of rapid and unstoppable transformation whose power can be
understood only retrospectively, in its legible after-effects.
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The day of the germ attack is May 1, which, as Wong astutely notes, is International Workers Day. Thus,
“London’s American-engineered plague roughly yokes together labor activism and empire” (Racial
Reconstruction 153).
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And these after-effects are gratuitously visceral. Mervin, to this point in the story
a rather staid narrator, rhapsodically catalogues China’s swift collapse: the country
becomes a mass of “plague-stricken wretches” who carry the cocktail of viruses with
them wherever they go (118). China becomes a “charnel house” and an “inferno” where
“hundreds of millions of dead remained unburied and … millions died of starvation
daily” (119, 120). “Cannibalism, murder, and madness reigned. And so perished China,”
Mervin enthusiastically concludes. These excessive tableaux perform the aesthetic
function of displacing all the fears of invasion and defeat back onto the Chinese body,
and London indulges as much as he can, describing the invisible meta-plague as “the allconqueror” and “the destroying angel” (118, 120). For just as the Chinese body is
overdetermined as a site of contagion at every level of social existence, it is afflicted with
every plague known to science: “[t]he man who escaped smallpox went down before the
scarlet fever. The man who was immune to yellow fever was carried away by cholera”
(118), and in the chaotic destruction new viral life emerges: researchers “suggested that a
new plague-germ originated … a hybridization between plague-germs” (119).
Extinguishing threatening races while establishing an entirely new viral life (one, Mervin
notes, that is eagerly studied by American scientists [119]) demonstrates once more
London’s fascination with the vitality of the microbe.
China’s metaphorical virality proves no match for the encounter with the literally
viral, what Mervin defines as “ultra-modern war, twentieth-century war, the war of the
scientist and the laboratory” (119). America’s ability to channel the power of the
microbial sublime to attain its imperialistic ends is read as its skill in the new century.
Mervin ends his historical discussion with a note of American regeneration: the
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wilderness that was China becomes colonized and sectioned-off by the conquering
imperial powers (120). This territorial occupation is a “tremendous and successful
experiment in cross-fertilization” Mervin assures the reader, “a vast and happy
intermingling of nationalities” living under benevolent American rule. Thus, the
microbial sublime opens up not only the scientific frontier of an invisible world we can
only gesture toward, but also a physical frontier as those microbes depopulate the
overcrowded west and reinvigorate the space of white masculine destiny once supposed
to have vanished. London finds in the microbe an incredibly useful narrative tool,
foreclosing a challenge to an animate hierarchy while opening up new physical and
intellectual spaces for the white male body to inhabit.
“The Unparalleled Invasion” thus serves as a narrative of biopolitical fantasy: the
rhetoric of plague as the great social leveller is infused with a twentieth-century
bacteriological understanding of the microbial world and its impact. Indeed, the
genocidal project is referred to in hygienic terms as “the great task, the sanitation of
China” (120), implying a formulaic resolution to issues of global complexity. London’s
understanding that there exist organisms that are smaller than bacteria, the notion that
there is a sub-visible realm of microbes with the power to destroy bodies entirely, is used
for purposes of an ultraviolent regeneration: Slotkin’s understanding of the frontier
myth’s accompanying violence is updated to the microbial bastions of twentieth-century
biological warfare, extending and replicating the violence that has characterized
American frontier power for centuries. In “The Unparalleled Invasion,” London sutures
violent fantasy to an ostensibly scientific discussion, infusing the speculative and the
naturalistic toward a fantasy of hegemonic white supremacy. London’s awe at the
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microbial sublime is a means toward assuaging the anxieties accompanying a vision of a
settler America at the beginning of the twentieth century: a closed frontier, a supposedly
waning American life, persistent Asian immigration, and the waxing power of Asian
nation-states at the dawn of the twentieth century are all quickly and easily resolved
through the deus ex machina of the microbial intervention. The speculative fantasy of
“The Unparalleled Invasion” rejects diplomacy and other geopolitical matters of
international, intercultural encounter in favour of a totalizing vision of genocide.

1.5

Narrating Backwards: The Romance of Futurity

The element of fragmented futural temporality plays an important role in both of
these stories. In both “The Unparalleled Invasion” and The Scarlet Plague, characters
from a far future speak back toward their past, which is the writer’s present. The former’s
ending note that the story we have read is among the “Excerpts from Walt Mervin’s
‘Certain Essays in History’” (120), as well as its veneer of scholarly examination,
suggest an uncontroversial history that has been fully absorbed into the cultural
consciousness. Likewise, The Scarlet Plague also possesses a telescoping narrative, with
Granser and his youthful charges living in the 2070s, reflecting back on the Scarlet Death
outbreak of 2013 (and a past-tense narrative that suggests that Granser himself has long
passed on). Wong notes that such temporal manipulation was common to the future-war
and Chinese invasion literature of the time, as it disrupts “the linear model of historical
progress found in national reconciliation romances” and instead “defamiliarize[s] and
restructure[s] the experience of the present” (“Future Tense” 516-7), a feature common to
speculative fiction (see Csicsery-Ronay Jr. 77-79). The significance of the positioning of
this narrative voice helps us to resituate our thinking about London’s ideas of microbial
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sublime and immunity. Even in these futures, the narrative voices are no more certain
about how the microbial world operates—it is still a matter of mysterious awe and
sublime violence. The additional levels of narration are no more able to demystify or
historicize the processes of the destructive microbes—they remain just as immune to
narrative as they did during the events themselves. Narrators in London become the new
mythologizers, drawing together well-worn stories of American identity and progress and
weaving a new (if vague) understanding of science in order to inject these stories with a
new sense of life.85 Thus, to cite London’s famous line from White Fang, that “life is
movement; and the Wild aims to destroy movement” (4), in his speculative fictions,
London seems incapable of moving beyond his reified image of the male body. The
inability for London’s multifaceted narrative voices to interrogate or question each other
or the myths they propagate, and the sense of reification that links together these
temporally extended narratives, suggests that such obsessive focus on the violence of the
microbial sublime as a mysterious solution to the issues of ecological contamination,
immigration and international diplomacy, are anxieties around white masculine identity
from which London cannot escape. Rather than rejuvenating his preferred American
bodies and landscapes through interventions of the microbial, London’s texts freeze
them, substituting movement for an illusion of an eternally vital masculine body that
never existed.

Indeed, it is this sense of unreflective mythologization that Berkove sees as evidence that “The
Unparalleled Invasion” to be read ironically. He argues that the narrative voice of Walt Mervin is
intentionally ridiculous, and that “[i]t is impossible to believe that London would identify with a historian
so obviously shallow and ethnocentric” (“Parallax” 34).
85

120

Chapter 2

2

The Voice of the Flesh: Traversing the Immuniverse with
William S. Burroughs
“Among living beings, only man has language”
(Aristotle, Politics)
“In the beginning was the word and the word was God and the word was
flesh … human flesh … In the beginning of writing”
(William S. Burroughs, Electronic Revolution)
In Chapter One, the idea of narrative immunity was utilized for the purpose of

constructing and maintaining boundaries. For Jack London, the awareness of the
microbial world opened up anxieties relating to the role of white male subjectivity; the
incompleteness of that knowledge could be used to foreclose that same gulf. The lack of a
clear understanding of the epidemiology and pathology of microbial agents allowed
London to inject ideological fantasy into his speculative fiction, creating narratives in
which the white male body is redeemed from the threats of global capital and racial
encounter and reconciled with a re-naturalized American frontier. If London resorted to
the microbial to rescue borders that were becoming precariously porous, then William S.
Burroughs (1914-1997) converges on that same space with the goal of disintegrating such
barriers. Writing almost half a century after London, Burroughs’s fiction of the late1950s and 1960s—from his landmark novel Naked Lunch (1959) to his more
experimental “Nova trilogy” comprised of the novels The Soft Machine (1961, revised
1966), The Ticket That Exploded (1962, revised 1964 and 1967), and Nova Express
(1964)—is primarily fixated on the narrative entrapments into which subjectivities have
become entangled. Human beings are now little more than what he calls “soft machines,”
bare material upon which limiting and controlling “scripts” (or narratives) have been
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encoded. Self-possessed identity is an illusion overseen by shadowy and totalizing forces
of control, for Burroughs. The problem, in other words, is narrative, and Burroughs’s
solution is to relocate and reinvigorate the materiality that is located within these stories.
The flesh of the body, its presence—despite or because of that body’s grotesque or abject
qualities—becomes the locus for Burroughs’s attempt to rework a narrative practice that
is not predicated upon a power asymmetry that he terms “The Algebra of Need” (Naked
Lunch 201).
Burroughs is not a writer who can be said to cloak his political and aesthetic
interests beneath layers of subtlety. He prefers to deliver his ideas with the force of a
hammer. As he explains in an interview:
My basic theory is that the written word was actually a virus that made the spoken
word possible. The word has not been recognized as a virus because it has
achieved a state of stable symbiosis with the host, although this symbiotic
relationship is now breaking down […] Is the virus simply a time bomb left on
this planet to be activated by remote control? An extermination program in fact?
(qtd. in Miles 482).
For Burroughs, the entire history of humanity can be pathologized through the flesh’s
encounter with the viral organism of language. This encounter is fundamentally
predicated upon an imbalance between the word that narrates and the flesh that becomes
encoded and understood through these words. Burroughs thus maps a kind of ontomythology of human existence and subjectivity that is appended to infection. What
makes this story one of urgency, as Burroughs suggests at the end of the excerpt above, is
that the chasm between materiality and the word is continuing to expand, and an
apocalyptic cataclysm cannot be far behind. The virus, for Burroughs, signifies a violent
hunger, and in the widening gyre of modernity comes the increasing likelihood of an
entropic end.
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Burroughs’s theorization of the word resonates with the biopolitical project of
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. In contradistinction to Foucault’s claim that,
“starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved” (History 139),
Agamben understands the biopolitical project to have a far longer history. Agamben
notes that the Hellenic Greek terms for life, zoe, meaning “the simple fact of living
common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods),” and bios, “the form or way of
living proper to an individual or group,” constitute a political hierarchization of life from
the outset of Western civilization (Homo Sacer 1). This organization of life into different
qualitative spheres inaugurates the whole project of biopolitics in the West: indeed,
Agamben views every iteration of governance and rule from this period on to be marked
by this distinction between bios and zoe. This is precisely because, for Agamben, the role
of sovereignty is not a type of power regime that morphs over time into a wider
biopolitical array, but is the constitutive feature that animates Western political projects.
Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s idea of the “sovereign exception,” a principle of power where
“[s]overeign is he who decides on the state of exception” (qtd. in Homo Sacer 11),
biopolitics utilizes sovereign power to announce who belongs within the sphere of bios
and what is representative of a base zoe. The obverse to the sovereign, then, is the titular
homo sacer, or “sacred man,” a Roman legal term referring to a person “who may be
killed and yet not sacrificed” (8). In other words, homo sacer is placed in a “zone of
indistinction,” existing as the bridge point between the spaces of bios and zoe. More than
this, the existence of homo sacer is what allows such a hierarchization to exist; the death
of homo sacer “is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the
execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege” (9, 82). Removed from any access
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to bios, the homo sacer is the figure for the bare life that is necessary for the maintenance
of this political system, but also a body forever excluded from access to the space of
politics.
Homo sacer thus becomes the “conditional negative” that is situated between two
disconnected spheres. Homo sacer inaugurates a politics on a negative grounding. Here
again we can detect Agamben’s divergence from Foucault: the latter saw biopolitics as a
transformation of regimes and institutions of power, but did not see biopolitics as
possessing an inherently positive or negative character. Agamben, by contrast, sees
biopolitical organization as necessarily negative, as it “constitutes itself through an
exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life,” meaning that political
organization cannot be considered except with bare life as the negative figure haunting it
(Homo Sacer 7). Therefore, “until a completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer
founded on the exception of bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will
remain imprisoned and immobile, and the ‘beautiful day’ of life will be given citizenship
only through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the
spectacle condemns it” (11). All (Western) politics is biopolitics, and this politicization of
bare life will yield only further mutations of domination, violence, and mass murder.86
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Indeed, Agamben suggests even radical political critiques operate with an unconscious acceptance of this
negative figure at the heart of its politics. Agamben suggests that the “weakeness of anarchist and Marxian
critiques of the State was precisely not to have caught sight of this structure and thus to have quickly left
the arcanum imperii aside, as it if had no substance outside of the simulacra and the ideologies invoked to
justify it” (Homo Sacer 12). For Agamben, the political project must be wholly rethought; in this sense he
has some affinity with Burroughs, who had little interest in any kind of critical political project aimed at
capitalism: “I was never tempted by any political program,” he claimed (qtd. in Miles 52). Yet where it’s
clear that Agamben’s politics is focused on rethinking a politics of community and collectivity, Burroughs
is most commonly recognized as embracing a hyper-individualistic libertarian political ideology (see Miles
487; A. Seltzer 347.; McCarthy 38). When asked about his stance on the Vietnam War, Burroughs
responded bluntly: “I don’t want to hear about the fucking masses and I never did” (qtd. in Miles 52).
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Foucault famously said of his analysis of biopolitics that “[f]or millennia, man
remained what he was for Aristotle, a living animal with the additional capacity for
political existence” (qtd. in Agamben, Homo Sacer 119). Foucault’s definition here
paraphrases another of Aristotle’s ontological distinctions, that which privileges the
human as the “living being with the additional capacity for speech” (McLoughlin, “The
Sacred” n. pag.). Agamben traces an affinity between these two concepts in his
philosophical project, finding a direct correspondence between the metaphysical and the
biopolitical. The role of language in determining the human is an idea to which Agamben
continuously returns, for it sutures together his various other philosophical projects. In
the introduction to Homo Sacer, Agamben claims that “[t]he link between bare life and
politics is the same link that the metaphysical definition of man as ‘the living being who
has language’ seeks in relation between phone and logos” (7). In Agamben’s conception,
both the metaphysical definition of humanity and the (bio)political dimension of human
organization are structured in an homologous fashion. Thus, if biopolitics is predicated
upon the inclusive exclusion of bare life, then the metaphysical definition of humanity as
the being that possesses language is similarly structured upon an inclusive exclusion. In
Language and Death, Agamben traces out his thinking on this subject, providing a
similar model to that more famous shape of his biopolitics. Between the “animal voice”
of phone and the discursive meaning of logos, Agamben detects what he terms “Voice”
(with a capital to distinguish it from phone). “Voice” operates as the mediation between
these two separate spheres, for it is “a no-longer (voice) and a not-yet (meaning),” a point
by which the human being is made distinguishable from the unintelligibility of animal
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sound but prior to an entrance into language (35).87 However, Agamben immediately
clarifies, this Voice “necessarily constitutes a negative dimension,” for it is the “ground”
of the metaphysical dimension of the human that necessarily disappears in order to
establish the human within language (35). Thus, the connection between the metaphysical
and biopolitical structures is made clear here: both are founded on an originary
negativity, a grounding in a disavowal that can nonetheless be exorcised from the
centrality of these structures. Voice and bare life haunt these models of thinking through
their inclusive exclusion, both of which necessarily limn the possibilities and
considerations of contemporary philosophy and politics. It is through this negative
philosophical project, spanning metaphysics and biopolitics, that we can gain an
understanding of Burroughs’s literary project.
Given the affinities between Agamben’s philosophical interests—the tenor of the
biopolitical, the metaphysical concerns of the human being, the central role that language
plays in both, it is surprising that his philosophical project has not more often been
utilized to examine Burroughs’s literary works.88 Throughout Burroughs’s writing, the
metaphysical condition of the human as a living being possessing language and a living
being possessing the capacity for politics is ceaselessly interrogated and inverted. For
instance, The Soft Machine ends, appropriately enough, with a “negative creation myth”
(Robinson 48) that depicts the alien origins of the language virus and its corrupting
influence on pre-linguistic human beings. The final routine, entitled “Cross the Wounded

As Agamben will explain in The Open: “[a]nimals do not enter into language, they are already inside it.
Man, instead, by having an infancy, by preceding speech, splits the single language” (qtd. in Attell 57).
88
The major exception to this statement is Christopher Breu, who utilizes both Agamben and Esposito to
think about Burroughs. I will discuss Breu’s contributions in greater detail below.
87
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Galaxies” (Soft Machine 173-178) depicts pre-linguistic, animalistic beings and their first
encounter with the “muttering sickness” or “talk sickness” (173). The narrative voice
recounts:
We waded into the warm mud-water. hair and ape flesh off in screaming strips.
stood naked human bodies covered with phosphorescent green jelly. soft tentative
flesh cut with ape wounds. peeling other genitals. fingers and tongues rubbing off
the jelly-cover. body melting pleasure-sounds in the warm mud. till the sun went
and a blue wind of silence touched human faces and hair. When we came out of
the mud we had names. (174)
Pre-linguistic materiality is fundamentally altered in this closing scenario, reshaped by
language in a grotesque baptism of filth. Indeed, cutting up this passage, Burroughs’s
narrative voice adds on the following page that “[h]uman our bodies melted into when we
crawled out” (175). The concept of “human” is something that the hypostatic material
condition becomes when it encounters language. The “ape flesh” is rendered as beholden
to a different ontological character from when it becomes linguistically equipped, and
this idea sets up the rest of the trilogy’s obsession with an invasive, parasitic force. There
is a clear temporal disjunction between the “ape flesh” that exists prior to its transcendent
mud bath and the divided being that emerges on the other side. This form of bare life is
riddled with a narrativizing past: in closing The Soft Machine with a kind of “origin
story,” Burroughs plays with the notion that a narrative history of language can exist.
“Cross the Wounded Galaxies” thus acts as a kind of satirical biopolitical myth of human
origin and linguistic capability—a story of the predation of language on the body, which
will recur endlessly throughout the remaining volumes of the trilogy. We think of
ourselves as mutated by language into something else, removed from our fundamental
flesh into an entirely different ontological category.

127

Yet if language is an infectious and malevolent organism, then how can it be
possible to write one’s way out of such a trajectory? How is it possible to narrate
immunity when the concept of narration, for Burroughs, is a priori one of
contamination?89 Burroughs famously claimed that “[a] new mythology is possible in the
Space Age, where we will again have heroes and villains with respect to intentions
towards this planet—the future of the novel is not in Time, but in Space” (qtd. in
Grauerholz and Silverberg 181).90 The Nova trilogy represents that attempt to
disempower the old myths of human existence and prepare a new storyline. Clearly,
Burroughs sees the possibility of instantiating a new relationship to language. If, as Alex
Houen contends, Burroughs’s literary project while writing the Nova trilogy sought to
“extend the possibilities of the human as a species” (104), then this involved thinking not
only in terms of geopolitical entities, but of microcosmic factors and encounters as well.
In order to understand how he approaches such an ambitious project, it is necessary first
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This is of course a question with which all Burroughs scholarship grapples. Toby Tanner notes the
“paradox of using language to release people from language” as organizing Burroughs’s writing career, and
suggests that Burroughs’s move beyond this impasse is to engage in a kind of “sky writing” that “fad[es]
even at the moment of articulation” (122, 140). Meanwhile, Robin Lydenberg sees the Nova trilogy as
attempting to perform such radical experimentation on the capacities of language so as to “exhaust the
language parasite, to push linguistic strategy and physical sensation to their limits,” resulting in a liberatory
escape from the body (137). Breu notes “the ambuigity of the concept of the virus in [Burroughs’s] hands”
(38), while Oliver Harris notes that the virus for Burroughs is a “mythic object of radically ambivalent
fascination” (214). Lastly, David Porush adds that “[t]rue silence cannot be attained in this universe, since
noise is a background condition of the cosmos …. But this silence Burroughs hopes to attain is the absence
of code through cancellation of the message” (103).
90
Burroughs delivered these remarks at a contentious literary conference in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1962.
There Burroughs’s work was both highly praised and excoriated from various camps. Most interestingly,
Mary McCarthy defended Burroughs’s works (primarily Naked Lunch) by stating that “I thought the
national novel, like the nation-state, was dying and a new kind of novel, based on statelessness, was
beginning to be written” (33, emphasis added). McCarthy’s homology between the literary form of the
novel and the role of national identity is an interesting one with respect to biopolitics. As Breu remarks, the
novel’s setting of Interzone (loosely based on Tangier, Morocco) “points forward to late-capitalist
economic and social organization that [was] just emerging or becoming newly dominant in the fifties and
sixties” (37).
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to examine the cultural milieu in which Burroughs was writing, and the advent of new
discourses of infection and immunity at this time.

2.1

Mutually Assured Exclusion—The Shape of Cold War
Biopolitics

In the fifty years between the speculative naturalism of London and the early
postmodern experiments of Burroughs, the science of microbiology and immunology
both developed tremendously. While the virus was still a theoretical concept in the early
twentieth century, by the 1930s Wendell Stanley was able to finally glimpse a virus under
an electron microscope and isolate a dead viral microbe. It was only after the Second
World War, and the dawn of the Cold War, however, that virology entered its own
“golden age” (Radetsky, qtd. in Foertsch 22). As Priscilla Wald demonstrates, the 1950s
saw the virus enter into the public consciousness, with the discoveries made by
microbiologists rapturously reported in mainstream newspapers such as the New York
Times, and “[t]he earliest treatments of viruses in both specialty and mainstream press
expressed wonder at this unusual life form,” marveling in particular at its liminal
character, existing on the boundaries of both life and death (161). Yet this wonder was
soon eclipsed by greater existential fears, for “[a]ccounts of viruses frequently shared the
page with another topic of particular interest: the allegedly emerging global threat of
communism and the politics of the Cold War” (158). The characteristics of viruses as
beings hijacking the “healthy” machinery of a body in order to spit out identical copies of
itself had a specific resonance in the Cold War imaginary. As Daryl Ogden notes,
“[v]irologists posited the existence of powerful viruses, dangerous enemies beyond the
body’s borders, capable of violating those borders under favorable circumstances” (248).
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Science and ideology emerged side-by-side, and mutually informed one another: “[f]rom
the press to the movie theater, the classroom to the television screen, Americans, like
their Soviet counterparts, were inundated with stories and images of a cunning enemy
waiting to infiltrate the deepest recesses of their being” (176).91 The threat of the virus
became the threat of a hostile and organized invasive force, an image eerily familiar to
Americans on the geopolitical scale.
In concert with the post-war boom in virology were similar advances in the field
of immunology, the study of the body’s response to disease. As Arthur Silverstein
remarks, the years between 1951 and 1972 were “the era of most rapid change in
immunology” (367), a period marked by vast amounts of government investment of
people and resources into a better understanding of the idea of the body and bodily
defense. Ogden claims that “following the conclusion of World War I theoretical and
experimental advances in immunology advanced at a snail’s pace,” and would not reach
mainstream awareness until the 1949 publication of Frank Fenner’s and McFarlane
Burnet’s The Production of Antibodies (244, 245).92 Starting from this study and
continuing on throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Burnet would posit that the immune
system works on the basis of what is termed “self/nonself discrimination” (Cohen 26). As
Burnet would explain in a later book, “[t]he production of antibodies or any other
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One of the examples Wald provides of this intermingling rhetoric is in a report from the House of
Representatives that reads “[c]ommunistic ideals are germs in the body politic, hostile, but harmless so long
as the body maintains a healthful condition and reacts normally to human needs. They are dangerous only
when the resistance of the body becomes weakened through social or selfish errors” (172). Cindy Patton
adds another dimension to this connection, noting that “medical and military imagery [were]
interchangbl[e]: reds and queers were alternately diseases and invasions” (Sex & Germs 88).
92
In fact, this was the second edition of a volume published under that name. Burnet (without Fenner) had
originally published The Production of Antibodies in 1941, but this version “made no mention at all of
autoimmunity or antiautobodies” (Silverstein 165).
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immunological reaction by an organism is carried out against foreign materials, that is,
against anything that is not part of that organism” (qtd. in Esposito, Immunitas 154). The
body produces unique “self markers” on every one of its individual cells, which prevents
the body’s immune system from targeting and destroying them. When a cell not
indigenous to the body enters, it lacks such self markers, and therefore provokes an
immune response (Silverstein 164). Burnet’s theorization is that the body is capable of
recognizing its own cells while targeting alien invaders that do not possess such a
biological signature. So persuasive was Burnet’s theorization of self/nonself that the
theory came to dominate the thinking of immunology for decades, and, as Silverstein
notes, “immunology has more than once been called ‘the science of self-nonself
discrimination’” (92). Once again, such a familiar image lent itself well to the political
situation, as “immunologists warned healthy and sick Americans alike of formidable
enemies within the body that appeared … to constitute the Self but were, in fact, Other”
(Ogden 248).
The landmark developments in post-war virology and immunology suggest a
development of a new paradigm of understanding bodies and their relationships to
environments. Yet as Cindy Patton aptly remarks, “[a]lthough we commonly characterize
modern medicine as a move away from mystifications about the body … both science
and popular culture retain the logic of older symbolic systems,” and the explosive
scientific interest in virology and immunology in the 1950s “can be viewed as
articulations of more longstanding basic models” (Inventing AIDS 58). For Patton, these
new paths of science not only tinge the cultural imaginary, but are themselves drawn
from the established beliefs and ideologies that shape that culture. Wald does the most to
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unite these two strains of thought, showing how they are both involved in the idea of
subversion and sabotage within the American political and cultural landscape of the Cold
War. Noting the “conceptual exchange between virology and Cold War politics,” Wald
sees how “[a]s viruses became increasingly sinister and wily, sneaking into cells and
assuming control of their mechanisms, external agents, such as Communists, became
viral, threatening to corrupt the dissemination of information as they infiltrated the nerve
center of the state” (158-159).93 Patton describes how “[i]mmunology provided the
grammar for shifting dominant metaphors of disease from offense to civil defense,”
useful in the time of “lingering Cold War paranoia [that] demanded that our immune
systems should conform to a policing and confessional ideology” (Inventing AIDS 60).
Ogden, meanwhile, notes how the two disciplines offered different rationalizations for
the wider cultural clash with communism: “virology capitalized on fears of a hot war
with America’s communist adversaries while immunology was predicated on the fear of
disloyalty and subversion within the body (politic) itself” (248).94 And Emily K. Martin
explains that it was during this era that “the imagery of the body as a fortress or a castle
was most vibrant” (71).95 The sciences help to reify the idea of diametrically opposed
forces and the need for vigorous maintenance of defensive structures in order to protect

While the Cold War’s most infamous sign may have been nuclear weapons, Iliana Semmler points out
that “[t]o a considerable degree, the virus has taken the place of the nuclear bomb as a threat of destruction
that animated film and fiction during the Cold War and after” (161).
94
As both Ogden and Patton prove, the sciences of virology and immunology existed in competition with
each other during this time, “until a virus was discovered which was causally related to immune failure,”
this being HIV/AIDS (Patton 58; see also Ogden 248).
95
Wald disagrees with Ogden, Patton, and Martin, suggesting that what most captivated both virologists
and the American public during this era was “the virus’s ability to appropriate the mechanisms of the cell
for its own reproduction” (173), rather than simply the invasion and destruction of the host organism. For
Wald, these readings overlook the subversive and infiltrating power the virus had in the American cultural
imaginary.
93
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the mutually embodied entities of nation and state. Thus the Cold War organizes the
contours and elements of biological and biopolitical thinking, placing the body and the
environment within a sphere of aggressive conflict for mastery. Such thinking will inform
the particularly immunological declension biopolitics takes, as well as potentially
enabling the means to see beyond such bellicose discourse.

2.2

Additional Capacities—The Persistence of the Flesh

Wald claims that “[n]o one more insightfully chronicled the anxieties of the age
than William S. Burroughs,” due in no small part to his “understanding of the science he
used in his work” (183, 185). Burroughs’s era is characterized by the paranoia and
uncertainty that the new political and scientific horizons portend, and the virus becomes
his guiding metaphor of these turbulent times. Yet, more than just a writer with an
awareness of science, Burroughs is, as Christopher Breu contends, in the first instance a
writer of biopolitics. From Naked Lunch onward Burroughs constructs “fictional
landscape[s] that [are] built around biopolitical production,” and where “[b]are life
becomes the locus in which sovereignty is fully visible” (37, 56). Most interestingly,
Breu analyzes how Burroughs examines “the flesh as a key site of resistance as well as
exploitation in late capitalism” (47). What makes Burroughs’s fiction so resonant is that
he is aware of how the ideologies of inclusive exclusion are built on top of the human
flesh. Such a locus is not just a vector of exploitation and violence in a biopolitical
regime, but it is also how to rethink biopolitics beyond its negative declension that
informs Agamben’s reading. If there is a possibility of reworking biopolitics, then it must
involve rethinking the body and how we narrate it and its relationship to immunity.

133

For Breu, this “new flesh” focuses the possibility of grounding a response to
biopolitical regimes of production and control. But how are we to consider this flesh? As
something pre-linguistic, an immanence that can undercut the primacy of language in
poststructuralist thought? Breu himself does not fully theorize the idea; to think through
Burroughs’s engagements with the flesh’s biopolitical qualities requires thinking through
some of Roberto Esposito’s densest meditations on biopolitical ontology. Esposito
expands upon the work of Foucault and Agamben by suggesting that the reason “a
politics of life always risk[s] being reversed into a work of death” (Bios 8) is because
political organizations rely on a “paradigm of immunization” that “introject[s] the
negative modality of its opposite” (52). Bare life, then, is that which is negatively
opposed to a community of bios, and must be immunized against. For Esposito, this
paradigm inevitably tends toward increasingly (self-)destructive autoimmunity. To this
point, the biopolitical projects of Agamben and Esposito are aligned, as they trace the
role of bare life in biopolitical organization and the way that such biopolitical
organization will become increasingly mobile and rapacious. Yet there is a key
distinction in their thought: in contrast to Agamben, who sees biopolitics as ineluctably
inflected with a negative violence directed at bare life,96 Esposito believes that biopolitics
possesses an affirmative as well as destructive valence.

Esposito’s translator and commentator Timothy Campbell argues that “the overwhelming impression” of
Agamben’s biopolitical project “is of a kind of flattening of the specificity of a modern biopolitics in favor
of a metaphysical reading of the originary and infinite state of exception that has since its inception eroded
the political foundations of social life” (“Translator’s Introduction” xxii). This historical critique is a valid
one, yet it also further aligns the projects of Agamben and Burroughs, as Burroughs is only intermittently
interested in historical epochs and, as will be discussed below, treats the language virus and the materiality
of the flesh as transhistorical, hypostatic concepts.
96
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The way to approach and comprehend such a non-destructive, non-immunitary
principle of biopolitics requires deconstructive inversion of these principles at their most
violent. To this end, Esposito attempts to outline a deconstructive reading of the
autoimmune biopolitical regime par excellence of Nazi Germany. Esposito identifies the
three main pillars of the Nazis’ biopolitical program as “the absolute normativization of
life,” “the double enclosure of the body,” and “the anticipatory suppression of birth”
(Bios 11). If these programs represent the apex of biopolitical destruction, then it is
necessary to rework these terms, to “turn them inside out,” in order to develop a
generative vision of biopolitics (157). The most salient of these strategies, for the
purposes of this argument, is Esposito’s focus on the concept of “flesh.” For Esposito,
Nazi Germany’s “double enclosure of the body” involved “the chaining of the subject
into his own body and … the incorporation of such a body in that extensive body of the
German ethnic community” (157).97 The body becomes an absolutely fixed point within
such a biopolitical regime, and the individual body becomes a kind of microcosmic
replication of the national body of the German state, a homunculus used to represent the
hygienic and genetic character of the German people. In the development of the
individual body and the “body” of the nation-state, Esposito detects the apotheosis of the
immunitary paradigm, predicated upon a self/nonself binary distinction and the radical
destruction of the latter category.

This point seems to develop Agamben’s description in Remnants of Auschwitz that “[w]ith the emergence
of biopower, every people is doubled by a population” (84). This is an expansion on Foucault’s point made
in “Society Must Be Defended” that it is the introduction of a biological racism into political calculation
that turns (or, rather, extends) people defined by political organization into racial figures who are
biologically categorized (see 254-255).
97
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If the Nazi regime, representative of a kind of biopolitics taken to the extremity of
its autoimmune potential, absolutely captures subjectivity within embodiments, then
Esposito’s remedy is not to decouple the individual body from the national body (which
would be the sign of post-War neoliberal governmentality and is still irrevocably tied to
this notion of the immune body), but to working out a concept of “flesh” that forces us to
rethink material presence and social being. While the notion of “flesh” has been critiqued
by poststructuralist thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy as a relic of a
transcendental metaphysics, becoming for them “the most directional vector through
which Christianity penetrates modern philosophy” (Esposito, “Flesh and Body” 89),
Esposito himself reverses these concepts—“modernity expressed its increasing demand
for immunization by assigning absolute centrality to the figure of the body” (95). In
contrast to the critical approach of Derrida and Nancy, Esposito turns to Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, who reads the flesh as that which “has no name in any philosophy” (qtd.
in Esposito, Bios 159). This is because, per Esposito, “no philosophy has known how to
reach that undifferentiated layer (and thus for this reason exposed to difference), in which
the same notion of body, anything but enclosed, is now turned outside … in an
irreducible heterogeneity” (159).98 When Merleau-Ponty claims that “my body is made
of the same flesh as the world … and moreover … this flesh of my body is shared by the
world” (qtd. in 160), Espsoito sees that commonality of identity and world, of a shared
ontology, as a vital component in articulating a new biopolitics. His formula that “the
flesh is to community what the body is to immunity” (“Flesh and Body” 95) makes this

Esposito’s reference to flesh as an “undifferentiated layer” has a significant echo with Burroughs’s
exploration of “undifferentiated tissue” in Naked Lunch, of which I will discuss in greater detail below.
98
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connection explicit. It is the ontological commonality of the flesh, its ability to link
together a material presence in the world that is undifferentiated and unprivileged in its
presence that is not only philosophically invigorating, but generatively biopolitical. Such
a vision does not mean to reduce everything down to a shared and completely selfcoincident experience. Esposito will go on to reject the normativity of life through the
experience of singularity, suggesting that his affirmative biopolitics would see the shared
singularity of life in “a being that is both singular and communal, generic and specific,
and undifferentiated and different, not only devoid of spirit, but a flesh that doesn’t even
have a body” (Bios 167).
Thus, the biopolitical stakes of Burroughs’s literary project are set out:
Agamben’s approach in thinking through how the “inclusive exclusions” of both animal
voice and bare life are necessary negativities to prop up the intertwined metaphysical and
biopolitical projects that excavate and define what is “human,” but he remains somewhat
reticent on how to articulate a vision unrelated to these domineering logics. Esposito’s
deconstructive project of immunity and his focus on the flesh as the site of ontological
community while maintaining an affirmative singularity allow us to begin to think what
such a biopolitics not organized around (auto)immunity might look like. As Breu
suggests, Burroughs is a writer of the flesh in all its grotesque, abjected, and relentlessly
morphological possibility. For Burroughs, narrating flesh is a means of narrating
immunity, of halting the asymmetry of viral infection that creates bodies that matter only
insofar as they do not matter, and challenging the illusions of immaterial transcendence
that are replete in postwar capitalist society. Burroughs is the poet of bare life, using it as
his hypostasis for exploring the universe. If the Nova Trilogy is to serve as the
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“mythology for the space age,” then it must explore a myth of bare life beyond its role in
immunization, beyond its subservience to the virus of the word. Burroughs’s project, in
other words, is an attempt to immunize against immunity, to divine a narratology of flesh.

2.3

Atrophied Preface: Naked Lunch and the Biopolitical
Flesh

Naked Lunch most immediately explores the abjected role of the flesh under
threat; the novel creates “a fictional landscape that is built around biopolitical
production” (Breu 37). The clearest example of this is instantiated in the character of
Bradley the Buyer. Bradley is the “[b]est narcotics agent in the industry,” owing to his
unique ability to appear indistinguishably from other heroin addicts. “He is so
anonymous, grey and spectral,” the narrator informs us, that “the pusher [sic] don’t
remember him afterwards” (Naked Lunch 14). Yet while this physical appearance mirrors
that of the junkies, Bradley’s addiction is not that of the opiate, but his own addiction to
taking orders and working within the hierarchy. The narrator states that Bradley’s “body
is making his own junk equivalent,” that Bradley has a “steady connection. A Man
Within you might say” (15). Addiction manifests itself on the body of its mark, no matter
what the element of addiction is—it any case, it subordinates the subject to a
deteriorating materiality, and the interchangeability of addiction makes it a useful tool for
police infiltration. Indeed, Bradley is so good at his job that he becomes an object of
disgust in the police department, and he is fired from his job by the District Supervisor
for being too skilled at manifesting need. In response to this deprivation, a distraught
Bradley, craving the effect of control, absorbs the District Supervisor into himself (16).
The conclusion of this sub-routine follows an almost paradigmatic Agambenian
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trajectory: Bradley is arrested and placed before a judge who states that “I would
recommend that you be confined or more accurately contained in some institution, but I
know of no place suitable for a man of your caliber. I must reluctantly order your release”
(16). The increasingly inhuman Bradley, reduced to a ravenous fleshiness, “spreads terror
throughout the industry” through his relentless absorption of both police and addicts,
until “he is caught in the act of digesting the Narcotics Commissioner and destroyed with
a flame thrower” (17). As a cap to this story, the narrator explains “the court of inquiry
ruling that such means were justified in that the Buyer had lost his human citizenship and
was, in consequence, a creature without species” (17, emphasis added). This passage
depicts Bradley’s loss of identity within the “algebra of need,” and how the systems of
control can no longer classify him as a human citizen, but a material “creature without
species,” the ultimate bare life, a hungry flesh that must be policed and destroyed before
it disrupts the black-market economy and the police action that develops parallel to it.
Bradley’s identity is stripped away until he becomes manipulable bare life, capable of
being destroyed or reformed according to regimes of biopower. Bradley The Buyer in
particular seems to echo with Agamben’s warning of the mobility of bare life, that
“[b]are life is no longer confined to a particular place or definite category. It now dwells
in the biological body of every living being” (Homo Sacer 140).99

In the routine titled “islam incorporated and the parties of interzone” (Naked Lunch 121-141), Burroughs
satirically organizes political factions around explicit concerns of the flesh. The four major political parties
in Interzone are the Factualists, the Liquefactionists, the Divisionists, the Senders. The Divisionists
represent the “moderate” party of Interzone, so named because they “literally divide,” amputating “tiny bits
of flesh and grow[ing] exact replicas of themselves in embryo jelly” (137). Lest the Divisionists be
considered representatives of a freeing of fleshly materiality, the narrator immediately adds that “[r]eplicas
must periodically recharge with the Mother Cell,” suggesting that there remains a central organism from
which all other replicas emanate, that they are copies without any independence or lives of their own (138).
Thus the Divisionists represent a kind of empty materiality, forming mindless clones of themselves used
99
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In spite of the sad fate of Bradley, Breu suggests that it is possible to see the flesh
as a “site of resistance” within the novel, and points toward the most (in)famous portion
of Naked Lunch, the story of “the man who taught his asshole to talk” (111) that appears
in the routine titled “ordinary men and women” (101-121). In the routine, narrated by the
sinister Dr. Benway, a carny is able to grant his asshole the ability of speech for the
purposes of entertaining his spectators at his nightly show; however, the asshole comes
with a conscience and subjectivity of its own, one that exists in distinction and opposition
to the carny. Eventually, the voice begins “demanding equal rights” that are possessed by
the carny’s whole, though not his hole (111). Benway’s story ends with the asshole
victorious: Undifferentiated Tissue grows around the carny, filling his mouth and leaving
only his eyes unencumbered; this story is rendered by Benway as a moment of horror, as
“you could see the silent, helpless suffering of the brain behind the eyes, then finally the
brain must have died, because the eyes went out, and there was no more feeling in them
than a crab’s eye on the end of a stalk” (112).
Benway’s tale is a literalization of the revenge of matter, as the carny is
grotesquely subsumed by a materiality that extends beyond his sense of self, a hungry
and vital flesh that rebuilds the body onto which it is a part. Benway refers to this “new
flesh” as “un-D.T., Undifferentiated Tissue, which can grow into any kind of flesh on the

only for physical and sexual labour. It is the Senders, however, who are described as “the most dangerous
and evil men in the world” (136). This faction is composed of telepaths, who practice a form of
“encephalographic research” termed “biocontrol,” in a prescient echo of biopower. The Senders use their
mind control abilities to beam out “telepathic broadcasts instructing the workers what to feel and when”
(137). The Senders stand in for forms of complete biopower manipulation, and the narrative voice explains
that this form of mental control is predicated on replicating and maintaining its own power: “[y]ou see
control can never be a means to any practical end…It can never be a means to anything but more
control…Like junk…” (139). The Senders are the apotheosis of biopower in Interzone, reducing bodies to
static pawns controlled by a singular operator, the mental dominating the physical.
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human body” (111). For Breu, this moment represents the positive tonality of a
Burroughsian biopolitics—he sees the talking asshole as “the new flesh in its initial
emergence—flesh that has no stable place in the symbolic and indeed exists in
contradiction to it” (Breu 58). Yet it is important to consider how this new flesh is being
narrated, and by whom. The novel introduces Benway by describing him as “advisor to
the Freeland Republic, a place given over to free love and continual bathing,” then noting
that his appearance in this state “indicates all is not well behind the hygienic facade;
Benway is a manipulator and coordinator of symbol systems, an expert on all phases of
interrogation, brainwashing, and control” (19). Throughout Naked Lunch, Benway
experiments on the flesh and identities of patients that happen to pass through his everchanging official residences. In this sense, the bare life of “un-D.T.” represents the
ultimate vector of control for Benway, the canvas upon which he can develop and
construct endless experiments of materiality.100
This memorable story is bracketed by the sinister Drs. Benway and Schafer and
their interests in the experimental capacities of the human flesh. The story is prefaced by
the doctors’ interests in modifying the human being—as the latter comments, “[t]he
human body is scandalously inefficient,” proposing “one all-purpose hole to eat and
eliminate” in place of a “mouth and anus to get out of order” (110). Benway one-ups his
colleague by suggesting “[w]hy not one all-purpose blob?” before launching into his

While Benway is perhaps Burroughs’s most recognizable antagonist, Sean Michael Bolton offers an
interesting dissension, suggesting that “Benway reflects Burroughs’s own hyper-practical approach and
becomes a sort of alter ego” (68). For Bolton, Benway’s fascination in experimenting on the flesh that
characterizes bare life is akin to Burroughs’s own literary project, that both Benway and Burroughs serve as
“the pharmakeus, the administrator of the pharmakon as writing” (69).
100
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story (110). Likewise, after Benway’s story reaches its conclusion, he returns to a more
general discussion of tissue:
That’s the sex that passes the censor, squeezes through between bureaus, because
there’s always a space between, in popular songs and Grade B movies, giving
away the basic American rottenness, spurting out like breaking boils, throwing
out globs of that un-D.T. to fall anywhere and grow into some degenerate
cancerous life-form, reproducing a hideous random image. Some would be
entirely made of penis-like erectile tissue, others viscera barely covered over with
skin, clusters of three and four eyes together, crisscross of mouth and assholes,
human parts shaken around and poured out any way they fell. (112)
Benway continues by noting that: “[t]he end result of complete cellular representation is
cancer. Democracy is cancerous, and bureaus are its cancer. … Bureaucracy is wrong as
a cancer, a turning away from the human evolutionary direction of infinite potentials and
differentiation and independent spontaneous action to the parasitism of a virus” (112).
Benway’s homology between the tissue of the individual being and the organization of
the nation-state here act as the extension of Esposito’s theorizing of the “double
enclosure,” material that allows for the growth of viral agents. While Breu is correct in
seeing the radical materiality that un-D.T. portends within Burroughs’s literary universe,
he does not attend to how that flesh will become inevitably recaptured within narration.
Benway, the ultimate biopolitical operator, is able to direct the tissue within a narrative of
corruption and disgust. Thus, Breu is correct in seeing in Benway’s “un-D.T.” an
evocation of a post-war “new flesh” that operates as both the site of domination and
resistance within Burroughs’s conception. The new flesh is a kind of literalized “bare
life,” a materiality stripped of any political quality whatsoever, reduced to a present
immediacy. For Breu, such depictions demonstrate how “[b]are life thus becomes the
locus in which the violence of sovereignty is fully visible and can be enacted outside of
the dictates of constitution, social contract, or law” (56). But if that is the limit point of
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bare life’s presence in the text, then we still remain trapped within Agamben’s paradigm
of a biopolitics predicated upon the “inclusive exclusion,” where bare life is taken as the
source of sovereignty’s power. In other words: it is not enough for Burroughs to merely
represent bare life; a truly radical program requires reworking narrative taking bare life
as its protagonist. The un-D.T. remains wholly within the experimental and narrative
purview of the sinister Benway, who uses it to pronounce a parasitic and viral threat that
must be contained and subverted through rigorous experimentation. Benway serves, at
this point, as the novel’s perspective of immune narration, devising un-D.T. as an
ambivalent concept that he, as a medical professional, is capable of pathologizing and
exploring.
Naked Lunch is, above all, a novel exploring the potentiality of materiality. As the
author writes in the “Atrophied Preface” that closes the novel (182-196), “[y]ou can cut
into Naked Lunch at any intersection point…I have written many prefaces. They atrophy
and amputate spontaneous” (187). Naked Lunch is about breaking away from the
outdated form of the novel as an embodied whole, of representing instead a series of
fragmentary entrance points. In empowering the flesh, Burroughs writes that “[t]he
Human Virus can now be isolated and treated” (141). As Breu notes, Burroughs’s
invocation that “the way OUT is the way IN” represents his belief that the flesh that is
manipulating and dominated by regimes of control is also the locus of resisting this
biopolitical power (58). Yet at the level of narration, Burroughs is uncertain how to
proceed. Naked Lunch provides a useful prologue to Burroughs’s Nova trilogy, for it is in
this novel that he depicts or gestures toward several of the ideas that he will develop in
his later work. The fragmentation of conventional narrative structure and character, the
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focus on a mutating and vibrant flesh-without-body and the ways in which narrative
attempts to recoup and manipulate such illustrations are all helpful. Perhaps most
importantly, however, Burroughs starts working toward a thinking of the parasitic
character of the virus, and how it operates. His consideration of “The Human Virus”
throughout Naked Lunch shows Burroughs’s interest in thinking through illusions of
identity and its predatory nature toward flesh. Yet we can also see the limit points of
Burroughs’s radical thinking in Naked Lunch; by moving on to the Nova trilogy, with its
increasingly notable formal and narratological experimentation, we can detect Burroughs’
more radical formal engagements with the narration of bare life.

2.4

The Nova Trilogy: The Flesh Made Word

Burroughs’s Nova trilogy develops directly from the ideas he explored in Naked
Lunch and its “algebra of need.” Burroughs expands his scope to include not only the
abject citizens of Interzone, but the entire universe and all of human (pre-)history in its
scope. Burroughs’s chronotope encapsulates the entire realm of existence within the
algebra of need in order to demonstrate how such logics of domination have developed
and permutated, and to explore options in counteracting this degraded life of the flesh.
While in Naked Lunch Burroughs speaks of “The Human Virus,” the Nova trilogy
extends this idea of addiction-infection to include almost every aspect of life. At the heart
of this ontology, however, Burroughs identifies a central source:
The “Other Half” is the word. The “Other Half” is an organism. Word is an
organism. The presence of the “Other Half” a separate organism attached to your
nervous system on an air line of words can now be demonstrated experimentally.
... [T]he “Other Half” worked quite some years on a symbiotic basis. From
symbiosis to parasitism is a short step. The word is now a virus. (Ticket 49)
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It is language itself that Burroughs identifies as the ur-infection, the alien force that
operates on the flesh, creating out of it human identity while simultaneously capturing
and enslaving that material life. The reason for this is simple: viruses, unlike bacteria,
lack the replicative machinery to make copies of themselves, and so they require host
bodies with DNA machinery in order to maintain existence. “What does a virus do
wherever it can dissolve a hole and find traction?” Burroughs’s narrative voice, Inspector
Lee, asks—“It starts eating—And what does it do with what it eats?—It makes exact
copies of itself that start eating to make more copies that start eating to make more copies
that start eating and so forth to the virus power the fear hate virus slowly replaces the host
with virus copies” (Nova 73). In this mytho-philosophy, the flesh is the existential
hypostasis upon which a predatory viral language has erected the concept of human being
and human civilization.
Parodying a Biblical pronouncement, Burroughs lays out the scope of his literary
project: “[i]n the beginning was the word. In the beginning of what exactly? The earliest
artifacts date back ten thousand years give a little take a little and ‘recorded’ — (or
prerecorded) history about seven thousand years. The human race is said to have been on
set for 500,000 years. … What we call history is the history of the word” (Ticket 50).
Burroughs identifies a scope of existence that exceeds the province of language—there is
some quality, some essence of life that precedes the intervention of the word. Word
empowers the speaking animal, and thus the political animal; for Burroughs, the
dominating power that all political structures take, therefore, is an epiphenomenon of the
word on the living presence of a universal flesh. Thus, the purpose of the Nova trilogy is
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two-fold: to excavate that vital principle, and to rescue it from this grotesquely literal
prison-house of language.
Burroughs further explores this parasitic connection between language and flesh
through the description of writing. Throughout the trilogy the connection between flesh
and paper is drawn: “[t]hese colorless sheets are what flesh is made from — Becomes
flesh when it has color and writing — That is Word And Image write the message that is
you on colorless sheets determine all flesh” (Nova 28). And, even more explicitly, to
“[l]ook through the human body the house that passes out the door — What do you see?
— It is composed of thin transparent sheets on which is written the action from birth to
death — Written on the ‘soft typewriter’ before birth” (Ticket 159). The thin pages are
the material instance, the background, the focus not on its instantiation but only as the
ground by which written language appears. The word depends for existence upon these
transparent sheets, but becomes the focus point of attention. And it is made clear
throughout the novels that this sheet-flesh is of primary importance to the viruses of the
nova mob. In Nova Express, for instance, a virus explicitly takes over the narrative to
explain “I am not two—I am one—But to maintain my state of oneness I need twoness in
other life forms—Others must talk so that I can remain silent—If another becomes one
then I am two—That makes two ones makes two and I am no longer one” (77). In this
philosophical disputation, the virus’s sense of oneness is predicated upon the divisibility,
the non-unity of that which it invades. A monad-like sense of self-presence requires
preying upon the flesh, of dividing it endlessly through experiments, through destruction
of the bare life of the flesh. This is language itself speaking, explaining that its pure
presence can only be maintained through a constitutive negation, the separation and
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continual divisibility of the (bare) flesh, the life upon which it supports itself to become
unified and self-present. The absence of that flesh would not lead to a oneness, but to a
total absence, an annihilatory void.
Nova Express offers the clearest vision of Burroughs’s radical position, opening
with the announcement of Hassan i Sabbah101 to the citizens of the earth, reiterating that
the planet is the victim of an extraterrestrial viral invasion (aided and abetted by human
collaborators). Hassan urges the citizens of the earth to reject the Boards of the Earth and
their alliance “[w]ith any people anywhere who offer you a body forever. To shit forever”
(4). Hassan then asks, rhetorically, “[w]hat scared you into time? Into body? Into shit? I
will tell you: ‘the word.’ Alien word ‘the.’ ‘The’ word of Alien Enemy imprisons ‘thee’
in time” (5). Anticipating his critics, Hassan warns that the viral collaborators will accuse
Hassan of “want[ing] to take your body and all pleasures of the body away from you,”
substituting it for “his cold windy bodiless rock” (5). Thus Nova Express opens with a
battle over the terms of life as they relate to the body and its component flesh. This
central conflict will be written into the master plot that organizes the three novels.

2.5

“Dial police”—Scripting Nova

On the surface, the Nova trilogy appears to offer a reasonably straightforward allegory of
infection and immunity in a Cold War key. In the overtly sf storyline that informs the

“Hassan i Sabbah” refers to the ninth-century Isma’ili Muslim cleric. Timothy Murphy provides a
detailed biography of the historical Hassan (120-122), noting that he was a convert to Isma’ilism (a subsect
of Shi’a Islam), who became the spiritual and military leader of a group of Muslims from his fortress
“Alamout” (121-122). The word “assassin” derives from the pejorative “hashishiyyun,” or “user of
hashish,” which was applied to Hassan and his followers (122). As many critics have noted, Hassan
becomes another of Burroughs’s literary obsessions, and becomes another of his constantly shifting
fictional avatars (see Bolton 182; Harris 185).
101
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novels (particularly The Ticket That Exploded and Nova Express), a sinister
extraterrestrial cabal comprised of “The Insect People of Minraud” and the “Virus Power
Of The Vegetable People” has “formed an alliance … to occupy the planet earth” (Nova
72). These alien beings are aided and abetted on earth by a corporate board of executives
who, “[i]n three-dimensional terms … is a group representing international big money
[and] who intend to take over and monopolize space” (Ticket 139). These conspiratorial
forces represent the shadowy and antagonistic powers that shape and control human
existence. Life on earth is subject to a vast and planet-wide biopolitical procedure that
trains bodies into a (literally) circum-scribed life. As the narrative voice somewhat
gnomically puts it: “[d]eath is orgasm is rebirth is death in orgasm is their unsanitary
Venusian gimmick is the whole birth death cycle of action — You got it?” (53). These
alien powers, who have surreptitiously maintained the hierarchical control mechanisms of
earth’s governmental and social apparatuses, represent the emanation of a distorting and
organizing influence of power on the flesh of the body.
As Burroughs is interested in examining how language operates as a malignant
infectious organism within these novels, he establishes a cabal of extraterrestrial
criminals called the “nova mob,” a cadre of sentient viruses that direct the operations of
the Board and the Insect People of Minraud. The nova mob—Burroughs’s literalization
of the language virus within the narrative—are represented as a kind of B-movie gangster
organization, its members possessing such names as “‘Sammy the Butcher,’ ‘Green
Tony,’ ‘the Brown Artist,’ ‘Jacky Blue Note,’ ‘Limestone John,’ ‘Izzy the Push’” and so
on (Ticket 55). Notably, these criminals “are not three-dimensional organisms” and so in
order to operate on earth they require the use of pliable human bodies. The mobsters
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accomplish this through infecting the bodies by their addictions, turning humans into
mindless “coordinate points,” vectors through which the mobsters can move (as “a single
controller can operate through thousands of human agents” [57]). This description of the
nova mob echoes that of the Senders in Naked Lunch, except whereas they were of
human origin, the nova mob are an alien virus.
The purpose of the mob on earth is laid out in stark terms as well: to “create as
many insoluble conflicts as possible and always exaggerate existing conflicts” that will
lead the planet toward “terminal identity and complete surrender” (Ticket 55; Nova 13).
The mobsters, as a representation of language’s control mechanisms, have succeeded in
completely enslaving the planet to their whims, turning human beings into puppets that
enact their desires. Inevitably, the rapacious appetites of the nova mob and their
antagonistic relationship to the flesh will “lead to the explosion of a planet, that is to
nova” (Ticket 55). The nova mob garner pleasure and experience through the
manipulation and control of bodies, and their desires eventually culminate in an
apocalyptic inferno. As is stated in the text, “these life forms should not be on the same
planet [as humans] —Their conditions of life are basically incompatible in present time
form and it is precisely the work of the nova mob to see that they remain in present time
form” (55). This incompatibility is expressed through the asymmetry by which the flesh
of earthlings is present while the nova mobsters always remain somewhat immaterial and
abstracted. As such, the threatened destruction of the planet does not existentially
threaten the nova mob, because they are never fully instantiated in the coordinate points
they inhabit. The mob operates on a fundamental asymmetry between their seeming
immateriality and the existing and pliable flesh, and so planets like earth act as an endless
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and horizonless pleasure palace for the criminals, who are exposed to experience without
themselves being affected by time and death.
In spite of how thoroughly the planet and its inhabitants have been captured and
placed under the sway of the nova mob and their co-conspirators, the fate of the planet is
not completely hopeless. The hegemonic control of the nova mob is challenged by the
arrival on earth of a counterforce: the nova police, a collection of agents who are
empowered to “expose and arrest Nova criminals” (Nova 7), revealing their schemes to
the denizens of earth and then removing them from their positions of power. As nova
police spokesman Inspector J. Lee102 explains, “[w]hen disorder on any planet reaches a
certain point the regulating instance scans police” (54). This reference to a “regulating
instance” seems to suggest that the nova police act as galactic antibodies, intervening to
prevent the spread of viral power and the terminal infection of life on earth. Indeed, the
nova mob appears as a particularly dangerous infection, for Lee explains that “the work
of the nova mob … [is] to create and aggravate the conflicts (55).103 Instead of

Lee is widely read as an alter ego of Burroughs himself. “Lee” was Burroughs’s mother’s maiden name,
and he used the pseudonym “William Lee” for his first novel, Junky (1953) (Miles 11, 240-241).
Furthermore, the protagonist of Junky, Queer, and Naked Lunch is in each case named “Lee.” As Roberta
Fornari notes, “William Lee” is a “semi-autobiographical” character “who reflect[s] the tension between
author and creation” (257n2). When Inspector Lee confronts the virus “Genial” in Ticket, the latter seems
to remember Lee, who responds “I’m immune now, remember?” (28). Given that the nova mob operate
through the vices of coordinate points, it is reasonably clear that “Genial” is meant to be read as an
anthropomorphization of heroin addiction, and Inspector Lee’s membership in the nova police and
immunity to “Genial” represents his kicking of his heroin habit he displayed throughout Burroughs’s earlier
novels (see also Murphy 133-140).
103
It is worth noting that “nova” is a bit of a misnomer. Carl Sagan describes a nova as a process belonging
only to binary star systems, which are “powered by hydrogen fusion,” while a supernova is the event that
happens to single star systems through a process of “silicon fusion” (243). “While two stars of roughly the
same mass will evolve roughly in parallel,” Sagan writes, if there is an unequal distribution in mass, the
larger star will burn quicker, and thus enter into “final white dwarf decline” sooner (242). With one star
closer to the end of its life, the proximity of the two stars leads to an increased profusion of hydrogen,
which becomes superheated and leads to an explosion (243). All of this may simply be a case of Burroughs
misunderstanding astrophysics terms, but Murphy notes that the nova mob’s leader, Mr. Bradly Mr. Martin
“is himself a doubled character and may also be an autoparasitic double star that consumes itself” (126). In
102
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maintaining symbiotic equilibrium, the nova mob appears to tend toward complete
consumption that will end in “nuclear war and nova” (55). The viruses in Burroughs’s
universe are entropic creatures, causing an inevitable dissolution of the host bodies in
apocalyptic annihilation. The nova police, however, vow to intervene and shut down the
nova mob before they can fully enact their plan.
Given Burroughs’s countercultural attitudes, a squadron of police heroes seems
somewhat out of place. Yet, as Lee explains, the nova police are of a fundamentally
different category than terrestrial law enforcement agencies: “we found that most existing
police agencies were hopelessly corrupt—The nova mob had seen to that” (Ticket 56).
Quotidian police agencies operate on the same principles of domination and control as
the nova mob. But Lee points out that there is one primary difference between nova
police and other kinds: “the nova police have no intention of remaining after their work is
done — That is, when the danger of nova is removed from this planet we will move on to
other assignments — We do our work and go” (54). This self-effacement is the nova
police’s rejection of power and control. Lee’s superior, the District Supervisor, elaborates
on this point, explaining to Lee that the nova police “is in point of fact a nonorganization” that does “not encourage togetherness, esprit de corps. We do not give our
agents the sense of belonging. As you know most existing organizations stress such
primitive reactions as unquestioning obedience. Their agents become addicted to orders”
(10, 9). Collective purpose engenders the organizational models that Burroughs sees as
inevitably linked to controlling mechanisms, and the police serve as the most potent

one sense this idea further illustrates Burroughs’s dislike of entropic dualisms, as critics have demonstrated,
but in another way we can understand that to “go nova” always requires a duality.
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illustration of such dangers.104 The nova police, by contrast, are singular beings, acting
without direct orders (the District Supervisor informs Lee that “[y]ou will receive your
instructions in many ways. From books, street signs, films” [10]). The job of a nova
policeman is ultimately one of interpretation, to examine the signs and to make the right
moves to apprehend the nova criminals and prevent the spread of their viral control. In
this way, the nova police are represented as the kinds of ideal readers—figures who are
capable of working on their own to discern the hidden actions of control rather than being
dictated orders and a purpose. As the Supervisor makes clear to Lee, for the nova police
“[t]here is no certainty. Those who need certainty are of no interest to this department”
(10).
In the fundamentally different kinds of organization of police agencies, Lee traces
a specific kind of medicalized resonance: “[t]he difference between this department and
the parasitic excrescence that often travels under the name ‘Police’ can be expressed in
metabolic terms: The distinction between morphine and apomorphine” (Nova 51).
Whereas regular police are an iteration of addiction to power and control, rigid hierarchy,
a maintenance of the status quo, the individualistic and dis-organized nova police are
representative of what seems to be Burroughs’s perfect inoculative agent. Burroughs first
encountered apomorphine in 1956, as he sought a remedy to his heroin addiction. He
travelled to London and there met Dr. John Dent, a specialist in addiction who placed
him on a regimen of the “metabolic regulator” apomorphine that was injected into the
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It is worth recalling that, in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault examines the provenance and
establishment of police departments as a constitutive feature of the movement into a biopolitical regime;
one of the initial purviews of police power is overseeing and enforcing public health, because such an
organization’s job involves “the ‘preservation of life’” (334).
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body to help control cravings for addictive substances (see Miles 284-285). Burroughs
was—temporarily—cured from his addiction to heroin and considered apomorphine to be
the miracle drug that could break the total through which addictive substances held the
body in its thrall.105 In the “atrophied preface” of Naked Lunch, Burroughs praises the
power of apomorphine to break the control of addiction, calling it “the best method of
withdrawal I have experienced” (220). Importantly, as Burroughs contends, “[n]ot one
case of addiction to apomorphine has ever been recorded” (203). The drug works to cut
off the addictive potential of other drugs without substituting itself as a new addiction.
Within the context of the Nova trilogy, Lee specifically aligns the nova police with this
curative. If “[w]ord begets image and image is a virus” (Nova 48), then what is required
is to shut down those things from iterating. Apomorphine is “no word and no image”
(Nova 48), it blocks the proliferation of these constitutive features of addiction and viral
enslavement. Without the production of word and image, the enslaved life of planet earth
can be freed from the viral controls placed on it.
Indeed, the nova police’s apomorphic power seems to extend to their command of
language. In the meeting between the District Supervisor and Lee, the latter recounts how
“the D.S. walked behind me talking in a voice without accent or inflection, a voice that
no one could connect to the speaker or recognize on hearing it again. The man who used
that voice had no native language. He had learned the use of an alien tool. The words
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Burroughs would combat addiction to heroin (as well as other substances) throughout his long life.
While apomorphine did allow himself freedom from heroin for some years, he found find himself hooked
on the opiate throughout his life, especially during the years in New York City in the 1970s, where his
appreciative circle of fans and the ready supply of the drug led to his relapse (see Miles, 550-551). Seeking
to break from his addiction once more, Burroughs began taking the methadone cure while in New York,
and would continue to do so for the remainder of his life (552).

153

floated in the air behind him as he walked” (Ticket 9). Although the content of the
Supervisor’s speech (referenced above) is straightforward and imperative, Lee focuses on
the tactile quality of this speech, how its seeming anonymity contributes to its seeming
strangeness. The D.S.’s speech takes on the same grey and anonymous quality of Bradley
The Buyer, that exemplar of bare life. Once again, Burroughs makes explicit this
connection between the nova police and immunity-as-absence: the Supervisor’s
manipulation of language, the way in which it lacks an individual identity, as “no one
could connect [it] to the speaker” means that it maintains a kind of universal quality,
something that has not been placed into a discrete identity, a subjectivity that is
predicated on the exclusion of otherness. Lee refers to the words as though they have
taken on a material quality of their own, “float[ing] in the air behind” the Supervisor (9).
Unlike the fantasy of immateriality and transcendence upon which language operates, the
D.S. concretizes language, forces it into a material existence upon which it shares a
symmetrical relationship with the flesh.106 The nova police utilize language with all the
delicacy and awareness that goes into maneuvering an “alien tool”—instead of becoming
a constitutive part of an identity, and opening a vector through which language can
invade, the D.S. flattens language, inhabits it rather than allowing it to inhabit his flesh.

There are obvious affinities here with the formalism of poetic language discussed in Viktor Shklovsky’s
influential essay “Art as Device” (1919). Famously, Shklovsky contrasts “poetical” and “practical”
language and notes that the latter method language becomes automatized, is turned into an algebra of
symbolization (79). Poetical language, on the other hand, “exists in order to give back the sensation of life,
in order to make us feel things, in order to make the stone stony” (80). This method of “ostranenie” has
most frequently been translated as “estrangment” or “defamiliarization,” echoing Bertolt Brecht’s
“Verfremdungseffekt,” but, as Alexandra Berlina points out, a more correct translation would be
“enstrangement,” which emphasizes not distance and alienation from language, but an awe with the
unfamiliar contour and texture of language (see 56-61). Thus, Shklovsky’s formalism, like Burroughs’s, is
about redrawing connections with the word’s materiality.
106
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The nova police have therefore been taken as Burroughs’s thematization of an
immunizing power to counterbalance the destructive rapacity of the nova mob (see
Hayles 214, Lydenberg 70, Tietchen 113). As the trilogy progresses, however, the
presence of the nova police as an immunizing force against the viral exploitation of the
nova mob seems to give way to a more familiar depiction of the stasis that such a
dualistic Manicheanism implies. The police are authorized by some higher galactic
authority and Lee explains in his press conference that “[y]our earth case must be
processed by the Biologic Courts,” which satirically morphs the vision of a covert
apocalyptic war into something more mundane and bureaucratic (Ticket 54). Lee then
immediately problematizes this recourse to justice, noting that the Biologic Courts are
“admittedly in a deplorable condition at this time — No sooner set up than immediately
corrupted” (54). This literalization of a universal biopolitical apparatus (that distressingly
appears to mirror the inertia of a twentieth-century bureaucratic state) suggests that the
nova police have their own limits, are less a miraculous force of immunization than a
fallible and limited agency. Indeed, equipped with their “antibiotic handcuffs” and
vowing to “arrest these criminals and turn them over to the Biologic Department for the
indicated alterations” (Nova 75; Ticket 56), the police do not appear to want to eliminate
the threat of viral power so much as to contain and modify it. In configuring this galactic
battle between the nova mob and the nova police less as an apocalyptic war of total
contamination or purification than as a cops-and-robbers plotline, Burroughs suggests
that such a straightforward narrative of immunity is insufficient to encapsulating the
nuances of flesh in biopolitics.
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Indeed, Nova Express is a consciously anticlimactic end to the trilogy, wherein
the nova mob is apprehended and brought to the Biologic Courts, only for things to
become bogged down in total judicial paralysis. In a lengthy chapter entitled “This
Horrible Case” (133-146), Burroughs transforms his hallucinogenic and mutating
universe into a dull procedural narrative, with the lawyers for the nova mob endeavouring
to hoodwink the jury into a “better chance of a compromise verdict suspended pending
mutation proceedings” by hiding the predatory nature of the nova mob’s viral predation
as “absolute biologic need” in favour of a narrative around which the nova mob ends up
on earth through pure happenstance and accidentally mutates to adapt to the ecology
(Nova 143). This staid courtroom drama, and the mob’s newfound goal to endlessly defer
judgment through legal loopholes—in other words, through the manipulation of
narrative—suggests that Burroughs is uninterested in the idea of two diametrically
oppositional forces. That same narrative that inflects Cold War thinking from the geo- to
the biopolitical Burroughs is clearly disdainful of, and the development of the nova police
from a radically immunizing force to an apparatus of a dysfunctional bureaucratic
macrocosm, mirrors the writer’s own apprehensions with such ways of narrativizing
infection and immunity.
In an interview with Conrad Knickerbocker after the publication of his trilogy,
Burroughs enunciates this skepticism about the immunizing qualities of the nova
police,107 exclaiming that “[o]nce you get them in there, by God, they begin acting like

Similarly, in a letter to Alan Ansen, Burroughs wrote that “I endeavored to distil an archetype of the
perfect police in Inspector Lee” (qtd. in Miles 407). The meaning of “perfect” here is ambiguous—it could
mean that Lee represents the ideal, non-authoritarian police officer who serves as a regulating force against
the domineering powers that populate the universe, or, on the other hand, that Lee is the police officer par
excellence, a duplicitous and dissembling agent of those very mechanisms of control.
107
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any police. They’re always an ambivalent agency” (qtd. in Lotringer 70).108 In spite of
their claims of non-addictive potential, the nova police become, as Timothy Murphy
suggests, a “second-order addiction” (131), whose presence, while not explicitly viral like
the nova mob, still requires the flesh to exist with the aid of a regulating agency whose
motives are unclear and tied to hierarchical power structures. The nova police’s presence
manages to disrupt the entropic narrative that the nova mob use to enslave the planet, but
as the novels progress, the familiarity of a linear narrative reasserts itself. If, as
Burroughs suggests, language itself is a virus, then literary figures created within that
language cannot immunize against its infective qualities. In order to narrativize bare life
in a way that does not replicate the dominating structures it has been subjected to,
Burroughs’s project moves away from representations of immune narrators to exploring a
formal concept of immunizing narrative itself.

Burroughs then adds: “[f]or Nova Police, read technology, if you wish” (Lotringer 70). The
technological aspects of Burroughs’s fiction have been a major source of critical comment. Marshall
McLuhan positively reviewed Burroughs’s novels, seeing in them illustrations of his own ideas about
media extensions of the body. He writes that, “[i]t is the medium that is the message because the medium
creates an environment that is as indelible as it is lethal. To end the proliferation of lethal new environment
expression, Burroughs urges a huge collective act of restraint as well as a nonclosure of sensory modes”
(72). Katherine Hayles likewise sees in the omnipresence of the tape recorder in The Ticket That Exploded,
as well as in Burroughs’s frequent recorder experiments in his private life, the idea that “technology [is] not
only … a theme but [is] an articulation capable of producing new kinds of subjectivities” (217). Anthony
Enns, meanwhile, explores how technologies such as the tape recorder and the typewriter are crucial
elements for Burroughs’s formal and narrative experiments (104-110). As Burroughs himself says in
Electronic Revolution, “technologies with escalating efficiency produce more and more total weapons until
we have the atom bomb which could end the game by destroying all players” (57). The only way
technology can work for the freedom rather than enslavement of humankind is if it, like apomorphine,
effaces itself upon its usage (58).
108
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2.6

Rewrite Department: The Immunizing Power of the
Cut-Up

If the word is such a dangerous viral entity, then its opposite, silence, serves as a radical
space of freedom. Throughout the Nova trilogy, silence is viewed as the ultimate
inoculation against the word’s power: Lee tells the citizens of earth that “[a]pomorphine
is the only agent that can disintoxicate you and cut the enemy beam off your line.
Apomorphine and silence,” while the D.S. “contemplate[es] the risky expedient of a
‘miracle’ and the miracle he contemplated was silence” (Nova 6; Ticket 51). The final
page of Ticket features an image by Brion Gysin that renders the phrase “To say good
silence by” in a scrawl that becomes more and more illegible until it finally gives way to
the blankness of the page itself (203). Silence is the optimal mode of escaping the word’s
viral logic. But such an escape is easier said than done, so to speak. As Lee explains,
“[m]odern man has lost the option of silence. Try halting your sub-vocal speech. Try to
achieve even ten seconds of inner silence. You will encounter a resisting organism that
forces you to talk” (Ticket 49). The word virus is deeply lodged within physical being,
and silence is no longer an option. It is this paradox between the wish to escape the viral
power of language and the necessity to exist within a linguistic universe that compels
Burroughs to attempt to write his way out of the infective trap language has laid. When
the narrative voice in the Nova trilogy announces “[t]here are no good words — I wrote
silences” (85), this is more than just an oxymoronic statement: it is an attempt to
foreground the necessity of engaging with language, of bringing it to the forefront of
thought of the material. Burroughs seeks to “write silences” by reconfiguring how to
narrate the body that does not cede control to the viral capacities of language and the
biopolitical structures such a movement entails. If the “plot” of the Nova trilogy (such as
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it is) details the flesh-made-word, the surrender of the materiality of the body to the
entropic scripts of narrative that is always biopolitical and predicated upon an unjust
rendering of bare life, then at the level of narrative, Burroughs seeks to free the flesh
from this trap. Indeed, Burroughs’s aim is to turn the word into a kind of material entity,
something that is present rather than absent, to grant a material dimension to the word in
order to narrate the flesh in such a way that it does not become the raw material of
domination.
The Nova trilogy represents, for Burroughs, his “most formally radical work”
(Murphy 102), and this is due to heavy involvement in manipulating and re-arranging his
(and others’) work through a process he called the “cut-up technique.” In 1959, when
Burroughs was living in the famed “Beat Hotel” in Paris, his friend Brion Gysin began
experimenting with cutting into and rearranging diverse texts in order to produce new and
unexpected associations. When Gysin showed his experiment to Burroughs, the latter
“agreed that the results were amusing but immediately recognized its importance as a
technique and pronounced it to be ‘a project for disastrous success’” (Miles 363).109
Burroughs explained that “cut-ups make explicit a psychosensory process that is going on
all the time anyway,” a process by which one’s surroundings and environment leak into
the practice of reading (Third Mind 5). For Burroughs, one’s contextual situatedness is a

The randomization effect of the cut-up technique of course precedes its “discovery” by Gysin. Edward
Robinson’s historicization of such a formal technique points back to T.S. Eliot’s collage work in The Waste
Land and Tristan Tzara’s 1920 instructional “To make a dadaist poem” that invites would-be practitioners
to cut newspapers to bits, place the pieces into a hat, and rearrange them (6-7). Indeed, Burroughs refers
specifically to both of these artists as forebears, and explains that “I had been working toward the same
goal” (qtd. in Robinson 6). While Naked Lunch is often believed to be the beginning of this formal
experimentation, it was not until after Burroughs had finished writing the novel that he began to work on
the cut-ups in earnest.
109
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dynamic element involved in reading and thinking, and the cut-up is a way to materialize
into language the complexities of that process. As Burroughs explicates the function of
the cut-up technique, he indexes language to a form of material existence. In describing
the act of reading a man reading a newspaper, Burroughs describes how “his eye follows
the column in the proper Aristotelian manner, one idea and sentence at the time. But
subliminally he is reading the columns on either side and is aware of the person sitting
next to him. That’s a cut-up.” (Third Mind 4-5). In other words, the cut-up technique is
meant to be a recognition of an expansion of the physical sensorium to encompass a more
expansive version of reality; cut-ups “establish new connections between images, and
one’s range of vision consequently expands” (4). As Burroughs expounds on in Nova
Express, “[t]here is no true or real ‘reality’ — ‘Reality’ is simply a more or less constant
scanning pattern — The scanning pattern we have accept as ‘reality’ has been imposed on
us by the controlling power on this planet” (53). Within the context of the novels, this
scanning pattern is represented as the “Reality Studio,” a production company that reifies
experience through a curated simulation of reality.110 Thus, one of the mantras repeated
throughout the novels is the need to “[s]torm the reality studio and retake the universe”
(Ticket 151).

The “Reality Studio” seems to anticipate the theoretical work of Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard
radicalizes Guy Debord’s concept of the “society of the spectacle,” pushing it to its logical extreme. He
suggests that late capitalist society has surpassed such spectacle and gone headlong into the “hyperreality”
of pure simulation (Simulation 2). While the spectacular still posited an outside referent, the society of
simulation is lost within a vertiginous and totalizing self-referential environment: “[e]verywhere, in no
matter what domain—political, biological, psychological, mediatized—in which the distinction between
these poles [time and space] can no longer be maintained, one enters into simulation” (31). The postmodern
affinities between Burroughs and Baudrillard have often been remarked upon, particularly in Murphy (4243), Russell (“Guerilla Conditions” 171), and Bardini (189).
110
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Burroughs and Gysin formalized the process of the cut-up technique, taking
excepts from Shakespeare, Rimbaud, Pound, and T.S. Eliot, along with magazines such
as Life or Time and then “cut[ting] them into four sections …. [that] were moved against
each other until a likely phrase or sentence was found. … This process was repeated for
as long as it produced interesting new word combinations” (Miles 363). Burroughs later
developed the “fold-in” method, an “extension” of the cut-up whereby a page of original
writing is folded down the middle and overlaps another page, creating a “composite text”
that is “read across half one text and half the other” (Third Mind 75). The effects of the
cut-up experiments, Nathan Moore suggests, “have no meaning but they have sense, a
becoming, a particular evocativeness (sensuality)” (439). In particular, what these
experiments reveal is that Burroughs is interested in engaging with the flesh of the written
word, the pulp upon which its materialization comes into being. As seen above,
Burroughs consistently describes flesh as “transparent sheets,” making explicit the link
between writing and material instantiation. By performing such specifically physical
actions on the written word, Burroughs (and Gysin) attempt not only to rewrite language,
but to engage with language’s material contexts. Linear language constructs a limited
frame that narrows the possibilities of the senses from experiencing the full effect of
reality; the cut-up method, in Burroughs’s belief, allows the flesh to experience a fuller, if
less ordered, experience of that reality.111 The cut-up and fold-in methods, in their
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The affinities between this idea and Lacanian notions of the symbolic and the real are evident. As Lacan
in Seminar II, the symbolic order of language operates as the structuring mechanism by which a chaotic
and disordered reality is shaped through the subject’s entrance into the symbolic substitution of language.
The “real,” as Lacan puts it, is “without fissure,” and as humans “we have no means of apprehending this
real … except via the go-between of the symbolic” (97). Indeed, it would not be possible to speak of human
beings without the symbolic, because without this language that is “constitutive for the subject” there
would be no means of navigating such unstructured presence (Ecrits 7). Intriguingly, Lacan does adopt a
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disruption of that “Aristotelian” notion of linear semantic order, recouple language with
materiality, allow it to graze against the chaotic and unstructured flux of reality without a
delimiting order that narrows the sensory aspects of the flesh.
Within the context of the Nova trilogy, the experimental quality of these
techniques has also been popularly read as a kind of practice of defense against the virus.
As Priscilla Wald suggests, “[t]he strategy of inoculation became an explicit aesthetic” in
Burroughs’s novels (186), while Scott Bukatman likewise contends that “[t]he cut-up
technique represents an immunization against the media-virus; a strengthening of the host
organism against the infectious agent” (78). Allen Hibbard further sees Burroughs’s
novels as the act of “putting words together in new combinations and disseminating them
as a sort of inoculation or counter-virus” (qtd. in Bolton 52). The cut-up technique is seen
as somehow a kind of necessarily inoculative practice, the act of cutting through linear
narrative and rearranging text in a collage method in order to develop individuated
associations is naturally immunizing. While this is certainly Burroughs’s intent in
employing the cut-up method, the relationship between immunity, narrative, and
embodiment has not been fully explicated. Why is this form of writing immunizing
against the viral word? Robin Lydenberg claims that the technique serves as “a linguistic
weapon against the binary thinking which generates conflict on a philosophical level (in

slightly infectious tone when talking about the symbolic, noting that it “takes hold in even the deepest
recesses of the human organism” (6). It is precisely this structuring mechanism that Burroughs seeks an
escape from. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Lacan has been a major influence in Burroughsian scholarship. For
instance, when Tietchen describes Burroughs’s work as dramatizing the entrance into language as
“intersubjective discourses which are in turn (mis)recognized as individual” (110), while Bolton explores
how both Burroughs turns Lacan’s structuring of language as the Symbolic dimension as a traumatic
encounter with a pre-existing power (128-130). Breu claims that “Burroughs’s conception of language as a
virus suggests the applicability of Lacan’s theory for the analysis of his works,” and sees Burroughs’s
writing of the “new flesh” as exemplifying an unruly materiality unconstrained by the limits of the
Symbolic; that is, the tissue of the Real (39, 42).
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all either/or antitheses)” (70), but such a reading seems to simply move that binary to a
meta-narrative level (conventional, linear language vs. experimental literary cut-ups).112
Such readings can only end up replicating the binaries that Burroughs endeavors to reject,
reinscribing the nova dualisms on a narrative level. Instead, we should look at
Burroughs’s literary method not as a kind of antivirus, but rather an attempt to
reconfigure the terms through which we think of virus and immunity, as mediated
through the bare life of the flesh.

2.7

Enfleshing the Word

“Suppose there is no enemy??,” muses one of the narrative voices (Nova 112).
Appearing more than halfway through the final volume of the trilogy, this idea seems to
lack the same kind of force as the continual recourse to the language of intergalactic war
and stellar apocalypse that has characterized the style of the narrative thus far. Yet it is
nonetheless a vital point to make: if the dualistic narrative of nova mob versus nova
police settles into inertia, then perhaps the good/evil, virus/immunity narrative must be
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Within the narrative of the trilogy, Burroughs articulates what one of these experiments would look like.
The routine “The Mayan Caper” (Soft Machine 81-93) depicts the reporter Joe Brundige embarking upon
an ambitious time travel scheme to return to the heyday of the Mayan Empire and destroy the “codices” of
the Mayan priest class, thereby destroying the procession of linear time that organizes Mayan life and
serves as a prefiguration of capitalist management of time. In order to travel back in time, Joe melds with a
Mayan boy in order to go undercover. A symbiotic operation leads to a “composite being” rather than a
parasitically controlled one. This queer subjectivity, part-Joe, part-Mayan, is then able to successfully
complete his “Mayan Caper.” He is able, after seducing one of the Mayan priests, to surreptitiously “mix
the sound and image track” with revolutionary commands to “[c]ut word lines—Cut music lines—Smash
the control images—Burn the books—Kill the priests—Kill! Kill! Kill” so that “the priests would go on
pressing the old buttons with unexpected results” (91). The caper is a success, and the peasant labourers
under the hierarchical control of the priests rise up and destroy their oppressors. What Joe (narrating these
events after the fact, and presumably returned to his original body) notes of the dying priests is that “[y]ou
see the priests were nothing but word and image, an old film rolling on and on with dead actors” (93). In
contrast to Joe’s highly embodied odyssey, the priests possess no quantifiable materiality—their seeming
existence is a sham, a concatenation of the disembodied “word” and “image” viruses that are used to
maintain an asymmetrical relationship to the bodies of the labourers under their command.
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rejected in favour of a different epistemological model. Even the nova policeman Lee
hints towards this idea when he muses that “[t]he word may once have been a healthy
neural cell. It is now a parasitic organism that invades and damages the central nervous
system” (Ticket 49). The point is less an historical one—that the word organism and the
human body existed in harmonious equilibrium (something the origin story in The Soft
Machine would dispute) but rather that there exists the possibility that these two
organisms could potentially intersect with one another on a symbiotic basis without
degenerating into parasitism (though that threat of parasitism always remains in
Burroughs’s paranoid thought). The problem, Burroughs implies, is the fantastical
investments of the word’s immateriality and the body’s immortality. Breu identifies in
Burroughs’s work a “dialectic between the material and immaterial” (50). In the
expansive mythology of the Nova trilogy, this same dialectical consideration is extended
from the locus of “junk” to the ur-contagion of language. There is the tendency to think
of the word as insubstantive, a medium through which communication operates instead of
an actual thing. Yet, as Inspector Lee intones, “[t]he human organism is literally
consisting of two halves from the beginning … whereby two entities inhabit the same
three-dimensional coordinate points” (52, emphasis added), and, likewise, the nova mob
are neither “ghosts” nor “phantoms” but “very definite organisms indeed” (Ticket 58).
The point of these expostulations is to make clear the word’s innate materiality, and the
way this is hidden from the denizens of the earth, the inhabitants of language. Burroughs
implores the reader to consider the virus—even when instantiated as language—as a
material entity. The first step in countering the threat of material/immaterial binaries is to
remember that the word possesses a material dimension to it.
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What seems to be the heart of the problem of viral invasion for Burroughs is one
of asymmetry. As Lydenberg correctly notes, “Burroughs perceives the disembodied
voice of language as a strategy of absent control rather than present self-expression”
(137). An example is given early on when Inspector Lee investigates a case of a
mysterious suicide in England, believing it to be the work of a nova mobster. Examining
the case of “Harrison,” Lee discovers that, instead of committing suicide, the man was
compelled to do so by the virus known as “Genial” that had turned him into a coordinate
point and experimented on him. Lee explains how this works to a Scotland Yard
detective: “so long as the spliced tape finds an outlet in actual sex contact it acts as an
aphrodisiac .. nothing more .. but when a suspectible subject is spliced in with someone
who is not there then it acts as a destructive virus .. the perfect murder weapon with a
built-in alibi. ‘Genial’ was not there at the time. He never is” (Ticket 20). Illuminating
this passage through the narrative mode of detective fiction allows Burroughs to explain
how language operates as a weapon at war with the flesh. The word, instantiated in this
episode as the nova criminal “Genial,” illustrates the way we consider language to be that
absence that we never possess.
The idea of asymmetry recurs throughout Ticket: toward the novel’s end the
narrative takes on an instructive tone, informing the reader of a hypothetical experiment
between the subjects “S” and “W.” The nervous systems of the two subjects are capable
of “total recording” of the sense perceptions of the other. Thus experiments between the
two can take place whereby the experiences of S are spliced in with those of W and viceversa. But the narrator goes on to warn that “[i]f S is spliced into the total record of W
and W is not spliced into the total record of S this unilateral splicing may result in W
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contracting an S virus to his considerable disadvantage” (165). In other words, the
relationship existing between the two beings requires a shared exchange of information
and experience in order to produce a symbiotic subjectivity. If the exchange is not
reciprocal, then one element will have an unfair advantage over the other, and that is the
origin of parasitism. Again, Burroughs recourses to the eternal bare life of Bradl(e)y,
who, in his appearance as a space explorer in Ticket, is captured by the Insect People of
Minraud and experimented on once again. This time he is spliced in with the alien
organism known as “Mr Martin.” This organism is joined together with the unwilling
Bradly, who is not reciprocally spliced into the body of Mr. Martin. As the doctor
performing the operation comments, “[t]he difficulty is with two halves that — other
parasites will invade sooner or later — First it’s symbiosis, then parasitism — The old
symbiosis con” (85). The resulting entity, termed “Mr Bradly Mr Martin,” becomes the
putative “leader of the [nova] mob,” and “the separation gimmick that keeps this tired old
show on the road” (55, 134). Bradly once again becomes Burroughs’s index for exploring
the experiments in plasticity that bare life undergoes, this time using Bradly to
demonstrate the invasive story of language’s takeover of the body. Mr Bradly Mr Martin
introduces this narrative fragment, stating “[n]ow for me — The story of two halves,” but
it is clear that the bare life of Bradly is silenced in the enunciation of Mr Martin.
If the heart of the problem is an asymmetry between the material human and the
impalpable virus, then the question becomes how to effect a new equilibrium. Early on in
Ticket, Lee muses on the possibility of escaping viral logic through the use of a virus. He
explains: “of course parasitic life is the easiest form to create…I wonder if…” As Lee
trails off, the narrative voice picks up his train of thought, speaking of “a nice virus ..
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beautiful symptoms .. a long trip combining the best features of junk hash LSD yage ..
those who return have gained a radiant superhuman beauty!” (19). The suggestion here is
that, if the virus can be utilized for destructive purposes of enslavement and domination,
then perhaps its replicative qualities can be utilized to perform a magnificent posthuman
transformation. Certain critics read such a possibility as implicit in the trilogy: Bolton
connects the promise of the “nice virus” to that of apomorphine, seeing it as
“transcend[ing] the parasitism of language and its binary oppositions,” (25) while Steven
Shaviro reads a postmodern invocation to “[s]tylize, enhance, and accelerate the process
of viral replication: for thereby you will increase the probability of mutation” (45), a kind
of postmodern team-up with the viral power.113 Such a position seems to filter down to
the novels themselves, as in Nova Express, where the scientist Winkhorst notes that “[i]t
is of course misleading to speak of a silence virus or apomorphine virus since
apormorphine is anti-virus,” and yet nonetheless this conceptualization characterizes
Burroughs’s thinking (48). Only a few pages later, Uranian Willy the Heavy Metal Kid
commands to “Release Silence Virus” (59), which, by the novel’s end, appears to come
to pass. In his essay “My Own Business,” Burroughs muses on an “obligate cellular
parasite” that “occup[ies] a certain brain area which we may term the RIGHT center”
(Adding Machine 16). Burroughs connects the physiology of the right lobe of the brain to
politically conservative ideology, suggesting that it is the political right that

Thierry Bardini’s analysis of “junk” develops Shaviro’s postmodern thesis. Bardini sees what he calls
the “hypervius” as the ultimate image of late capitalism, and cites Burroughs as the “patient 0 of the
hypervirus, the original vector” (179). For Bardini examining Burroughs’s screenplay Blade Runner: A
Movie (1977), “redemption comes from the underground, that is, the junked world, not in the form of the
android, but rather in the form of a virus” (177). A virus is unleashed that stops a cancer outbreak and
rescues the dying human race; for Bardini, this is the essence of “junk” as the ontology and ethics of
postmodern late capitalism.
113
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pathologically replicates the viral organism. On the following page, however,
Burroughs’s prescribed cure is “a virus designed to attack the already occupied RIGHT
centers in the brain, inflaming and irritating these centers so that the target, muttering and
finally screaming imprecations, dies in convulsions of rightness” (17). Yet Burroughs
seems to discard these ideas and instead reformulate his opinions on the following page:
[p]erhaps the most effective tactic is to alter the conditions on which the virus
subsists. That is the way various manifestations of the RIGHT virus have
disappeared in the past, as in the Inquisition. Conditions change, and the virus
guise is ignored and forgotten. We have seen this happen many times in the past
forty years. With the RIGHT virus offset, perhaps we can get the whole show out
of the barnyard and into space. (18)
Viral thinking only ever succeeds in reproducing itself, even when it purports to be
antiviral in nature. Recourse to narratives of the virus, even if used in “liberatory”
purposes, will ultimately only ever reproduce those conditions of viral control that
Burroughs seeks to escape.114
One way of affecting this symmetry, Lee suggests, is through the use of the tape
recorder.115 “[Y]ou can separate yourself from the ‘Other Half’ from the word,” he
claims in the press conference, by use of the tape recorder (Ticket 50). The recording
capabilities of magnetic tape allows for the possibility of exorcising one’s internal

Eric Mottram, one of the first scholars to critically engage with Burroughs’s work, argues that the
dominant theme throughout the writer’s career is “the way in which victims of vampirism themselves
become addicts in a chain of organized predatory lust and loss of identity,” and cites Bram Stoker’s
Dracula (1897) as a clear influence (63). This idea of vampiric parasitism links Burroughs’s viral thinking
not only to the nascent fields of virology and immunology, but more clearly to older narratives and stories
about infection and parasitic control.
115
The tape recorder, at the time of Burroughs’s writing, was a relatively new and advanced technology
(see Hayles 208). Burroughs was fascinated with the possibilities that the tape recorder provided for literary
experimentation, and would, with his lover Ian Somerville (a sound engineer), experiment with recordings
as he did with written text (see Miles 403). Hayles in particular focuses on the tape recorder and its
potentially revolutionary aspects in Burroughs’s writings, noting that “[m]anipulating sound through taperecorders becomes a way of producing a new kind of subjectivity” (220).
114
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monologue, the “sub-vocal” speech that has parasitically grafted itself onto the body and
“convince[s] by association that your body sounds will stop if sub-vocal speech stops”
(160). By placing one’s language inside a tape recorder, and then experimenting upon it
through juxtaposing language and sound, one can achieve a radical break from the
confines of language. “Splice your body sounds in with air hammers,” Lee suggests,
“[b]last jolt vibrate the ‘Other Half’ right out into the street” (50). Burroughs sees with
this media technology “the metonymic equation between tape-recorder and body”
(Hayles 211), as a place that can rematerialize the word. Yet if the tape recorder is
analogous to the body, the magnetic tapes themselves represent the re-materialized flesh
in all its physical presence. Throughout the “writing machine” routine (Ticket 62-68), the
image of this magnetic tape cut up and reconfigured recurs: “[s]heets of magnetized
calligraphs drew colored iron filings that fell in clouds of color from patterns pulsing to
metal music,” “[g]reat sheets of magnetized print held color and disintegrated in mineral
silence as word dust falls from demagnetized patterns,” “[p]hotomontage fragments
backed with iron stuck to patterns and fell in swirls mixing color dust to form new
patterns, shimmering, falling, magnetized, demagnetized to the flicker of blue cylinders”
(Ticket 62-63). With word encapsulated in technology, the potential to engage with it in a
symmetrical and non-predatory encounter exists.
The nova storyline ultimate replicates the Cold War ideology that Burroughs
seeks to escape. In Electronic Revolution Burroughs claims that “EITHER/OR is another
virus formula. It is alway [sic] you OR the virus. EITHER/OR. This is in point of fact the
conflict formula which is seen to be archetypal virus mechanism” (56). From the political
blocs of capitalist/communist down to the microscopic level of virus/antibody, this
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dualistic logic is always ultimately viral in nature because of its divisionist ontology. But
the self/nonself model of immunology is a product of political ideology rather than a
scientific fact. Polly Matzinger, for instance, proclaims that we must “stop running a cold
war with our environment,” positing instead a “danger” model of immunity that “allows
us to live without maintaining a rigid sterility that segregates us from the environment.
We become a habitat,” instead of a fortress (qtd. in Cohen 29). Likewise, Haraway makes
note of the immune “system’s” omnipresence in the individual body and the “vast array
of potential circulating antibodies,” which not only do far more than repel and devour
foreign interlopers, but are also constantly undergoing a process of mutation (217). Thus,
the self/nonself melts away into a more generative image of the network: “[t]he immune
system is everywhere and nowhere. Its specificities are indefinite if not infinite, and they
arise randomly; yet these extraordinary variations are the critical means of maintaining
individual bodily existence” (218). Esposito, in his project to deconstruct the paradigm of
immunization that marks biopolitics, articulates an ambitious project wherein “we
imagine a philosophy of immunity that, without denying its inherent contradiction, even
deepening it further, reverses the semantics in the direction of community” (Immunitas
165). For Esposito, “the most extraordinary example of this [immunity-community]
dialectic—partly due to its symbolically germinal character—is pregnancy,” exploring in
a deconstructive key how the development of the child’s body within the mother’s
demonstrates the productive and affirmative alterity that is always already a part of the
human (169-171).116 In this ambitious move, Esposito attempts to rework the declension
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One of the most common challenges evoked by critics to the self/nonself binary with respect to
immunology is the growth of a fetus inside a mother’s body. As Emily Martin notes, “[f]rom an
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of immunity from that which divides life into overarching categories of self/nonself in
favour of an expansive and mobile ecology of recognition, adaptation, and connection.
What all of these thinkers try to do, ultimately, is put forward an epistemological
rethinking of the process of immunity to break it free from the shackles of reductive Cold
War terminology and ideology, and toward a more expansive and materialist conception
of body and environment. It is a way of effecting a philosophical symmetry that will help
avoid the lapse into the EITHER/OR that winds inevitably toward a nova.
Daniel Punday highlights Burroughs’s literary experimentations as developing a
“post-evolutionary body” within the framework of narratology, exploring these texts in
such a way that the reader is meant to understand “how the narrative body, the starting
point for the fictional world, is itself the product of some far more important and
fundamental process that has created and shaped this entity” (50, 51). Punday’s reading is
persuasive, and he is certainly correct to highlight the way that Burroughs’s thematic and
representational content is reflected in his formal and narratological methodology, but his
reading of Burroughs’s narratological qualities as primarily about the viral seems to miss
the point. He writes that “[t]he virus … is the mechanical process that produces the body
almost as an afterthought,” that “[e]ven if the virus itself contains no content, no real
message, it itself directs and drives the body that carries it” (50, 51). Punday sees

immunological point of view, the fetus is a ‘tumor’ that the woman’s body should try furiously to attack”
(59). Timothy Morton cites the retrovirus “ERV-3” that “may confer immunosuppressive properties to the
placenta, thus allowing embryos to coexist in the mother’s body.” The point, for Morton, is that “[t]here is
no way of knowing which bits of our DNA are actually ‘ours’ and which are plasmid insertions”
(Ecological Thought 35). Eula Biss too explains that “[t]he cells that form the outer layer of the placenta for
a human fetus bind to each other using a gene that originated, long ago, from a virus. Though viruses
cannot reproduce without us, we ourselves could not reproduce without what we have taken from them”
(30).
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Burroughs as writing narratives that are about viruses, where human bodies are of
secondary concern, the hosts that the virus organizes and maneuvers in space and time.
But Burroughs is not writing fictions of the virus; he is thinking of ways to prevent the
repeated outbreak narrative from happening again. His novels are not about privileging a
newer, “viral” kind of narrative, but about rethinking what narrative immunity would
look like.

2.8

“Shift Linguals”—The Voice and Cut-Up Narration

It is worthwhile, at this point, to return to Agamben’s interest in the intersections of
language and politics. As mentioned above, Agamben sees structural affinities between
the metaphysical description of the human being and the biopolitical. Thus, for Agamben,
the Voice becomes the “negative foundation of language” (Mills 37), the linkage point
through which the purely animal phone and the logos that is uniquely the province of the
human are connected. As he will explain in Remnants of Auschwitz, his most explicit
conjoining of his metaphysical and biopolitical projects, “this Voice is always a
mythologeme or a theologoumenon; nowhere, in the living being or in language, can we
reach a point in which something like an articulation truly takes place” (129). The Voice
is an emptiness, a “non-place” (130) that is utilized to structure the metaphysical
constitution of the human being.117 Voice is never present, and Agamben’s project is thus

Indeed, critics often note how Agamben’s conceptual terminology circles back to these models.
McLoughlin, for instance, notes how the concept of “Voice” would later develop into the idea of
“sovereignty” that dominates Agamben’s later work (in Murray and White 197).
117
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to highlight the empty and nihilistic foundation upon which the philosophical project of
exploring the human being has become.118
It is here, within the speculative character of Burroughs’s narrative, that we can
detect a divergence point between his thought and that of Agamben’s. Both McLoughlin
and Mills make note of how the imperative of Agamben’s thinking about the relationship
between phone and logos is to develop a concept of “language without Voice” (“Voice”
198; 37), and Attell notes that Voice “is not the negative breach within the hegemonic
metaphysics of presence, but rather the very ground of the hegemonic metaphysics of
negativity” (82). These critics thus suggest that Agamben’s project is one of scrutinizing
that negative metaphysical grounding: a project that attempts to rework the constitutive
negativity that is inscribed at the outset of the metaphysical project, in the same way that
biopolitics must be thought of without bare life as the negativity needed to support its
structures. This is what Agamben will term the “step-backward-beyond” (qtd. in
McLoughlin, “Voice to Infancy” 157). Yet we can conceive in Burroughs a similar
movement, of returning to an originary split in order to articulate a new embarkation

Agamben’s critique of the metaphysics of language is a less well-known hermeneutic than that of
Jacques Derrida’s différance. While Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence as instantiated
in the idea of the voice seems resonant here, I wish to foreground Agamben’s approach for two reasons.
The first is simply that the a Derridean approach to Burroughs’s work has been thoroughly conducted by
critics (see, for instance, Bardini 179-186; Murphy 35-36, 41-42; Lydenberg 123-124, 173-174). More
substantially, however, there is a clear split in the critical approaches to language and metaphysics between
Derrida and Agamben (see Attell 74). Whereas Derrida’s deconstruction explores how the concept of
“presence” must always be haunted by the trace that supplements such an assertion, and thus that presence
always contains within it absence (see Of Grammatology 26), Agamben sees negativity instantiated in the
zone of indistinction between phone and logos—in Voice. Thus, Derrida’s attempt to demonstrate that
absence subtends presence is, for Agamben, a restatement of this negativity. Therefore, as McLoughlin
notes, “Agamben criticizes Jacques Derrida’s grammatology as returning philosophy to its originary
negativity” (“Voice” 198). While I suggest that Burroughs’s project is not ultimately coterminous with
Agamben’s, I do believe that the latter’s search for an affirmative presence, as opposed to an endless
permutation of trace and play that summarizes Derrida’s approach, to be much closer in spirit to
Burroughs’s literature.
118
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point for a politico-philosophical project. Agamben is concerned with mapping out the
ways politics continually resorts to bare life in order to instantiate itself; Burroughs seeks
to create a mythology in which bare life is the starting point for thinking about life and
social interaction. Thus, rather than trying to think of a “language without Voice,”
Burroughs is interested in inverting the negative inflection of Voice, turning it from
something that is a “non-place” (Agamben, Remnants 130) into something that is fully
present and can be accounted for. In that zone of indistinction that Agamben obsessively
returns to and maps out, Burroughs sees the possibility of articulating a new radical
ontological project, a space of bare life speaking with its own Voice.
Agamben’s linguistic project is heavily informed by the linguistic analysis of
Émile Benveniste. In particular, Agamben is interested in the idea that “every language
has at its disposal a series of signs (which linguists call ‘shifters’ or indicators of
enunciation, among which, for example, there are the pronouns ‘I,’ ‘you,’ ‘this,’ and the
adverbs ‘here,’ ‘now,’ etc.)” (Remnants 115). These shifters, according to Benveniste,
“cannot be defined except in terms of ‘locution,’ not in terms of objects as a nominal sign
is. I signifies ‘the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing
I’” (qtd. in Agamben, Remnants 116). Such shifters, in other words, contain no
informational content on their own until they are inhabited by the speaker in the act of
speaking; they are “‘empty signs’ that become ‘filled’ when they are assumed by the
speaker in the act of discourse” (Attell 70). For Agamben, such shifters represent the
process of the way that language organizes the thinking of the human being, as “the
psychosomatic individual must fully abolish himself and desubjectify himself as a real
individual to become the subject of enunciation and to identify himself with the pure
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shifter ‘I,’ which is absolutely without substantiality and content other than its mere
reference to the event of discourse” (Remnants 116). If, as Attell suggests, “the firstperson pronoun … turns out to be precisely the key to the door that for Agamben will
lead past the paradoxes of subjectivity” (55), it is because through the purely empty
content of “I” (and other linguistic shifters), Agamben is able to demonstrate the wholly
self-referential quality of language and its self-positing field.
Burroughs once again seems to think along the same lines as Agamben, but his
speculative thinking allows for a literalization very different in quality from Agamben’s
philosophy. Burroughs’s interest in the linguistic malleability of the signifier is perhaps
the most interesting character of his cut-up method, and where his attempts to enflesh
language become most clear.119 The phrase “[s]hift linguals” repeats throughout the
trilogy (Soft Machine 149; Ticket 104; Nova 61, 62, 65, 67), an invocation to rearrange
our understanding of the referential character of linguistics. The routine “do you love
me?” (Ticket 43-49) is a particularly sustained and illuminating example of the quality of
the cut-up’s potential. It is worth quoting one paragraph at length to demonstrate its
potential:
Do you love me, Nancy of the laughing sex words? — Still i feel the thrill of your
charms vibrated to neon — giggling out all the little things you used to do —
‘Twas good bye on the line of Bradly’s naked body — love skin on a bicycle built
for two — like a deflated balloon — Your cool hands on his naked dollars, baby
— You were meant for me sucked through pearly genital face — Still i feel the
thrill of you spurting out through the orgasm seems to whisper: “Louise, Mary,
swamp mud” — In the blood little things you used to do — recorder jack-off —
Substitute mine — Bye bye body halves — i’m half crazy all for the love of color
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While Burroughs does not appear to be aware of the linguistic theory of Benveniste, he was certainly
interested in exploring linguistic possibility. In the 1930s he enrolled in the linguistic seminars of Alfred
Korzybski, whose work focused on “the fallacy of Aristotelian either/or logic: that a proposition is either
true or false …. [Korzybski] said that the either/or contradiction does not correspond with the human
nervous system at all. It is not either/or; it is both/and” (Miles 73; see also Bardini 180).
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circuits — Do i love you in the throat gristle? Ship ahoy but remember the red
river body explode sex words to color — Do you love me? — Take a simple tape
from all the things you were — Moanin’ low my sweet 8276 all the time —
Who’s sorry now in the underwater street? ‘Twas good bye on color bicycle built
for response in the other nervous system— (48).
The entire routine consists of modifications on this raw material, churning out and
reconfiguring these phrases and words cut-up from popular love songs, such as Rudy
Vallee’s “I’m Just a Vagabond Lover,” The Contours’s “Do You Love Me,” and Harry
Dacre’s “Daisy Bell” with fragments of the sf terminology that forms the plotline of the
novels (the “body halves” that the nova mob infect, the bare life of Bradly). These cut-up
phrases are robbed of any kind of context or connection to conventional sentence
structure, but they are not pure asemia or glossolalia which, as Agamben notes, “merely
radicalizes a desubjectifying experience implicit in the simplest act of speech” (Remnants
115). Burroughs seeks a mid-way point between enunciating language and glossolalia,
providing recognizable fragments from popular culture or the novel’s own narrative
structure, but robbed of their linear connections. The “i”s that are utilized throughout
these fragments are thus robbed of a unifying context—there is no uniform subject of the
“I” who inhabits and enunciates this discursive space, but instead a constant
foregrounding of these shifters as material signifiers. Indeed, Burroughs seeks to expand
that shifting quality to all of language, not just to certain deictic pronouns. The words in
these cut-up scenarios depend upon a constant deformation of a separation between the
word’s material instance and its linguistic signification. It is in these attempts that
Burroughs tries, at the level of form, to imbue the narrative with the trace of the material,
to imbue the Voice with an affirmative character.
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The “writing machine” routine in Ticket gives a clear narrative example of this
material practice. The routine depicts a carnivalesque “Exhibition” that appears as a
macroscopic tape recorder, where customers can enter and transform writing. One room
involves a giant “writing machine that shifts one half text and half the other through a
page from on conveyer belts,” clearly referencing the fold-in method (65). According to
the narration, “spectators are invited to feed into the machine any pages of their own text
in fifty-fifty juxtaposition with any author of their choice,” and watch in delight as the
machine responds by “permutating through page frames in constantly changing
juxtaposition” (65). The remainder of the routine is devoted to examples of these fold-ins,
with the poetry of Shakespeare, Rimbaud, Eliot, as well as Nova trilogy characters such
as Mr Bradly Mr Martin appearing throughout. Here again, the text becomes wholly
devoid of its linguistic powers, reduced to a narration of Voice rather than a commanding
narrative language (such as the Mayan codices). Hayles sees a “chaotic recursivity” at
work in this section of Ticket, exploring an infinite generative possibility that an emptied
language cannot delimit (217). Yet where Hayles sees Burroughs as playing between the
poles of a normative “body” and an individuated “embodiment,” between hegemonic
practices of inscription and radical self-composing writings of incorporation (193), and
thus a writer whose “emphasis remains on subversion and disruption rather than creative
articulation” (220), I think that such a reading does not push Burroughs’s rewrite project
far enough. In thinking about the Nova trilogy as explicating the Voice of the flesh, as the
hypostatic units of a new and affirmative politics of bare life, then Burroughs is not
defining things in negation, but taking those constitutive negations and setting them at the
beginning of a new iteration of philosophy and biopolitics. The flesh and the Voice are
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the keys to Burroughs’s Agambenian step-backward-beyond, and in pushing these
concepts to the forefront of his poetics, one must discard the antiquated and tainted terms
of “body” and “language.”

2.9

The Qualified Flesh

All of this said, Burroughs’s bare life is ultimately still a qualified one. Burroughs
made little secret of his misogyny, and his writings and interviews from the time are
replete with references to the malignant, alien qualities of women. As Miles recounts,
Burroughs became particularly withdrawn and antisocial during the writing of the Nova
trilogy, and his “theories … had reached the stage where he now proposed that women
were not human at all but had been sent from a distant galaxy as agents for a giant trust of
insects that were manipulating the Earth. Burroughs suggested that all women should be
exterminated just as soon as males had found some form of parthenogenesis” (393-394).
Such opinions filter their way into his writing as well: in The Job, a combination of
routines, essays, and interviews, Burroughs responds to the question “[h]ow do you feel
about women?” with the response: “[i]n the words of one of a great misogynist’s plain
Mr. Jones, in Conrad’s Victory: ‘Women are a perfect curse.’ I think they were a basic
mistake, and the whole dualistic universe evolved from this error. Women are no longer
essential to reproduction” (110). Similarly, in his later novel The Place of Dead Roads
(1983) Burroughs, through his persona of Kim Carsons, expounds that “[w]omen must be
regarded as the principal reservoir of the alien virus parasite” (qtd. in Grauerholz and
Silverberg 453). At the level of gender, then, Burroughs seems to recourse to the dualism
that much of his Nova trilogy is seen to challenge and deconstruct. As Jaime Russell
notes, “[t]he binaries of male/female, masculine/feminine, and soul/body are supposedly
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rendered obsolete by the texts’ creation of a monocentric universe in which the concepts
of ‘female,’ the ‘feminine,’ and ultimately the ‘body’ are erased through exclusion”
(Queer Burroughs 157). In the viral logic of the Nova trilogy, women are consigned to be
that parasitic other, another of the overdetermined origins of the dualism that Burroughs
reads as being the vital juncture upon which power relations have been erected. As such,
the flesh of his bare life mythology is a solely masculine one. Throughout the Nova
trilogy, the scenarios of genesis and intimacy are solely the province of queer male
contact: in one routine in Ticket, the boy-prostitute Ali, on meeting with a client, becomes
the site of a new, generative spawn—“Ali could feel something coming alive in his
rectum and wriggling down into his testicles,” and then, at the climax of their encounter,
“[t]he man caught [Ali’s] ejaculation in a jar — Tiny green frogs with sucker paws stirred
in the sperm” (38). Ali is just one example of a continually generative possibility within
Burroughs’s universe, a universe where the privileging of the flesh of bare life and its
morphological possibility is predicated on the exclusion of a feminine materiality.
Indeed, in the Nova novels the only named female character that appears is the nova
mobster “‘Hamburger’ Mary.” The other references to embodied women bodies are
always qualified as a closing bracket in a binary equation: Johnny Yen (another nova
mobster) is referred to by Inspector Lee as “[t]he Boy-Girl Other Half strip tease God of
sexual frustration,” while an alias for Mr. Bradly Mr. Martin is “Mr and Mrs D” (Ticket
53, 55). In both of these cases, the dual-gendering of the nova mobsters is meant to
signify the binary structures that the viral word is predicated upon, a crystalline
sectioning of their power of dividing the flesh. The feminine is not invoked in the flesh
for Burroughs, but remains a sign of the viral corruption of the flesh of bare life.
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This qualification ultimately sneaks the dualisms Burroughs so vehemently
opposes back into the structural logic of his narrative. Interestingly, Burroughs seems to
doubt the efficacy of a “pure” cut-up narrative or universe. Upon publication of the first
draft of The Soft Machine in 1961, the most intensely abstract and experimental cut-up
Burroughs had performed, he found himself dissatisfied. In a letter to Timothy Leary,
Burroughs complains that “The Soft Machine is too difficult. I am now writing a sciencefiction book that a twelve-year-old can understand” (qtd. in Miles 398). Indeed, following
its publication, Miles notes that Burroughs “became so dissatisfied with The Soft
Machine that he completely rewrote it, taking out most of the cut-ups and substituting
sixty-five pages of new material in a straight narrative line” (407). On its own, the pure
narrative confusion and chaos of the cut-up technique is unsustainable, producing a
complete absence of localizability.120 The cut-up is part of a dialectical process, in other
words—it needs to be situated within the context of conventional, linear narrative in
order to be efficacious.
Indeed, within The Ticket That Exploded (a novel that also underwent substantial
rewrites), Burroughs juxtaposes substantial linguistic experimentation with almost
straightforward routines. For instance, the routine “do you love me?” (discussed above),
perhaps the most sustained example of cut-up experimentation in his novels, immediately

And leading critics to level one of their most consistent complaints against Burroughs’s
experimentation: that of boredom. John Willett maps a trajectory of reaction to Burroughs’s prose: “first
shock … then a steady nausea … finally boredom with the endless monotony” (41). Alvin J. Seltzer makes
a similar comment, claiming that “[w]hat was shocking in Naked Lunch becomes repetitious in The Soft
Machine, and alternately annoying and uninteresting in Nova Express and The Ticket That Exploded”
(359). Punday suggests that “[a]mong the many frustrating qualities of Burroughsian prose, one of the most
striking is the repetition of scenes with slight variations” (50). And David Lodge, while referring to Naked
Lunch as a “very indecent” book, seems to compliment it when comparing it to Nova Express, which he
derides as “very tedious” (76).
120
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precedes the routines “operation rewrite” (49-54) and “the nova police” (54-62), two of
the most comprehensible and straightforward sections of the text, which lay out in an
explicit and declarative fashion the viral nature of the word and the actions of the nova
police. Indeed, perhaps to humorously underscore this point, the last few pages of “the
nova police” are conducted in question-and-answer format between Inspector Lee and his
interlocutors of the press. “Question: ‘Inspector Lee, i don’t quite understand what is
meant by a ‘coordinate point’—Could you make this a little clearer?” one voice helpfully
asks (Ticket 58). As Breu is right to point out, Burroughs’s writing style often takes this
approach: his sentences often begin conventionally, with a clearly identifiable subject and
predicate, but decompose as they continue along, clauses accumulating until the whole
structure collapses (41-42). In Breu’s own words, “[t]he second half of the sentence[s]
emphasize[] the materiality of the signifiers deployed and, in clustering these signifiers
together, creates discrete subsyntactic units … that become entities unto themselves”
(42). To add to Breu’s insight, and to connect this idea back to the narrative power, these
“subsyntactic … entities” only make sense, are only empowered, through the appearance
of the conventional embarkation points. This same progressive defamiliarization structure
is scaled up to the organization of the novels themselves. Thus we can see the dialectic of
Burroughs’s narration, the way that immunity is predicated upon a constant
refamiliarization with the familiar markers of sentence structure and plot. As the D.S.
tells Lee at the beginning of Ticket, “[a]s you know, inoculation is the weapon of choice
against virus and inoculation can only be effected through exposure” (10). On the level of
narrating a war with the word, Burroughs continually inoculates and re-infects his reader,
exposing them to the radical experimentation of language, as well as an almost
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parodically didactic narrative throughline. The narrative immunity that emerges in the
Nova trilogy, then, results from a symmetrical coupling of the word to the flesh and
transmuting this synthesis into a Voice.
At the beginning of Homo Sacer, Agamben announces that “[t]he protagonist of
this book is bare life” (8), and the philosophical project that follows continually centers
this material existence at the (excluded) heart of political and metaphysical apparatuses.
Bare life is what enables and empowers these thoughts and images of power to exist, and
Agamben’s philosophical career is devoted to tracing the contours of this idea. In a
similar, and far more literal vein, Burroughs too makes bare life the hero of his novels
stretching from Naked Lunch to Nova Express. Burroughs, a biopolitical thinker avant la
lettre, is concerned with how the flesh is constantly consigned to hierarchical functions of
power that continually repress, shape, and imprison its mutable vitality. Thinking of bare
life as that which is excluded in both metaphysics and politics by language, Burroughs is
obsessed with thinking through a way outside of this trap. His Nova trilogy of novels is
ultimately, then, concerned with a seemingly straightforward question: how is it possible
to narrate immunity when language is itself an infectious entity? The novels themselves
can be considered experiments that attempt to locate various avenues of access to this
immune principle, moving from plot and character to narrative voice and ultimately to the
structure and materiality of narrative language itself. Burroughs’s discovery seems to be
that there is no way finally and completely to think one’s way outside of the virus,
outside of the infectious quality of language, but only to continually subject the reader to
infection in order to inoculate through a deforming experience. The flesh will always be
subject to reterritorialization, to capture by viral powers. What Burroughs’s literary
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project ultimately does is excavate the bare life of the flesh from its subsumption beneath
the illusions of body, identity, and language, exposing it as the hypostatic in-common that
subtends all political and philosophical thought. However, this flesh must be recognized
and re-presented through constant exposure to the virus of language. As Burroughs writes
in the introduction to his novel Queer (1985), “to set the record straight: writing [is]
inoculation. … I achieved some immunity from further perilous ventures along these
lines by writing my experience down” (128; see also Wald 186). Yet this writing can only
be immunitary when considered as a whole—when comprised of viral and inoculative
writing practices, linear narrative and formal experimentation, the dialectical connection
that the process of reading these interconnections provides. It is only as a whole that the
Nova trilogy can speak in the Voice of bare life—analyzing the work on the level of
language will always threaten to negate that Voice, to promote the language of the viral,
and to restart the biopolitical project once again.
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Chapter 3

3

( )topia: Queer Topologies and Topographies in the AIDS
Writing of Samuel R. Delany
“[T]he condition called AIDS does not have, as it were, natural borders”
(Susan Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors)
“Well, here during the Great Plague, I’ve kind of given my psyche a little
push and gone back to my old perversion. So far, so good.”
(Samuel R. Delany, letter to John Bravard, 1983)
The preceding two chapters have dealt with viruses as a speculative concept: for

both Jack London and William S. Burroughs, narratives of viral outbreak and immune
response allow one to model and rethink social identities and relationships. This chapter
turns away from narratives of fictional viral outbreaks in order to consider a
representation of the very real HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States throughout the
1980s and 1990s. This is not to retreat from the analysis of speculative fiction that I have
heretofore employed; rather, in examining the work of Samuel R. Delany (1942- ), I wish
to explore how a writer confronting an actual viral epidemic makes use of speculative
literary tools in order to challenge dominant and prejudicial assumptions of viral
transmission, and offer a means of thinking radically about alternative conceptions of
identity, community, and space.

3.1

Discourse and the AIDS Epidemic in America

It has been noted that the dominant thinking of the American medical establishment
toward the end of the 1970s was a triumphalism over infectious disease. As Alfred W.
Crosby notes,
[i]n 1969 the Surgeon General of the United States, William H. Stewart, assured
us that we had left infectious disease behind in our dust. Three years later, in the
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final edition of the classic Natural History of Infectious Disease, author and
Nobel laureate Macfarlane Burnet concluded that “the most likely forecast about
the future of infectious disease is that it will be very dull.” (xi)
Such narratives of the end of infectious disease were, as Crosby informs the reader,
derailed by the onset of the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s (xii).121 First noticed by the
medical establishment in 1981 with a publication in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report (see Wald 220; Triechler 49),122 the provenance of the disease remained unknown
until the viral origin of the syndrome in the Human Immunodeficiency Virus was
discovered in 1983.123 Sontag suggests “[t]he advent of AIDS has made it clear that
infectious diseases are far from conquered and their roster is far from closed” (72).
Concomitant with this awareness of the continued vulnerability of human populations to
opportunistic infections come those narratives so clearly familiar associated with these
ideas of infection.
As I explored in the previous chapter, the post-war sciences of virology and
immunology were engaged in a rivalry with one another to explain the origins and effects

Following this line, Susan Sontag writes of how, prior to the discovery of AIDS, “[m]edicine had been
viewed as an age-old military campaign now nearing its final phase, leading to victory” (72), while Heather
Houser notes that “[i]f the 1970s seemed to confirm a narrative of biomedical progress due to an explosion
of vaccines and novel procedures … [t]he first cases of HIV/AIDS … shook the confidence of
epidemiologists and pharmaceutical researchers” (31). Likewise, Priscilla Wald notes that “[t]he human
immunodeficiency virus jolted scientific researchers and medical practitioners out of their sanguinity”
(213).
122
Cindy Patton makes clear, however, that even earlier incidences of the disease among vulnerable
communities, such as intravenous drug users, likely went unnoticed. She writes: “it now appears that
injecting drug users had already experienced an epidemic of HIV-related pneumonia deaths in the late
1970s The epidemic, noted at the time as ‘junky pneumonia,’ did not trigger public health investigators’
interest because it was not considered remarkable that drug users should get sick and die from any number
of illnesses” (Inventing AIDS 27-28).
123
The two main research teams that worked on identifying the virus were led by Luc Montaigner at the
Institut Pasteur in France, and Robert Gallo of the National Cancer Institute in the United States. The
French research team first isolated the virus in 1983, while the Americans discovered it the following year.
United States Heath and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler publicly announced these findings in
1984 (Jones and Salazar 26, 34).
121
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of infectious disease. It was the advent of AIDS that brought these two disciplines into
close contact with one another, as both required the other to fully account for this
particular virus. As Emily Martin remarks, “it is frequently implied in the press that
virologists will have to become immunologists to understand HIV. This is a way of
saying that virologists will not be able to understand the tiny microbes that they study in
isolation unless they understand them in the context of the immune system as a complex
system” (130). Immunological research during the AIDS epidemic required “accounting
for the specific trigger that sets in motion the immune reaction and its subsequent
malfunction,” while virology “cannot study the life of HIV unless it can be observed in
relation to host cells” (Patton, Inventing AIDS 58). Because HIV is an immunodeficiency
virus, wherein the immune response of a human body is suppressed by the viral agent,124
the two sciences that were once contrasted with one another now reinforced one another’s
understanding of the ways in which infections develop and are transmitted. Likewise, as I
have shown in the previous chapter, such models of etiology and epidemiology are never
exclusive to the realm of science, but are always informed by and in turn shape the wider
cultural and political sphere.
As Cindy Patton notes, “[t]he paradigmatic representation/embodiment of the
‘AIDS virus’ is the gay man. Thus gay men are in the uncomfortable position of being
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An immunodeficiency virus is one that impacts the ability of the immune system to successfully
mobilize and respond to infectious agents. In the case of HIV, the primary area affected, as Victoria Harden
notes, are immune cells known as “helper T-cells,” which are vital in immunological response for directing
an anti-viral reaction (17). When HIV enters the body, it targets T-cell receptors in the immune system.
Although the immune system launches an anti-viral response, the virus’s ability to evade anti-viral cells
(through misrecognition and through mutation) means that the body is able to contain the virus but not
eradicate it. As HIV remains inside T-cells and continues to reproduce, the ability of T-cells to recognize
and attack opportunistic infections is progressively eroded, until the point where the body is unable to
prevent microbial illnesses from replicating inside it (see Noursadeghi and Pillay 6-10).
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constantly spoken about,” inscribed within specific cultural narratives over which they
have little or no control (Inventing AIDS 55).125 Certainly, this was how the disease was
first received by the medical community, which termed it Gay-Related Immune
Deficiency, or “GRID” for short.126 Such a framing of the syndrome as one afflicting gay
men only heavily informed the socio-medico-political response to the burgeoning crisis.
Michael Scarce, for instance, notes the number of less formal terms for the disease that
persisted in the early years of the epidemic: “gay lymph node syndrome, gay cancer, gay
plague, homosexual syndrome, community-acquired immunodeficiency (CAID), and
acquired community immunodeficiency syndrome (ACIDS)” (347). Wald astutely points
to how the usage of such terms, and in particular the “D” in GRID referring to
“deficiency” as opposed to “disease,” subtly implies that “the immunodeficiency [was]
not the result of an acquired disease, but an outcome of homosexuality itself” (222). Such
organizing of HIV/AIDS as something that affected gay men only had the dually
damaging effect of singling out this group for stigmatization and demonization, while at
the same time effacing other groups at risk from the syndrome. This segregation of gay
men from the rest of society, as those marked by the disease, allowed for the mobilization
of politically regressive action (or inaction).
Paula Treichler’s famous claim that “the AIDS epidemic is simultaneously an
epidemic of a transmissible lethal disease and an epidemic of meanings or signification”
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The problematics of this figuration are manifold, rhetorically constructing heteronormativity as
somehow safe from the “gay disease,” while at the same time effacing the many non-gay male
demographics disproportionately affected by the illness.
126
Paula Treichler notes how “[b]y late 1982, enough nonhomosexual cases had been documented to render
GRID an unsuitable diagnosis,” and the acronym “AIDS” was chosen to replace it at a medical conference
that same year (47).
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(11) underscores that the epidemic in the United States indelibly intertwined ideas of
biological pathology with homophobic, racist, and classist cultural narratives.127 Even
when the rhetoric deployed to discuss the epidemic did not rely on the overtly racist,
homophobic, or millenarian figurations,128 it still often portrayed queer subjects as
enacting a malignant kind of choice. Popular nonfiction accounts of the disease, most
notably Randy Shilts’s highly controversial account of the early years of the AIDS crisis
in And the Band Played On (1987), traffic in these tropes. The enduring legacy of Shilts’s
book is its narrative throughline following airline steward Gaetan Dugas, who becomes
the infamous “Patient Zero.”129In Shilts’s book, Dugas turned the spread of the infection
into a kind of conscious act: “Shilts … endowed [Dugas] with the sinister agency of

127

Around the epidemic has accrued a staggering amount of cultural narratives that attempt to explain or
contextualize the disease’s appearance within the cultural consciousness. Such narratives, which attempt to
assign blame or contour a neat logic of infection, have persistent and often damaging material effects on
those who are afflicted by the syndrome. Jesse Helms, the Republican Senator from North Carolina during
the epidemic, was instrumental in using his political influence to “prohibit the use of funds [of an act to
promote AIDS research and education] … from being used to provide AIDS education, information, or
prevention materials and activities that promote, encourage, or condone homosexual sexual activities or the
intravenous use of illegal drugs” (qtd. in Crimp 70; see also Patton, Inventing AIDS 56). Crimp concludes
with the note that the Senate voted overwhelmingly in favour of Helms’s amendment, 94-2 (156).
128
One of the more common narratives deployed against gay men in an attempt to rationalize the
transmission of the virus dwelled in imagery of Biblical apocalypse. Peter Allen cites a doctor in New York
referring to AIDS as “the ‘Wrath of God Disease’” in a conversation. Thomas L. Long, meanwhile, traces
the history of equating male homosexuality with irredeemable sin by evangelical preachers and
fundamentalist politicians throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which then saw the virus and its associated
symptoms as a form of divine retribution (9-18). Long quotes celebrity preacher Billy Graham, who frames
the disease by claiming that “God has chosen to allow man to reap what he sows to help him learn the bitter
lesson that sin brings pain,” and Republican Congressman William Dannemeyer of California, who speaks
of “a corruption of spirit that leads to selfishness and preoccupations with pleasure …. At that point, excess
and perversion come into fashion, and, after that—catastrophe” (qtd. in 18). The cultural logic of such a
narrative created a linear causality that had calamitious material effects for those affected by the disease.
129
Shilts’s book and its depiction of Dugas—as well as its description of Dugas as the infamous “Patient
Zero”—has long been controversial (see Crimp; Wald). As noted in a paper published recently in Nature by
Worobey et al., the blood belonging to Dugas possessed “neither biological nor historical evidence that he
was the primary case [of HIV] in the US” (98). New York Times reporter Donald McNeil further adds that
Shilts’s description of Dugas as “Patient Zero” was also a misnomer: “in an early epidemiological study of
cases, [Dugas] was designated Patient O, for ‘outside Southern California,’ where the study began” (n.
pag.).
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retribution,” writes Wald (215), while Crimp notes how “Shilts created the character of
‘Patient Zero’ to embody everything that the book purports to expose: irresponsibility,
delay, denial—ultimately murder” (57), and Patton states how “[i]t is now commonly
believed … that gay male sexual culture before AIDS was chaotic, amoral, and
thoughtless. Randy Shilts’ epic And the Band Played On has been particularly influential
in confirming just this view” (Inventing AIDS 44). As each of these critics understand, the
trajectory suggested in this rendering of the gay male is a movement from a frivolous,
dangerously ludic existence to a more sober and “mature” post-AIDS identity.130
If Treichler’s “epidemic of signification” adage holds true, then the paramount
importance of signification was understood not only by conservative forces proffering
various narratives of immune purity or responsibility, but also among activists seeking to
challenge such destructive myths, particularly in the America of the 1980s and 1990s.131

Indeed, the concept of maturation and responsibility is central to Crimp’s highly critical response to
conservative gay commentator Andrew Sullivan’s 1996 New York Times Magazine article “When Plagues
End: Notes on the Twilight of an Epidemic.” Sullivan pens a stark narrative of progress that can be detected
in the epidemic, where “[b]efore AIDS, gay life—rightly or wrongly—was identified with freedom from
responsibility, rather than its opposite,” but the onset of the disease has forced a reckoning in the gay
community, and “with AIDS, responsibility became a central, imposing feature of gay life” (qtd. in Crimp
5). Sullivan professes a progressive narrative of gay life in which the hedonistic rebelliousness of the postStonewall era is fundamentally transformed by AIDS into a sober understanding of a “mature” political and
communal identity (15). Philip Brian Harper critiques Sullivan along a different axis, exploring how the
title of Sullivan’s article, “When Plagues End,” suggests that the deaths that will continue to occur as a
result of the syndrome—deaths that Sullivan himself admits are inevitable—are rhetorically consigned by
the commentator “do not constitute AIDS-related deaths at all” (95). Harper paraphrases Sullivan’s article
as: “I know that many people who are not white or not U.S. residents will still die, but in my narrative,
those people do not really have AIDS” (95). Harper’s critique, ergo, crystallizes the concept of narrative
immunity and its biopolitical implications dramatized by Sullivan’s article. Sullivan’s idea of an immature
and self-destructive queer community that is forced into “maturity” (read: neoconservativism and
respectability politics) certainly evokes immunity as a means of insulating certain bodies from the
apocalyptic narrative of AIDS while marking those outside this narrow category to an unnarratable death.
131
The classic text detailing the aims and practices of ACT UP’s activism is the handbook Women, AIDS,
and Activism (1990), published by the Women’s Caucus of ACT UP. For a more recent survey of the role
of AIDS activism, see Deborah B. Gould’s Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight Against AIDS
(2009), which takes into account the affective power and charge of such action. David France’s successful
documentary How to Survive a Plague (2012), as well as its textual counterpart (2016) have proven to be
130
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Perhaps best encapsulated in the famous slogan of the AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power
(ACT UP), “SILENCE = DEATH,” printed on posters beneath the pink triangle of the
gay rights movement, the power of signifying and rhetorically fashioning the way in
which the disease was interpreted and responded to by the wider American culture
became a field of contestation.132
Among the many commentators and theorists on the role of signification and
language in shaping the epidemic, Samuel Delany is one of the most thoughtful. A queer
black writer living in New York City during the epidemic, Delany saw first-hand the
devastation caused by the disease and the effect that the denigrating narratives around
HIV/AIDS had in amplifying the crisis.133 In his nonfictional writing, Delany specifically
seeks to dismantle “the discursively impoverished notion that AIDS is a ‘homosexual
disease’” (Jewel-Hinged Jaw 219). Indeed, it is this focus on the discursive construction
of the disease that fuels Delany’s 1993 lecture “The Rhetoric of Sex/The Discourse of
Desire,” a paradigmatic example of his thinking on AIDS. In a self-consciously

popular, though not entirely uncontroversial depictions of the ways activism and institutional science
approached the disease. Sarah Schulman’s and Jim Hubbard’s documentary United in Anger: A History of
ACT UP (2012) provides a bleaker depiction of AIDS activism than that of How to Survive a Plague, while
also attending to groups of activists often overlooked, including lesbian and transgender activists.
132
Literary theorist Lee Edelman pushes Treichler’s idea further, suggesting that the AIDS crisis is not just
an “epidemic of signification,” but a “plague of discourse” (“Plague of Discourse” 94). For Edelman, while
the work of AIDS activists is invaluable in saving the lives of communities afflicted by the disease, in the
responses of the ACT UP campaign, there is the potential “to naturalize and reposition certain aspects of
the ideological structures that inform and produce those noxious representations [of gay men] and those
oppressive subjectivities in the first place” (97). In Edelman’s deconstructive analysis, the famous
“Silence=Death” activism campaign works within the production of a discourse that becomes
oppositionally entangled (and thus enables) the homophobic narratives it seeks to counteract. The political
power of rhetoric is Edelman’s chief object of analysis, and I will discuss this in greater detail through the
nonfictional AIDS writing of Delany.
133
The focus on the racial aspect of queer identity is beyond the purview of this chapter, though it is
important to the intersectional analysis of identity and community that Delany explores throughout his
career. For a thorough overview of how race operates in Delany’s thought and fiction, see Tucker. For an
intersectional analysis of how Delany’s interests in race, sexuality, and class overlap, see Griffiths. For the
racial politics of The Mad Man, see Ravela.
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Foucauldian vein, Delany defines discourses as a specific function of language, one
which “lodge[s] inchoately in the processes by which we make a text make sense” (8).
The primary action of discourse is to “assign import,” or value, to figures that unfold
within language (11). Rhetoric, meanwhile, is the particular mode in which such
discourses are expressed and transmitted. The juxtaposition of these terms allows Delany
to work through how the “homogenization of discourses” of race, sexuality, gender, and
class around the concept of AIDS “has produced an angering, murderous sexual
rhetoric,” one shaped by the discourse of patriarchy (36, 38). He takes particular aim at
the spread of cultural misinformation having to do with “repeated sexual contact” as the
cause of infection, referring to such claims as “murderous misinformation” (37). Delany
states that the empirical facts of AIDS transmission are that “it is not transmitted by oralgenital sex between men. And that it is transmitted easily and effectively through anal
sex,” adding that “[a]nything else we might say about its sexual transmission is all in the
realm of superstition” (38).134 The lack of publicly disseminated studies on the disease
acquisition vectors only further the pernicious and false discourse of “repeated sexual
contact” of any kind being the cause of the illness (38). Delany urges his audience to
“demand with me that monitored studies be initiated, be rigorously overseen, and their
results be widely disseminated,” for it is in this kind of study that the cultural
underpinnings of such conservative discourses of sex and sexuality can be challenged. In
the final words of the lecture, Delany suggests that his audience “[e]ncourage” the

In Delany’s case, he admits that his own approach is purely anecdotal, based upon his own personal
sexual experiences and sero-status, and that he is not uniformly advocating such an approach (Shorter
Views 56). As Tucker remarks, “Delany is not arguing that oral sex is safe, but pushing against the
hysterical underpinnings of supposed discourse analysis” (263). Indeed, Delany uses his own anecdotal
evidence to underscore the vital need for increased scientific studies to be done on AIDS transmission.
134
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rhetoric of desire “through your own discussions” (39), emphasizing a dialogic approach
to thinking through the formation and transmission of received discourses, and how
rhetorical modes can challenge such approaches.
Another significant work by Delany on the role of discourse in the shaping of the
disease occurs is his article “Street Talk/Straight Talk” (1990). Delany identifies two
modes of rhetorical strategy that shape the discourse of AIDS: straight talk, in Delany’s
parlance, is “mellifluous, precise, sophisticated,” the purpose of which being “‘to
inform’—as it often says of itself—where formal differences and divisions have become
unclear, violently erased, violated” (41, 42). In other words, Delany’s straight talk is a
kind of “official” discourse, the rhetorical mode implied by institutional modes of
explanation. In contrast to this mode is “street talk,” which is “[b]rutal, repetitious,
vulgar,” a mode of articulation that operates in “ignorance, rumor, misunderstanding, and
outright superstition” (41). While such ordering would seem to suggest a clear preference
for straight talk over street talk, Delany suggests that each rhetorical method casts
“shadows”—straight talk’s shadow is “awkward, obscurantist, and often crashingly
irrelevant,” while street talk’s shadow is “clear, concrete, and honest” (42). The problem
comes about when these discourses are combined into one another, which produces the
contradiction that, while studies show AIDS is unlikely to pass through oral sex,
“perfectly learned statements flood society, all stating, equally unequivocally, that AIDS
can be transmitted by any and every sexual act involving an interchange of bodily fluids,”
a kind of misinformation, a “discursive crime at one with murder” (53, 54). Separating
out the two modes of discursive action, making them irreducible to one another, and then
employing both street talk and straight talk is Delany’s method of exploring the power of
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rhetorical engagement with a disease. Delany is certainly aware that “[n]either street- nor
straight-talk rhetorics can fully encapsulate a disease” (Hirtle 331), and his literary
project makes use of both without any attempt to privilege one over the other, to
hierarchize a relationship between these modes of articulation and the shadows that they
cast. “Rhetoric can control discourse,” Delany insists, “but only if it is insistent, accurate,
analytical, and articulate” (56). Delany argues that rhetorical practice is the best means of
contesting a unidirectional discourse about AIDS, and this requires rhetorical practices of
street talk and straight talk, a dialogic engagement with how discourse operates.
In his continued emphasis on the importance of dialogic engagement in his
writing, how such “rhetorical dialogue becomes the ideal discourse on AIDS” (Hirtle
322), Delany implies the necessity for a communitarian response to the syndrome. Rather
than a monologic approach to knowledge, Delany underscores the need for discussion,
for the transmission of ideas and engagement shared by a circuit of people. Such a
requirement in order to combat dangerous discursive formations means that community is
of central concern to Delany’s thinking about AIDS. And in Delany’s writing, such a
community is granted a specifically spatialized character that prevents it from becoming
idealized in temporal logics of a futurity.
Work on Delany’s role as an AIDS writer-activist has explored his vital
contributions to the discourse. Thomas L. Long concludes his discussion of Delany’s
AIDS writing by claiming that “[f]or three decades, Samuel R. Delany has been alerting
fiction readers (queer and otherwise) to these [epistemological] disparities, and to the
clinical reticence and inadequate research that contributes to these disparities” (224).
Likewise, Kala Hirtle reads “street talk” and “straight talk” as complementary modes of
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discourse that “force[ ] the reader to analyze what is being said: this is the first step to
changing the discourse of AIDS” (331). Hirtle points to the way that Delany considers
writing and fiction to be an invaluable vehicle for engaging with and redirecting
sociopolitical structures. The power of writing, for Delany, is that it cannot be reduced to
a singular axis of examination or interpretation, either for the author or the reader. As
Robert Reid-Pharr suggests, Delany “refuses to remain within the often unspoken limits
that distinguish ‘literary’ fiction from paraliterary forms like science fiction,
pornography, comics, and literary criticism. On the contrary, Delany remains tightly
focused on demonstrating the full range of social, discursive, and aesthetic contours of
the world he imagines” (681). Such an approach includes his fictional as well as
nonfictional writings; throughout, Delany seeks to mobilize the rhetorical and narrative
structures and tropes of fiction in order to engage with the social effects of discourse.
“Fiction makes models of reality,” Delany writes in an essay on the efficacy of sf, and it
is the power of language and the latitude of its aesthetic deployment in non-mimetic
writing that allows readers and writers to rethink the society into which they are
embedded (Jewel-Hinged Jaw 31). This latitude enables sf to explore the possibility of
language more powerfully than naturalistic fiction. The latter category, Delany states, is
predicated around the idea that it “could have happened,” while sf is built around events
which “have not happened” (10, 11). Plausibility based around present knowledge
forecloses the fullness of linguistic possibility, while an openness to futurity, or at least
an admission of the incompleteness of such knowledge, is reflected in the language and
structure of sf. Delany provides as an example the sentence, “[t]he red sun is high, the
blue low,” which he says is “meaningless” in naturalistic fiction. “The particular verbal
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freedom of SF,” he contrasts, “coupled with the corrective process that allows a whole
range of the physically explainable universe, can produce the most violent leaps of
imagery” (11-12). SF has a utility insofar as it allows us to expand the vocabulary and
narrative possibility of figuring worlds. This is an approach he will take up in his fictional
writing on AIDS: his 1984 novella The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals and the 1994 novel
The Mad Man. Both texts interweave informational aspects of AIDS prevention and safe
sex within speculative literary environments, juxtapose naturalistic writing about New
York City with phantasmagoric landscapes and characters. The skill of Delany’s writing
is that such approaches are not sectioned off from one another, or hierarchized; the nonmimetic narratives of Plagues and The Mad Man are not didactic allegories about the
history of AIDS, but essential elements in a larger project of reworking the discourse
around queer identity, community, and space in the era of AIDS.135
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Such a parallel, non-hierarchical structure is something Delany utilizes throughout his career. For
instance, his memoir The Motion of Light in Water (1987) provides readers with perhaps the author’s
clearest demonstration of this idea. Delany begins his memoir with his recollection of his father’s death in
1958 when Delany was seventeen years old. After finishing writing this account, however, he notes the
historical inaccuracies involved: his father passed away in 1960, and Delany was eighteen at the time. He
sums up the introduction (and the memoir’s theme of parallelism) thusly:
“My father died of lung cancer in 1958 when I was seventeen.”
“My father died of lung cancer in 1960 when I was eighteen.”
The first is incorrect, the second correct.
[….] In no way do I feel the incorrect sentence is privileged over the correct one. Yet, even with
what I know now … the wrong sentence still feels to me righter than the right one. (xviii).
Later in the memoir, Delany explains that a linear ordering “hierarchizes” the memories, while a parallel
printing of his impressions allows him to represent their intertwined and equally privileged effect (29).
Parallelism is Delany’s formal touchstone as a writer, a way of analogizing and contexutalizing space and
the identities within such spaces. This will be an important rhetorical figure deployed in thinking through
how AIDS is formulated with relationship to queer identity, community, and space.
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3.2

Sick Spaces: How Environment Informs AIDS
Thinking

In Mary Douglas’s famous examination of dirt and disorder in Purity and Danger
(1966), she aptly notes that “[w]here there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of
a systemic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting
inappropriate elements” (35). Douglas’s comparative analysis of religious and social
systems continually underscores the point that pollution is a conceptual category
mobilized to define and delimit the boundaries of what is considered proper. Pollutive
material is utilized in classifying social spaces and identities along binary boundaries.
Douglas’s study, though not about the United States and antedating the AIDS crisis, is
invaluable in demonstrating how such an organizing mechanism is enacted during a viral
epidemic. Allen remarks that “there was a long tradition in the West of seeing disease as
God’s punishment for sin” (xv), and in this sense, HIV/AIDS adhered closely to this
narrative. Yet the hegemonic reception and recoding of the disease also made use of other
archaic narratives of disease transmission in order to vilify those affected by it. Susan
Sontag clearly articulates this idea when she explains that “AIDS has a dual metaphoric
genealogy. As a micro-process, it is described as cancer is: an invasion. When the focus
is on transmission of the disease, an older metaphor, reminiscent of syphilis, is invoked:
pollution” (17). Sontag identifies the way in which HIV/AIDS is rendered as an
environmental kind of disease, one in which the thinking of disease becomes tied not
only to queer bodies but also spaces that have been designated (and denigrated) as queer.
This older theory to which Sontag refers has echoes with the miasmatic theory of disease
that was posited as an alternative to theories of contagion until the bacteriological work
of Pasteur and Koch in the nineteenth century definitively proved the contagionist theory
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true. Miasma theory suggested that “epidemic diseases were caused by environmental
conditions, such as noxious gases emanating from human wastes, unhygienic living
conditions, rotting animal and vegetable matter, and swamps” (Osborne 8). Unlike
contagion theory, however, miasma theory did not impute any microbial organisms as the
causes of disease—the environment itself had become polluted, a tainted area whose
degeneracy corrupted healthy bodies. Indeed, as Osborne further remarks, “the supporters
of the miasma theory posited that certain individuals had a predisposition to catching
epidemic diseases due to physical infirmity, diet, corrupted morals, and emotional
excitement” (8).
And indeed, such statements about the growth of AIDS rely on such a lineage. Peter
Duesberg, a biochemist, for instance, speculates in 1982 that “[c]ombined with the
bathhouses, all these infections go with lifestyles which enhance them” (qtd. in Crimp
51), while Shilts claims that “[j]ust about every type of unsafe sex imaginable, and many
variations that were unimaginable, were being practiced with carefree abandonment [sic]
at the facilities” of New York bathhouses (qtd. in Crimp 56). Furthermore, Patton writes
of how, in the early 1980s, “immunological interpretations of AIDS emphasized the
relationship between environmental management and internal bodily breakdown. Early
epidemiological studies were cited as evidence of gay men’s failure to thrive in the highstress ‘gay’ lifestyle” (Inventing AIDS 61). In such readings, it is as though the space of
queer contact itself becomes suffused with infectious potential, as though the disease
emanates from these places, turning them into vectors of the contagion.136 Ira Tattelman,
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This focus on urban space and queer community has been commented upon by queer theorists, most
notably Judith Halberstam, who writes that “[m]ost theories of homosexuality within the twentieth century
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in his examination of bathhouses as an important aspect of queer urban community, notes
that they “could have become a site for AIDS education, demonstrations, workshops, and
videos” (“Meaning at the Wall” 404). The space, which brought together queer citizens
from a variety of demographics, could have been a perfect nexus for promoting safe sex
without demonizing spaces or subjectivities. Instead, “[t]he existence of bathhouses and
press coverage of them made the baths mythic. HIV was transmitted through some of the
sexual activities that took place in the bathhouse, and AIDS as a condition formed outside
the bathhouse was used to interrupt the activities within the bathhouse” (394). Queer
theorist Aaron Betsky writes that “AIDS destroyed queer space,” which he means both in
the direct sense that gay clubs and discos were closed down by public health authorities,
but also that “the fantastical structure of queer space as communal reconstruction
disappeared” (180, 177). Space becomes just as tinged with “sin” as the bodies that
occupy it, and must be policed as those bodies are as well.
Indeed, such a logic resonates with what Lawrence Buell terms “toxic discourse.”
Noting that toxicity is “an interlocked set of topoi” (639), Buell is interested in thinking
how the concept of the “toxic” gains a rhetorical force and clarity in yoking together
various social, economic, political, and even aesthetic concerns under a banner of
poisoned atmospheres. While there has been a long history of American environmentalist

assume that gay culture is rooted in cities, that it has a special relationship to urban life, and that … erotic
dissidents require urban space because in rural settings queers are easily identified and punished” (35).
Halberstam terms such queer writing “metronormative,” and seeks ways of deconstructing such a
hierarchized binary. Likewise, Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, in their anthology Queer
Ecologies, seek ways of drawing connections between queer theory and ecocriticism, “advocating a
position not only of queering ecology, but of greening queer politics,” that draws explicitly on
Halberstam’s attempts to queer the urban/rural divide (22). Heather Houser, meanwhile, takes Halberstam’s
idea of metronormativity and uses it with specific reference to AIDS narratives, claiming that “[i]n the U.S.
the native habitat of HIV/AIDS was and remains the city,” and is interested instead in how “what emotions
arise when AIDS experience is transplanted to unfamiliar landscapes” (32, 34).
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writing that makes use of narrative tropes and themes of toxicity,137 Buell cites Rachel
Carson’s landmark environmentalist text Silent Spring (1962) as the beginning of the
modern era of toxic discourse that makes use of scientific and aesthetic understandings of
toxicity and pollution in order to think through and strategize responses based in
environmental justice (see 645). In Buell’s theorization, toxic discourse allows people to
access a language that is capable of connecting ways of discussing social, political,
environmental, and economic discourses in ways that are potentially liberatory. In a
similar vein, Heather Houser’s concept of “ecosickness” resonates well with this idea.
Houser’s project notes how affect “contours a narrative of environmental investment or
disengagement that is centered on sick bodies” (7), how bodies and ecologies come to
mirror and script one another. Affective understandings, for Houser, allow one to create
connections between bodies and environments and interrogate how these ideas can be
analyzed analogically. Language and affect are ways in which artists, thinkers, and
readers are able to apprehend and respond to methods of ecological damage and bodily
illness. While the AIDS epidemic of the United States (focalized, for Delany, specifically
through New York City) may not exist on the same register as chemical disasters like
Love Canal, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, or Bhopal, I suggest that Buell’s and
Houser’s fruitful methods of thinking through how toxicity incites calls to social and
ecological justice that fit within Delany’s framework. As Buell argues, “toxic discourse
may invoke a sense of place to call a localized collectivity into being or, if it is already

Buell traces the antecedents of toxic discourse back to the “gothic representation [of] public health
issues” in Charles Brockden Brown’s late-eighteenth-century novels of yellow fever, Arthur Mervyn
(653n50). This, as I note in my Introduction, is an early example of a virus outbreak narrative.
137
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self-consciously there, to raise it to a higher degree of self-consciousness” (653). Thus,
where homophobic rhetoric of AIDS transmission relies on ideas of perverse bodies and
corrupted spaces, the ideas of toxic discourse and ecosickness fiction focalize approaches
that can radically rework and appropriate such discursive powers.
Delany is not often thought of as an ecocritical writer,138 and yet his AIDS fiction
seems to meditate on these notions of toxic discourse and ecosickness, emphasizing the
ways that bodies and communities are made discursively visible, are brought to the
forefront of rhetorical figuration, through analogical discussions interweaving space,
bodies, and disease. Delany, who as a reader and scholar of Foucault, is highly interested
in the ways that discourse is used to shape social reality (see Shorter Views 23, 41),
interprets the conflation of the queer body as always already diseased and the decadent,
morally corrupt urban space as the incubator of such diseases; thus, examining New York
City and its gay male population through the prism of toxic discourse allows us to
understand the ways that identities and spaces are yoked together. Buell suggests that
toxic discourse “calls for a way of imagining physical environments that fuses a social
constructivist with an environmental restorationist perspective” (656); in The Mad Man,

A notable exception would be Tavia Nyong’o’s article “Back to the Garden: Queer Ecology in Heavenly
Breakfast,” which situates Delany’s first memoir, about his time in a folk music group-cum-hippiecommune as one that demonstrates the “ambient poetics” of Delany’s writing in a way that cultivates and
ecological understanding of New York community and identity without relying overtly on sentimentalized
depictions of pastoral “nature” (747). Nyong’o’s work is important in aligning the undertheorized ideas of
ecocriticism in Delany’s body of work with the omnipresent discussions of queer theory. As Nyong’o
argues, “Delany’s literary and sexual ecologies ‘without nature’ provide a way of pursuing the utopian
spirit of the musical and sexual subcultures of the sixties without necessarily seeking pathways ‘back to the
garden’” (747). Delany locates the importance of ecological protection and community even located in the
urban Greenwich Village. While Nyong’o does not focus on Delany’s AIDS writing, her work is invaluable
to outlining this strand of ecological thought. Likewise, Mary Catherine Foltz’s discussion of “excremental
ethics” in The Mad Man points to Delany’s way of rethinking the cultural logic and capital that absents
itself from waste in the extravagant pornographic scenes involving excrement in the novel. Here too, albeit
in a less explicitly stated vein, Foltz connects Delany’s work to ecocritical approaches.
138
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the spaces where the queer community is allowed to flourish are constantly under threat
of erasure by institutional forces, and Delany finds a way of articulating an optimistic
mirror to the toxic discourse that co-determines the body and the land as sites of
infection. He sees queer space as vital to the continuation of queer identity, and charts its
perseverance and flourishing in Manhattan during the AIDS epidemic.
Delany’s approach to thinking through the importance of space, both in its
importance to queer community and the biopolitical aspects of control, is central to his
celebrated memoir Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, which he began writing shortly
after the completion of The Mad Man. In it, Delany discusses how “the city has instituted
not only a violent reconfiguration of its own landscape but also a legal and moral
revamping of its own discursive structures, changing laws about sex, health, and zoning,
in the course of which it has been willing, and even anxious, to exploit everything from
homophobia and AIDS to family values and fear of drugs” (xi-xii). The metropolis is the
key site of a kind of queer identity, it is the site of a democratic vision of “interclass
contact and communication conducted in a mode of good will” (111), wherein erotic
connections between people are highly charged and filled with a potential. Indeed,
Delany compares the strict enforcement of queer spaces (movie theaters, adult video
stores) to management of plagues: “[o]ne is reminded of seventeenth-century London and
Marseille’s response to the plague—though here the plague may just be that pleasant
suburban couple, lawyer and doctor, herding their 2.3 children ahead of them, out the
door of the airport van and into the Milford Plaza” (xvii). Thus, the project of his AIDS
writing (both fictional and nonfictional) is to push against the rhetoric that circumscribes
AIDS as a death sentence, an atomizing condition, and an unbridgeable difference. Queer
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sexuality in the time of AIDS may indeed be surrounded, but within that space the
possibilities for queer topographies exist and can be explored.
Jolene Hubbs’s examination of Delany’s essay Times Square Red, Times Square
Blue makes the vital claim “that a healthy public sphere facilitates carnal connections for
and among its varied inhabitants” (352). For Delany, space is sexy, and is imbued with
the erotic characteristics of its inhabitants. Even more intriguingly, Hubbs goes on to add
that Delany’s exuberant and positive reading of Times Square in the 1970s and 1980s as
a place of queer sexual identity is one that reverses the dominant medical narratives:
“Delany turns on its head rhetoric used against the old Times Square,” suggesting that the
plague narrative that Times Square-as-queer-space is subject to can be repurposed and
turned against its rhetorical assailants. Yet Hubbs’s view of plague and place is strictly
figurative: the issues she describes as plaguing are “pornography and poverty—ailments
to be cured by gentrifying development,” while Delany’s rhetorical reversal demonstrates
that “a mouse brought the plague to Times Square—Mickey Mouse, that is” (352). I wish
to extend Hubbs’s linking of queerness and place to notions of health and disease by
making her claim more literal and by connecting Delany’s thoughts about queer New
York City to the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s, the intersection of which
Delany wrote about extensively.139 The reorganization of Times Square and other queer
spaces in New York was (among other reasons) begun explicitly in response to the AIDS
crisis and the fear that public queer space would serve as a breeding ground for HIV
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Although Delany describes himself as not being particularly activist beyond his fictional and nonfictional writing on AIDS. In an interview with Thomas Long, Delany admits that “[o]utside of writing and
writing-related activities (lecturing to and talking with various groups, usually in colleges around the
country) I’ve done very little [for AIDS activism]” (Shorter Views 125).
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transmission. Under this logic, space made legible as queer must be effaced, reordered or
manipulated to prevent the propagation of this deadly “lifestyle.” Thus, Delany’s writing
project is located in exploring, fighting for, and naming space as queer, finding linkages
to other spaces and connecting them together in a coherent if shifting map or periplum.
Taken from Ezra Pound’s Cantos, Delany glosses the periplum as “from before advent of
universal longitude and latitude …. [p]eriploi were detailed descriptions of the coastlines
of the mainland and the various islands” (Times Square xv-xvi). This progenitor of the
fixed, organized map, the periplum offers Delany a way of describing “what the temporal
and the lay of the land looked like and felt like and the thoughts [the navigator] had while
observing it” (xvi). Thus, in the shift and sway of the coastline, the imprecision of the
border, one can imagine not only the combination of the subjective and the objective, but
a border that is not so rigidly fixed.
Prior to 1985, Delany notes, “public sex was largely a matter of public decency—that
is to say, it was a question of who was or wasn’t offended by what went on in public
venues.” With the advent of AIDS, in what Delany terms a “sham concern” on the part of
the local powers that be, the discourse shifted to one of infection and quarantine (91). In
examining this logic, what Delany sees is “that even as the city has spoken of supporting
‘safer sex,’ while it hasn’t made ‘being a homosexual a crime’ … by law it has
criminalized each and every homosexual act … ‘in public’” (91). Echoing his concerns in
his essays on AIDS, Delany is focused on the ways institutional discourses (of public
health, of urban planning and renewal, of an omnipresent and conservative sexual
moralism) have come together into a dangerously self-reinforcing mechanism of
controlling both bodies and spaces by conflating them. During the late 1980s and early
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1990s, during which the AIDS epidemic continued to balloon while all but ignored by
federal and local government institutions, an ongoing attempt to “renovate” New York
City was placed underway, until the stewardship of Republican mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
For Eric Rofes, Manhattan—and Times Square specifically—were transformed during
this time from “a primarily working-class, poor neighborhood into the centerpiece of
Rudolph Giuliani’s empire,” an empire predicated around a sanitized, “Disneyified”
space catering to the tastes of white, heterosexual middle-class families who travel into
the space of Times Square but do not inhabit it (103). Along a similar line, Tim Dean
argues that “[a] legitimate desire to make the city safer was harnessed to the rhetoric of
safer sex that had been invented by gay men committed to public sex, and then cynically
deployed against the institutions of public sex at the expense of all those (but especially
sexual minorities) who used those institutions” (187). In this renovationist rhetoric,
Times Square becomes figured as diseased, as a giant miasma containing fears of
potential infection, and the response is to reshape its space so that access is heavily
policed and restricted, and those moments of queered “interclass contact” disappear.140

Queerness is heavily spatialized in Delany’s thinking, and the attempts of institutional power to
dominate that space require action. The attempt to “clean up” New York City constructs the discourse of
the city and its inhabitants as unclean, infected, both propagating and spreading a disease. Thus, these
actions then determine a logic of urban renewal by which the local businesses of Times Square (particularly
the pornographic theatres, clubs, adult video stores, and other “immoral places”) were shuttered and the
city was able to “open up the sites for developers” (Times Square 91). The result is that Times Square has
been turned into a shining beacon of a tourist trap whereby the “small-town” visitor gets to “have fun, as
you sample the food and culture and see the monuments and architecture,” but “the one thing you do not do
is go out into the street alone and meet people. The fear of such activity in New York City is, for most outof-towners, one with the fear of bodily contagion from AIDS” (156, emphasis added). With not just the
identities of queer men in New York City, but the spaces they live in and experience placed under the sign
of AIDS, Delany is focused on writing a counter-narrative, of deploying his prodigious rhetorical gifts, in
ways to undo such denigrating discursive structures.
140
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Delany’s project is a multifaceted one: while attempting to educate his readers on
the necessities of safe sex, he also seeks to revivify the spatial component of urban queer
contact that is so vital to his thinking. If, as David Bell suggests, “public sex is not only a
form of physical occupation but also a practice of intimate citizenship, one that … often
demands and creates particular kinds of public nature to accommodate and facilitate it”
(qtd. in Erickson 17-18), then Delany, both in his fiction and nonfiction, seeks to embody
just such a stance. Inhabiting and existing within communal urban space is a means of
asserting one’s identity and community. In the face of a destructive disease, this is vital
work. In articulating an awareness of safe sex and its practices, Delany does not want to
retreat into defensive narratives that delimit the possibility of queer intimacy and
relationality. Crimp closes his famous essay “How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic”
by noting that “we are now reclaiming our subjectivities, our communities, our culture …
and our promiscuous love of sex” (81). In responding to and writing about the AIDS
epidemic, Delany is adamant about tracing the space of that queer community.

3.3

Communal Ground

Much of the criticism on Delany focuses on whether or not his fiction can be
considered utopian. At a first glance, an answer seems straightforward: in an interview
with a graduate class of students at McGill University in 1986, Delany speaks candidly
about his reluctance to use the term “utopia,” stating, “I don’t think SF can really be
utopian. I mean utopia presupposes a pretty static, unchanging, and rather tyrannical
world,” and further adding, “I’ve always seen SF thinking as fundamentally different
from utopian thinking” (Shorter Views 323, 324). In Delany’s conception, utopia involves
a rigid, top-down thinking involving a conceivable telos which a society must move
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toward an eschatonic stasis and then enter into it.141 In this fashion, Delany seems to
accept Michel Foucault’s reading of utopias as “fundamentally unreal spaces” (“Of Other
Spaces” 24), that are therefore ultimately not useful in conceiving of a vision of the
future.142 For Delany, we can detect a distinction between the impossible and the unreal:
while the former may appear consistently throughout his texts, they remain
apprehensible, things that can be understood as occurring under different circumstances.
If, however, the ability to conceive of those circumstances strikes one as fundamentally
impossible, then those narratives become meaningless.
This utopian impossibility is tied, in a foundational way, to the concept of
temporality. As Fredric Jameson argues, the postmodern moment, riven as it is with the
collapse of a sense of history in favour of an all-pervading concept of space, can be seen
through the “symptom” of the “waning of the utopian ideal” (“Politics of Utopia” 36).
Utopia, for Jameson, is that which “emerges at the suspension of the political,” at those
moments when the political order has become so disconnected from the lived experience
of everyday citizens, that the possibility of imagining otherwise becomes a particularly
powerful critical and political tool (43). But that imagination of alterity is always
conceived of through its temporal character, as something that could only come into
being were the extant political institutions to rupture. Ultimately, for Jameson, the
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Long comments on the affinities between the apocalyptic and utopian strains in American fiction. He
cites Lois Parkinson Zamora, who notes that “apocalypse, one of the most basic yet least understood myths,
has always been essential to America’s conception of itself” (qtd. in 45). He himself points out that
American literature’s apocalypticism has always contained within it a “utopic sensibility” (36). I will
discuss these ideas of utopia and stasis at greater length in the following chapter.
142
Griffiths charts Delany’s change in thinking about utopia, noting that, after the pornotopia of The Mad
Man, he constructs a “meta-utopia” in his most recent novel, Through the Valley of the Nest of Spiders
(2012). This meta-utopia, Griffiths suggests, is founded in his thinking of queer blackness, and that
“Delany’s “queer.black utopianism is epistemological, rather than a form of object study” (307).
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utopian is a diagnostic through which we understand interpolation within an ideological
regime, for utopia’s “function lies not in helping us to imagine a better future but rather
in demonstrating our utter incapacity to imagine such a future … so as to reveal the
ideological closure of the system in which we are somehow trapped and confined” (46).
Since utopias are conceived as alternatives to the currently existing sociopolitical
organizations, they can only be informed by those ideas, and hence utopias are necessary
to understand the way in which we are conditioned. Thus, when Jameson refers to utopias
as “barely audible messages from a future that may never come into being” (54), he
situates things in the temporal relation, leaving secondary the spatial.
In Cruising Utopia, José Esteban Muñoz offers a more nuanced vision of the
utopian impulse, finding it to be immanent to the everyday. Drawing on German
philosopher Ernst Bloch, Muñoz finds that the utopian can be located within the
quotidian actions of life (22). These pleasurable and optimistic moments that we engage
in daily are, for Muñoz, models that can be abstracted to a vision of the utopian future,
where these moments serve as impressions, or “invocations,” to use Muñoz’s terms, of
“future collectivities” (25). Where Jameson reads utopia in purely abstract terms, Muñoz
finds the individual practices of everyday life to contain within them the seeds for another
and better place. Yet Muñoz explicitly casts his queer reading of utopia through the lens
of an unreachable temporality. In the opening words of the book, Muñoz informs us that
queerness “never arrives” but rather acts as “the warm illumination of a horizon imbued
with potentiality” (1). The queer is the utopian, for Muñoz, and both are unable to
become fully realized within the scope of his world vision. They remain glimpses of a
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better world that we catch in fragmentary encounters, frayed artifacts from other worlds,
never to become fully concretized.
For his part, Delany is far more amenable to the concept of heterotopia than he is
to utopia: “[w]hat I start from is the fictive element, considered in terms of a series of
questions. What would you like the effects of the government to be? What would you like
the world to look like as you walk down the street? What unpleasant things could you
tolerate in that world?” (Shorter Views 329). The occasion for this expostulation is a
discussion of Delany’s novel Triton (1976), subtitled “An Ambiguous Heterotopia.”143
The heterotopic imagination of Delany—a term he clearly draws from Foucault, although
he does not mention the theorist during his lengthy discussion of the term in this
interview144—is based in “the inevitability of social difference” (Chan 181). Utopias fail
because, in Delany’s view, they can only provide a macroscopic view of a society, one
that cannot help but tend toward “hegemony” (Shorter Views 328), thereby obviating the
possibility of a better place. Heterotopia serves Delany’s speculative purposes both

The subtitle is a direct response to the subtitle of Ursula K. Le Guin’s 1974 novel The Dispossesesed,
which was subtitled “An Ambiguous Utopia.” In the interview, Delany reveals that he added the subtitle to
the novel after the first draft, as in between drafts he read Le Guin’s novel and felt the need to respond to it
(321). The title too would later be changed to Trouble on Triton in 1995. Delany’s reasoning for his
differences with Le Guin are explicitly ecological: he says that in The Dispossessed the harshness and
scarcity of the landscape ultimately prevent the flourishing of a heterotopic vision. “When the landscape is
as harsh and ungiving as the Annares’ and your laws are set up in ecological accord with it,” Delany
argues, “you don’t have to worry too much about individuals—or groups—deviating too far from these
laws. Those who deviate, the landscape itself, punishes—if not obliterates” (323). Here again Delany
considers topology to be ineluctably linked to the character and quality of the socio-political content (and,
on another level, the literary imagination involved). Le Guin constructs her ecology in such a way as to
enforce her utopian vision. By changing the environmental conditions, Delany contends, the entire
character of a topology changes with it and the possibility for a greater otherness becomes possible.
144
Delany does, however, discuss the medical context of heterotopia: “It’s the removal of one part or organ
from the bodyand affixing it at another place in or on the body. … A skin graft is a heterotopia. But so is a
sex-change” (Shorter Views 342). Here again the vocabulary of speculative fiction and criticism ensnares
bodies and landscapes.
143
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because it is absolutely otherwise to what is now, but also because it originates in the
lived space, not in the imagination of a singular subject-position. This vision aligns with
Foucault’s declension of the term, where heterotopias are “counter-sites” that are “outside
of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (“Of
Other Spaces” 24).145 Likewise, Delany aligns utopic thinking with the engineer, and
contrasts this with the more creative being proper to the heterotopia. While the latter
“starts with a local problem, then looks around among existing materials for things to fix
it with,” the engineer “doesn’t really feel she’s started to work … until she’s got an
overarching principle to apply to the solution of the problem, which she then implements
as carefully and accurately as possible by precise technical means” (Shorter Views 331,
emphasis added). This description gets to the heart of Delany’s spatializing logic:
heterotopia is built from the surrounding ideas, while utopia is drawn from elsewhere, its
scaffolding imported and erected (however ill-fittingly) overtop of the existing space.146
Thus, although most critics discuss the utopian impulse in Delany’s work (for example,
Davidson 13, Hubbs 345, Muñoz 52, Nyong’o 747, etc.), keeping the writer’s own

Here Foucault makes a subtle but important distinction between “space” and “place.” Space, for
Foucault, is epistemological in character—it shapes how we understand bodies and motion. Thus, when he
describes the contemporary era as “the epoch of space” (“Of Other Spaces” 22) over the nineteenth
century’s focus on time, we can understand how space is the quality that structures dwelling within the
world. Place, meanwhile, signifies physically extant, bounded locales. Specific places exist within the
categorical ordering of space. Thus, Foucault’s title “Of Other Spaces” gains an added resonance: it is not
simply about the construction of different areas within a wider horizon or ecology, but specifically
locations or topologies that possess a different ontological character.
146
Incidentally, then, Delany lines up precisely with Muñoz’s reading of “potentiality,” a “certain mode of
nonbeing that is eminent, a thing that is present but not actually existing in the present tense” (9). Muñoz
considers potentiality to be a key term for his reading of utopia, and Muñoz devotes an entire chapter of
Cruising Utopia to Delany’s memoir The Motion of Light in Water to depicting the temporal and spatial
power of the quotidian queer utopia.
145
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discomfort with the term is an important one in understanding his project, especially in
regard to his fictional work on AIDS.147
Delany adds another term into the mix when, in the opening disclaimer to his
1994 novel The Mad Man, he explains that the events of the novel are not realistic but
rather a “pornotopic fantasy” (xiii).148 He reiterates this point in an interview with
Thomas L. Long, stating, “I suppose I ought to be flattered by some readers’ confusing it
with realism. But, finally, it is a pornographic work. Its venue is pornotopia, not a
realistic portray of life on New York’s Upper West Side, for all I have used that as the
basis of what I wrote” (Shorter Views 133). Delany’s movement is interesting here: he
states that Manhattan serves as the model or template for his pornographic world in The
Mad Man, but then has charged its character with something that breaks it from a realist
discourse. Thus, the confusion of these critics is perhaps understandable, for Delany is
overlaying his fantasy landscape overtop of a recognizable and traversable urban ecology.
The author describes “pornotopia” as “the place where pornography occurs …. the place
where any relationship can become sexualized in a moment” (Shorter Views 133). It is a
New York City overwritten, reinscribed as a place where queer contact is always on the
cusp of realization. As Darieck Scott writes, pornotopia differentiates itself from utopia
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Indeed, while Guy Davidson notes at the outset of his article the same concerns Delany possesses over
the concept of utopia, he frames his reading of The Mad Man solely through “the ‘future-oriented’ potential
within eros,” and notes that “[t]he decidedly contemporary, gritty, and sometimes grim New York City
setting of Delany’s novel does not, of course, constitute a utopia, per se” (14). It will be the aim of this
chapter to challenge this temporally deferred project that Davidson sees here in favour of the present
possibilities of the queer topology Delany is interested in constructing (and challenging).
148
In spite of this description, and Delany’s assurances to his audience in the “Disclaimer” that the acts
performed are not physically possible, Davis repeatedly characterizes The Mad Man as a “realistic” novel
(164, 179, 184). Davis reasons that while “it’s true that all the material of the novel has some connection
with sex,” ultimately “the connections are by no means always direct” (181).
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by not imagining an emancipatory place, and instead positing an “asymptotic” movement
toward that location, thereby performing a “working-backwards toward utopia”
(Abjection 208). Likewise, Muñoz refers to Delany’s vision of pornotopia as “antiantirelational” queer theory, depicting “pornographic communal rapture” in place of the
(self)-destructive insular jouissance celebrated by theorists like Leo Bersani and Lee
Edelman (14).149 The pornotopia, the place of “apocalyptic sexuality” (Scott, Abjection
240) where the emphasis is less on the destruction than the paradigm-shifting revelation,
helps to foreground Delany’s interests in thinking through a transformative topology.
Whether utopia, heterotopia, or pornotopia, Delany’s work, fictional and critical,
is informed by a connection to using the inhabited space to construct a vision of queer
possibility. Thus, I wish to shift the register of discussions about Delany’s AIDS fiction
to focus on its “( )topian” quality, its foregrounding of potential spaces in order to grasp
the immanence of queer identities and relations, rather than thinking through some kind
of idealized, suspended temporality. Indeed, my neologism ( )topia is intended to

Bersani and Edelman are primary thinkers associated with the “anti-relational” queer movement. In
Homos, Bersani argues that “we should be questioning the value of community and, even more
fundamentally, the question of relationality itself,” because, while visible LGBT communities are extant
and politically active, Bersani adds that “it is also true that the improvement [of the lives of LGBT
Americans] has left oppressive social structures intact, [so] we might wish to cultivate the
anticommunication impulses inherent in homo-ness” (52, 53). Picking up on this idea of queerness as being
innately oppositional, Edelman in his polemical No Future, asserts the figure of the queer as “outside and
beyond … political symptoms, the place of the social order’s death drive: a place, to be sure, of abjection
expressed in the stigma” (3). More than just being a philosophical residuum of a liberal order, Edelman
suggests that “queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its
figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such
resistance from every social structure” (3). Edelman pushes the concept of queerness to its figural extreme,
engaging implicit beliefs of discourses constructed around queer identities. Muñoz, for his part, pushes
back against these theories, seeing in them the implication of “the purity of sexuality as a singular trope of
difference,” to which race, gender, class, etc. are all derivations (11). Muñoz affirmation of “the essential
need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity” is a stark rebuke to Edelman, swapping out his no
futurity for a utopian queer futurity. Muñoz selects Delany as one of his exemplars of this queer futurity,
and indeed, in spite of the failures and difficulties of creating connections between people that I will
explore in this chapter, Delany’s fiction as a whole can be characterized as dramatizations of relationality.
149
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foreground not just the spatial approach that dominates Delany’s writing about AIDS, but
also its necessarily undetermined character. Space cannot be definitively u-, hetero-,
porno-, or even dystopian for Delany because that space is constantly being configured
and reconfigured under the deployment of discursive strategies. Space is the hypostatic
point for thinking through questions of queer identity and community, and for countering
the hegemonic rhetoric of infection that is deployed to signify both queer bodies and
queer spaces as somehow innately sick. Rather than retreating from such rhetorical
approaches, Delany attempts to deconstruct the internal logic that orders such readings,
and redeploy them in an affirmative way. Susan Sontag ends AIDS and Its Metaphors
with a call to action, asserting that “the metaphors [of AIDS] cannot be distanced just by
abstaining from them. They have to be exposed, criticized, belabored, used up” (94),150
and Delany’s writings on AIDS attempt to explore such a plan of action by rethinking the
way that bodies and spaces are affectively associated with one another. This is the
essence of Delany’s project on discursively engaging with the virus.
Delany’s first AIDS work, the novella The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals, can be
thought of through the metonymic logic of heterotopia—in placing two narrative spaces
(“present-day” Manhattan and fantastical Nevèrÿon) in parallel with one another, and
locating spaces of crossover between the two, Delany is interested in the way that the
boundary or border line illustrates the concept of containment. The novella is fired by
characters in the “real” world and in the fictional Nevèrÿon who try to transcend their

Treichler, while sympathetic to Sontag’s project of challenging the metaphorical inflections AIDS is
given, does not accept the ends of Sontag’s goal, to do away with such metaphorical language: “[n]o matter
how much we desire, with Susan Sontag, to resist treating illness as metaphor, illness is metaphor, and this
semantic work—this work to ‘make sense of’ AIDS—must be done” (14).
150
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spaces, escape the spatial logics and ideologies that imbricate them within the narrative of
disease transmission. The fact that The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals is characterized by
the failure to transcend, to cross over, to locate a vector of escape beyond the twin
plagues afflicting these spaces is important to Delany’s thinking, as it suggests that there
is not a simple border that can be transgressed in order to flee into a space outside the
virus. Meanwhile, in The Mad Man, Delany takes a different approach, reworking the
supposedly “corrupt” spaces and “toxic” bodies that inhabit them toward demonstrating
how a self-sustaining social system can flourish and thrive even in the midst of an
epidemic outbreak. His pornotopian landscape is one that rejects the redemptive logics of
a “pure,” “healthy” rural space and a decayed, infection-prone urban space. Rather,
Delany locates within the cityspace queer topologies whose rules do not conform to the
larger, oppressive logics of heteronormative space.
For Delany, the image and the rhetoric of the borderline —between people, and
between places—is the signature metaphor of the AIDS epidemic in the United States,
and his self-consciously poststructuralist approach to writing about AIDS fictionally is
directed at which boundaries have been erected toward damaging ends, which boundaries
are impossible to surpass, and what spaces can exist (and flourish) within circumscribed
spaces. The spaces of AIDS are lined with innumerable marks of boundaries permeable
and impermeable, and Delany’s work explores how fundamental they are to
understanding AIDS discourse.
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3.4

The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals: Crossing the Bridge
of Lost Desire

A major source of the fear in the first years of the AIDS epidemic stemmed from its
unknowability. The syndrome was understandable only after it had begun to manifest,
long after the virus had damaged the immune system beyond repair. By the time AIDS
was visible, it was too late. As noted above, it was not until 1984 that HIV was publicly
understood as the causal agent of AIDS; in those early years, that lack of a familiar
scientific narrative invoked terror. If, as Wald aptly notes, “[t]he identification of a virus
generated a viral narrative” (216), then the years prior to the isolation of the microbe
offer a less rigidly organized narrative. Indeed, “occasionally referred to as the first AIDS
novel” (Hirtle 319), Delany’s The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals151 is interested not in
providing a fantastical outbreak narrative for AIDS, but something more ambitious. At
the end of the novella, “Chip” (the real-life nickname of Delany and his quasi-fictive
persona within the novella), muses on how AIDS, prior to the discovery of HIV, is a
“microbiologically unagented terror” (335). The lack of a clear epidemiological causation
in the first years of the crisis removes that familiar narrative of microbial infection and
direction. It is that lack of structure that Delany is interested in exploring in Plagues, the
way that homophobic and queer narratives attempt to map and navigate spaces that seem
to be shot through with the dangers of infection.

151

Hereafter referred to as “Plagues.”
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Plagues152 is a dense novella, weaving together sword-and-sorcery fantasy with
contemporary naturalistic writing. The novella is bifurcated between the fantastical land
of Nevèrÿon (and its capital city of Kolhari) in the midst of a mysterious outbreak of a
plague, and a depiction of early 1980s Manhattan traversed and narrated by Chip in the
enigmatic and uncertain first years of the AIDS crisis.153 What links these two cities,
ecologies, and genres (realism and fantasy) in the novel’s narrative is the virus that is
known only through its victims (urban gay men). Toward the end of the novella, Leslie
K. Steiner (another of Delany’s fictional personae who is a critic from the future
metatextually commenting on the novella itself) argues that the reason for creating such a
parallel between two spaces is “maybe he [Delany] wasn’t trying to allegorize a political
situation. Maybe he was trying to allegorize a feeling” (333).154 Steiner’s words suggest
the novel is an affective project, attempting to understand the similitude of pain, loss,
fear, and continuity in two vastly different spaces. What goes unsaid by Steiner, but
which is just as clear, is the implication that space does matter in constructing these
narrative worlds (ones which Delany, the archetypal postmodern writer, is clear to point
out are authorial constructions [268]). How people navigate the space they inhabit, how
they find it politically or socially altered in the midst of plague, and how disease and

Plagues is a story in the collection Flight from Nevèrÿon, the third of four books in Delany’s Nevèrÿon
series. For thorough accountings of the Nevèrÿon series, see Burnett, Johnston, and Kelso.
153
Indeed, much of the Manhattan sections of the novels are lightly edited from Delany’s own voluminous
correspondence from the time. See 1984.
154
S.L. Kermit, another of Delany’s fictional personae, as well as Leslie Steiner’s interlocutor, criticizes
this reading in the novel’s most self-reflexive episode, arguing that Delany “doesn’t capture—or
‘document,’ to use his word—the feel of the gay community between eighty-two and eighty-four” and
referring to Kolhari as, contra New York, “very smalltown.” Kermit sums up the preceding Plagues by
calling it an “old, old, old story” without “a new—much less radical—thing in it! And I don’t like it one
bit” (326-7). In constructing his postmodern fictional ecology, Delany remains aware of its inherent
limitations.
152
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viruses serve to organize the limitations or boundary lines of spatial thinking, appear
clearly throughout Delany’s AIDS work.
Another of the links and doublings that connect Manhattan to Kolhari is the way
in which space is biopolitically monitored and policed, as it is viewed as carrying the
unknown diseases within its very architecture. A stoneworker in Kolhari lashes out at the
Bridge of Lost Desire, a central throughway in the city, striking it repeatedly with a
hammer. When stopped by the crowd, the stoneworker cries out, “I’m tearing it down …
this overground sewer! … You can be sure, here is where you give it to one another, like
a deadly secret you whisper in the dark from this one to that. Can’t you see it? This is
where it comes from, the plague!” (257). The stoneworker’s failed assault on the bridge
and his rationalization to the crowd intimately tie together the concepts of identity and
place. The Bridge of Lost Desire—a site of sanctioned prostitution (258)—becomes a
vector for social contamination and a breeding ground for physical disease. The space is
both queered and infected, and the response to this is to destroy the space, remove it from
existence and consign it to the memories of its inhabitants. On the following pages,
Delany transposes this scene to modern-day Manhattan. Chip’s friend Ted tells him about
a movie theater where he cruises, in which:
he found written in red paint on the john wall:
AIDS PATIENTS CRUISE HERE!
[…]
It could have been someone who knew something and was trying to warn people.
It could have been somebody who just wanted to stop the cruising. Or it could
have been someone who didn’t get what he wanted there sexually and was just
bitching. But any way you read it, you didn’t want to be there. (258-9)155

A similar moment is recounted by Delany in a letter to his friend Robert Bravard “at the height of the
most hysterical media coverage of the disease” (1984 16). Entering a tearoom in the Manhattan subway
system, Delany finds that “somebody had come in and filled both the urinals and the commodes to the brim
with plaster of Paris, which had now hardened into bulging swirls, rendering them unusable” (16). Delany
155
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This anecdotal moment again yokes queerness and infection to specific places, anchoring
them to a physical site. The virus is given a locus point, like standing pools of water, as a
means of combatting the infection. On the Manhattan side of the novel’s bridge the
violence directed against space isn’t quite so literal, but is about inscribing space in such
a way as to justify its destruction by the forces of control.
The longest section of the novella details the travels of an Kolhari nobleman
known as The Master, who is obsessed with a legendary, quasi-mythical architect
Belham. The Master seeks to travel throughout Nevèrÿon in order to retrace Belham’s
steps and reconstruct the identity of the mysterious builder. The Master looks at the map
he makes of Belham’s supposed movements and refers to it as the “Great Work,”
marvelling at “[t]he logic, the order, the sheer reasonableness of it, in the lines that
crossed the geographical signs for mountains and rivers and forests, was as beautiful as—
I thought then—truth must always be” (277). It is in the graphic representation that The
Master announces: “[t]here was Belham’s life!” (277). Not just in its graphic
representation of a life, but more specifically in its incarnation as a map, The Master
associates Belham’s life and identity with his movements. The Master’s belief is that

is unsure whether this action is performed by “paranoid straights” or “some socially conscientious gays
who thought … they were protecting the health chances of their fellow gays in the community” (although
he leans toward the latter interpretation), because the effect is ultimately the same—a destruction of place
as the means of preventing the spread of the disease. Yet, as Delany notes when he checks in on the
washroom a few days later, “[t]he only thing that seemed to have occurred is that those odd straights whose
used the facilities for that daily … leak on the way home from work had realized that the place was now not
functioning. So the only users at all were from the gay community … Not, I suspect, the intended result”
(16). The attempted control of urban sites of contact as a means of controlling queer encounter (which is
conflated with the spread of disease) backfires, turning the place into a place of only queer contact. These
moments, fictional and real, demonstrate the logic that sutures queer bodies and spaces with emergent
diseases to show the slippage between an illness that affects people to the people as the originator of that
illness.
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each new location will unveil more about Belham until he has managed to collect (and,
subsequently, publish) the history. Indeed, The Master and his retinue travel across
Nevèrÿon, moving backwards through Belham’s life as though they were the stations of
the cross, hoping “to comprehend the great and sweeping pattern of a great man’s
sweeping life” (278). In these moments, The Master suggests that the map of a territory
and one’s life are coterminous, and that space can incarnate and give shape to the identity
of a person.
Of course, The Master’s Great Work is derailed almost as soon as it begins. Upon
arriving in the town where Belham was supposed to have died after a drunken fall, a
villager tells The Master that the actual town had moved in the intervening period. Later
reflecting on the incident, The Master realizes that “new trees would have grown up and
old ones must have come down, so that the actual site would appear different, anyway, in
just those details I’d hoped, til then, to recapture by presence” (280). It is here when The
Master realizes that the affinity between landscape and person is not exact, and that the
possibility of perfect representation or reworking is by necessity impossible. This
revelation worries The Master, whose perspective is that a total spatial experience can
forge a connection with people from the past. Like the thinking that suggests queer
bodies and urban spaces share some insidious toxic quality, The Master is convinced that
the territory incarnates the totality of Belham’s life. As his project becomes an
increasingly hopeless task, The Master laments that “where, before, I’d had supreme
order, now I had incompleteness and imprecision superimposed on inaccuracy and error”
(293). Racing then to the place of Belham’s supposed birth, The Master is informed by a
local that “I’ve heard [Belham] was born in practically every village in the south” (297).
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The Master naively believes in the unchanging nature of space, that it holds an essence of
identity that can be understood, and that the origin point is of primary importance to
grasping a life. But as Belham’s origin becomes fully obscured, The Master’s project
finally stalls out. He admits to himself that “Belham’s ability to create wonders of
abstraction and stone design from what he’d seen in [towns and villages] was just not the
same as my little ability to re-create what even then I was becoming more and more wary
of calling his ‘life’” (298). The Master has, up until now, been a consummate
metonymist, thinking of how the linking chains of contiguity bring him within the orbit
of Belham and make his work, in a sense, of a similar quality. He admits in this moment
that the fact that these acts are different, split by time, place, class, and characteristic,
means that there are some boundary lines that cannot be crossed through substitution.
The confrontation with the impassibility of some borders is made literal in the
final movement of the episode. Desiring to abandon his project and his loyal followers
rather than admit to them that the project has collapsed, The Master tells himself that:
We were at the southernmost edge of what is called Nevèrÿon
I knew it:
We were at the southernmost edge of my map.
And that map was Nevèrÿon. (300)
Here again, as The Master conflates the representation with the thing it represents, his
parallel sentences converge suddenly in the idea that the map is the territory, and that
fleeing south beyond Nevèrÿon, he can maneuver beyond the space of his failures to
which he feels bound. And yet before he can embark on this further journey, he is
stopped by what he believes to be a monster hiding in the woods. Although neither he nor
his companions ever see the creature, The Master is frightened enough to abort his
attempts to escape Nevèrÿon and instead return to Kolhari. What is most interesting about
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this encounter is how The Master narrates it. Instead of focusing on the monster itself, he
decides to muse on the concept of what a monster is, explaining that monsters are formed
from discourse—the rumours, gossip, and whispered talk that bubble up around a
person’s actual life. The Master states that “[w]hat I had been pursuing was not Belham
but the monster called Belham. And what my whole journey had taught me was precisely
what sort of monster it was: it was made, as all such monsters are, of contradiction,
supposition, miscalculation, impossibility, and ignorance” (300).156 The Master
comments that he “had encountered some monster god who roamed our borders,
preventing such defections as I had foolishly hoped for” (302). Monsters, both literal and
figurative, patrol and enforce the uncrossable boundary lines in Plagues. As Delany later
commented to Thomas L. Long, this monstrous figure represents “the evil monster of
desire,” a desire “of the reader to make [disparate facts and ideas] into a whole, to form
them into a coherent entity” (qtd. in Long 348). Both The Master’s attempt to reincarnate
the life of Belham through space, as well his musings of fleeing beyond the known
borders of the world are strategies of escape, are failed attempts at transcendence. In both
cases, The Master fails and is recalled to himself and his immanence. This lengthy
portion of Plagues helps to articulate Delany’s concerns with the idea of coherently
mapping an identity, of using knowledge of topology toward some kind of transcendent
flight into another identity, a vector of escape.

This structuring of description mirrors Delany’s claim in “The Rhetoric of Sex/The Discourse of Desire”
that a rhetoric that challenges hegemonic discourse “is insistent, accurate, analytical, and articulate”
(Shorter Views 56).
156
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These threads of the biopolitics of space, the ideas of transcending one’s place
and identity, and the attention to failure are all brought together at the end of Plagues.
Alarmed at the spread of the plague, the ruling class of Kolhari plans a massive Carnival
as a distraction. Ostensibly designed as a celebration for Gorgik the Liberator, a slaveturned-warrior whom the government promotes to a municipal sinecure,157 the real
reasoning is “to get [the people’s] minds off this unbearable plague!” (216). The intention
is clear: awareness is threatening, can turn the discontented of the city toward collective
action against Kolhari’s governmental forces. And so the Carnival acts as a kind of
immunity of forgetting, attempting to overwrite the fear of plague with a story of (empty)
triumph. The Carnival is situated along the Bridge of Lost Desire; beneath it, however,
“[i]n [the] oldest, central section of our city” (324), a secret ritual that acts as a counterfestival is planned. Various members of Kolhari (including, among other recurring
characters, The Master) come together beneath the bridge to witness the “Calling of the
Amnewor,” an ancient ritual that involves summoning an old, pagan god.158 This
practice, performed by a nameless Wizard, opens with the claim that “[f]ailure signs our
beginning … [and f]ailure will sign our end” (321). What separates the ritual below from
the party above is the “realization of that failure,” the conscious understanding of the
inability to cure the plague or fix what will occur (321). The Carnival along the bridge
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Although Gorgik does not appear in Plagues, he is often the protagonist in other Nevèrÿon stories.
Insofar as there is a “main character” in this series, it is Gorgik.
158
Within Kolhari, the official religious icons are various nameless gods. It is only older gods that are given
names. As the (middle-aged) Child Empress Ynelgo notes to one of her attendants, “[t]hese nameless gods
have created a barrier of silence that has imprisoned these malignant and alien deities and demons till their
callings have been stripped of terror” (228). These prophylactic gods are meant to insulate against not the
terrors themselves, but the ability to conjure up the terrors through their significations. Delany is drawing a
clear parallel between the nameless gods and the discourse of governmental silence around the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the 1980s.
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and the ritual beneath it act as mirrors of one another, geographically and conceptually—
they inhabit the same space, but one performs an act of performative forgetting, and the
other of conscious remembrance. This is central to Delany’s notion of ( )topia: the space
is shaped by the rhetoric deployed toward it. While the Carnival is used to make people
forget about the threat of the plague, a kind of narrative forgetting, those below the bridge
ritualize that inability to escape or transcend a threat.
The Calling of the Amnewor is a highly formalized series of actions. The
audience is placed in a dark chamber facing a throne, upon which is seated a desiccated
corpse. This skeleton is not, the Wizard makes clear, some kind of sacrifice, but rather
the medium by which the Amnewor will make contact with the living audience, whose
Call will “animate … however marginally … this symbol of our mortality which we have
enthroned for the night” (321). Behind the audience, the Wizard informs them, is the
monstrous, chimeric form of the Amnewor, whom the Wizard repeatedly implores the
audience not to gaze upon, lest they be devoured by the old god. When the Amnewor
successfully calls to the skeletal figure, it rises from its death and begins a halting march
toward its audience, guided by a mute girl wielding a staff and wearing a mask to protect
her from the annihilatory gaze of the god (323). At the outset, this ritualization seems
straightforward: the Wizard refers to the animated corpse as the attendees’ “champion,”
and links it analogically to the triumphant Gorgik who above is likewise marching to his
destination at the city’s central castle (320, 321, 324). The similitude between the
audience and the corpse, who was once like them, is called forth to confront the
Amnewor, as only the dead “can face the Amnewor from vanquishing distance” (321).
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All of the above proceeds on the unspoken but implicit assumption that the
Amnewor is a representation of death. Yet as the Wizard narrates to his audience (both
present and reading), “[t]he Amnewor is, you know, a god of edges, borders, and
boundaries” (323).159 While the Kolharian ritualists may already be aware of this fact, the
naming of the Amnewor as a border god changes the tenor of the entire scene. The
Amnewor is not the god of the border between life and death, for “she does not care what
distinctions she guards, or how we sex her in homage to the concept of distinction itself.
She only cares that distinctions exist” (323).160 In the Wizard’s self-creating narration,
the positions shift, and the passive Kolhari audience, which seemed to be allied with the
corpse against the looming god, is now caught between the god and this more palpable
figure of death. As the deceased warrior reaches out to the audience, the Wizard tells
them that “you are the border he must pass, transgress, obliterate with some terminal
motion to become one with what animates him,” while the Amnewor is what, “indeed,
guards you” (323). Were the audience to look away from the shambling memento mori in
front of them, then “[y]ou will be defeated” as corpse and the border-concept of the

The Wizard adds that “[y]ou may have even encountered her [the Amnewor], reeking and putrid on
some overhung night, as you tried to get from here to there, all at once too intensely aware of what the
separation between them meant” (323), which makes clear that the being encountered by The Master in the
woods (a story that takes place several decades before the ritual) was some iteration of the Amnewor.
160
Likewise, although as mentioned earlier the ritual takes place in the central hub of Kolhari, the Wizard
claims that even “this displacement to the center she [the Amnewor] has not much changed her nature; for
no matter how Nevèrÿon expands, even as it reaches out to encompass death and the stars, she’ll still prowl
and linger along its rim” (323). This Derridean moment suggests that the border and the boundary line are
more than just geographical properties, that distinctions and borders can be erected anywhere and called
forth at any time. Darieck Scott discusses the concept of namelessness and godliness in Delany’s fiction at
length, noting that “Delany’s nameless god[s] [are] a way of figuring the endlessness of meaning’s deferral.
… But we the readers know, especially because we are reading the word ‘nameless’ across a number of
texts, that nameless is but another name and cannot escape this play: what namelessness would then suggest
is the flailing quality of what it attempts and how it must fail” (“Divinities” 715). This reading highlights
again the sense of flight that characterizes all of Plagues.
159
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Amnewor would merge into one seamless whole. The living people become boundary
lines that must be upheld. This significant shift in the dramatization of the ritual
dissociates the audience from their champion and places them in a different, stranger
position. Up until this point, Plagues has detailed the way spaces and bodies are
consigned as carriers of plague, and how attempts to transgress these barriers are met
with failure or incomprehension, and the ritual has seemingly reproduced this fact by
allying the living humans with their dead compatriot against the unknowable Amnewor.
At this point, however, the Kolharians shift, become representatives of the border that the
now-alien deathly figure must not cross.
The ritual ends with the revived corpse, unable to pass by his gazing audience,
crumpling into a pile of detritus at their feet. The Wizard announces this event a moment
of hope:
[t]hat he fails (again, and again, and again) to transgress the boundary you
represent, between the possible and the probable, the imprecise and the precise,
the dying and the dead, the surmised and the certain, that (once more) he does not
join with the absolute outside which, you are sure though you have never seen
her, controls you unto life and death …. means there is some hope that we need
not close forever and absolutely with the power of our own despair, that some
informative contradiction remains to be untangled, which may define our distance
between our lives and the plague. (325)
The Wizard’s revelation that this Calling of the Amnewor has been a performative act of
failure, of mobilizing borders against the complete collapse of signifiers into their
meanings, that there remains some kind of hope to challenge the possibility of death’s
dominion, is perhaps a minor one. But as the Wizard notes in the final lines of his ritual,
“it is the discrepancy, the contradiction, the gap between what you recall and what you
can say … that vouches safe our hope, that indicates the possibility of something more,
just as, at this end, its total articulation … signs, again, our failure” (326). It is the
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possibility of the roots of discourse—the words utilized to make up such pronouncements
about queer identity and space—are never univocal, that there is always some space for
maneuverability, for rewriting and resignifying to take place. Boundaries heretofore have
represented impediments to community, contact, care, and understanding. Yet at this
moment—the densest and most resonant episode of Plagues—the boundary is what
circumscribes the plague’s sovereignty. Failure, then, is not simply an act of negation, but
also an act of prolonging, of making the possibility of a better, more just connection a
reality. For, as Plagues continually dramatizes through its spatial and temporal
dislocations, one can never truly get outside of one’s place. Delany is suggesting that the
attempts to maneuver outside of the inhabited space in order to gain a sense of
perspective are doomed to failure, but those failures are cause for speculation, and for
hope.
Plagues ends with characters from Manhattan and Kolhari encountering one
another. Chip, while walking through Riverside Park (the site of John Marr’s first few
excited encounters with homeless men in The Mad Man),161 encounters Noyeed, another
of the recurring cast of the Nevèrÿon series, and a man who has managed to successfully
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True to the doubling nature of the novella, this final moment recalls an earlier one in Plagues, where
Chip’s friend Ted is crossing a bridge and finds himself amid “some kind of carnival” (259), suggesting the
bleed-over between contemporary Manhattan and fantastical Kolhari. The bridge magically provides
connections across cities separated by space, time, and reality. On the bridge Ted encounters the Kolhari
citizen Noyeed, and asks him if he is “worried about the plague,” then tells Chip that “I know you’re
supposed to call it an epidemic. But I swear, almost every time I ask anybody what they think about AIDS,
they look at me and say: ‘Age? What do you mean, “age”?’” (259). In opting for a general term of “plague”
instead of the more contemporary terminology of AIDS, Ted unwittingly opens the dialogue up to the
crossing-over Kolhari citizen (as the denizens of that city have no medical terminology for their enigmatic
disease, and refer to it solely as “the plague”). More intriguingly, as Ted continues to speak to the silent
stranger, he asks him to leave the carnival and instead join him at “a ceremony. Or a program. … It’s the
Calling of the Amnewor” (259). Ted finds this moment eerie: “is that the weirdest thing? I don’t know
where the words came from” (259). Ted’s unwitting knowledge of the ritual suggests that it has a relevance
not just for the citizens of Kolhari, but everyone living under the plagues.
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flee from the fantasy world and into the “real” one. While in all previous encounters with
Noyeed the character has been mute, he is able to now-haltingly speak and attempts to
narrate his long journey from Kolhari to Manhattan: from attending the Calling of the
Amnewor to his flight (via dragon) from Nevèrÿon to Manhattan. When Noyeed pauses
in his reflection because his English is too poor, Chip encourages him to “[t]ell me in
your own language …. I’ll understand” (346). Chip’s narrative is then suspended for a
prolonged explanation by Noyeed, who lyrically recounts his egress from Nevèrÿon. At
the end of his story, in the novel’s final line of dialogue, Chip asks him “how do you find
our strange and terrible land? Have you heard that we have plagues of our own?” (350).
Their conversation breaks off there, and in the novel’s final lines, Chip notes that “he
looked at me across the fire, turned to the river … then looked at me again. And I would
have sworn, on that chill spring night, he no longer understood me” (350). The
conversation between Chip and Noyeed is initiated by discussing disease, and it ends at
disease as well. While the novel’s closing tableau of two men near in proximity but
separated by language underscores the ambiguity of the moment, there is, in this dialogic
encounter, the possibility of some forging of a communal relation between the two.
Although the shared language of Chip and Noyeed falters and vanishes, the possibility of
its return remains, for it ends with inhabitants of different worlds sharing the same space.
Plagues, written as it is during the first few years of the AIDS epidemic, is not a narrative
of optimism, but asserts that fantastical escape is not what is needed during the time of an
epidemic, when bodies and spaces are signified as being somehow contaminated.
Concluding an interview for Camera Obscura magazine in 1988, Delany remarks
on how, despite the label of “fantasy,” his Nevèrÿon series is just as concerned with
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relevant questions of history, social organization, and identity, as more “literary” genres.
He notes that “I would only warn the buyer [of the collection] that anyone who expects
fantasy to escape them in any way, simply through its particular order of mimesis, will be
bitterly disappointed” (Silent Interviews 162). Fantasy does not insulate one from the
effects of history, historiography, and the attempts to render a social reality in writing.
Despite the non-mimetic landscape of Nevèrÿon, Delany is determined, in his fiction, to
demonstrate that such questions organize and structure ways of thinking about space and
community. In Plagues, Delany has constructed two parallel worlds, populated by
similarities: a mysterious illness, a disinterested, conservative governmental structure,
and a series of figures looking for some kind of escape, some means of gaining a
perspective on the events to which they are subject. Neither Nevèrÿon nor Earth is the
utopian escape that would make this work a fantasy. In creating two parallel epidemics,
in two worlds abutting each other, Delany is focused not on a kind of escape—a Flight
from Nevèrÿon, as the title of the larger collection implies—but the ways in which
political and social connections are shaped through shared, overlapping space and
experience. Delany is not interested in fostering a fantasy of escape, not because these
borders are too strong but because there is nothing beyond those borders. Instead,
understanding the necessity of inhabiting a space and reworking the discourse therein is
vital to articulating a vision of community. The prefix that introduces ( )topia is
constantly rewritten, and it is necessary, then, to understand that space in order to assert
an affirming prefix. While the affect of Plagues is one of uncertainty and fear, it is also
about the importance of space in Delany’s thinking. In the years following the publication
of Plagues, Delany’s fiction will attempt to push on with this work begun in the first text.
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3.5

The Mad Man and the Ecology of Queer Space

If Plagues serves as a document to the feelings of fear and ambiguity during the early
years of the AIDS epidemic in the United States, The Mad Man, composed ten years
later, demonstrates a shift away from such pessimism in Delany’s writing in the
intervening years. The Mad Man is a sprawling, 500-page tome detailing the life of John
Marr, a queer black graduate student of philosophy in New York City, working on a
thesis about Timothy Hasler, a (fictional) young, brilliant philosopher murdered under
mysterious circumstances in the 1970s. Marr’s intellectual odyssey parallels his sexual
odyssey. Much of the novel details his growing interest in oral sex, urolagia (pissdrinking), and coprophilia (shit-eating), particularly with the homeless men of Manhattan
(his interest is initially piqued by Hasler’s detailed descriptions of his own liaisons with
homeless men in his diaries). The Mad Man, described by Jeffrey Allen Tucker as a
transgressive form of novel that consistently crosses the boundaries between the
“literary” (the bildungsroman, the philosophical novel, the academic satire) and the
“paraliterary” (the pornographic book, the sprinklings of science fiction and fantasy
throughout the text),162 serves Delany’s method of “decentering” the discourse around
AIDS and queer identity (252-53). Pushing Tucker’s argument further, I want to suggest
that the transgressive nature of The Mad Man extends into the way that Delany thinks
through and figures spaces that are marked as “queer.” His attempt to underscore the

Delany has expressed at length his interest in “paraliterary” genres of writing (sf, pornography, comic
books, etc.) and argued for their importance. He describes paraliterature as “a material practice of social
division” (Shorter Views 210), one that exposes the class-based attempts to police culture in through the
canonization of the “literary” and exclusion of the “paraliterary.” For a more in-depth discussion of
Delany’s concept of the paraliterary, see his interview with Para*doxa magazine (Shorter Views 186-217)
and his essay “The Politics of Paraliterary Criticism” 218-270).
162
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value of queer space highlight the threats that face it, and demonstrates how space is
integral to forming queer community.
Like The Master in Plagues, John Marr enters into the world of academia with a
naively ambitious plan to write a “grand Hegelian project” titled “The Systems of the
World” which he envisions as “a six-hundred page tome on psychology, history, reality,
and metaphysics, putting them once and for all in their grandly ordered relation” (13, 10).
Delany’s gently mocking presentation of graduate student precociousness is also a
depiction of the traditional, rigidly ordered idea of philosophy as affixing positions
between experiences (like the vast topics Marr enumerates above), creating an organized
machinic system. Indeed, during Marr’s occasional trips to the porno theaters of Times
Square, looking for fleeting sexual contact, he considers the acrimony between queer
subjects (such as the transgender patrons who share the theater with him) and the
heteronormative denizens of the city: “[w]e are guilty that we are not them—are not those
boys destined to run the systems and cities of the world …. They, on the other hand, are
terrified, lest through some inexplicable accident, some magic happenstance of sympathy
or contagion, they might become us” (155). Here Marr explicitly align the operators of
political power as the inheritors and organizers of the systems of the world. Those in
charge of politically managing—and policing—space are those who are specifically
opposed to the persistence of the queer spaces that appear on the margins.163 Marr goes

In a similar thematic key, Christian Ravela reads these systems of the world as a “trope [which] works
as a cipher that frames the narrative in terms of the classical bildungsroman’s central ideological
concerns—the subject’s development in relation to a social order” (97). Ravela focuses specifically on the
liberal-humanist concept of the subject that the bildungsroman produces; his reading is central to
understanding the notion of which bodies are considered the rightful inhabitants of space and which are
consigned to the margins and in (or as) the waste.
163
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on to state that “the boys for whom society is made (as well as the city fathers a few of
those boys will manage to become) would prefer that none of them [transgender people,
and queer people more generally] existed” (155). Those Hegelian systems of order that
manage the world become an increasingly unattractive prospect for Marr as he progresses
through the novel, learning instead about more queer, spectral kinds of tracing systems.
But there are subterranean systems, ones that seem to escape official discourse.
The driving “mystery” of the novel are the circumstances behind the murder of the young
genius Timothy Hasler164 somewhere in the vicinity of the gay bar “the Pit” (135).165 The
enigma baffles Marr’s straight-laced thesis supervisor, Irving Mossman, and proves of
almost obsessive interest to Marr and Hasler’s poet friend Almira Adler. Yet when Marr
finally goes to the Pit, he is provided with the answer to Hasler’s murder in a
straightforward manner. This anticlimactic resolution to the “murder mystery” is summed
up when Marr discloses to Mossman that: “[i]t was just a manner of asking the right
people the right questions. To a lot of people, it wasn’t a secret at all. Only to the official
forces—the police, people like that. It’s a matter of getting yourself in the right systems”
(487-8, emphasis added). This description sums up, broadly, the progression of The Mad
Man: Marr’s development from the believer in the rigid ordering of the world to an

Various scholars make note of Hasler’s real-world models. Reed Woodhouse describes Hasler as “a
conflation of Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Delany himself” (213), while Scott finds in Hasler reflections of
“Foucault, Pasolini, and Hofstadter” (Abjection 226). Davis, meanwhile, recognizes as the inspiration for
the Hasler character the Anglo-American linguist Richard Montague, “a young … gay philosopher,
murdered in 1971 by persons unknown” (181). The sheer variety and breadth of philosophical fathers
speaks to Delany’s omnivorous knowledge as well as his interest in showing how these various approaches
to doing philosophy can open up approaches to the world.
165
The novel would, in fact, win the Lambda Literary Award for “Best Gay Mystery” in 1996 (Ravela 96;
Davis 181). As Davis rightly notes, “The Mad Man doesn’t read like a mystery” (181).
164
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understanding of the plurality of modes of social organization and understanding how
they operate.
As in Plagues, space is tightly organized and surveilled in The Mad Man.
Delany’s term for the archons of Manhattan’s space are the “city fathers” (Mad Man
155). These abstracted forces—who never appear in the flesh in Delany’s works, but only
as stormclouds on the horizon—constantly endeavour to circumscribe queer identity
through the rigorous policing of space. In The Mad Man, this occurs through the
continuous closure of gay clubs as a response to the AIDS crisis. That novel’s
protagonist, John Marr, narrates how the city fathers shut down the gay nightclub the
Mineshaft, as well as the St. Marks Baths because of gay activists providing live
demonstrations of safe sex.166 “They weren’t just showing you how to put on a condom,”
Marr recounts, “[t]hey were doing live, active, hands-on sexual demonstrations,” which
“outrage[s]” the city fathers, and leads to these closures (179-80).167 The logic behind
this moment of closure extends beyond just the idea that spaces of queer congregation are
possible vectors of spreading HIV—it suggests that queerness is itself linked to the
disease, and that its continued public existence is a threat, even when promoting

The Mineshaft, as Ira Tattelman notes, was an “exclusively gay sex club” that opened on Washington
Street in the 1970s (“Staging Sex” 300, 305). The St. Marks Baths, meanwhile, established in 1913,
“became exclusively gay” in the 1960s and served as a “hotbed of a revolution in public sex that
crystallized for many homosexual men the very essence of what it meant to be gay in America in the late
1970s and early 1980s” (Peters, qtd. in Tattelman, “Meaning at the Wall” 399). In each case, Tattelman’s
analyses highlights the communal character of the club, writing of how the space “unified everyone who
was there” (“Staging Sex” 305).
167
While Marr urges the necessity of safe sex education in queer communities, he is himself rather
distanced from some of its practices: “For all my sympathy with [safe sex activists],” he writes in a letter,
“let me note that their particular option—condoms, no fluid exchanges—while I feel it is just as valid as
mine, still, is not mine; indeed, it’s not a lot of people’s” (Mad Man 180). Or, as he puts it more bluntly to
his friend Pheldon, “A blowjob with a condom? … That sounds about as exciting as sucking off a pencil
eraser” (179).
166
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prophylactic sexual encounter. Indeed, as Marr remarks, “the etiology of AIDS is
astonishingly similar to the etiology of homosexuality itself in the conservative view, that
sees it as a disease, i.e. a sickness that can be carried asymptotically for years, until
eventually it appears as a sudden and deadly weakening of the system that leaves one a
victim of every possible evil contractible” (174). Delany here aligns the discourses of
homophobia and AIDS to demonstrate the ways in which lives are circumscribed by
discursive controls.
In Marr’s long letter to his supervisor Mossman’s (soon-to-be-ex-) wife Sam, he
describes the gay nightlife area of Manhattan, commenting, “[i]t’s meaningful that, with
the Strip below it, Hell’s Kitchen a block to the west, the theater district just to the east,
and midtown Manhattan above it, this particular area has no name of its own” (148). The
gay space lacks a name of its own, even though it does not want for an identity. It is
space, in all its presence, even if it lacks a rigid designator. Here again, Delany
foregrounds a ( )topian rhetoric—the space undergirds the names that are placed upon it.
This lack of legitimation within the unofficial discourse of New York City is significant
for Marr because it suggests that queer space is almost always being overwritten. Indeed,
as he notes a couple of sentences later, the space usually is called by a name, but only a
relative one: “[o]utsiders tend to call it by any of the names above—‘Theater District,’
‘Hell’s Kitchen,’ ‘The Strip’—depending from which area they approach it” (148). At the
level of signification, the queer space of the city exists as a purely relational entity, its
existence absorbed into the directional maps from which people approach it. Yet this
directional approach brings for those passers-by the “feeling, as they pass into it and out
of it, that something is nominally wrong” (148, emphasis added). The queer space of
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Manhattan transfigures the borrowed monikers applied to it, grafting it into these spaces
while still being marked as somehow different.168 Queer space is a hypostatic supplement
to the understood Manhattan geography, both clearly defined and ghostly in absent name.
“[I]t doesn’t really have a name,” Le Veuve tells Marr, “[o]r, at least, it doesn’t seem able
to keep one when it gets one” (149). Yet in spite of the ephemerality of its name, the
place persists. Delany’s queer Manhattan may lack clear geographic markers, may drift
between the boundaries, but it is still tied to a specific spot. Parallel lines erupt from
within the island, making it a space clearly defined and transversed.
Just as space in The Mad Man is coded as being contaminated, queer bodies are
continually pathologized throughout the novel. During Marr’s research into Hasler, he
discovers that the philosopher was “the most self-tortured of hypochondriacs” (92). Held
in the grip of “strange mental and physical jactitations that … convinced him he was
about to be the victim of a brain tumor, heart attack, stroke, or fatal neurological
condition” (92), Hasler has nothing physically wrong with him, per medical discourse.
These annual doctor’s diagnoses do nothing to dispel his fears; indeed, they only add to
them. As Hasler notes in his diaries,
[T]his is as if, from three times a week to three times a day, my body puts me
under immediate sentence of death. It sends out signs and signals, little pains in
the chest and ribs, tiny glitches in the perception, small dizzinesses, headaches …
which my mind has no other choice but to interpret as the most direct and
inexorable statement from an authority in the very heavens: “Within the next ten
to twenty seconds, your heart will cease to beat—and you will die!”
[…]

Humorously, Marr notes how even the members of Manhattan’s gay scene cannot affix a name to this
space. His friend Mark Le Vueve explains that “eight or nine years ago, a bunch of regulars at the bars here
started calling it the Minnesota Strip—because that summer four or five farm boys turned up hustling at the
Pit who started out in … Minnesota. But that name only lasted a season” (149).
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Then it…doesn’t happen.
But that doesn’t prevent the horror accompanying it. (94-95)
For Hasler, the fact that his body does not get the reprieve of death’s cessation means that
his paralyzing fears become indefinitely prolonged. Here we have the obverse of desire’s
eternal recession (or the desire for death): a continuous shock of imminent death or
disability without the payoff. Hasler is left in a limbo of a body perpetually on the verge
of death. Although Hasler dies years before the first reported case of HIV, and although
Marr contends that “daily fears of dying don’t soak my sheets with sweat every night”
(106), this perpetual precipice is meant to link Hasler to Marr and those under the threat
of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s—they all live under the sign of a disabling fear, one that lies
outside the purview of medical discourse. Hasler’s condition and the omnipresent fears of
HIV/AIDS permeating queer Manhattan life in the 1980s produce rhetorics of disabled
bodies, which become melded, in Delany’s conception, with intersecting movements in
relation to queerness and ecology. These complex discursive interweavings create the
conditions for the erasure of queer bodies and spaces within Manhattan, and The Mad
Man pushes back against this approach by turning these negative signifiers into
possibilities of queer identity and community formation.
For, despite his malady, Hasler finds ways of pushing against his affliction:
namely, sex and philosophy. Yet these two ideas should not be thought of as distinct from
one another,169 but as integrally linked. Hasler mentions in his diary that “the only thing

This approach describes how Marr’s reticent supervisor Mossman approaches writing about the
philosopher. He splits Hasler’s life in two, planning to write a biography of the philosopher while Marr’s
dissertation is to look only at the intellectual side of Hasler’s life (26). Yet even this policing of facets of
identity is too much for Mossman: he confesses in a letter to Marr that he is giving up on the Hasler
biography after reading about the man’s queer sexual desires, stating “[w]hat compassion can I have for a
169
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that has been able to halt these endless rehearsals of death ... is philosophy,” while his
crush on an undergraduate student—and the sexual release he gets from thinking about
him—“left him without a hypochondriacal attack for three wonderful days” (94, 97).
Rather than privileging either side of a mind/body dualism, Delany shows how both are
necessary curatives to Hasler’s hypochondria. The philosopher’s fears freeze his mind
and body by placing them under apprehension of immediate dissolution, and his salvation
from these phobias is through indulging in the pleasures of intellectual and physical
work. These two tasks even mutually reinforce each other—Hasler’s desire for his
student gives him the peace of mind needed to complete an article (97).
Thus, as Marr comes to learn in his own awakening, Hasler cannot be sectioned
off into intellectual and private being, as Mossman intends. Rather, Hasler’s intellectual
gifts are nurtured by the exploration of his sexual desires. This clearer picture of who
Hasler is changes Marr’s relationship not just to his own work (freed from his dissertation
paralysis, he publishes several articles for non-academic magazines on Hasler’s life,
philosophy, and speculative fiction), but also his increasing engagements with sexual
practices. Marr rejects the rigid, map-like systems of the world and takes on Hasler’s
interconnected sex-and-writing approach. As such, Marr’s life begins to mirror Hasler’s
own.
Timothy Morton, in his influential essay on “Queer Ecology,” explicitly aligns the
discourses of ecocriticism and queer theory along their shared interest in intimacy (281),
explaining that “[t]o contemplate ecology’s unfathomable intimacies is to imagine

man who, once a week, bought a bottle of cheap wine, went out and hunted up an old black wino in the
park, the two of them getting blitzed together, till he got the wino to urinate in his mouth?” (47).
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pleasures that are not heteronormative, not genital, not geared to ideologies about where
the body stops and starts” (280). This identification of queer eroticism as overflowing the
boundary designators (of the individual body and the sectioned landscape) aptly
characterizes the detailed pornographic scenes of The Mad Man. Marr’s first, extensive
sexual encounter with the homeless denizens of Manhattan is with a man who refers to
himself only as “Piece O’ Shit” (30).170 Marr’s romantic and sexual partner in the final
part of the novel is a man named “Leaky” Sowps, in reference to his sexual gratification
from urination—in his own words, “[p]issing on black guys is a real thing with me”
(341).171 Tony, another of Marr’s lovers, says of his sexual proclivities: “I guess,
somehow, getting into shit, eating it and stuff, bein’ low-down and all, that’s like getting
closer to being dead. Making it more natural, more ordinary. It’s warm, ordinary,
pleasurable. It makes life easier” (326).172 In a rhetorical pushback against the coding of
queer bodies as contaminated and pathological, Delany dramatizes particularly nonnormative forms of sexual intercourse, highlighting the exchange of manifold bodily

Mary Catherine Foltz reads Marr’s experiences with Piece O’ Shit as indicative of the ways sexual
pleasure with waste becomes productive and powerful; Delany’s ethical approach is to “do something
different with shit” (43). For instance, she describes how what attracts Marr most to Piece O’ Shit is his
Yoni rings, which “collect the drippings from the penis and other excretions from the body; therefore, a
cheesy substance can be found by the lover willing to venture into the walls of the penis.” Thus, in Marr’s
and Piece O’ Shit’s lovemaking, the latter “builds a penis that becomes both a vagina and a breast (a goat’s
breast!) that produces the substance that becomes cheese” (49). Waste is never an end in itself, but becomes
the site of radically new queer space.
171
An incredulous Marr believes that Leaky is a nickname, but the man avers, “[t]hat’s what my old man
named me” (341). Although he previously used the name “Larry” with social workers, he becomes annoyed
when they “write it down ‘Lawrence.’ So finally, I decided, what the fuck. My name was Leaky, so that’s
what I’d tell anybody who asked me. It sure ain’t ‘Lawrence’!” (341). Names hold power in the ordered
systems of the world, as seen in the attempt to affix Leaky with a traditional first name. Just as with the
nameless queer space in Manhattan, Leaky’s subjectivity precedes any attempt to name him. This is not to
say that names hold no power in Delany’s literary world—they are, in fact, a significant aspect of
discursive power—but they are not static terms.
172
The academic Marr informs Tony that his description “would … have been worth a whole chapter in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (326).
170
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fluids and materials, and sees them not as grotesque, but downright rejuvenating. After a
sexual encounter with Leaky, Marr narrates his feeling of total bliss: “there’s another,
psychological peace, which, were I religious, I’d describe by saying it feels like you’re
doing what God intended you to do, occupying the space God intended you to occupy.
Perhaps it’s the feeling of desire—not want, or need, or yearning, but desire itself—
satisfied” (388, emphasis added). In this significant moment,173 Marr ties together, like
his forebear Hasler, sex with philosophy, using the two to articulate a poetics of place, a
feeling of a sustainable relationality that allows a positive sex to flourish. In the sex that
Marr participates in (particularly with Leaky, with whom he ends the novel in domestic
bliss [492]), in spaces public or private, a new periplum is drawn, one that safely
ensconces (albeit perhaps only temporarily) its navigators.
The Mad Man at once reproduces a space where sexual encounter is brimming in
every social interaction (Scott, Abjection 208) but also an attempt to rescript the dominant
ideas of what constitutes sexual pleasure and intimacy. Leaky articulates this idea most
eloquently when he tells Marr
I still eat mine [cum], too—unless I’m givin’ it to somebody else to eat for
me…that I like enough to give it to. Piss, shit, cum, snot, cockcheese—all that
stuff … That’s like a present that comes from inside you. Inside your own body.
I mean: how am I gonna give somebody somethin’ more personal than my own
cum, my own piss, my own spit, my own shit? (374)

Scott and Davidson both highlight this moment as well as a key part of the novel’s understanding of
queer relationality. Scott comments that “the loop of desire” for Marr is, at least momentarily, closed, that
the relentlessly futural orientation of desire has been somehow short-circuited (Abjection 239). Davidson,
meanwhile, cautions that “it would perhaps be unwise to take Marr’s experience of ontological plenitude at
face value,” but that we can locate “a collective extension of the individual experience of satisfied desire, a
bridging of the notionally private experience of sexual feeling and the public experiences of urban identity
and interaction” (23). Spatial themes are implicit in both critics’ readings, underpinning the ways that
desire’s momentary arrest has created a place (domestic, utopian, or something else) that can be not only
inhabited by Marr, but shared with his lover Leaky.
173
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Ravela notes the complex affective economy occurring in this passage: Delany makes no
attempt to “romanticize” these bodily excretions, to “associate them with anything but
abjection, waste, and ultimately social death,” but that they are still presented as “the
stuff of gifts” and therefore “the most intimate gesture” (109).174 In addition to Ravela’s
reading, I would suggest that it is through these acts of bodily exchange that the novel’s
characters regain their sense of purpose: Hasler is snapped out of his existential dread by
his sexual activities, while Marr is finally able to creatively work around his dissertation
writer’s block through his own affairs. Delany depicts these acts as regenerative, as
communal, modifying the terms of the toxic discourse about queer bodies and AIDS,
using them not as symbols of degeneration or impending sickness, but as highly literal
acts of recuperation.
Mary Catherine Foltz refers to The Mad Man as Delany’s attempt to construct an
“excremental ethics,” locating the “pleasures of reveling in the flotsam of late capitalism”

One can detect the register of Georges Bataille in such an arrangement. Bataille’s fascination with the
place of waste with respect to the notion of economy occupies much of his intellectual work. In “The
Notion of Expenditure,” Bataille explores the realm of contemporary bourgeois capitalism and its
distinction from previous modes of socioeconomic structure. He notes that modern bourgeois capitalism
rejects the notion of expenditure as part of the economic cycle of accumulation, that the bourgeoisie is
“characterized by the refusal in principal of this obligation. It has distinguished itself from the aristocracy
through the fact that it has consented only to spend for itself, and within itself” (Visions of Excess 124).
This circumscribed method of accumulation without expenditure points inevitably toward fascism for
Bataille—the structuring of a “homogeneous” society in which “heterogeneous” elements, what Bataille
terms “unproductive expenditure,” is classified and denigrated as waste (Visions of Excess 142). Shannon
Winnubst provides a valuable reading of Bataille’s notions of economy and waste as they relate to
modalities of power. In her fascinating reading, Winnubst locates within Bataille’s understanding of the
model of economic accumulation an anxiety of futurity: “[t]he reduction of our lives to the order of utility
forces us to project ourselves endlessly into the future” (183). Bataille describes the realm outside of
“utility,” of adherence to economics of scarcity, as “the domain of the sovereign” (qtd. in Winnubst 185).
In applying these ideas to The Mad Man, we can perhaps extend Bataille’s thinking on the subject to think
not just of the sovereign subject, but the community who unfold a heterotopic space inside the borders of
consumer capitalism.
174
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(45, 43).175 This ethical dimension that Foltz sees as undergirding the novel is an
essentially ecocritical one, although she does not dwell on this topic: the sewage system
that modern urban society is literally founded upon, the one that transports excreta to
some unthought other space, is a process that “is ruining our freshwater systems and
depleting the fertility of the earth” (42). Waste either goes away, or, when it cannot be
ignored, it accrues within the cityspace itself—the city becoming the space of waste and
trash, like the homeless bodies that proliferate in Delany’s fiction. Rather than fleeing to
the untouched countryside, Delany—through his character John Marr—seeks not only the
pleasures of these supposed wasted, diseased figures, but also companionship and
community with them. The junked urban space of 1980s Manhattan, ravaged by AIDS,
becomes for Delany the foundation of a subterranean topography of queer desire and
connection.
The extremes of erotic pleasure that are derived throughout the course of The Mad
Man are attempts to rethink the network of pleasures and the ordering of desire. This
discourse, too, is tied to space. When Marr attends a “Wet Night” at the gay club the
Mineshaft (an orgiastic night of beer-fuelled piss-drinking), he literally loses his shirt in
the excitement. Fruitlessly looking for it after the night’s festivities, Marr is told by the
bartender that he is out of luck: “[a]nything that’s in there, it goes out as garbage” (123).

Intriguingly, Foltz’s analysis does not make reference to Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection. Kristeva
famously writes of the abject as “[t]hese body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands,
hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being.
My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border” (3). The abject is what limns subjectivity in
Kristeva’s reading, is the detritus against which a sense of identity is both revoked and is constantly
troubled and haunted. Yet in Delany’s universe, these bodily excretions are not abject, are not cast as
horrifying or disgusting, but rather as beneficial, shareable, and erotic. The powers of horror hold no
dominion in Delany’s pornotopia.
175
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This philosophy is taken by the marginal homeless men whom Marr becomes
increasingly associated with: after a liaison with Crazy Joey, he tells Marr that “[t]he
world’s your fuckin’ toilet … And don’t you forget it!” (275). In Delany’s narrative,
however, this pronouncement is not meant as a nihilistic abrogation of communal
engagement; quite the opposite, Joey means this as an empowering thing to say. For the
various madmen to which the novel’s title refers, these products of garbage and waste
have a powerful ecological and erotic meaning. Waste becomes both a self-conscious act
of purgation and a means of engaging with the cast-offs of a late capitalist society
(whether this be products such as piss and shit, or the homeless men with whom Marr
forges a community).176 In The Mad Man, Delany rejects a recuperative ecological
perspective that damns the urban space as a site of corruption (due to queer intimacy) and
the space of rehabilitation as being the untouched pastoral landscape. Rather, it is by
digging into the queer spaces of the city, ones that have been scripted as corrupt and
slated for destruction by the manipulators of the systems of the world, that the queer
ecological perspective can come into focus most clearly.
This critique of space and identity is most intense later in in The Mad Man. As
John Marr digs deeper into Hasler’s life and work, he secures an interview with the
renowned poet Almira Adler, who was also a close friend of Hasler’s. The entire episode
is rich in detail that helps to explore the centrality of place and identity to Delany’s
thought. Marr encounters Adler, who is staying at the house of a friend, reading “in a

Delany discusses the possibilities of the “junk city” in his guest lecture at McGill University. He notes
that there is a reversibility to the ideological framing of junk, but suggests that “we live in Junk City—and
it’s a very rich town” (Shorter Views 331).
176
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small New York backyard” before immediately correcting himself that “no, this was not a
yard: it was a brick-walled garden,” signaling a shift from the prosaic to the uncommonly
cultivated “natural” space. Indeed, Marr notes with some wonder that “[i]t’s an odd
feeling to walk into a garden and realize that the six-foot mobile slowly below the hook
sticking out over the shrubs is a real Calder, that the four-foot painted plaster sneaker
collapsing elegantly beside the rhododendrons is a real Oldenburg” (284, 285). These
observations demonstrate that Adler’s space is not only a natural one, but a space
specifically cultivated to achieve a highly curated, artificial sense of “natural beauty.”
Furthermore, the first thing Marr notices about Adler is that she “wore a silver-gray
sweater against a chill that simply wasn’t to be felt in such an enclosed space at this time
of year” (284). Marr’s immediate perceptions underscore the sense of displacement he (a
young, poor graduate student in Manhattan) feels in relation to the aristocratic Adler.
When Marr comments on the pristine beauty of the backyard, Adler remarks, “[i]f all
New York were like this, I might move here” (286).
As Marr and Adler discuss Hasler’s life and relationship to the poet, Adler
evinces obvious discomfort with Hasler’s homosexuality. “Sex in general was something
Tim and I didn’t discuss—very much,” Adler informs Marr, “I’m sure he felt it was a
kindness to me, and frankly, it was a kindness from him that I accepted that reticence,”
and that she “was never very accepting of Tim’s sexuality” (288, 289). Instead, Adler
notes that her discussions with Hasler revolved around “[p]oetry …. and philosophy”
(288), which, given Hasler’s confession earlier in his journal that it is sex and philosophy
that help him overcome his anxiety, seems somewhat ironic, especially as Adler
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pointedly tells Marr that she intentionally never read Hasler’s journals that she had kept
in her possession (287-88).
What ties these disparate threads together is the way that Adler begins to link
sexual identity with health and place. When Adler first meets Hasler, during a poetry
reading that brings her from her native California to New York City, she recalls “thinking
that Tim was a marvelous sign for the health of the whole society” (290). Significantly, at
this first meeting, Adler is unaware that Tim is gay. As their friendship blossoms, Adler
invites Tim to her summer home at Big Sur in California, explaining to Marr that “The
Sur is such a wonderfully therapeutic landscape” (291, emphasis added). When Adler is
informed of Hasler’s queerness (by another of her gay friends), she refuses to allow
Hasler to invite his friend Pete (mistakenly believing him to be Hasler’s boyfriend).
When Marr pushes Adler as to why she did not allow Hasler to bring Pete, she divulges
that she thought “I was protecting him from his own perversions,” then immediately adds
that “Breakers’ Point is beautiful, it’s healthy, it’s inspiring” (292). The presence of queer
sexuality in what Adler terms as a naturally healthy space promises encroaching
corruption. Landscape and identity collapse, in Adler’s thinking, as mutually constitutive.
Thus, while she notes that most of her friends are gay (289), she only likes to have them
visit her individually because then she and her cultivated, natural space can help to heal
them. As she puts it to Marr, “I suppose that I had somehow incorporated [Breakers’
Point] into my vision as a place where these poor, wonderful, brilliant—but, I was sure,
deeply wounded—creatures could come, and I would hold their sickness at bay, by
refusing to let any sign of it within the grounds” (292-93). Adler reads the “natural,”
beautiful landscape of Breakers’ Point, unblighted by the noise and pollution of the urban
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space, or indeed by any other sign of human social intersection outside of her own
choosing—she notes that “Breakers’ Point doesn’t have any neighbors—at least, not
within hollering distance! That’s one of the things that’s so wonderful about it” (293)—as
a space where it is possible for queer sexuality to be healed, for some normalizing vision
of heterosexuality (or blissful asexuality) to subsume the desires she sees as unclean. By
contrast, the presence of a queer couple within the grounds threatens to toxify this sacred
space, morphing it from a refuge of urban decay and its attendant metaphors into a
replication thereof. Indeed, Adler contrasts her rhapsodic descriptions of Breakers’ Point
with a description of the Pit, the gay bar outside which Hasler was murdered: “[i]t was an
evil place, full of evil young men trading on the desires of pathetic older men” (288).177
The Adler of the present-day, at the time of her interview with Marr, expresses contrition
over her prejudices, in part blaming herself for Hasler’s death (Hasler cuts his trip to
Breakers’ Point short because Pete was not allowed to come, and it is during his return to
New York that summer that he has his fateful encounter at the Pit). Yet what this episode
of The Mad Man does is clarify the discourse of associating bodies, sexualities, and
spaces. Hasler is repeatedly coded as sick and in need of healing by Adler, and the
environment of wealthy, cultivated nature will provide this necessary tonic. Hasler
himself may not be HIV-positive, nor even alive during the time of AIDS, but this
episode goes to underscore just how queer bodies are coded as somehow poisoned, and
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It should be noted that Adler herself never goes to the Pit, and this is a second-hand description she
receives from her gay friend Roger. She adds that “I was perfectly furious at Roger for talking about [the
Pit] that way, because I really felt that if Tim had gone there … to reduce it to such absurd and moralistic
terms was to preclude ever finding out actually what went on!” (288-89). Considering the way that Adler
reduces and moralizes the space of Breakers’ Point, such a similar reaction does not appear out of
character.
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how such scrutiny and rhetorical attack will only have increased during the AIDS
epidemic.
Of course, this is not to suggest that everything about Delany’s New York City in
The Mad Man is indicative of an optimistic fantasy. As he notes in his interview with
Long, “‘[p]ornotopia’ is not the ‘good sexual place.’ (That would be ‘Upornotopia’ or
‘Eupornotopia.’) It’s simply the ‘sexual place’—the place where all can become
(apocalyptically) sexual” (Shorter Views 133). Delany remains skeptical of the situation
of any kind of prefix to a ( )topia, for even an affirming one signals a freezing of
potentiality into a signifier. Space is constantly being recoded and rewritten by various
agents and affects. Even within the queer space of Manhattan, borders and boundaries
exist that are not wise to cross. The clearest example of this in The Mad Man is the gay
bar the Pit, the site of Hasler’s murder (and the same place that Crazy Joey will die in the
book’s climatic sequence, an intentional doubling of the Hasler incident). As the name
suggests, the Pit is possessed of an abyssal quality: while the Mine Shaft’s name suggests
eventually hitting a kind of erotic paydirt, the Pit conjures up only the image of a
daunting depthlessness. When Marr asks the Pit’s owner about Hasler’s death, she tells
him, “[d]own here we don’t have too long a memory It’s probably better that way” (34950). Meanwhile, a bartender tells Marr about the “parking-lot trick,” the protocol to
dispose of any murdered Pit patron: “[y]ou take them outside into the parking lot out
back—then you call the police” (351). The bodies that the Pit devours are regurgitated,
decentered from their place of death into the no-place of a back-alley parking lot (outside
of the Pit’s property boundary line).
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The two murders of the novel—Hasler’s in the 1970s and Crazy Joey’s in the
1990s—are perpetrated in the Pit, and both occur for the same reasons. Hasler’s homeless
lover, Michael Kerns (known to Marr as “Mad Man Mike,” the leader of the homeless
circle whose sexual activities he joins), and Marr’s lover Joey each arrive at the Pit,
whose “philosophy,” according to its bartender, is “hustling. … That’s all it’s here for”
(353). As Ravela remarks, “The Pit’s sexual economy is predicated on a logic of scarcity”
(101), one anathema to the productive exchange of waste that Marr and his circle of
lovers take part in. Mike and Joey, who each show up and violate the hustling codes of
the Pit by “taking it out and flashing it around” (469), incite the murderous rage of two
different hustlers who see the strict capitalist logic of buying-and-selling as being
violated by the men who are trying to give it away for free, and attack them. Hasler is
accidentally stabbed by a hustler, Dave Franitz, while another hustler targets Joey and
kills him for violating the club’s protocol of sexual exchange. William Haver thus
understands the Pit as the space where “two mutually incompatible economies …
pleasure [and] production” come to a cataclysmic head (361). The nakedly capitalist
hustler ethos of the Pit is unable to incorporate the homeless members whose communal
circuit of desire is valueless (the men parody the exchange economy by “selling” one
another for a penny, and when Marr attempts to pay more for Leaky, he is told, “[j]ust a
penny—you can’t sell a person for no more than that” [Mad Man 415]);178 the specific
sites that are incarnated within the cityspace of Manhattan are still subject to barriers that
cannot be melded, the capitalist spaces of heavily policed queer desire and the
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See Ravela for a detailed discussion on the ways that Delany critiques and parodies economic exchange
in late capitalism (particularly 101-104).
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“interclass” (Delany, Times Square 111) queer circuits cannot seamlessly bleed into one
another. Space is at a premium in Delany’s pornotopic New York City, and the
transgression of its boundaries is harshly sanctioned. Indeed, Ronnie Apple, a frequent
Pit-goer, ironically eulogizes Crazy Joey by stating: “[w]e come to places like this, to
pursue our clean and costly pleasures … and they come to soil it all, pollute it with pain
and rage and lust” (478). Ronnie here resorts again to the association of the queer body
with pollution and uncleanliness, this time drawing a further distinction between the
older, middle-class, “clean” pleasures that the johns of the Pit seek, and contrasting it
with the “soiled” homeless interlopers who have no desire or means to participate in the
game of exchange being played nightly.
The Mad Man does not offer a kind of transformative, transcendent vision of
queer sex within Manhattan; it is not about Manhattan as an unambiguously queer site.
Indeed, as Davidson notes, “Delany gestures towards the dark and disturbing intonation
of much of the novel, something that has been passed over in some of the best critical
accounts, which emphasize instead the novel’s cheery optimism” (19). The Mad Man is
not Delany’s attempt to allegorize Manhattan out of existence, into some idealized
plateau of queer sex, but rather to map those sites where radical queer relationality are
most evident, and to narrate them fully. By having his characters circle the Pit in a
repetitive fashion, drawn into its maw in episodes that shatter the optimistic sheen of the
homeless men’s community, Delany illustrates the ways in which community is always
contingent, always fragile, and not always transferable into any space.
This caution also extends to the people who are able to exist within this queer
interclass community which Delany creates. For all of the novel’s construction of
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alternative spaces of queer desire, and its attempt to push back against the toxic discourse
that surrounds (and attempts to construct) the bodies of queer men in New York City,
there is a significant moment where the fantasy seems to break down. In spite of the
Disclaimer that opens The Mad Man, wherein Delany writes that the following events
depict “a set of people, incidents, places, and relations among them that never happened
and could not happen for any number of surely self-evident reasons” (xiii), there is not a
single depiction of anal sex. This is when the novel shifts out of its “pornotopic fantasy”
scenario. The novel’s opening lines are Marr’s assurance to the audience that “I don’t
have AIDS. I am surprised that I don’t,” while, in the novel’s closing moments, Marr
repeats this assertion to the audience (7, 492). Marr announces that one reason he may
not have AIDS is because his sexual excursions have been “since 1980—all oral, not
anal” (7). While characters with AIDS appear at the margins of the text, the only
character with AIDS who has a significant role within the novel is Marr’s first homeless
lover, Piece O’ Shit. After Marr’s first sexual interaction with the man, several years
elapse before the two encounter each other again. When they do reconnect, it is during
the night, and they engage in another liaison and then fall asleep outside. Marr is later
awakened by a truck’s headlights that illuminate the homeless man’s body, and he sees
that he is covered in Kaposi’s Sarcoma (193-94). “[S]eeing the lesions on him,” Marr
attests, “was like being hit,” and he fantasizes momentarily about waking Piece O’ Shit
up to berate him, before a police officer appears and Marr is forced to run away (194). He
then notes that “I never saw Piece O’ Shit again,” but goes on to speculate that “I think it
was AIDS with Kaposi’s. I think he’s dead” (197). Referring back to his first encounter
with Piece O’ Shit, who does not self-identify as queer, Marr then ruefully adds that “if
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he made it to a hospital and anybody bothered to ask him, I believe he died swelling the
statistics of heterosexual cases …. Whatever he thought he was excused from, it’s yet
another lie that will kill people who are not him” (197). This moment is a significant one
in the book because it is the only time a character who is definitively HIV-positive
appears to have sex, and it is represented as a moment of horror (though Marr’s friend
Pheldon tries to reassure his friend that “[s]ome people are saying … you can’t get it
through oral sex” [196]).179
The significance of this passage is sharpened considering it follows on the heels
of Marr’s account of a revelation he undergoes, his “most mystical of mystical
experiences,” whereby, after spending a prosaic day cruising in a gay theatre, he “no
longer had any fear at all of the disease” (171, 172). Marr’s explanation is an ambiguous
one, linking his fear of AIDS to his fear as a child of the discourse of homosexuality
popularized by psychologists like Erich Fromm in the 1950s, who pathologized the
condition. Marr escapes the hold of this destructive rhetoric by “looking at the people I
was doing it with, many of whom seemed no less happy than anyone else, [so] I began to
ask that most empowering of questions: Could all these people around me be both crazy
and damned?” (173). The extant queer community negates the isolation, the twin
conclusions of queer men as both morally and psychologically compromised, pushing
back against these power relations. Marr adds: “[w]hen one is dealing with the
satisfaction of an appetite, you relegate the Erich Fromms et alia to the place where one
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The final pages of the novel, after the conclusion of the narrative, are a reprinting of a 1987 Lancet
article entitled “Risk Factors for Seroconversion to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Male
Homosexuals,” which details that “[t]he absence of detectable risk for seroconversion due to receptive oralgenital intercourse is striking” and “[a]voidance of anal intercourse must be the principal focus of efforts to
reduce risk of the male homosexual community” ([505]).

248

stores those abstractions that don’t particularly relate to the systems of the world around
you. I did that. And I ceased, somehow, to be terrified” (173). The space that exists—that
pre-exists any act of Romantic creation by a singular will—serves as a buffer against the
various forms in which discourse is used to demonize queer desire. Whether it is the
psychoanalysis of the 1950s or the medicalized rhetoric of the 1980s, the existence and
persistence of queer bodies within the spaces that they create and maintain acts, for Marr,
as a barrier not to keep people out, but to hold together a community in the face of such
an attack.
That this revelation occurs prior to Marr’s rendezvous with Piece O’ Shit suggests
that even within the pornotopia that The Mad Man creates, the physical presence of
AIDS, the signifiers written onto Piece O’ Shit’s body, threaten the coherence of the
fantasy. While the novel is devoted, as Tucker argues, to pushing against the hysteria that
underpins the discursive analysis of AIDS and its potential avenues of transmission
(263), it is notable that the ( )topia Marr traverses for so long does not literally involve
characters with AIDS, but only discursively adjacent figures.
Marr’s final encounter with Piece O’ Shit is a difficult moment to analyze,
because of the host of baggage attached to the idea: obviously Delany is not arguing for
any kind of ignorance of medical opinion, since he stresses again and again in his critical
work that detailed “monitored stud[ies]” of the virus and its transmission are necessary
for combatting the hysterical discursive elisions that crop around AIDS. His statement
that “[r]hetroic can control discourses—but only if it is insistent, accurate, analytical, and
articulate” (Shorter Views 37, 56) underlines the necessity of relying on scientific
veracity to challenge superstitious, homophobic pronouncements. Yet The Mad Man is a
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self-admitted fantasy, a place where the physical consequences of certain sexual acts are
bracketed. Davidson glosses the pornotopia as “like utopia … at once a real place (the
real Upper West Side) and a non-place (a site of impossible sexual relations)” (17). Yet
even within the supposedly non-representational elements of this space, certain
boundaries cannot be fully transgressed. So while Marr does not apparently contract
AIDS from his sexual contact with Piece O’ Shit, the terror and despair that inflect this
scene,180 as well as the absence of any major character with AIDS in the novel, suggest
that there is a limit point to the queer topology, that challenging the association of AIDS
with queer sexuality and space is the main objective to the book, and that engagements
with the syndrome itself cannot as easily inhabit such an idealized space. While Delany is
dedicated to challenging the narratives of immunity that are used to condemn queer
individuals and spaces, Marr remains immunized from the threat of AIDS within the
fantastical pornotopia.
Samuel Delany’s writings on AIDS, from The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals in
1984 to The Mad Man in 1994, represent space as a necessary component of community
without reducing it to being coterminous with identity, and his works think through how
space is manipulated, transformed, and organized when the mainstream discourse around
queer identity is understood through a deadly viral infection. While critics often think of
Delany as a utopian writer, the temporal delay, that promise of futurity implied in the
name, does not seem to fit the urgency of his project. And indeed, in his two lengthy
fictional works on the topic, he lays his emphasis not on the temporal, but the spatial, the

Marr later notes in his letter to Sam that suicide “was one of the things I’d considered most seriously
when I’d first been certain I had AIDS” (234).
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( )topia, the accent falling not on the temporal prefix but the embodied root. In Plagues,
he parallels 1984-era Manhattan with his bustling fictional city of Kolhari, and sets them
side-by-side, traversable through the Bridge of Lost Desire. The import of this
organization is to construct that allegory of feeling, to contextualize the potential affinity
between afflicted communities, to create parallel spaces where queer bodies are not
totally isolated. Although the dominant theme of Plagues is the failure to transgress
boundaries, Delany deconstructs the logic of escape to demonstrate the importance of
immanence. Meanwhile, The Mad Man is concerned with tracing the circuits of queer
communal identity and space, and with twisting the toxic discourse that codes the queer
body and the queer urban space as hopelessly corrupt. The joyous bodily exchanges that
John Marr, Leaky, Piece O’ Shit, and the other members of this loose group of interclass
allies perform both mocks the hysterical coding of bodily matter as tinged with disease,
and also mobilizes a rhetoric of “positive abjection,” using the weapons of the city fathers
and other moral authorities against them. If the border becomes a dominant image of
AIDS discourse, the prophylactic barrier that must be enforced between healthy and sick,
Delany does not try to reject the border as an outmoded concept, but reorganizes the
rhetoric of borders, expanding it to locate other afflicted peoples, or reinforce it as a
space where queer male sexuality can flourish. Gods and monsters, institutions and
Freudian fathers may seek to enforce rigid boundary lines, but Delany’s restlessly
deconstructive works show how his queer periplum will always manipulate those
boundary lines, shift their meanings and project a queer topology to be explored, a (
)topia whose prefix remains wholly open to some kind of new potentiality.
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Chapter 4

4

The Apocalyptic Community: The End of Immunity at the
End of the World
“[C]ommunity, in its infinite resistance to everything that would bring it to
completion (in every sense of the word achever—which can also mean to
‘finish off’), signifies an irrepressible political exigency, and that this
exigency in its turn demands something of ‘literature,’ the inscription of our
infinite resistance”
(Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community)
“New York, I love you but you’re bringing me down”
(LCD Soundsystem)
In each of the preceding chapters, encounters with viral outbreaks serve as the

means of thinking through what constitutes a community or collectivity. This final
chapter will explore further this notion of community through an examination of Colson
Whitehead’s novel Zone One (2011). Set in the aftermath of a catastrophic zombie
outbreak that very nearly destroys the United States (and the rest of human civilization),
Whitehead’s novel seemingly tells the story of “a return to normalcy” (Sorensen 560), a
snapshot of the aftermath of an outbreak in which the late capitalist status quo is
reassembled, in which the individuals and small bands of survivors come together and are
remade into a recognizable social organization. In effect, Whitehead’s novel is centered
around the interrogation of what a community is, how it can be constituted, and how the
prospect of narrative immunity works in relation to such groupings. Zone One is
ultimately about the breakdown of a comprehensible, familiar social collectivity of
American late capitalism, as it is predicated on the idea of an individualistic immunitary
principle that prevents a “true” community from ever coming to occupy the center of
such relational encounter. Zone One explores the way in which contemporary late
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capitalist society has reached its end stage as a cohesive community, how it fragments
under an increasingly literalized series of infectious metaphors. What comes to supplant
the immunitary collectivity of twenty-first century America is, ultimately, beyond the
storytelling purview of Whitehead and his pseudononymous protagonist, Mark Spitz.
Whitehead demonstrates just how integral the idea of immunity has become to narratives
about late capitalist, twenty-first century life, and so Mark Spitz is unable to look beyond
into the coming community.181 Zone One provides a particularly self-conscious
commentary on the concepts of infection and immunity that dominate narratives, and
how, if we are ever to reach some utopian sense of community that exists outside of the
immunitary paradigm, we will not be equipped with the narratological tools to make
sense of such a socius.

4.1

Virus/Viral: Competing Ideas of Infection

The twenty-first century is enchanted with the metaphor of the virus, which finds
an almost universal applicability to the social situations characterized by increased
interdependence, networking, and connectivity. As Jasbir Puar and Patricia Clough note,
“[t]he ‘viral’ has come to describe a form of communication and transmission in and
across various and varying domains: the biological, the cultural, the financial, the
political, the linguistic, the technical, and the computational” (13). This idea is replete in
theorizations of the “postmodern,” that there is a kind of viral character to late capitalism
and the intensely networked sociality of twenty-first-century digital life. Indeed, there is
the sense that the viral is a kind of non-actual entity, something that describes a state of
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I borrow this term from Giorgio Agamben’s aphoristic book of the same name.
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affairs rather than a biological process. As Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker
write, “[i]n the informatic mode, disease is always virtual” (122). The viral has become a
persistent metaphor in attempts to think through the possibilities of connection, influence,
and contact. The tension between the conceptions of “virus” and “viral” are productively
explored by Zach Blas, who signifies the “virus|viral” relationship as one of similitude
but not complete similarity (29). Blas argues that “[w]hat a virus is and does cannot be
extracted into the quantifier viral just as the qualities of the viral cannot be reduced to the
virus” (30). Essentially, the usage of “viral” in the present stage of technologically
focused, late-stage capitalism is not merely an analogy, but a conceptual expansion of the
ideas of the virus to encompass the ideas of capitalism and technology. As Blas notes,
“[c]ontagion in the viral sense is not even self-replicating or mutating” (32), but a kind of
reference to the intimate connection between networks in the digital age and the
interweaving of subjectivities according to the whims of networking. In effect, the viral
has mutated from the originary concept of the biological virus to come to describe the
ways in which subjects within a globalized capitalist society are meant to relate to
commodities, to technology, and to one another.
For Tony Sampson, this omnipresent recourse to the analogy of the infectious
agent is a kind of “molar virality,” which he defines as “the organizational tendencies of
analogical thinking that forcibly bring singularities into unified relation with each other.
This relates to, for example, the universal application of epidemic models across a range
of contagious phenomena” (5). In essence, Sampson suggests that this continual analogy
deployed nowadays in the term “viral” points toward a means of reducing everything
down to straightforward relations of infection and immunity. For Sampson, this method is
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one of social control, “a mode of domination over multiplicity, order over complexity,
generality over difference” and is therefore “endemic to new biopolitical strategies of
social power” (9, 5). Sampson thus detects perhaps the limit point of the biopolitical
interweaving of politico-legalistic models of infection and immunity with biological
understandings of bodies. In this notion of virality, all relations become potentially new
vectors of contamination. This is perhaps most clearly recognizable in the adoption of the
term “viral marketing.” This way of thinking creates a plane of similitude where
everything has the potential to “go viral,” to become infectious or to link together groups
of people in such a way as to render them dependent upon connections.
And yet, as Sampson notes, one of the primary problems with this analogical
model that is exemplified in molar virality is that it is not really viral at all. “The problem
for viral marketers,” he writes, “is that contagion appears to be all but out of control”
(95). The analogical principle of viral infection that is simplistically summarized in the
equivocatory phrase “like a virus” is ultimately quite unlike what it professes to be.
Sampson highlights a number of issues with the adoption of biological infections to
modes of social exchange. Two seem particularly relevant to this discussion: first, that
“[v]iral marketing is an imperfect crime, because the identity of the criminal needs to be
circulated along with the act itself” (Goffey and Fuller, qtd. in Sampson 75). Since viral
marketing is always attached to some kind of product, the marketing strategy will
inevitably, no matter how ingenious or gnomic, make clear its source.182 Viruses do not

Sampson’s chief case study to highlight this point is the “Lonelygirl15” series of videos appearing on
Youtube, an early example of a video that “went viral” and became a popular sensation. Ultimately,
Sampson notes, “the video blog was designed to promote the work of a couple of budding Internet
moviemakers” (64).
182
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disclose themselves to the cells they hijack, but a viral video must ultimately give way to
a sellable product. Likewise, Sampson continually emphasizes the difference between the
genetic manipulation of a virus and the ephemeral character of the meme. While the idea
of memes working like viruses became a popular analogical relation, popularized by
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene (1976),183 the fatal
flaw for Sampson is that genes are material, and memes are not, that “the meme is
missing. … [T]he memetic unit of imitation, unlike the gene, has yet to be located” (70).
Ideas may filter across social networks, but they do not fundamentally change the
makeup of the body. At its heart, the problem that Sampson detects with the notion of
molar virality is that it is not viral enough, that its seeming connection between biological
infections and affective or social connections is a superficial one. Sampson’s point is that
attempting to reduce, to analogize, connectivity through a super-metaphor of virality
illuminates neither the activity of social networks nor the pathology of the virus. The
metaphor ultimately buckles.
Sampson’s response is to see an alternative form of social activity that can be
expressed through the logic of virality, what he terms “molecular virality,” which can be
“located in the accidents and spontaneities of desire” (6). This second form is, like a
positive biopolitics, one that emphasizes singularity over a Leviathan-like subsumption
into one massified whole. Drawing on an explicitly Deleuzian paradigm, Sampson argues
that a way of rejecting the biopolitical mechanisms of affective manipulation in a late

In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins defines memes as “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of
making pots or of building arches” (192). He writes that “[c]ultural transmission is analogous to genetic
transmission,” and sees the adaptability of ideas, concepts, and cultural forms to operate along Darwinian
principles of inheritance, and suggests that “longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity” are the qualities
that enable certain memes to persevere over generations of human evolution (189, 194).
183
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capitalist structure operates through a scheme of “nonimitation,” whereby one seeks to
“become disconnected from the affective grip of these associative chains,” suggesting
that the expression of this would be through a “suppression of empathy: a refusal to
engage in the transmission of affects, emotions, and feelings of others” (190).
Nonimitation is not an apathy, but a “pure antipathy” that is not an attempt to disengage
from the ineluctable socialities in which subjectivities find themselves, but rather an
“antisocial relation with ... a ‘neighbor who is in touch’” (190). Affect becomes a key
locus of biopolitical manipulation in the contemporary late capitalist period, and so
providing an affective blockage point to this spread is a way of preventing the molar
codings of bodies according to corporate and/or political interests. As Sampson notes,
this is not to rearticulate an antiquated model of precarious connectivity and impregnable
immunity, but rather that the nonimitative approach will “sooner or later, support …
novel social inventions that move away from the harmonious mainstream of organized
molar states toward a potential molecular revolution” (191). Rather than apathy, a
surrendering and deadening of affect, a passivity that allows the spread of molar virality
to steamroll over subjectivities and code them into domineering arrangements, Sampson
adapts Gabriel Tarde’s model of “antipatheia,” or “antifeelings that may fend off the
unwanted and mostly unconscious epidemics of viral love,” and which will, in time,
“grow into revolutionary contagions too big to be constrained by any molar organization”
(192). Sampson sees human beings as parts of “a continuous flow of decoded
(deterritorialized) social monads, or singularities” (8), and this attempt to block out and
prevent the overdetermined spread of molar virality will eventually spark some kind of
process of connection and organization not predicated upon the rapacities of capitalism,
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but on a positive desire. In place of a rigidly networked and policed society, Sampson
implies, there is the potential to move toward a more expansive kind of community.

4.2

The Coming Community and the End of Immunity

Sampson places a particularly positive intensity on the concept of the singularity.
Noting that “[t]he singularity is not a given body; rather, it is a topological constraint, or
degree of freedom that is yet to come” (88), singularity seems to exist beyond the
horizons of individual subjectivity and the narrower focus of the politics of the
individual. This prominence of the singularity puts Sampson’s thinking alongside those
who conceptualize of community as a concept not coextensive with “society,”
“collectivity,” or “civilization,” but something more abstract and liberating, a concept
that can be utilized to provide an alternative direction to thinking through subjectivity,
politics, relationality, and ontology. And indeed, the concept of community has become a
particularly rich site of theorization for decades now.184 In his famous analysis of
“imagined communities,” Benedict Anderson notes that community is a “deep, horizontal
comradeship” that forms the bedrock of political nationalism (7). The thought of
community underpins the political, and breathes into it a sense of purpose. Yet the
community is not necessarily something extant, but futural: not an origin, but a horizon
line, something that wavers in the future rather than instantiates the past. This thinking of
community as that which is to come, rather than that which has already occurred, is
useful to think through its relationship to narrative immunity.
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While my analysis will focus specifically on Roberto Esposito and Jean-Luc Nancy, they are very
consciously indebted to the work of antecedents such as Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and Jacques
Derrida, among others.
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Most significant to thinking through community for the purposes of this project is
Roberto Esposito, as he relates this theoretical concept in opposition to immunity, and
thus casts the community in explicitly biopolitical terms. In Communitas, Esposito
examines the etymological root common to both “immunity” and “community,”
exploring the importance of “munus” to his philosophical project. The term, as Esposito
declines it, has multiple definitions associated with duty, such as “onus” and “officium,”
and their denotations of public office and obligation. Its third meaning, “donum,” is what
attracts Esposito, for its relationship to the other terms is more enigmatic. Noting that
“donum” means “gift,” Esposito asks “[i]n what sense would a gift … be a duty” (4)? Yet
noting that this gift refers only to the one that is given, and never the one that is received
(139), Esposito demonstrates that there is an “obligation that is contracted with respect to
the other and that invites a suitable release from the obligation” (5). Instead of an act that
is closed off by the repaying of the debt, Esposito suggests that the holding in-common of
an unpayable obligation is what constitutes a community. In this sense, then, a
community is not “a body … a corporation … in which individuals are founded in a
larger individual” (7), but a shared sense of absence that suspends the idea of a whole and
self-present identity from the very outset. Community can be detected in the shared lack
of totality common to every person. Indeed, the point, for Esposito, is that subjectivity
begins in such a lack, such an absence that cannot be re-opened. Esposito dramatizes the
revelation of community as a kind of “exposure,” stating that community “doesn’t keep
us warm, and it doesn’t protect us; on the contrary, it exposes us to the most extreme of
risks: that of losing, along with our individuality, the borders that guarantee its
inviolability, with respect to the other” (140). Community is that which threatens the
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coherency of identity, risking that disintegration of the boundaries that are needed to keep
the cohesive shape of the individual existing within a society of individuals.
If community represents a state of being-in-debt, then immunity stands in for that
constitutive opposite around which Esposito constructs his biopolitical philosophy. “[H]e
is called immune,” writes Esposito with reference to the Latin origins of the term, “who
has to perform no office” (Communitas 6). The immune person is exempt from this
ontological debt; rather than being opened to that shared lack, the immune person
constitutes herself as removed from that precarious exposure, nested within a cocoon of
completed self-identity. Modern politics, suggests Esposito, is animated by the rejection
of “this unacceptable munus,” of an attempt to rearticulate a relation to the world not
shaped by a sense of shared vulnerability and potential interpenetration (12). Immunity,
therefore, possesses an innately political character, a shaping of subjectivity amid the
dangers of an obligatory lack. For Esposito, this political character of immunity becomes
ingrained into the Western political project at the time of Thomas Hobbes.185 Hobbes, per
Esposito’s gloss, sees the one thing that human beings have in common to be “the
capacity to kill and, correspondingly, the possibility of being killed” (26). Because of this
innately antagonistic relationship, the only solution for Hobbes is an attempt to annihilate
(or at least suspend) this relationality. Hobbes’s social contract, the creation of the
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In this sense Esposito distinguishes his biopolitics from Giorgio Agamben and relates more closely
(although not exactly) with Foucault. Agamben, as discussed in Chapter Two, sees all of Western politics
since the Greek city-states to be founded on an immunitary differentiation of zoe and bios, of bare life and
political life. Timothy Campbell’s critique of Agamben highlights the “flattening of the specificity of a
modern biopolitics in favor of a metaphysical reading of the originary and infinite state of exception that
has since its inception eroded the political foundations of social life” (xxii). While Campbell’s critique is
apt, Agamben’s philosophical project appears to fully embrace metaphysics rather than retreat from it;
indeed, as I endeavour to demonstrate in Chapter Two, such an ahistorical reading of biopolitics has its uses
when considering narrative immunity.
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commonwealth of the Leviathan, then, is the abnegation of the community. As Esposito
puts it, “the contract does not coincide with the gift, nor does it derive from it. Rather, it
is its most direct negation …. The sovereign exchange between protection and obedience
corresponds to this power … to undo: to preserve individuals through the annihilation of
their relation” (29). Hence, the image of the Leviathan as a single body, a singular will
exercised on the multitude. “By their individual submission to a central power,” writes
Ed Cohen, “it overwhelms them all” (59). In place of the community of obligation comes
the commonwealth of a powerful political structure. Yoked together under the will of a
sovereign power, immunity is incarnated within the Hobbesian model (and as something
that will inform political projects in the West for centuries to come) as a particular kind
of freedom. Such a relation forms the Hobbesian definition of liberty, which is referred to
in Leviathan as “Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth” (qtd. in
Cohen 59). Freedom in this sense is a negative freedom, a freedom-from186 the duties and
obligations involved within a political power structure.
What is so pernicious about this Hobbesian model of the immunitary
commonwealth, predicated upon a social contract indemnifying individual liberty above
all else? Certainly, as Esposito himself admits, the community against which Hobbes
opposes himself is a chaotic morass, a dangerous exposure, “of suddenly falling into the
nothing of the thing” (140). The subsumption beneath a general will creates an order, a

This concept of liberty is most famously elucidated by Isaiah Berlin, who refers to this idea as “negative
liberty,” or “the area in which the subject … is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be,
without interference by other persons” (169). Such a conception of freedom, Berlin notes, was privileged
by British political philosophers beginning with Hobbes, and equally influential in the works of John
Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill (170). This idea is in contrast to what Berlin
terms “positive liberty,” or “the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master” (178).
186
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structure, for which the community seems unable to account. Yet this immune principle
that flowers in Hobbes’s thinking as the centerpiece of a shared freedom becomes
increasingly the means of an insulating and annihilatory relationship with respect to life.
Immunity, as Esposito sees it, privileges the idea of “life” above the concept of the living;
ergo, “[l]ife … sacrificed to the preservation of life” becomes the direction in which this
immunitary biopolitics ineluctably tends toward—a final and apocalyptic
autoimmunity.187 In this sense, the immunitary paradigm is a rejection of death by
attempting to exile it outside of its sense of self. This is the very opposite of community,
which Jean-Luc Nancy, following Heidegger, sees as predicated upon the necessity of
death. He argues that “[d]eath is indissociable from community,” that the experience of
the finitude of an individual’s being is not experienceable by that individual, but by the
others in which something is shared (9). Ergo, community is marked by death, it is
“revealed in the death of others; hence it is always revealed to others” (15). It is
community’s exposure to death, the shared obligation in which the borders of self
dissolve and are communicated to others, that founds itself. Immunity is designed to
reject that acceptance of death within its borders—it exiles death’s power beyond its
borders.188 The immune paradigm, the possibility of retreating from the obligation of
communal relationality, therefore increasingly is taken as the idea of subjectivity and
freedom within Western political projects, and this sovereignty is what must be defended

Amplifying this point, Jean-Luc Nancy goes on to claim that “[a] community is the presentation to its
members of their mortal truth (which amounts to saying that there is no community of immortal beings: one
can imagine either a society or communion of immortal beings, but not a community)” (15).
188
Foucault articulates this same point when he argues that, for biopower, “death is power’s limit, the
moment that escapes it” (History of Sexuality 138).
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and protected above all else. Biopolitical projects, ranging from the ultra-individualism of
neoliberal capitalism, to the genocidal hyper-immunity of the Nazi regime, are the many
offspring of this central idea of immunity working within the political.189 To push back
against this immunitary character, to locate an “escape or release from the individual
subject” (Esposito, Communitas 15) is therefore the project of these theorists of
community, an attempt at thinking beyond the increasingly policed borders that come to
characterize immunitary biopolitics.
Yet this is not to suggest that community implies some kind of idyllic
relationship, a kind of meta-being or mystical totality. Throughout Communitas, Esposito
emphasizes that it is fruitless to understand community as “a mutual, intersubjective
‘recognition’ in which individuals are reflected in each other so as to confirm their initial
identity” (7).190 Such an originary identical nature would justify the exclusion and
expulsion of what is considered to be non-identical as a threat to the stable character of
the community. Likewise, Nancy warns of “the retrospective consciousness of the lost
community,” the mythologized vision of a formerly extant utopian space of community
that has since vanished due to the vicissitudes of politics. This “lost, or broken,
community,” whether it be illustrated as “the natural family, the Athenian city, the

Nancy discusses how “[c]apital negates community because it places above it the identity and the
generality of production and products,” while the Nazis sought to “annihilate community in the delirium of
an incarnated communion” (75, 35). For a more in-depth discussion of Nazi biopolitics and its relation to
the paradigm of immunity, see Chapter Two.
190
Nancy will echo Esposito’s critique of such a utopian view of intersubjectivity, writing that “[t]here is a
myth of the dialogue: it is the myth of the ‘intersubjective’ and intrapolitical foundation of the logos and its
unitary truth” (76). For Nancy, this belief in an intersubjective relationality is merely a disguised vision of
an originary myth of unitary totality, a monologic substance from which all differences diverge and can
ultimately be reduced to. Intersubjectivity masks the logic of similarity behind its superficial depiction of
singular connectivity.
189
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Roman Republic, the first Christian community” and so on, “always … is a matter of a
lost age in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and
in which above all it played back to itself, through its institutions, its rituals, and its
symbols, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy, autonomy”
(9).191 The issue with such an idealized nostalgia, Nancy cautions, comes about through
those descriptors of such vanished communities as “tight, harmonious, infrangible” and
“immanent”—they are depictions not of a singularity, but of a static and reductive
identity, an originary space where everything was once constitutively the same, before
differences rent such beautiful unity and foisted a defensive immunitary character into the
world. Thinking about community requires pushing back against the concept of
sameness, of a shared quality or property that binds everyone together. Community
consists of a more audacious and expansive connection.
What community offers us, Esposito suggests, is an escape from the entropic
insularity of the immunitary, a possibility of thinking through a relationality that is not
predicated upon a desire for similar identity or a hostile reaction to difference.
Community is that salve against immunity sought by the critics who have taken the
biopolitical concept of immunity as their topic of analysis. Cohen, for instance, highlights
the contingent nature of how the politico-legalistic character of immunity came to be
applied to biological organization:
[i]magine what might have happened if [Elie Metchninkoff] had not been so
focused on either the individual organism as a milieu interieur or the dynamics of
aggression and response which underwrote his political ontology, evolutionary

Nancy further suggests that “at every moment of its history, the Occident has given itself over to the
nostalgia for a more archaic community that has disappeared” (10), implying a similar approach as
Agamben in viewing the occulted immunitary character of Western political organization.
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worldview, and laboratory experiments. He might then have described the
dynamics thorugh which complex organisms systematically mediate their
relations with the others with whom they must concur by using immunity’s
etymological opposite, ‘community,’ since community foregrounds the coconstitutive dynamics of living. Imagine what might have happened if
‘community’ had achieved the same biological status that immunity did. (281)
In a similar vein, Eula Biss ends her On Immunity by thinking through the ways that
immunity is itself a communal characteristic, “a shared space—a garden we tend
together” (163), suggesting that immunity possesses a communal character when thinking
about human beings as beings-in-common as opposed to individualistic monads.
Thinking through the political implications of these contrasting ideas of immunity
and community has fired the projects of philosophers and theorists; I wish to think
through their association in the literary sphere. I have been arguing throughout this
project that the narratological aspects of these sf novels dealing with viral encounter
possess a kind of immunity to them at the level of narrative: that the narration, in its
imparting of events, in making sense and constructing a temporality out of infection and
its progress, is employing a kind of narrative immunity. The narrative voice is immunized
from the threat of the contagious, becomes the means of conveying a sense of a
subjectivity in the face of contamination. Thus, while many of these novels depict
outbreaks and their aftermaths as examples of apocalyptic endings and the potential
founding of a new, utopian collectivity, how are these visions of the future narrated to us?
Do they still contain that immune character within the narrative? And if we are trying to
envision a way of pushing back against the encroachment of the biopolitically immune
figure, then how can narrative do it? At its most basic level, how is it possible to narrate
that community so sought after by those opponents of immunitary biopolitics?
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Certainly, Nancy sees the notion of community as a problem of writing. In his
essay on “literary communism,” Nancy translates his contrast between the immanent
communion and the transcendent community into literary terms. For Nancy, myth is the
language of immanence. Myth is the language of origins, of hypostatic identities, of a
traceable line between a beginning and an ending; myth offers a vision of a totalizing and
self-present system. By contrast, Nancy suggests, “literature” is that which “interrupts
itself,” interjects on any project of completion in order to leave an opening or a gap—and
it is that self-interruption that “makes it literature (writing) and not myth,” that “suspends
its own mythos (that is to say, its logos)” (72). The implicit immunological character of
Nancy’s schema is readily apparent: myth professes a kind of impenetrability, a cohesive
system that is able to build off of itself and construct a division between the self and the
non-self, what belongs within the myth and what exists outside it. Literature, by contrast,
that which disrupts its own cohesion and reliable transmission in favour of a kind of
communicability, presents itself as forming a kind of relation to that which is not present
within itself, a continual deferral of any kind of teleological endpoint. Thus, Nancy’s
point that “community [is] formed by an articulation of ‘particularities,’ and not founded
in any autonomous essence that would subsist by itself and that would reabsorb or
assume singular beings into itself” (75). The literature of community, for Nancy, is a
literature that remains open, in spite of the precarity involved in such a task, a literature
that continually risks exposure rather than retreats within its demarcated borders.
In thinking through the concept of community, then, we gain an understanding of
its importance to the biopolitical practices of immunity as well as to the practice of
literature. Nancy detects the outline of community within the act of writing—“the
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experience of community as communication … implies writing. We must not stop
writing, or letting the singular outline of being-in-common expose itself” (41)—but how
does that writing, that narration, encode or depict such a representation of a coming
community? To explore these questions and ideas further, I turn once more to the
literature of viral outbreak, and its depiction of the post-apocalypse: of an epochal end
and of what may persist beyond the edges of such a cataclysm. Viral apocalypse offers a
particular means of thinking through the community that is to come, and the narrative
capabilities in which we have the power to render them. To explore this idea further, it is
necessary to look at one of the most familiar iterations of the viral apocalypse in
contemporary popular culture: the zombie outbreak narrative.

4.3

The Age of the Zombie

In her examination of Zone One, Kate Marshall refers to the zombie as “critical and
cultural theory’s great cliché” (531). And indeed, the ubiquity of the zombie within
contemporary popular culture has been well-remarked upon: “[t]hat the zombie is
ubiquitous in popular culture cannot be disputed: From popular literature and comic
books to video games and performance art, in smartphone applications and in homemade
films, zombies are all around us” (Christie 1).192 Whitehead himself appears largely
uninterested in the wider cultural fascination with the zombie, remarking in an interview
that “I wrote Zone One because I wanted to fulfill my own curiosity—which goes back

Indeed, almost every critical text on zombies includes this disclaimer about their ubiquity: “[i]n these
dark, anxious years, the undead are having their day in the sun. None more so than zombies: the
contemporary vision of the walking dead horde has, without doubt, become the nightmare image of the
day” (E. Williams 72); “[i]n a 2000 interview with Ulrich Beck, one of our leading social theorists, the
language of sociology and horror was combined in what he has come to term ‘zombie categories’ …. The
(un)dead, it would seem, have come a long way, baby, indeed” (McIntosh and Leverette vii), and so on.
192
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decades—about the creatures” (Fassler n. pag.). But the concept of the reanimated dead
has a particular resonance when thinking through the concepts of narrative immunity and
its relationship to literature in the age of biopolitics. Thus, in order to set up the stakes of
the notions of community and narrativity that inform Whitehead’s novel, it is first
necessary to provide a brief excursus on the zombie and why it remains such a pop
cultural touchstone.
Much like the wider social phenomenon of virality, the zombie193 mythology is
everywhere, constantly posited and adapted to dramatize narratives of social relations and
anxieties. It is a mobile and manipulable cultural signifier. Yet it has a specific and often
ignored provenance. As noted by Kevin Boon, the zombie is unique among the
monstrous archetypes of twentieth-century Western popular culture because, unlike
figures such as vampires, werewolves, Frankenstein’s monsters, and so forth, “the
zombie proper emerges from religious and cultural origins of the African diaspora”
(5).194 Zombies comes from Haiti, where they were seen as “neither sick nor
cannibalistic; they were victims of an exotic religion, used as slaves, forced to submit to
the will of a zombie master” (Kee 9). This master is known as the “bokor” (McIntosh 2).
As Joan Dayan makes clear, these ideas of possession and control, and the concept of the
zombie, were legacies of colonialism and slavery during the French control of the island
(36). The zombie came to the attention of the American public due to the American

Wade Davis suggests that the word “zombie” derives from “the Angolian Kimbundu term nzumbe,
which means ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit of a dead person’” (qtd. in Bishop 47).
194
While almost every critic of the zombie in popular culture makes note of its Haitian origins, Kyle
Bishop puts forth the argument that “the zombie is a fundamentally American creation” (12), suggesting
that the figure’s appearance and vicissitudes within Western popular culture divorce it from its historical
roots.
193
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occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 (Kee 9), particularly through the publication of
William A. Seabrook’s sensationalist “travelogue” The Magic Island in 1929. In a short
section entitled “…Dead Men Working in the Cane Fields,” Seabrook defines the zombie
as “a soulless human corpse, still dead, but taken from the grave and endowed by sorcery
with a mechanical semblance of life—it is a dead body which is made to walk and act
and move as if it were alive” (93). Although the chapter ends with Seabrook speaking
with a scientist who dispels his superstitious illusions by telling him that the “sorcery”
practiced by these evil magicians is much more plausibly the usage of a drug which
induces a coma and renders people susceptible to suggestion, Seabrook’s book had an
immediate impact on American cultural consciousness. In 1932, a stage play entitled
Zombie, adapted from Seabrook’s writings, was performed in Manhattan (see Kee 14).
More famously, that same year Victor Halperin directed the low-budget horror film White
Zombie, starring Bela Lugosi. The movie depicts a newlywed white American couple on
honeymoon in Haiti, where they run afoul of a sinister magician named Murder Legendre
(Lugosi), who uses his powers to provide an unscrupulous plantation owner with
zombified labourers. Decades of American (and British) popular culture would return to
this idea of the colonial plantation, the ominous racialized image of the undead, and the
threat it posed to the white travelers who crossed into these eerie domains.195
In this initial figuration, the zombie stands in as a pure engine of capitalist
exploitation, the very “image of alienated, crushing, mindless labour in capitalist society”

Examples include Ouanga (1935), Halperin’s sequel to his earlier White Zombie, entitled Revolt of the
Zombies (1936), The Ghost Breakers (1940), I Walked with a Zombie (1943), and the British horror film
Plague of the Zombies (1968).
195
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(McNally 260).196 This early pop culture version of the zombie literalizes the anxieties of
capitalist and colonial exploitation, turning the alienated labourer into an abjected
creation of ceaseless toil. Mimi Sheller describes the zombie of Haiti as “the ultimate
representation of the psychic state of one whose body/spirit is consumed,” becoming
nothing more than a “degraded form of labour” (145), while David McNally emphasizes
that “Haitian zombies … are mindless labourers, people reanimated from the dead who
lack everything—identity, consciousness, memory, language—save the brute capacity for
labour” (259). Hence, in such stories the zombies themselves are not malicious actors, but
monstrous emanations of the will of the bokor, who taps into dark magic in order to work
his will.197 Zombies in these stories are tragic creations, pathetic bodies that have been so
entrapped within the cycles of exploitative labour that even in death they are denied
escape from the fate of labour. As McNally notes, “[w]hat capital does to workers,
therefore, is exactly what witches are said to do when they create a zombie: ‘to reduce a
person to body, to reduce behaviour to basic motor functions, to reduce social utility to
raw labour’” (142-143).
And yet, even in this more magical setting, the hint of contagion still lingers over
the notion of the zombie. Chera Kee, in her historical examination of early zombie texts,
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There is also, obviously, a highly racialized dimension to the zombie. The very title of the film White
Zombie implies a threatening difference from a “normal” zombie, and many critics discuss the issues of the
zombie-as-racial-other in culture (Kee 16, Degoul 27, McIntosh 5). While a more thorough discussion of
race and how it relates to Zone One or virality is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is an idea that
Whitehead touches upon in the novel, with the late revelation of Mark Spitz as being a black man. For a
lengthy and fascinating discussion of contemporary zombie stories and race, see Chapter Three of David
McNally’s Monsters of the Market: “African Vampires in the Age of Globalisation” (175-252).
197
Chera Kee examines the racial politics underpinning such early American popular narratives of the
zombie, noting that “black zombies were often background and filler, and it was the ‘black’ magic of
Haitian Voodoo, utilized by zombie masters, that openly threatened white femininity” (15). Indeed, in
White Zombie it is Lugosi’s Murder Legendre who practices black magic and threatens the film’s heroine.
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notes that the United States had a fascinated fear of Haiti, whose fight for independence
from the colonial French empire during the nineteenth century had resulted in decades of
violent conflict. Thus, “Haiti came to represent a sort of self-destruction that could
someday spill over into the rest of the Americas” (12). The zombie narrative therefore
becomes a particularly vivid illustration of the fear of corruption and destruction, of a
faltering nationhood and a faltering sense of self.198 Indeed, the plot of White Zombie,
hinted at in its title, is about the horror of the infection of this controlling slavery not on
the black men who labour in Haiti’s plantations, but on a white woman. The fear of such
a narrative is that the space of such abnegation is expanding, or that those meant to be
exist outside the remit of such infection have unwittingly entered its domain.
The more familiar image of the zombie comes from the filmography of American
director George A. Romero (1940-2017), most notably his trilogy of films Night of the
Living Dead (1968), Dawn of the Dead (1978), and Day of the Dead (1985),199 which
significantly revised the conception of the zombie.200 Instead of the undead being bodies
controlled by a bokor for nefarious purposes, the zombie infection in Romero’s films
(and the slew of zombie narratives directly influenced by him) is mysterious, global, and

Kee cites David Skal, who asserts that White Zombie’s 1932 release, during the height of the Great
Depression, meant to reinforce and explore “the nightmare vision of the breadline” (qtd. in Kee 17). Thus,
even in its first depictions in American popular culture, the zombie is tied to fears of an economic system in
crisis.
199
Romero would later return to his work on zombies, directing three additional films: Land of the Dead
(2005), Diary of the Dead (2007), and Survival of the Dead (2009), although these films have had less of an
impact on the canon of zombie popular culture than his initial works.
200
Interestingly, Romero did not initially consider his creatures to be zombies. The word is never used in
the film, and the shooting script of Night of the Living Dead refers to the creatures as “ghouls,” a more
general cannibal-monster (McIntosh 8; see also McNally 260; Abbott 31). Romero himself in an interview
stated that “I never thought of them as zombies. In Dawn [of the Dead] I used the word because everyone
was calling them zombies. … I said wow, maybe they are. To me they were dead neighbors” (qtd. in
Abbott 32).
198
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undifferentiated. It affects rich and poor, black and white, male and female alike, turning
them all into the more recognizably monstrous shamblers seeking to devour the flesh201
of the still-human. In moving from the resurrected labouring body to the shambling, ludic
masses, there is an implicit shift in economic focus: “[t]he present-day obsession with the
… abject figure of the zombie, might be taken as a symptom of an economy in which the
dominant financial logic of capital accumulation appears to not require laboring bodies at
all” (Cvek 3). Post-War Western culture and its increasingly post-industrial service
economy consequently affect the depiction of its undead, turning them from agonized
labourers into mindless, insatiable consumers.202
The zombie has, in more recent decades, come to serve a far more visible,
prominent concern. As Stephanie Boluk and Wylie Lenz elaborate: “the plague zombie is
a twentieth-century phenomenon, a new monster emerging at the moment when modern
science was unmasking the mystery of pestilence” (135).203 This type of zombie, the
epitome of which can be seen in Danny Boyle’s film 28 Days Later (2002), represents the
threat of the “viral zombie” (Boluk and Lenz 135): a fast, spreading pandemic whose
threat to the human race is not one of gradual breakdown, but of an aggressive, allconsuming force that will change them entirely. If Romero’s zombies served as mere

The popular zombie mantra of “brains!” is not part of Romero’s original conception. The idea was
developed by writer-director Dan O’Bannon in his 1985 film Return of the Living Dead.
202
Evan Calder Williams makes an interesting point regarding the concept of zombies as hungry, noting
that their consumption is, in fact, a kind of “anti-hunger”: “they don’t need to eat, yet it is what they do
above all else” (88). While Williams’s is clearly drawing attention to the metaphor of capitalist
consumption as fruitless and non-productive, I think we can also consider it as a kind of nostalgic
compulsion as well. Nostalgia will be a major theme in the following pages, and it is interesting to see that,
in this genre, the undead are just as susceptible to nostalgia as the living.
203
It should be noted that Boluk and Lenz identify Night of the Living Dead as the beginning of the viral
zombie narrative type, in spite of the fact that the cause of the epidemic, while ambiguous in the movie
itself, is imputed to radiation caused by the explosion of an interstellar probe.
201

272

figments of a ravaged and apocalyptic landscape, then the viral zombie of today
foregrounds the deformed face of the infected once-human.204
Sven Cvek makes the interesting note that “[w]hat is palpably absent from postfolklore US zombie narratives is the equivalent of the bokor, the voodoo magician
responsible for zombification. Instead, in his place we find some vague reference to a
mysterious epidemic, a pharmaceutical or military experiment gone wrong” (8). In the
absence of this pivotal figure, I contend that it is the virus itself that has come to represent
the bokor; instead of being the method of infection, the mysterious and infernal power we
impute to virality grants it the supernatural appearance of a summoner. Boluk and Lenz
refer to the glut of zombie stories as indicative of the “personified virus” (135), and I
think this apt description in turn grants a method of looking at the virus as a figure which
we recognize. Lacking that “religious awe that suffuses the language” (Wald 163) of
microbes in science and in early writing such as Jack London’s, the zombie grants a
familiarity to the virus, providing it a body with which we can identify it. In effect, the
zombie story grants us a means of identifying with the virus, seeing it as analogous to
humanity’s progressive, linear narrative as a part of our story. It is this fundamental
misrecognition that sets the stage, in Zone One, for both a placid recognition of the virus,
and for the destructive epistemic revelation that the virus is something other entirely.
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While Whitehead never provides an explanation for the origin of the zombie outbreak, the narrative
voice repeatedly refers to it as a “plague” that is transmitted through the bloodstream (18, 33, 60, and
passim). Indeed, while this plague is never referred within the text as a virus, one of the keyphrases in in
the Library of Congress catalogue page of the novel mentions “[v]iral diseases” ([viii]).
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Zombies have proven to be a durable metaphor, applicable to almost any scenario,
a handy allegory due to its essential blankness.205 As such, critics have come to read the
zombie as a representation of everything from capitalist exploitation of labour (McNally)
to hyper-consumerism, the racialized Other (Kee), ecological revenge (Marshall),
posthuman potentiality (Christie and Lauro), and so forth. This vision of the zombie has
proven to be an enduring one, and its adaptability is omnipresent as a tool in popular
culture. Outside of specific fictional narratives about zombies, it has also taken on a
particular resonance with regard to critical concerns. It is often utilized to discuss the
waning of late capitalism. McNally notes that, “[a]s banks collapsed and global
corporations wobbled, and millions were thrown out of work, pundits talked of ‘zombie
banks,’ ‘zombie economics,’ ‘zombie capitalism,’ even a new ‘zombie politics’ in which
the rich devoured the poor” (1). In his book titled Zombie Capitalism, Chris Harman
discusses the idea of the post-Great Recession bank as a “zombie bank,” or an image of
“financial institutions that were in the ‘undead state’ and incapable of fulfilling any
positive function, but representing a threat to everyone else” (11-12). Likewise, Henry
Giroux writes that “[t]he twenty-first century zombies no longer emerge from the grave;
they now inhabit the rich environs of Wall Street and roam the halls of the gilded
monuments of greed such as Goldman Sachs,” rendering an image of American sociopolitical hegemony as one of “hyper-dead” that “provides an apt metaphor for a new kind

In philosophy of mind, for instance, the term zombie is used to describe “a person who has no qualia,
but is nonetheless similar to normal people in various ways” (Mandik 32). Philosophically, then, zombies
are deployed not as flesh-hungry monsters, but as uncanny echoes, beings that have some fundamental
quality of humanity absent from them for purposes of a thought experiment. This usage demonstrates both
the latitude to which zombies come to be employed as well as an example of something fundamentally
lacking in their existence.
205
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of authoritarianism” (2).206 The disconnection of the zombie from its colonial, folkloric
roots and its adaptation to American popular culture as a reanimated corpse without any
specific labour-function207 makes it a malleable one, susceptible to adaptation in almost
any realm and available for almost any kind of critical reading. In this sense, the zombie,
like the grammatical figure discussed in Chapter Two, seems to operate as a kind of
deictic figure, a central emptiness that is animated and defined only in its contextual
relations.
Seemingly deictic, but not quite. Unlike the purely empty grammatical signifier
that Benveniste and Agamben discuss, the zombie’s one consistent characteristic is its
pure materiality, its physical embodiment no matter if animated by sorcery, infection, or
some unknown alien agent. The zombie materializes and literalizes the power of
infection, its palpable effects upon the body, the way that it undergoes uncontrollable
change. Thus, no matter what kind of allegory is transplanted overtop of these corpses,
that material persistence remains present. What shapes narratives about zombies is the
emphasis they place upon the body, upon its material presence. Zombies are not just
omnipresent—both within the pop culture landscape as well as the fictional areas in
which they roam—but are ever-present, a kind of relentless focus on the now. It is this
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As Alix Ohlin notes in her review of Zone One, the organizers of Occupy Wall Street suggested that
protestors dress up for Halloween “as a corporate zombie! … they see us reflecting the metaphor of their
actions” (n. pag.).
207
McNally critiques this separation of the zombie from its roots in alienated labour and capitalist
exploitation. He notes that the popularized figure of the omnipresent, post-Romero zombie “invisibilis[es]
the hidden world of labour and the disparities of class” (260). In this sense, McNally also attempts to use
the zombie as a figure to explore the limit points of global capitalism; while my examination of Zone One
will head in a more theoretical, less politically oriented direction, it is worth citing McNally’s focus on the
zombie’s innately political nature and its flattening through popular culture.
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idea that allows Whitehead to utilize the zombie in such a way in his thinking of what a
community will look like, and how it can be articulated.

4.4

Apocalyptic Blueprint: Richard Matheson and the End
of Narrativity

Whitehead cites Romero’s original trilogy of Dead movies as his major
inspiration in writing Zone One (see Fassler n. pag.). And yet, while the book shares
several affinities with these films, I find a greater resonance to exist between Zone One
and the text that influenced Romero: Richard Matheson’s 1954 novel I Am Legend.
Romero himself remarked that his film was primarily inspired by I Am Legend, in which
human civilization is annihilated by a microbial infection that kills or transforms its
victims into vampiric creatures. In particular, Romero was interested in Matheson’s
depiction of “one civilization replacing another” (Abbott 31), and how “people respond
or fail to respond to [cataclysmic change]. That’s really all [the zombies] ever represented
to me” (qtd. in E. Williams 90-91). Here, Romero foregrounds what is most important in
the zombie narrative: the collapse of a society, the ability or inability to narrate what
comes after that collapse, and a potential vision of what a supplanting collectivity may
look like. The central premise of both I Am Legend and Night of the Living Dead is thus a
sense of America’s exhaustion, and the society’s total collapse. I thus would like to
provide a brief analysis of Matheson’s novel in order to set up the ways in which
Whitehead’s later novel follows the blueprint of a post-apocalypse and the rise of the
infected dead in order to think through themes of community, immunity, and their
relationship to narrativity.
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In this genre-defining post-apocalyptic narrative, Cold War hostilities have led to
nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, and among the worldchanging fallout is a highly infectious bacterial plague that turns its victims into bloodcraving nocturnal creatures. Seemingly the only survivor of this event is Robert Neville, a
man whose immunity to the “vampiris” bacilli (as he terms it [75]) leaves him with the
burdensome task of exterminating the hordes of vampires that infest the California
suburbs in which he dwells. Thus, Matheson’s book is perhaps the first to truly shift the
idea of the reanimated dead away from magic and toward microbial infection, and
making its conflict the relation between contamination and immunity.
And indeed, Robert Neville is a paradigm of narrative immunity. He is, to borrow
the title of the 1964 film adaptation of the novel, the last man on earth. This is, he reveals
late in the novel to a woman who turns out to be infected, because of an incident during
the Second World War in which Neville, while stationed in Panama, was bitten by a
vampire bat. Neville speculates that “the bat had previously encountered a true vampire
and acquired the vampiris germ … But, by the time the germ passed into my system, it
had been weakened in some way by the bat’s system … as a result, my body built up an
immunity to it” (132-133). Apparently unique in his encounter with this infected bat,
Neville’s body is able to immunize itself against the threat of the disease and allow him
to live through the contagion, while his survival skills allow him to persist against the
beings that have been transformed. The contingent circumstances behind Neville’s
resistance to the vampiris bacteria once again bring up a common feature of zombie
narratives: that there are no innate qualities to survival, no special disposition as in Jack
London’s musings on the immunity of the white masculine body. The threat of the
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microbial infection is universal. Yet this also signals the universality of the narrative:
because there is nothing special behind Neville’s immunity other than pure chance,
Neville is meant to represent a kind of everyman, an average figure that is meant to stand
in for humanity—or, more precisely, hegemonic American masculinity—as a whole. The
zombie apocalypse narrative is a story that distills down qualities of humanity, and
therefore needs a representation of humanity as a microcosm. Neville becomes that
narrative device, and the narrative’s focalization through him can therefore be read as the
immune narration of a universal human figure.
What is interesting about Neville’s post-apocalyptic narration is just how
uninteresting it is. Neville’s life is one in which the horror and despair of the apocalypse
(including witnessing the death of his wife, her reanimation, and his subsequent re-killing
of her) has given way to a kind of static boredom. As Neville himself comments,
“[h]orror he had adjusted to. But monotony was the greater obstacle, and he realized it
now, at long last” (101). He spends his “dull gray afternoons” (1) dutifully reinforcing his
fortress-home, stocking up on supplies, and raiding vampiric spaces with the hopes of
killing and burning the bodies of any dormant monsters he finds, while at nights he
pacifies himself against the taunts of the vampires that crowd outside his domicile by
reading biology textbooks, listening to classical music, and getting drunk. In the absence
of any kind of social outlet, Neville expertly establishes a routine to keep himself going.
The most notable aspect of this post-apocalyptic limbo is how standard the procedure
becomes. “For him the word ‘horror’ had become obsolete. A surfeiting of terror had
made terror a cliché” (134). Neville appears as someone burnt out on affective
engagement, his sensorium overwhelmed and leaving him in a state of dull repetition.
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While he often rages against his predicament and its feelings of hopelessness—musing at
one point “[w]hy go through all the complexity when a flung-open door and a few steps
would end it all?” (18)—he maintains his daily schedule to the best of his abilities,
existing on in spite of the plethora of evidence that the human world has definitively
reached its end-point. Boredom, or an affective nullity, becomes another key
characteristic of this schematic zombie story, and a necessary one to access the world
after its collapse: boredom becomes the affective correlative of immunity, a way of
anesthetizing the protagonist against the emptiness of existence.
Yet as I Am Legend progresses, Neville comes to understand that the appellation
of “the last man on earth” is a very specific one, for as he learns in the novel’s final
movement, a new community has developed in the aftermath of the vampiris bacteria.
Although infected by the microbe, radical new drugs have allowed these beings to arrest
the degeneration into single-minded bloodlust, to, in the words of one of these new
beings, “live with the germ now” (144). While Neville inoculates himself against the end
of the world through daily routines and rituals of violence, the drug-amplified beings are
“helping to set up society slowly again” (144). And this is a society, a community, that
cannot possibly include Robert Neville among its membership. He is, as one of the new
beings terms him, “the last of an old race” (156), a specter of a bygone civilization.
This new vision of dominant life on earth that supplants humanity is one that is
announced in the most positive of valences. Neville is informed of this in the most
positive announcement possible, in a letter specifically addressed to him by Ruth, one of
these new humans whom Neville meets. Ruth’s letter informs Neville of this new society,
and forgives him for his violent attacks on her fellow infected: “I know now that you
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were just as much forced into your situation as we were into ours,” she writes to him
(143). Later, when soldiers of this new society attack Neville’s house and capture him,
pulling him “[i]nto the world that was theirs and no longer his” (154), Ruth comes to visit
him in his prison cell and inform him of the aims of the vampires’ attempts to re-establish
a new society by destroying the dead vampires, whose “brains,” unlike those treated by
the drug before death, “are impaired” (155). Ruth describes her society as “like a
revolutionary group—repossessing society by violence” (155), destroying the anti-social
elements of the apocalypse in order to return the world to a sense of normalcy. Among
these aberrations is Neville, who cannot exist alongside them. Ruth then gives Neville
pills to allow him to commit suicide before being executed by the new society. In this
way, Matheson announces this new, post-contagious community in as explicit and
positive a way as he can, granting them a spokesperson in Ruth, who calmly explains
their provenance and goals. In doing so, Matheson makes the coming community almost
exactly like the one it succeeds. Ruth repeatedly draws parallels between the actions of
her people and Neville’s own: when Neville attempts to justify his murder of the
vampires by saying he did so “[o]nly to … to survive,” Ruth responds “[t]hat’s exactly
why we’re killing” (155). Indeed, aside from the fact that these people are infected with a
disease, one which they are able to successfully manage with drugs, there appears to be
almost no difference between them and those of Neville’s “old race.”
Nevertheless, there is no possibility of Neville being integrated into this new
community—“[h]e knew he did not belong to them; he knew that, like the vampires, he
was anathema” (159). Even though Ruth highlights the similarities between them, Neville
cannot be granted access to the coming community. And it is a fate that Neville appears
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to accept with equanimity. Noting that “[n]ormalcy was a majority concept,” and that
therefore he is “the abnormal one now,” Neville swallows the poison provided by Ruth in
order to escape the ordeal of an execution (159). Neville cannot surmount the prejudices
and binary thinking of infection and immunity, cannot give way to the more fluid notion
of subjectivity that is implied through the carefully maintained equilibrium of human
subjectivity and bacterial infection. Such beliefs are genetically hardcoded into Neville’s
very blood.
And in his final moments of life, Neville locates something outside of the
boredom and fear that has characterized his existence since the vampiris outbreak: a joy
in monstrosity.208 Neville realizes that the new vampire society fears him, that “[t]o them
he was some terrible scourge they had never seen, a scourge even worse than the disease
they had come to live with” (159). This feeling fires Neville with a pleasure he has not
experienced within the scope of the novel heretofore: recognizing what he represents to
the new community, Neville finds the idea “amusing,” and notes “[a] coughing chuckle
filled his throat” (159). It is at this point that Neville understands that he is the “legend”
of the novel’s title, the mythological figure of death and destruction excised from the new
community in order to found its break with the past. Neville is cheered by this, animated
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The striking ending of the novel is one that its manifold film adaptations have never managed to capture.
The first adaptation of the novel, The Last Man on Earth (1964), comes closest, with Neville (played by
Vincent Price) hunted down and killed by the new humans. As he dies, Neville hurls epithets at these new
creatures, saying that they are “Freaks!” Both The Omega Man (1974) and I Am Legend (2007) drastically
alter the ending of the source material by having a group of human survivors exist in enclaves. In both
films, Neville (played by Charlton Heston and Will Smith, respectively) sacrifices himself while battling
the infected beings to allow the other human beings time to escape to a safer haven. In each case, Neville’s
blood is taken by these survivors to be used as an immunizing vaccine against the infection. These latter
films employ the narrative of sacrifice that Matheson’s original novel plays with in order to reinscribe a
plotline of heroic immunity and perilous infection. In both, Neville is valorized as a heroic figure protecting
humanity from predatory monstrosity, the very antithesis of Matheson’s work.
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in a way that he has not previously been. Part of the reason for this is that, in his
sacrificial death, Neville becomes indelibly inscribed within the foundation of that
community—he rhapsodically sees himself as “[a] new terror born in death, a new
superstition entering the unassailable fortress of forever” (159), interpolated into the
fabric of the new community through his total negation. Neville’s glee derives from his
realization that his physical death immortalizes his persistence within the coming
community. This is the final signal that this community will not truly break from that
which had preceded it.
I Am Legend is a noteworthy novel for its involvement in pathologizing the
undead being, turning it from an emanation of sorcery to one of microbiology, and for the
ways it scripts a narrative of post-apocalyptic immunity. It is a narrative about the end of
human civilization, and its replacement by something that comes afterward. And yet, in
his vision of a post-human society, Matheson ultimately creates too affirmative, too
clearly defined a vision of the future that is to come. Its proximity, its similarity, to the
society that has come before defuses its possibility of being something radically different
from that which came before, the society that climaxed in nuclear war and the
monomaniacal murdering of Robert Neville. Indeed, Neville appears so joyful at the end
because he is aware of the continuation of his project beyond the scope of his life, aware
that in becoming the sacrificial victim of the vampiris community, his immunitary
paradigm will continue to haunt them from that “fortress of forever.” In order to get
beyond the position of narrative immunity, then, all narrative access to that future
community must be constitutively denied. Any positive glimpse of such a society leaves
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it open and vulnerable to the infection of immunity, thereby negating its potential to
constitutively break from the notion of immunity that acts as the dark heart of modernity.
This rather lengthy digression into I Am Legend is relevant, not only because of
its substantial influence on the zombie genre, but also because of the clear thematic
resonances it shares with Zone One, specifically as they pertain to thinking through
notions of immunity and community during and after the apocalypse. Whitehead, like
Matheson and Romero, is intrigued by the idea of a civilizational collapse and what
comes to succeed human existence on earth, and how the remnants of that society narrate
their ends and this new beginning. In this vision of a coming community, the question of
immune narrativity is vital: how can the narratological tools we use, so indebted as they
are to ways of immunity, be utilized to describe something that is not just a repetition of
the same? Whitehead takes many of the same elements as Matheson’s novel: the
“average” protagonist, the deadened affect that characterizes the style of narrating the
apocalypse, and the possibility of something coming to replace humanity. Where he
differs from Matheson, however, is to suggest that if whatever newness to come is not to
just be a repetition of the old cycles of humanity, it cannot be beholden to the same rules
and style of narration. Whitehead continually interrupts and arrests narration in the postapocalypse, following Nancy’s idea of literary communism. The power and hope of a
community that escapes the immunitary trap is where narrative fails to pursue it.

4.5

Outbreak Optimism: Post-Apocalyptic Affect

Set in the aftermath of a worldwide zombie pandemic euphemistically referred to
as “the interregnum” (48), Zone One depicts an America attempting to restart itself. The
federal government—now situated in Buffalo—begins a project of recolonizing the
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nation by setting up settlement camps throughout the country, a project entitled the
“American Phoenix” (75). At the vanguard of this resettlement is the titular Zone One:
Manhattan Island, which is meant to be the crown jewel of this revived America. The
protagonist of the novel is “Mark Spitz,” a pseudononymous character who acts as a
“sweeper,” part of a team of civilians sent to exterminate any lingering zombies on the
island in the hopes of making the space safe for human inhabitants once more. Set over
the course of three days, Zone One follows Mark Spitz through this post-apocalyptic
American landscape that is attempting to reorganize and resurrect itself. Whitehead’s use
of this familiar setting is to interrogate what it means to envision futurity and community,
and how narration comes to inform the very contours of such endeavours. Thus, Zone
One is a novel of failure, about the failure to imagine an alternative future and failure to
narrate something truly different.
Mark Spitz provides a clear organization of what time means in this postapocalyptic America: “[n]ormal meant ‘the past.’ Normal was the unbroken idyll of life
before. The present was a series of intervals differentiated from each other only by the
degrees of dread they contained. The future? The future was the clay in their hands” (81).
This temporal categorization appears to offer the key to the novel’s structure, and I will
return to it in the following pages. Most immediately, it is possible to detect the
American Phoenix project as predicated upon a repetition of the past, a continuous
evocation of a nostalgic normality intended to comfort the survivors of the apocalypse.
The idea of the past as an “unbroken idyll” suggests its compression into a static vision of
life oriented by its ahistorical perception, rent through only by the eruption of the zombie
threat. Considering that this novel was written in the aftermath of the Great Recession of
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2008, the satirical element is evident enough: the liberal-capitalist paradigm is incapable
of envisioning anything other than a continuation of this trajectory in spite of its
spectacular failure, of the atrophying of politics to the point where the potential for some
kind of alternative articulation is impossible to imagine.209 As a complement to these
ideas, we can also see how the immunitary biopolitics comes to foreclose the possibilities
of narration in the aftermath of such an event, of how narrative can only replay hopes for
a flight into the comforts of the past.
In his study of the literary trope of apocalypse, Frank Kermode comments that
“[b]efore the End there is a period which does not properly belong either to the End or to
the saeculum preceding it” (12). Yet in Zone One, much of the humour derives from the
fact that this interstitial period attempts to evoke that preceding era as faithfully as
possible. Almost every aspect of the American Phoenix project is meant to evoke a sense
of familiarity with the pre-apocalyptic world of globalized capitalism, of return to that
epoch. Indeed, the very name of “American Phoenix” suggests a cyclicality to history
that will bring what is past back into the present. The official anthem of the project is
titled “Stop! Can You Hear the Eagle Roar? (Theme from Reconstruction)” (135), which
underscores once again the aspects of a nation rebuilding itself and also emphasizes,
through the image of the eagle, the particularly American character that this renewal
takes.210 And the familiar aspects of pre-apocalyptic life are continually described within

Indeed, this is clearly one of the novel’s primary inspirations. Ohlin, in her review of the book, notes
that New York “is the beating heart of the crimes under protest, and it is the heart of Colson Whitehead’s
satirical zombie novel, Zone One” (n. pag.). Sorensen, likewise, remarks that “the collapse of the global
financial markets” is one of the major world events that the novel works through (560).
210
Throughout the novel, the narrator uses the word “reconstruction” to refer to the American Phoenix
project and the colonizing of Zone One (see 9, 48, 135, 209, 290, et al.). It is possible to read this as an
allusion to the post-Civil War period of American politics (usually placed between 1865-1877), which
209
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the narrative as “returning”: the narrator notes how “[b]uzzwords had returned, and what
greater proof of the rejuvenation of the world, the return to Eden” than such infectious
marketing strategies (66)? Likewise, Mark Spitz muses that it is “[h]ard to believe that
reconstruction had progressed so far that clock-watching had returned, the slacker’s code,
the concept of the weekend” (9). The concept of return appears to be the entire ethos of
the American Phoenix: “[t]here had been laws once; to abide by their faint murmuring,
despite the interregnum, was to believe in their return. To believe in reconstruction” (48).
The use of “interregnum” to refer to the zombie plague further underscores this idea of
capitalism itself as a sovereign figure, an ephemeral idea that transcends the corporeality
of the human survivors. The American Phoenix asserts the omnipotence of the capitalist
project, Zone One re-establishes the dominion of capitalism over the space of the world.
The zombies momentarily interrupt that narrative, but are unable to permanently derail it,
and the seeming end of the zombie threat promises that return of the familiar structures of
life.
As with Robert Neville in I Am Legend, the predominant affect in Zone One
seems to be that of a lack of excitement in the wake of the apocalypse. Yet these
manifestations appear in subtly different ways throughout the novel. The most common
one is the intermingling sense of boredom and optimism that suffuses the great majority

describes a period of flourishing civil and economic rights for African-Americans, such as the passage of
the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, the founding of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the election of many
African-Americans to federal and state political office. The ultimate failure of the Reconstruction Era,
symbolized in the contested 1876 election of President Rutherford Hayes, who in return for his being
ratified as president signalled an official end to the project of Reconstruction and the re-institution of a
legalized white supremacy throughout the American south, is significant for Zone One. For a
comprehensive examination of the Reconstruction Era and the various historiographies that have attempted
to narrativize this time period, see Foner.
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of the survivors of the plague, the labourers of the American Phoenix project, called
(somewhat derisively) “pheenies” (16). As Mark Spitz notes at the beginning of the
novel, “[i]t had been a humdrum couple of days, reaffirming his belief in reincarnation:
everything was so boring that this could not be the first time he’d experienced it. A
cheerful thought, in its way, given the catastrophe” (9). Mark Spitz here claims two
different approaches: a boredom with the present and an affirmative, optimistic belief in
“reincarnation,” in the possibility of the future.211 The future is the space of possibility;
the present remains a kind of void, a waiting for that better future to come into existence
and assert itself.
This dual affective disposition: a boredom with the present and a hope for the
future, seems to be the affect of Wald’s outbreak narrative. Wald focuses on the
“formulaic plot that begins with the identification of an emerging infection, includes
discussion of the global networks throughout which it travels, and chronicles the
epidemiological work that ends with its containment” (1, 2). Her focus on this generic
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Of course, a critique often levelled against utopian narratives is that they are, in their absence of conflict,
boring. Jameson, in his reading of the utopian impulse in sf, remarks on how “a fear already implicit in the
conception of art in the … Utopian texts we have touched on, a fear that will develop into a gale-force wind
in the anti-Utopians … is simply the fear of boredom” (Archaeologies 184). The utopian vision where “the
political has withered away” and the dialectical force of history has stopped in some teleological happy
ending (185) would seem to be the same shape as the American Phoenix project, and would imply Zone
One as a kind of utopian space in itself. The difference, I contend, between the vision provided by the
American Phoenix (and critiqued by the narrative voice throughout the novel) and the negative utopian
vision the novel provides has to do, ultimately, with capital. The American Phoenix is predicated upon a
return to a late-capitalist economy, whereas the alternative proffered at the novel’s end is one wherein the
commodity form that underpins capitalism has vanished. In Jameson’s discussion of Thomas More’s
Utopia (1516), he writes that, as More is writing prior to the ascendency of capitalism to become the
dominant economic mode of the world, he is able “to fantasize [capital’s] removal from social life in his
new Utopian vision,” and comments that utopian narratives written in a capitalist hegemony offer “various
substitutions—stamp script, labor certificates, a return to silver, and so forth, none of which offer very
convincing Utopian possibilities” (17). It is the ability to entirely bracket off the power of capital in society
formation that allows for a Utopian vision, and this is why, in spite of that affective sense of boredom, the
American Phoenix cannot be considered properly utopian.
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narrative that influences not only popular culture representations of contagious outbreaks,
but medico-scientific ones as well, demonstrates the way in which society takes its cues
from its viruses. As she herself states, “[c]ontagion is more than an epidemiological fact.
It is also a foundational concept in the study of religion and society, with a long history of
explaining how beliefs circulate in social interactions” (2). The part of Wald’s outbreak
narrative that I would like to focus on closest is its final proposition—the promise of
closure of which she speaks, the way in which the story ends with “containment.” Indeed,
Wald does note that “[t]he outbreak narrative is conventional and formulaic, but it is also
always evolving” (28),212 but the idea of a definitive endpoint to the outbreak, and the
belief in the persistence of the human individual and society beyond that closure of the
outbreak narrative seems implicit within such a generic definition. There is, therefore, a
sense of familiarity and boredom to the outbreak narrative; the possibility of an
extinction-engendering outbreak does not appear to exist within the borders of that
familiar story.
Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism” helpfully underscores how
affect becomes the site of biopolitical control, and sets out an idea of affect that acts as
the locus for immunity in the twenty-first century. Arguing that “[a]ll attachments are
optimistic,” that they necessarily involve a desire to ecstatically transcend the subject (23,
3), Berlant suggests that optimism turns “cruel” when it becomes “a relation of
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Wald does note that the HIV epidemic apparently defies the logic of the outbreak narrative by virtue of
the fact that “it could not be contained” (27). Yet more recent discussions of HIV/AIDS, such as Tim
Dean’s Unlimited Intimacy, which investigates the subculture of “bug-chasers”—people who willingly
infect themselves with HIV—demonstrates that, in some ways, HIV has become more manageable, and
correspondingly, people’s affect toward it—at least in some social enclaves—has changed from fear and
disgust to something more complicated.
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attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered to
be either impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (24). Cruel optimism is
“the condition of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object” (24), a
condition of being ensnared within promises of “the good life” (11) that are unachievable
or suffocating. Cruel optimism is a poisoning of the utopian wish, for that connection to
an object (or concept, or person) is the very thing preventing “the expansive
transformation for which a person or people risks striving” (2).213 Thus, the American
Phoenix project is a kind of literalization of Berlant’s theory, an attachment to an illusory
vision of a better future that ends up blinding its adherents to their actual conditions of
existence and its precarity.
This idea is most noticeable in the American Phoenix project and its vision of a
future that is qualitatively undifferentiated from the novel’s past (and our present), a
nation of pure liberal capitalism. Such a concept is most clearly (and humorously)
illustrated in the tribulations of the sweepers charged with cleaning up the zombieinfested buildings in the financial district of Lower Manhattan. Despite the height of
these buildings, the sweepers are prohibited from throwing the bodies of killed zombies
out the windows; rather, they must carry them down the stairs and leave them on the
pavement for the sanitation crews. The reason for this is because “Buffalo wanted the city
habitable for new tenants …. The new era of reconstruction was forward-looking,
prudent, attentive to small details that will dividend in the years to come. The word came

Intriguingly, Berlant describes cruel optimism as “deictic” (27), in the same way that I have previously
examined both the grammatical term and the way it applies to zombies. The absence in deixis, its blank
space inflected by its situation, has a particularly enticing relevance for thinking of how immunity works
within narrative, as that prophylactic space.
213
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down: No more assaults on the windows of the fair city” (75). The idea of Manhattan as a
pristine and untouchable city that will become again what it once was, and therefore
needs to ignore the incursion of the flesh-hungry living dead into its midst, makes clear
the aim of Whitehead’s satire: even in the aftermath of a world-historical disaster, liberal
capitalism is incapable of envisioning a future outside or alternative to its trajectory. The
city must remain the same as it was before the plague, attractive to prospective buyers
and businesses. Indeed, this idea is amplified by the protests of the sanitation crews
against the sweepers’ habit of throwing zombie bodies out of skyscraper windows:
“[d]efenestration unduly aggravated their job. It was disrespectful. It was unhygienic.
Frankly, it was unpatriotic” (75). The yoking together of disposing of zombie bodies to
both hygiene and nationalism demonstrates the biopolitical capitalism of the American
Phoenix ideology, its relationship of health to nationhood.
This idea of the cruel optimism of a static capitalist society is most relentlessly
parodied when the survivors of Zone One do turn their eyes to the future generations of
America. The future is incarnated in the quasi-mythical figures of the “Tromanhauser
Triplets,” children who have fired the imaginations of the survivors throughout the
United States. The legend involves a woman, Doris Tromanhauser, who is pregnant just
as America succumbs to the zombie plague. Doris lives long enough in seclusion to be
rescued by government forces, give birth to triplets, and then die. In the wake of such
events, the legend of the Tromanhauser Triplets “spread through the Northeast
settlements,” and becomes a kind of totem of “an ebbing of the plague” (51). Indeed,
more than that, the triplets become representative of what the narrator calls “localized
hope,” a regeneration myth, proof of the rejuvenation of society (52): while Mark Spitz
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notes how the Chinatown in Manhattan will never be the same for him or people of his
generation, that it is being prepared for the Tromanhauser generation, “the repopulating
engine of babies, the unborn” (53, 56). The figure of the Child, being “[c]harged … with
the task of assuring ‘that we being dead yet live’” (12) becomes such a focalizing point of
hope, a synecdoche for the possibility of the regenerated future that is identical to the
neoliberal present, and as such, the Tromanhauser Triplets are elevated to the level of
near holiness.
One of the most relentless parodies of this inability to narrate the new comes in
the form of the pre-packaged nostalgia of “reproductive futurity” so thoroughly critiqued
by Lee Edelman in No Future. In that book’s introductory chapter, significantly titled
“The Future is Kid Stuff,” Edelman interrogates the ideological investments which
underpin the notion of “the Child” as the image of the future.214 For Edelman, such
investments are representative of what he titles “reproductive futurism,” that which limns
the very horizons of political thought itself (2). As Edelman explains, the structure of
(specifically American) politics is organized around the idea of the Child as the figure of
the future, that being which will both inherit the work of the present socius and carry
forward its works, and therefore “the Child [is] the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned
value” (4). The Child becomes, then, the “disciplinary image of the Imaginary past” (31),
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In another evocation of this ideology, Zone One constantly literalizes this usage of childhood as a
signifier for a future that is generically the same as the past. When provisional government representative
Ms. Macy shows up in Zone One, she suggests an idea for a new mural in one of the buildings checked by
the sweepers: “I’m thinking kids …. Pictures of pheenie kids in the camps, cavorting and pitching in.
Pressing seeds into the soil and sharpening machetes. No machetes—kid stuff. Smiling and laughing and
doing kid stuff. They’re the future, after all. That’s what this whole thing is about, the future” (207). Mark
Spitz puts a particularly cynical spin on things when he wonders “what did these folks do all day but try to
think up better ways to hone the future” (98).
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the figure invoked in order to manage and organize the shape and direction of the politics
of the present. As Edelman notes, the Child as a figure works as “an erotically charged
investment in the rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory narrative of
reproductive futurism” (21, emphasis added). Thus, the Child operates as a figure not
only of inheriting the future, but of maintaining that belief in the realization of a
(heteronormative) identity that carries on into the future. The future is micromanaged and
focus-grouped into a particularly corporatized vision of the neoliberal present, with all
the baggage that that involves.215 Edelman’s talk of the “sacralization of the Child” (28)
takes on an almost literal embodiment within Zone One in the Triplets as they become the
hope not just for the continuation of the present, but the redemption of the society
affected by such a major interruption in the narrative.216 The terminology employed here,
with its reference to manufacturing and engines, suggests a particularly mass-produced
vision of the future that is the same as the neoliberal present, a story of a return to the
same without seeming care for the problems that this causes.

There is an implicitly immunizing narratology to the Child throughout Edelman’s text. This is
particularly evident in his discussion of the film Philadelphia (1993). Discussing the film’s final scene, a
recorded flashback to the childhood of Andrew Beckett, who dies of AIDS, Edelman notes that this image
of childhood pushes “not only against the intolerant world that sought to crush the honorable man this boy
would later become, but also against the homosexual world in which boys like this eventually grow up to
have crushes on other men. For the cult of the Child permits no shrines to the queerness of boys and girls,
since queerness … is understood as bringing children and childhood to an end” (19). Edelman notes that
Philadelphia thus utilizes “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child performing its mandatory cultural
labor of social reproduction” (19) and to this point I would add that the child in this moment also is
deployed as an immunizing factor against the negative tonality of queerness that Edelman examines
throughout No Future.
216
Only Mark Spitz seems to be distanced from the jubilation of reproductive futurity; the narrator registers
Mark Spitz’s contempt when it notes that “Mark Spitz was pulling for them, rooting for them, or whatever
it was that one did when the world was ending and a statistically meaningless fraction of the planet’s extant
population encountered a slightly larger daily portion of misfortune. He didn’t want to get too invested”
(51).
215
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And yet, Whitehead ultimately denies the possibility of the Tromanhauser Triplets
as the redemptive figures of the post-apocalyptic world: later in the novel, word reaches
Zone One that the settlement camp of Bubbling Brooks, the location of the triplets, falls
to a zombie horde. When asked about the fate of the Tromanhausers, all Ms. Macy can
say is “I know one got out” (237). While the implication of one of the triplets surviving
the attack potentially implies the continuation of faint hope, the spectacular power of
triplets, of that “rigid sameness” being carried out not only linearly, but horizontally,
seems shattered by the downfall of Bubbling Brooks. The Tromanhauser Triplets become
the totemic representatives of the potential future and its reassuring sameness; the
survival of only one of the children only reinforces Mark Spitz’s pessimistic philosophy:
Bubbling Brooks “had done what all refuges do eventually: it failed” (239). In the fall of
the camp and the destruction of two of the three triplets, the suggestion may be that the
future is no longer “kid stuff,” is no longer the refuge and province of the specularized
Imaginary figure that will inherit the good deeds and structures of the present, but an
alien world whose inhabitants cannot be envisioned.
Such connections between the Tromanhauser Triplets and the idea of reproductive
futurism are not lost on critics of the novel; Leif Sorensen makes note of the mural and
the Triplets as dramatizations of Edelman’s thinking within the context of the novel (see
566-570). Yet I think it is possible to push this idea further: more than just Imaginary
investments within a futurity of biopolitical order, the specular children represent an
example of narrative immunity par excellence. There is a power invested in the children
of the mural and in the Triplets that extends beyond the scope of the survivors of the
collapse: they are unsullied by engagements with the narrative caesura that the zombies
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stand in for in Whitehead’s universe. The power of the children as investments is that
they are a way of casting into the future a stake of familiarity, of representation that
extends beyond the time frame of the present and its narrative entanglements. Essentially,
what the survivors do with the children is project a futural immunity, one that bypasses
the power of the zombies in order to fixate on a recognizable community to come. The
Child becomes the ultimate bearer of narrative immunity, its power being mobilized as an
end-run around the narrative blockage of the zombie threat. The Child expresses the
belief not only in the future that will of an identical character to the past, but also a kind
of narrative immunization against the threat of the zombies: there will be children, just
like their parents, to continue the work of society-building. In this sense, the outbreak
narrative is further closed off by the evocation of reproductive futurity, the most shining
example of the American Phoenix’s (cruel) optimism.
All of this hope is particularly ironic given the fact that the American Phoenix
appears to have very few immediate plans for dealing with the zombie outbreak. “No one
used the word ‘cure’ anymore,” the narrator explains, “[t]he plague so transformed the
human body that no one still believed they could be restored” (78). Having given up on
trying to cure the infected, the goal of the American Phoenix seems to ultimately be a
waiting game. Upon the discovery of “kill fields,” spaces filled with deceased zombies
who had not been destroyed at human hands, “Buffalo sent down word of their think-tank
scuttlebutt: the plague had finally, inevitably, exhausted what the human body could
endure. There was a limit to the depredations, and that meant a limit to the devastation”
(136). Such discoveries “hastened the start of many a reconstruction operation,” and
herald that “surely this is the American Phoenix rising” (136). The kill fields reassure the
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survivors, telling them that the scaffolding of civilization remains untouched, that the
return can be effected. Ultimately, the plan appears to be to wait out the zombie infection,
to let the disease take its course rather than intervene in it aside from the actions of the
sweepers to clear out the zombies that remain. In other words, the American Phoenix opts
for a laissez-faire solution, allowing the Invisible Hand of fate to dictate the progress of
the world. Such belief in the power of the killing fields, with whose discovery “one had
reason to dust off the old optimism” (136), suggests again a belief in the naturalness of
the global capitalist system, the impossibility of thinking otherwise, and in the assurance
that it will return things to the way they were, a comforting nostalgia.

4.6

“that was the problem with progress—it made you soft”

In contrast to the unwavering hope for the future that most of the survivors
possess, Mark Spitz differentiates himself by a far more cynical realism with regard to his
situation.217 In place of the hope for a return to a future that looks remarkably like the
present, Mark Spitz possesses an “affective blankness” (Sorensen 580). This lack of
affect, this seeming boredom with the utterly changed world, represents the particular
kind of narrative immunity that Zone One engages in: an affective immunity against the

Mark Spitz’s specific rationale for why he has survived the pandemic when so many others perished or
transformed is an interesting one: it is not his exceptionality, but rather his utterly ordinary character that
guarantees his preservation. Throughout the novel, Mark Spitz explains that his survival depends upon his
unexceptional existence: “[h]e was their typical, he was their most, he was their average,” and later, “[h]is
aptitude lay in the well-executed muddle, never shining, never flunking, but gathering himself for what it
took to progress past life’s next random obstacle” (10-11). Like Neville, Mark Spitz is a representative of
an average humanity, a remnant that survives the collapse. Yet while Neville’s survival is due to a unique,
albeit completely accidental, factor, Mark Spitz’s survival is because there is nothing at all about him that is
unique. It is this necessity for an average human representative that fuels Spitz’s nigh-metafictional selfreflection. Reflecting on this moment, Spitz reasons that his survival is assured because “[h]e was a
mediocre man. He led a mediocre life exceptional only in the magnitude of its unexceptionality. Now the
world was mediocre, rendering him perfect” (183). And thus, “[h]e had suspicions, and every day in this
wasteland supplied more evidence: He could not die” (182).
217
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possibilities of envisioning and seeking out a picture of the future. The Triplets represent
most clearly the attempts to buy into a hope for the future, and Mark Spitz’s ethos is
placed in particular contradistinction to such a position. His credo throughout the novel is
“[i]f you weren’t concentrating on how to survive the next five minutes, you wouldn’t
survive them” (32). The temporal window that Mark Spitz allows himself is one of a
gritty determination to encounter obstacles without succumbing to fantasies of a literal
cruel optimism. Blankness is the way to kill the possibilities of a future that will
constantly be frustrated by the appearance of the zombies, who are incapable of being
narrativized, of entering into a coherent narrative structure in Whitehead’s universe. A
bored resignation and focus on the present is the attempt to mediate against the deceptive
possibilities of a future.
This weariness toward return is most clearly explored through the history of the
nickname “Mark Spitz.” The reader never discovers Spitz’s real name; he is always
called Mark Spitz, in reference to the famous Olympian swimmer who happens to be
white. What is revealed slowly over the course of the narrative is how Spitz acquired this
name and its racially charged implications. It is only toward the end of the novel that it is
revealed that Mark Spitz is a black man,218 and that the nickname of Mark Spitz derives
from an incident in Connecticut during which he and a few other survivors were trapped

Although Whitehead slyly refers to Spitz’s race earlier on the novel. When the nickname first comes up,
the narrator remarks that “[t]he name stuck. No harm. Affront was a luxury” (26), suggesting that there is
something insidious about the application of the name to the character. More significantly, the narrator
notes that Spitz’s fellow sweeper Gary “was not reluctant in sharing his bafflement that Mark Spitz had not
been cut down in the first week, when the great hordes of unadaptables had been exterminated or infected”
(30). While ostensibly Gary’s surprise derives from Mark Spitz’s self-described mediocrity, Whitehead is
subtly referring to the horror film cliché in which black characters are the first to die at the hands of the
monster, while at least some white characters persist on to the end of the narrative.
218
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on a bridge teeming with zombies. While the other two safely plunge into the river
below, Spitz refuses, electing to stay on the bridge and singlehandedly eliminate the
undead. “When he told them later that he couldn’t swim,” the narrator adds, “they
laughed. It was perfect: From now on he was Mark Spitz” (182). When Spitz later
recounts this story to his sweeper colleague Gary, he explains that the main thrust of
irony in the moniker comes from “the black-people-can’t-swim thing” (287). While Gary
professes bafflement at such a stereotype, Mark Spitz remains skeptical, noting that “[h]e
found it unlikely that Gary was not in ownership of a master list of racial, gender, and
religious stereotypes, cross-indexed with corresponding punch lines as well as metatextual dissection of those punch lines” (287-288). This leads Mark Spitz to a deeper
meditation on what it is, exactly, that the American Phoenix resurrects along with its
vision of a liberal-capitalist utopia. “Would the old bigotries be reborn as well,” he
muses, “when they cleared out this Zone, and the next, and so on, and they were packed
together again, tight and suffocating on top of each other? Or was that particular bramble
of animosities, fears, and envies impossible to re-create?” (288). While the rhetorical
structure of the question leads to some possibility of there being a break, a rupture from
the structure of the past that had been the society which succumbed to the zombie plague,
Mark Spitz instantly disavows such utopian thinking: “If they could bring back
paperwork … they could certainly reanimate prejudice, parking tickets, and reruns”
(288). The post-apocalypse is therefore no refuge from the iniquities of the past, no
utopian break from the sordid history that impelled the catastrophe; so long as those
imbalances remain, be they racial, economic, or otherwise, they will eventually
metastasize into the dominant structures of that immune-community once more. It is a
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destiny that Mark Spitz definitively rejects when he thinks about how “[t]here were
plenty of things in the world that deserved to stay dead, and yet they walked” (288). The
solutions proffered by the American Phoenix project, by the attempt to return to the
status quo, are revealed, through Mark Spitz, not to be just cozy recollections of a past
within memory, but also a system replete with structural and social inequalities. This
revelation helps make clear the cruelty of the American Phoenix optimism.
Thus, Mark Spitz maintains a pessimistic, almost nihilistic vision of the future,
displayed in an affective lack that is not the boredom of the other survivors, but an
apathetic connection to the structures of social organization. Spitz’s blankness seems to
derive from a sense of anhedonia. The term, per the OED, refers to the “[i]nability to feel
pleasure” (“Anhedonia”). A clinical term, “anhedonia” is seen as an aspect of Major
Depressive Disorder, characterized by the DSM as “diminished interest in pleasure in
response to stimuli that were previously perceived as rewarding during a pre-morbid
state” (qtd. in Treadway and Zald, 538). Interestingly, this is a feeling that Whitehead
himself claims to suffer from. His essay recounting his experiences in the 2011 World
Series of Poker for Grantland magazine is titled, significantly, “Occasional Dispatches
from the Republic of Anhedonia.”219 Whitehead’s essay valorizes the anhedonic, turning
himself into that fictional nation’s representative at the World Series of Poker in Las

In an echo of his author, Mark Spitz spends “Last Night,” the time at which the zombie plague goes
pandemic and ruptures the world, inside a casino (although in Atlantic City instead of Las Vegas). Like
Whitehead, Spitz marvels at “the artificial habitat that is the modern casino. They did not want. It was all
inside” (82). In this sense, Zone One appears to suggest a hypothetical follow-through to Whitehead’s
musings in “Republic of Anhedonia”: the world will end, and eventually its effect will ripple through the
seemingly impenetrable barriers of the capitalist temple.
219
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Vegas220: “[w]e have no borders, but the population teems. No one has deigned to write
down our history, but we are an ancient land, founded during the original
disappointments, when the first person met another person” (n. pag.). If not intended to
be a record of the successes of the anhedonic (Whitehead is eliminated from the
competition during the third day), then his essay is meant to register the existence of the
anhedonic, the numbing sensation at a world of narcotized satisfaction.
After his defeat at the card table, Whitehead attempts to provide a moral that the
World Series of Poker revealed to him:
I learned a lot of things during my long, bizarre trip. About myself, and the ways
of the world. One, do not hope for change, or the possibility of transcending your
everyday existence, because you will fail. Two, if people put their faith in you,
you will let them down. And three, everything is a disaster. In short, nothing I
hadn’t known since childhood, but sometimes you can forget these things when
engulfed by a rogue swell of optimism, which happens, if infrequently. (n. pag.)
The entropic perspective of anhedonia allows for a perspective well-suited for inhabiting
a world characterized by an obsession with chronos, a hoarding of that kind of time.
Poker presents the vision of a sudden change, an interruption in the proceeding flow of
events, the ceaseless tide of the “Wave of Mutilation” (n. pag.). Anhedonia is not about
seeking pleasure, but about redemption, about breaking the spell of time. Yet in the end,
Whitehead is distanced from the possibility of such salvation, lost amid hermetic
moments in time and the zombies that characterize these spaces.
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Intriguingly, Whitehead describes the hotels in which the World Series of Poker takes place in terms of
apocalyptic and temporal imagery: he depicts one hotel as “[a] real Logan’s Run building,” and then
imagines a kind of apocalypse beyond its walls—“outside the walls, my world was ruined, the Library of
Congress half-buried in sand”; inside, by contrast, is hermetic, sealed off, protected. In his non-fiction, too,
Whitehead rehearses this idea of an apocalyptic space that is immunized against by a completely flat and
affectless present, a narcotization against the damages of time’s arrow.
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Yet in spite of Mark Spitz’s seemingly present-oriented cynicism, his disdain for
“pheenie bullshit” (32) then, and his attempts to focus on “the next five minutes,” he
cannot divorce himself from an almost constant remembrance of all that came before. As
such, the majority of the novel is comprised of flashbacks to the protagonist’s life prior to
the Last Night as well as his nomadic escapades during the interregnum. In the opening
pages of the novel, Mark Spitz is distracted from his patrol when he “succumb[s] to a
reverie” and is nearly devoured after being ambushed by a group of skels. That
“pandemic of pheenie optimism” (16) cannot help but infect even the most hard-bitten of
survivors. Indeed, Whitehead overtly pathologizes the late capitalist society that has
collapsed. Thinking back to the Last Night, Mark Spitz’s main concern is “Sunday
night’s recurring epidemic: Back to work” (84). Likewise, Mark Spitz’s place of
employment, the social media outlet of a Starbucks-like coffee franchise, is described in
specifically mutating terms: “[o]ne storefront divided into two, a dozen brick-and-mortar
locations metastasizing into an international franchise” (184). Musing on a popular
sitcom, Mark Spitz considers himself “[i]nfected by reruns … [he] had been hypnotized
by the show himself, nestled inside its eighteen-to-thirty-four demographic whose
underdeveloped cultural immune systems rendered them susceptible to the series’
shenanigans” (73). The past becomes the province of virality, reaching out with its
creature comforts in order to infect one with the affect of a nostalgic vision of the future,
a shallow and materialist optimism.
What sets Mark Spitz apart from the rest of his peers is not his disavowal of the
past, but rather his awareness of its essential past-ness. The American Phoenix thinktanks pathologize memory in the neologism “PASD,” which stands for “Post-Apocalyptic
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Stress Disorder” (66). Noting that “[e]veryone suffered from PASD” (67), Whitehead
clearly puns on the homophony between PASD and past—a connection made explicit in
the following pages where Mark Spitz misunderstands the agonies of a collapsed soldier.
When an army recruiter tells him “it’s his past,” Spitz is confused, until the recruiter
clarifies: “[h]is P-A-S-D, man” (69). PASD undercuts the optimistic sheen to which the
American Phoenix idealizes nostalgia, and therefore these memories become
medicalized. Mark Spitz is able to return to these memories, inhabit them, but he does not
succumb to them in the way the pheenies do. The activities of the previous life are gone
forever, and unlike the living dead they will never be resurrected. Mark Spitz is not fired
by an optimism but by a nostalgic affection for that which is forever past. The past is
something to be mourned, to return to, but without any expectation of its triumphant
rebirth. While the other characters, so focused on the majesty of the American Phoenix,
succumb at the novel’s end to the surge of zombies, Mark Spitz is able to turn off his
reveries: “[n]ot enough memory, with his survival programs running, for his PASD. His
past” (314). Whereas the past becomes pathological for the other characters, Mark Spitz
is able to disconnect himself from it, to fully inhabit the temporal frame of the present
that characterizes the zombie apocalypse.221
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A further similarity between the two texts is their narrative mode: both I Am Legend and Zone One are
narrated by a third-person omniscient narrator, and focalized through the characters of Neville and Spitz.
The effect is a further immunization; as Kate Marshall aptly notes, “[r]ather than housing this narration
within dialogue … the narrative voice [of Zone One] maintains its third-person distance. Mark provides a
third-person narration of his own experience from within the third-person narrative frame of the novel”
(534).
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4.7

When the Straggler Awakes

Whitehead’s chief addition to the zombie mythology is to create an apparent
distinction in the classification of zombies. The great majority of zombies are referred to
as “skels” (short for “skeletons”) and are representative of the typical undead figure:
shambling, implacably hungry for the flesh of the living, only ceasing when their brain
has been definitively destroyed. Yet there exists a second type, termed “stragglers” by the
humans, whose mode of existence appears to be entirely different and relatively benign.
Unlike skels, stragglers “did not move …. They were a succession of imponderable
tableaux” (60). Indeed, stragglers do not even appear to succumb to the temptations of the
flesh, remaining motionless and unresponsive even when in close proximity to human
beings. Instead, stragglers remain frozen in a single location; if moved, they return to that
space. “The general theory,” the narrative explains, “contended that the stragglers
haunted what they knew” (64), fusing themselves to a singular space. The stragglers
appear to imbue meaning into the spaces they “haunt” (60), becoming visible signatures
of the effect of space, of memory, on the body. Stragglers make manifest the importance
of memory, of returning again and again to places of import. As the narrator remarks,
“[t]heir lives had been an interminable loop of repeated gestures; now their existences
were winnowed to this discrete and eternal moment” (62). Thus, while the skels may be
representatives of the empty, meaningless present, the stragglers seem to embody a
melancholic connection to a meaningful past. It is no wonder, then, that “while the
regular skels got referred to as it, the stragglers were awarded male and female pronouns”
(102). In the stragglers, the survivors of the apocalypse see echoes of themselves, looking
to reclaim and make manifest some image of the past.
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Indeed, the Lieutenant in charge of Zone One has a particular affinity for the
stragglers, repeating his admiration for them throughout the novel. “Personally, I like
them,” he tells Mark Spitz, “I think they’ve got it right and we’re the ninety-nine percent
that have it all wrong,”222 later he tells Omega Unit that “stragglers … know what they’re
doing. Verve and a sense of purpose. What do we have? Fear and danger. The memories
of the ones you’ve lost” (121, 196). Unlike the pheenies attempting to revivify the past,
the stragglers, as the Lieutenant sees them, are “always inhabiting the perfect moment.
They’ve found it—where they belong” (196). The stragglers seem to exist in an everpresent state of melancholy, an understanding that the past is gone, never to return. This
devotion to loss, and the rejection of a foolhardy attempt to incarnate what has vanished
in the open space of the future, makes these figures so attractive to the Lieutenant.223
Mark Spitz, who admires the Lieutenant, likewise possesses the same kind of
disposition toward stragglers as the military officer. Spitz tries (in vain) to prevent Gary
from executing a straggler they encounter in one of the office buildings (100-101), and
later daydreams about being a straggler himself. During a patrol of Zone One, Mark Spitz
happens across a long-abandoned chain restaurant, which prompts an extended reverie
about his childhood and his family’s frequent trips to the place. Spitz muses on how
“[c]lassic rock had greeted them every time,” and his disappointment that the décor of
each restaurant is identical (190). Although he had never encountered this particular
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Keeping with the post-Great Recession context in which this novel was written, this is an obvious echo
of the Occupy Wall Street protests, and its most famous slogan, “We are the 99%.” Yet here the concept is
flipped: the 99% are the monstrous, and the 1% is the idealized and humanized figure.
223
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Lieutenant commits suicide later in the novel. This is what Mark
Spitz refers to as the “forbidden thought” (283), the attempt to bridge the gap between the meaninglessness
of human endeavour and the idealization of the undead.
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iteration of the restaurant before, Spitz notes that “[h]e had been here before and not been
here before. That was the magic of the franchise” (191). Mark Spitz finds comfort in the
homogenization that the restaurant offers, its suggestion of a repeated time-space that can
be rolled out in an undifferentiated fashion. When he enters this restaurant, at once
familiar and totally new, he feels himself become “a ghost. A straggler,” and then,
following up on this thought, wonders where he would possibly go if he were a straggler.
He decides, ultimately, that “[m]aybe he’d come here” (192, 193). What is interesting
about this passage is how nostalgia is identified and understood as a constructed
process—Mark Spitz refers to this restaurant as “[h]is introduction to the nostalgia
industry” (189)—but at the same time this does nothing to blunt its affective hold, both
living and dead. The purpose of this extended vignette demonstrates the importance of
rescuing something from time, of trying to prevent moments from being lost in the flood
of temporality. Indeed, when Mark Spitz later tells the Lieutenant that “I’m here because
there’s something worth bringing back,” the officer terms such a rationale “straggler
thinking” (270-271). Stragglers are mired in the past, nostalgically connected to a
moment in the past that defines them, that gives them a dimension of humanity. Both
Mark Spitz and the Lieutenant, therefore, recognize in this subset of zombies not just a
physical resemblance, but the spark of some humanity, the possibility of some form of
shared identity.
Yet unlike the Lieutenant, Mark Spitz’s convictions are not quite so unshakeable:
following the Lieutenant’s suicide, he comes to see the stragglers not as “the Lieutenant’s
sentimentalized angels, dispensing obscure lessons through the simple fact of their
existence,” but rather understands them as “vermin that needed to be put down” (280,
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281). This lesson comes a little too late, however. While on patrol, Mark Spitz’s sweeper
team, Omega Unit, encounters a fortune teller’s shop, complete with a straggler, and
Gary attempts to entertain Mark Spitz and team leader Kaitlyn by engaging in a parodic
palm reading session with the zombie. “Madame Gypsy, can you help us see the future?”
Gary asks it. After engaging in a pantomime of psychic encounter, Gary tells his
companions that “[t]hey say every thing is going to be all right” (283, 284). Once again,
the assurance of a bright and hopeful future is evoked, with the straggler acting as a
parodic medium to this invocation of pheenie optimism. Yet as soon as Gary lets go of
the straggler’s hand, “she grabbed his hand and chomped deep into the meat between the
index finger and thumb” (284). The narrative of comfort and familiarity, of recognition,
that the stragglers seem to offer the survivors, the representation of a kind of mirror or
similitude, an extension of human desires and memories, turns out to be a fatal
misrecognition. The immobility and docility of the stragglers is a mistake; their actual
purpose or motive remains occluded from human understanding. It is no coincidence that
the straggler who breaks the pattern and strikes back is a fortune teller: she makes clear
the future of the human race in her actions that disrupt the familiar lull to which the
sweepers have become accustomed. As the narrator warns earlier in the novel, “[t]he
plague didn’t let you in on its rules; they weren’t printed on the inside of the box. You
had to learn them one by one” (107). This lesson demonstrates the desire for connection,
for a way of looking at the past that the human beings desire to locate in the zombie
stragglers, and how this error of connection kills Gary and heralds the doom of Zone
One, and possibly humanity as a whole. If the past is identified as normal, as the place
where recognition can be located, then the sudden shift of the stragglers from ostensible
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dormancy to violent presence represents the final rebuke to the nostalgia that tinges every
action of the American Phoenix project.
It is apropos, then, that the ending to Zone One is both an apocalyptic ending and
a narrative beginning. The novel, characterized to this point by stasis, suddenly erupts
with the apocalyptic violence only hinted at before. The seemingly safe place of Zone
One is completely overrun by skels (and the newly mobile stragglers), and the settlement
collapses almost instantly. The American Phoenix project is revealed as hollow, an
exercise in “PR,” according to the Buffalo representative Ms. Macy, who lets slip the far
more serious straits the human survivors find themselves in: “[w]e don’t even have food
for the winter” (311). This attempt at reconnecting with a vanished present proves to be
the ultimate kind of cruel optimism, blinding the inhabitants of Zone One to the reality
that it really is “the end of the world,” that “[t]he last months had been a pause, a breather
before the recommitment to annihilation” (318). And in spite of the apocalyptic events of
these final pages, Mark Spitz cannot help but find himself “smiling because he hadn’t felt
this alive in months” (311). As the zombies seemingly come to life, so too does Mark
Spitz, casting off that affective blockage that characterizes the time of the American
Phoenix, the anaesthetic time that has no vision of a future except for a return to a
desiccated present. Affect flourishes as the world ends, as the last vestiges of a static and
exhausted immunity falls away forever. As Manhattan is definitively lost, Mark Spitz
finds himself holed up, in classic zombie-movie fashion, in an abandoned building,
surrounded by hordes of the living dead. It is here that Spitz corrects his earlier
assessment of ending, noting that “[t]he world wasn’t ending: it had ended and now they
were in a new place. They could not recognize it because they had never seen it before”
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(321). Spitz, like Robert Neville before him, finds himself outnumbered and surrounded
by the marker of the end of humanity, and is affectively charged by this encounter. Yet
unlike Matheson’s novel, there is no positive evocation of a utopian new beginning, a
representative able to announce the citizens of the new world and reveal to Neville the
terrible effect of his violent crusade. For Whitehead the state of things can be declined
only negatively, through an inability to access that which is.
The zombies in this final movement of the novel are described in overtly marine
imagery: “[t]he ocean had overtaken the streets … Except it was not water that flooded
the grid but the dead,” a “sea of the dead” and a “black tide,” a “deluge [in which]
everyone was drowning” (302, 322, 312). The zombies are no longer defined by their
individuality or their resemblance (either physical or affective) to human beings, but have
become an irrepressible surge, a thrusting forth of the new society that will take the place
of the exhausted and static humanity, that Wave of Mutilation that Whitehead considers
in his essay on poker. Accompanying such a shift is Mark Spitz’s recognition that
“[t]hese were not the Lieutenant’s stragglers, transfixed by their perfect moments ….
These were the angry dead, the ruthless chaos of existence made flesh” (321). The
flatness, the affective lack displayed by the zombies have become replaced by a ferocious
activity, a liveliness unseen by any of the novel’s human characters. Like Neville, Spitz
opts to make a definite choice, to leave his (temporarily) secure abode and venture out
into the mass of zombies in the seemingly vain hope of making it off the vanquished
island. In the novel’s final paragraph, Spitz makes the proactive choice that he has
suspended throughout the entire novel: “[f]uck it, he thought. You have to learn how to
swim sometime. He opened the door and walked into the sea of the dead” (322). The
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inertia that froze Mark Spitz on the Connecticut bridge, that ensured his survival against
the hordes of zombies because of his averageness, vanishes at the end. He can no longer
be the inert figure of a static humanity—he makes his choice, opting to swim, to act
rather than react in this new land of the dead. The novel ends at this point, beyond which
the reader cannot venture with Spitz. While the prospects of his survival appear bleak, the
narrative’s endpoint is here less because of Spitz’s impending death224 than because of
the impossibility of the immunizing principle of inertia continuing on. Both in terms of
affect and action, Spitz shakes off his anhedonia, and commits, truly, to his principle of
existing in the immediate present. It is when the narrative kicks into action that it
vanishes, no longer able to sustain itself from the infective possibility. Zone One ends
here because, were it to continue, it would be transformed into something it is not,
something that the narrative cannot sustain or accurately depict. Like Mark Spitz, the
narrative frees itself from its inoculating cocoon to enter into an experience that it is no
longer possible to ably describe. Whether Mark Spitz escapes, is devoured, or joins that
coming community of zombie life, it is impossible for the narratological tools predicated
on immunity to explore.

After all, he may survive. In the 2004 “rom-zom-com” film Shaun of the Dead, the ragtag group of
survivors bluff their way past an army of the dead and into their safe haven of a pub by adopting the
posture, gait, and appearance of the dead, complete with the characteristic groaning. The ruse is only
temporarily successful, but the protagonists are able to make their way past the throng of the dead. This
moment, while meant to be comedic, suggests that it is, indeed, affect that determines zombification more
than any kind of physical infection. Mark Spitz, who is so often identified with the stragglers, may be able
to make his way through the swathe of zombies in this way.
224
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4.8

Writing Your Way into the Future

The novel’s end seems to mark, then, a complete cessation of human being on the
planet, a final and irrevocable collapse to the zombie contagion. Mark Spitz remarks at
one point that “[t]he plague had a knack for narrative closure” (160). This finality extends
to critical appraisal of the novel, which notes that “[a]gainst the late-capitalist fantasy of a
future that consists of an endless reproduction of the present, Whitehead offers the
shocking possibility of an absolute ending” (Sorensen 561). I find that Whitehead’s
considerations of narrative’s relation to apocalypse and community to be more nuanced
than this. Whitehead does not completely foreclose the possibility of writing from
engagement with the coming community—but he does disconnect this writing from the
possibility of narrative. In one of the novel’s most important passages, Mark Spitz
reflects on his pre-Zone One days working as a salvager in Connecticut. His job involves
removing abandoned cars from bridges, and he is paired with a mysterious woman who
titles herself “The Quiet Storm,” another survivor of the horrors of the interregnum. The
Quiet Storm uses a tow truck to maneuver the abandoned vehicles into patterns that are
clearly discernible, but whose meaning is utterly inaccessible to everyone who views
them. The incomprehensibility of these vehicular shapes takes on a specific power for
Spitz and the narrator: “[w]hile the other wreckers, indeed all the other survivors, could
only perceive the wasteland on its edge, the Quiet Storm was in the sky, inventing her
alphabet and making declarations in a row of five green hatchbacks parked perpendicular
to the meridian” (289). Physical perspective comes to dominate this rendering of
apocalypse, as the survivors think of the zombie apocalypse in terms of its horizontality,
perceiving an edge, a linearity with recognizable boundaries. The Quiet Storm, by
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contrast, looks on with an angel-eye view, witnessing the catastrophe not in terms of a
temporal projection but an event, one that requires new patterns, new modes of thinking
in order to properly understand them. Indeed, the car-pattern comes to take on a
particularly linguistic conception as the narrator delves further into Spitz’s reverie: “[t]he
grammar lurked in the numbers and colors, the meaning encoded in the spaces between
the vehicular syllables” (289). The question then becomes who this language is directed
toward, and the narrator ponders that these shapes are “aimed at—what? Tomorrow?
What readers?,” and later reiterating “[w]hat readership did she address? Gods and aliens,
anyone who could look down at the right time, from the right perspective” (289, 290).225
The juxtaposition of the future (tomorrow), with the immediate follow-up question of
“what readers?,” suggests the impossibility of the future inhabitants of the United States,
those primed by the American Phoenix project to live out a future that is structured like
the past, to be any better at reading these glyphs than anyone who is in the present. When
Mark Spitz asks the Quiet Storm “[w]hat’s that supposed to mean,” she replies that “[w]e
don’t know how to read it yet. All we can do right now is pay witness” (289, 290).
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There is an interesting engagement with the necessity of writing and interpreting in the face of
apocalypse. Jacques Derrida, in “No Apocalypse, Not Now” (1984), argues that humanities scholars are
necessary to debate the concept of apocalypse (in this case, the fear of nuclear war between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s). Derrida suggests that “[w]e can therefore consider
ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of
belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text” (24). For Derrida, the apocalypse is always, in some sense, an
act of writing, and therefore those who are trained in the act of textual interpretation and close reading are
apt for the job of exploring apocalypse and the writerly impulse at its heart. He adds that “the nuclear epoch
is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in texts by Mallarme, Kafka, or Joyce, for example, than in present-day
novels that would offer direct and realistic descriptions of a ‘real’ nuclear catastrophe” (27-28). Within the
context of Zone One, then, the Quiet Storm’s poetic rendering of an unreadable language becomes the more
“real” attempt to explore the idea of the end of humanity and the coming of a new community, toward
whom this writing is directed, than either the facile fantasies of the American Phoenix or Mark Spitz’s
fatalistic pragmatism.
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Mark Spitz begins the novel hoping to master the abilities of comprehension that
seem to elude his fellow survivors. Thinking of his time as a boy first encountering the
overwhelming island of Manhattan, he believes that “[t]here was a message there, if he
could teach himself the language” (7). By the novel’s end, however, there is a shift away
from the hope of understanding to the project of bearing witness to alterity. Here, then, is
the rupture with the reproductive futurism, the immunizing promise of a future premised
on a nostalgic past: the Quiet Storm is writing for an audience not yet in existence, not
yet capable of thinking through or inhabiting the world in a way alternative to what has
led to this cataclysm. It is not the case that one must render the apocalypse through
narrative immunity, an attempt to preserve against the threats of a contagious existence.
This language exists beyond the possibility of decoding; it is an asemia indecipherable to
those trained by the models of late capitalism into specific cycles of thinking toward a
static future. Indeed, the narrator claims that the Quiet Storm “wrote her way into the
future” (290), that she will attain a kind of durability that will outlast the vain optimisms
of the American Phoenix project because it is a gift directed toward futurity, a futurity
depicted as being radically different from anything that the survivors are capable of
envisioning. In summation, then, one cannot encounter or understand what that vision of
the future would be, because there is no method of grasping what that future would look
like. The glimpse of this alternative language, this one that speaks into the future, is
where hope exists in Zone One, in the possibility of a radically alternative future that does
not collapse into an overdetermined morass of viral encounter and capture, of a space
segmented into a different conception of time. The Quiet Storm’s top-down perspective
also suggests a rendering of time that does not proceed along the past-present-future axis
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of linearity that is so constraining to thinking outside of viral contamination, the temporal
logic that dominates the characters of the novel. The Quiet Storm’s occulted language is
meant to be seen from above, all at once, as a kind of event, from some perspective
foreign to the affairs of humans, as in Gods or aliens. Bearing witness to an alternative
logic, language, and temporality is the best that can be afforded, the closest image
Whitehead is able to conceive of as an escape from the logic of viral ubiquity and
immunizing entropy.
By the invocation of “Gods and aliens” as the potential “readership” of the Quiet
Storm’s future-writing, Whitehead breaks from the trap that Matheson falls into. The
zombies are not, like the vampiris-infected people, a positive representation of the
coming community. While they may indeed be the beings to inherit the earth, it is just as
possible that they are some transitionary stage, some movement away from
anthropocentric dominion. Whitehead refuses to depict what society it could be that
would decipher the Quiet Storm’s writing, that would be the inheritors of this linguistic
gift. To do so would expose them to the possibility of an immunitary definition: they are
this, they are not that. Instead, Whitehead offers no access to this future collectivity,
because such an existence would be impossible to put into the narrative language of
immunity to which we have become accustomed.
At the end of his essay “The Politics of Utopia,” Fredric Jameson memorably
claims that “[u]topias in fact come to us as barely audible messages from a future that
may never come into being” (54). The rendering of utopia within a narratological
paradigm offers us a vision of a future that, although “non-existent,” is also “nonfictional” (54). It is an attempt of imagining a picture of the future in order to develop a
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contiguity between a present and the possibility of a future that has jumped the tracks,
that has developed alternatively from this space of the present. Colson Whitehead inverts
this formula, and Zone One represents an attempt to send a barely audible message into
that unexplored future. Utopia, for Whitehead, can only be defined negatively,
identifying what it is not and demonstrating the way that such an illusory vision of utopia
is bound to fail. The American Phoenix project of the post-zombie America represents
such a negative utopia, an image of the future that is nothing more than a longing for the
nostalgia of the past, a representation of the complete exhaustion of the liberal
imagination in regard to community and collectivity. And such an imaginary utopia as a
rejuvenescent liberal-capitalist America is doomed to fail, destined to drown beneath the
unending waves of zombie bodies that crash against the shores of Manhattan. For Mark
Spitz, the novel’s anhedonic narrator, such a definitive wiping of the slate is the only way
to ensure that something other than the stultified sameness of the capitalist order that the
space Zone One is meant to exalt can come into being. The coming community, the
possibility of utopia, is one that cannot be directly narrated, for such an approach
threatens it with the possibility of instantiating the immunitary paradigm that leads
inevitably to an autoimmunizing biopolitics. To make a move toward that idealized cummunus that Esposito reads as the opposite of immunity, one must be divested of the
narrative strategies involved in such apocalyptic and utopian fantasies. In order to break
with immunity, it is necessary to break with the strategy of descriptive narration. Thus,
the vehicular grammar of the Quiet Storm is present, is recognizable as a patterned
system, has a rationale behind it, but remains elusively unreadable to the characters of
Whitehead’s world. The Quiet Storm’s language is that which is held out to the coming
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community, the debt carried forward into the future equipped to discern that barely
audible message of the exhausted present.
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Conclusion
In the preceding pages, I have endeavoured to sketch out the ways in which the
concepts of viral infection and immunity operate on generic and narratological levels. I
am interested in the way that the discourses of biology, virology, and immunology gain
discursive influence in the way that they unfold in speculative narration. Likewise, I have
sought, throughout this project, to articulate the manifold means that this dialectical
relationship between infection and immunity can be narrated: there are a series of
intertwining and conflicting ideas about who and what can be considered inoculated or
contaminated. As I have tried to demonstrate, the purpose of this project is to push back
against the notion that there is a single outbreak narrative (or immune narrative); rather,
these narratives are informed and shaped by a series of temporal, ideological, and
subjective displacements, each of which changes the trajectory of such narrations of
infection and immunity.
In these closing pages, I wish to briefly comment upon a few potential paths that
could further develop the aims of this project. One area of future study can focus on is the
role of the infected narrator in speculative fiction. In each of the four chapters, I have
examined texts featuring narrators commenting upon, but not affected by, disease. My
rationale for this focus is that I believed analyzing stories featuring narrators who are
themselves physically unaffected by viruses would make clearer the narratological
character of immunity. Yet, this is not to suggest that all narrators are necessarily
immune, nor that the concept of “narrative immunity” cannot apply to narrators or
characters who have been afflicted with a contagious illness. Indeed, there exists
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voluminous cases of speculative narratives about viral outbreak from narrators whose
contact with contagion changes their understanding of their identity.
A particularly potent example of such an event occurs in Greg Bear’s novel Blood
Music (1985), which presents the reader with the by-now familiar narrative of an
apocalyptic viral pandemic. What sets Blood Music apart from other such fictions is that
this apocalypse does not announce the end of the human race, but its ascension to a
“higher” form of existence. The novel is focalized through several characters, but it
begins with the research scientist Vergil I. Ulam and his romantic quest to cultivate a
“smart virus.” Recently fired from his job as a microbiologist at the genetics engineering
firm Genetech, Vergil decides to take his research with him, injecting himself with his
own experimental lymphocytes rather than leave them to be disposed of by his erstwhile
employers. Despite the sudden influx of these unpredictable microbes into his body,
Vergil acts largely unconcerned by this change—as he explains to his friend Edward
Milligan, his immune system “will take care of it. Like police” (63). In the weeks
following his act, Vergil undergoes a remarkable transformation: his own cells talk to
him. Termed “noocytes,” (“from the Greek word for mind, ‘noos,’” Vergil helpfully
explains [74]), these experimental “smart cells” refigure his entire body, upgrading his
physical and mental capacities, and cataloguing his entire personality within each cell’s
genetic memory (this is important, as the noocytes eventually liquify Vergil’s body in
their attempt to spread across the globe).
Blood Music possesses the common beats of a viral outbreak story—from the
initial contact, to the sudden catastrophic spread, to the frantic attempts by scientists and
epidemiologists to identify the contamination’s origin and halt its circulation. While
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Bear’s novel appears from the outset to be a familiar bio-thriller, it diverts from this path
quickly and in intriguing ways. The most generative aspect of Blood Music, however,
comes from the depiction of the human body’s intrusion at not just the cellular level, but
the narratological. As Vergil explains to Edward, his neologism for these smart cells “just
popped into my head” (74). As the virus reshapes Vergil’s body and mind, it is also able
to intrude into his own sense of narration. Later, as Vergil sits alone in his room, his
engages in a dialogue with his own cells:
--Yes, I am everything now.
Explain
--What? I mean, explain what?
Simplicities
--Yes, I imagine it’s tough waking up. Well, you deserve the difficulties. Damn
very old DNA finally waking up.
SPOKEN with other
--What?
WORDS communicate with *share* body structure *external* is this like
*wholeness WITHIN* *totality* is EXTERNAL alike
--I’m not understanding, you’re not clear.
Silence inside for how long? Difficult to tell the passage of time; hours and days
in minutes and seconds. The noocytes had screwed up his brain clock. And what
else?
YOU *interface* *stand BETWEEN* EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL. Are
they alike
--Inside and outside? Oh, no. (76)
The passage’s content (as Vergil and the noocytes attempt to discover a common
language) is disorienting, but it is particularly interesting the way Bear maneuvers
between the levels of dialogue between Vergil and the cells and his own internal
narration. Vergil’s own sense of “self” is pulled in three separate directions, between the
voices of the noocytes (his own reconfigured cells), the voice of his “self” engaged in a
(non-verbal) dialogue with the noocytes, and the voice of his “self” as interior
monologue. Bear is interested in thinking through the ways that not only subjectivity is
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altered by viral encounter, but the ways in which narration is affected in such a transition.
Vergil is alienated from his sense of self and his body, and this opens up the possibility of
a dialogic encounter, an interlocution with a seemingly stable and unified identity. For
Bear, there is the possibility of reorienting the scope and shape of self.226 This
paradigmatic example of posthuman narrative also foregrounds the way in which viruses
and immunities are necessarily rethought and the concept of narration re-figured around
such new subjectivities.
A second major avenue I can see in pursing this project further is to offer a clearer
analysis of gender. It is no accident that the four chapters of this project examine male
authors and feature male narrators (or, in the case of Burroughs, a masculine narrative
voice, at least). One of the goals of this project was to demonstrate the way that
“masculinity” is not a stable or unified concept—that it is riven by racial, sexual, class,
and temporal distinctions; like viruses, the term continually mutates in the landscape of
American speculative fiction. The “strenuous,” virile heteronormative white male

Bear’s virus writing has been subject of both intense critique and high praise. Laurel Bollinger notes that
Blood Music still trades on the fears of viral infection and invasion, and that “Bear creates a mind/body
split carried to a radical extreme,” suggesting a subjectivity abstracted from embodiment (392). Likewise,
in Heather Schell’s feminist reading of the rhetoric of viral infection, she posits a “germ theory of history”
whereby conservative notions of race, gender, sexuality, and so forth are transmitted through the rhetorical
language of biology in narratives about viral outbreaks, and cites Bear’s novel Darwin’s Radio (2000) as a
representation of this kind of theory (815). Ruth Mayer, in her study of bio-thrillers and rhetoric, challenges
Schell’s assertion, noting that there is a “resemanticization of the viral” in contemporary fiction, and that
there is a “more dramatically positive turn in Bear’s writing than in in [sic] virus thrillers” (17n.7).
Likewise, Lisa Lynch contrasts Bear’s novels with more straightforward bio-thrillers, suggesting that “Bear
asks his readers to reconsider the sort of intensive, militarized anti-epidemic operations that medical
thrillers such as [Richard Preston’s] The Cobra Event naturalize as desirable” (78). Stacy Alaimo presents
perhaps the most positive reading of Bear’s virus narratives, noting that the “messy, multiple, material
origins of this posthuman” transcription of human subjectivity through viral encounter “may suggest an
environmental ethics that … reconfigures the human as a site of emergent material intra-actions inseparable
from the very stuff of the rest of the world” (Bodily Natures 156). In Alaimo’s ethico-environmental
analysis, Bear’s viral fictions offer a way of thinking simultaneously about bodily and ecological
cohabitation (it should be noted that, with the exception of Bollinger, each of these critics primarily focus
on Darwin’s Radio and its sequel, Darwin’s Children [2003], rather than Blood Music).
226
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typified in the naturalist fiction of Jack London and the black, queer cosmopolitanism of
Samuel Delany, for example, possess few shared characteristics. But what yokes these
differing representations together is how the idea of the immune masculine observer is
able to represent and construct an identity and an ecology for such a new community.
Masculinity (in whatever form it takes) operates as a kind of principle of immunity in
these fictions, a necessary element in the dialectical operation of founding a new
community. And yet, these authors are all still informed by an understanding of
masculinity in which their characters are enmeshed and which empowers these
narrations. I find that the dialectics of immunity and community, of infected and
uninfected bodies, are mediated through a highly gendered lens in American fiction. In
American speculative literature of the twentieth century, our window into the biomedical
paradigm of virality, and its concerns about immunity and community, sickness and
health, the ecology of territory, can all be understood within how masculinity is
represented and how it does (or does not work). If there is a sense of “toxic masculinity”
in popular parlance, then there is also, as I have attempted to read it, a corresponding
“immune masculinity,” a narrative structuring of masculine identity that is sealed off
from the full effects of contagion.
Such an idea has been well documented in feminist theory. Elizabeth Grosz puts it
best when she writes that “in the west, in our time, the female body has been constructed
not only as a lack or an absence, but with more complexity, as a leaking, uncontrollable,
seeping fluid …. the deep-seated fear of absorption, the association of femininity with
contagion and disorder, the undecidability of the limits of the female body … are all
common themes in literary and cultural representations” (203). By contrast, masculine
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embodiments are viewed as being more impenetrable, solid in the face of contagion. And
indeed, the concept of gender is heavily biopoliticzed. Jemima Repo notes that, just as
Foucault located sexuality as a discursive technology inaugurated by biopower, so too
can we find gender as a similar technology.227 The historical contours of biopolitics
shape and condition gender, exploring the ways that conceptualizations of masculinity
and femininity are not only under fluctuation, but specifically tied to the orders of
biopolitical management and control. This immune narrative voice, the one capable of
diagnosing and conveying the movement of infection, allows for another method of
considering the ways in which biopolitics works. I turn here toward Haraway’s concept
of “situated knowledges,” which she defines as “embodied objectivity” (Simians 188).
While Haraway is speaking particularly about a kind of feminist critical-scientific
practice that emphasizes understanding the materiality of bodies and objects (or “actors”
[197]), I believe that we can see the narratively immune masculine voice as a kind of
embodiment in itself: in announcing itself as immune, it projects a specific kind of body,
and thereby allows an examination of this form to occur. And so, while I have tried to
think through the ways in which masculinity explores itself in relation to viral outbreak
and a sense of immunity, a further step in this project would be to put these texts into an
explicit dialogue with more feminist-oriented examinations of this dialectic of infection
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Repo begins her genealogy of gender with the note that the term shifted from the more general usage for
typology to a more embodied analysis in the 1950s, when psychiatrist John Money and his colleagues
rejected the idea of gender developing from biological sexual characteristic, insisting instead that “gender
had little to do with the physical body—it was learned after birth” (33). Such a challenge to the established
epistemology of sex and gender, suggests Repo, was quickly woven into a biopolitical hegemony: “[r]ather
than challenging the sexual order of things with their new scientific arguments, however, the doctors’ idea
of gender was used to justify surgeries on children with ambiguous genitalia in the name of social health
and order. Gender was therefore invented as much as a mechanism for normalizing, disciplining, and
governing sex” (4).
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and inoculation. After all, as Anne-Marie Thomas explains, “the virus figures so
powerfully in science fiction written by women, particularly those women writers who
see their goal as problematizing traditional notions of gender” (145). Viral and immune
narratives offer a far greater space to explore the dynamics of gender than this project has
been able to encompass.
Indeed, even a cursory examination of significant sf about contagious outbreak
reveals a wealth of feminist texts. Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) plays with this
idea of masculinity and infection long before the heyday of viral literature. Additionally,
many writers think through the interrelated concepts of gender identity and infection.
Joanna Russ’s The Female Man (1975), for instance, depicts the dimension of
“Whileaway,” where a plague has wiped out all men, leaving only women behind. James
Tiptree, Jr. (the pen name of Alice Sidney Sheldon) likewise explores the interrelations of
gender and infection in her short stories. In “The Last Flight of Dr. Ain” (1969), a
scientist obsessed with the environmental havoc of human beings unleashes a deadly
plague as a tribute to “mother Earth.” Octavia Butler’s Clay’s Ark (1984) deals with an
extraterrestrial plague that infects a group of people in the desert of the United States’
West Coast, and who begin to be transformed from mutually hostile strangers into a
inchoate family unit whose rewritten DNA changes their sense of subjectivity and
collectivity. Geoff Ryman’s The Child Garden (1989), meanwhile, depicts a futuristic
London where all children are infected with viruses meant to boost their physical and
mental acuity. Milena, the young protagonist, is immune to these viral upgrades, and
Ryman weaves together discourses of immunity, gender, and sexuality in narrating
subjectivity. Joan Slonczewski’s Brain Plague (2000) explores the concept of “smart
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microbes” that greatly increase the mental capacities of their hosts. This small and by-nomeans exhaustive sample demonstrates the ways that approaches to gender and virus
literature are not solely examined through a masculinist lens.
Perhaps the most significant speculative text that interrogates the intersections of
gender and narration through viruses and immunities is Nicola Griffith’s Ammonite
(1992), which tells the story of the planet Jeep and its viral ecology. Discovered by the
ominous (and omnipresent) Durallium Company, Jeep is colonized, only for the colonists
to discover too late that there is an endemic virus (also known as “Jeep”) that kills off all
males on the planet while leaving the majority of infected women alive.228 Marghe
Taishan, an anthropologist working for a government agency in cahoots with the
Company, is, some years later, sent to survey Jeep. Griffith immediately attempts to
combat the typical dualism of destructive disease and immunizing inoculation. As
Marghe plans her descent onto Jeep, she is ordered to take a vaccine that will ostensibly
protect her from the Jeep virus. Yet her colleague, Sarah Hiam, asks her to think about it
in another way, describing the vaccine as “a counterweapon. It’s control. Imagine: mass
vaccination of the women down there. If they need the virus to reproduce, then they’ll
die” (19). Griffith’s narrative attempts to decouple the associations of viruses with
destruction and immunity with a sense of self-protection. Viruses can be utilized toward
alternative expressions of identity and community, and the immunizing power of
vaccination can be a threat to such a self-sustaining ecosystem.229

228

The protagonist, Marghe, notes that the mortality rate for males (both indigenous Jeepians and humans)
is one hundred percent, while “[e]ighty percent of Company’s female personnel recovered” (14).
229
The novel opens with a visceral depiction of how such immunization can work, when Sarah reads
Company’s official procedures of post-contact inoculation to Marghe: “isolation, the removal of all the
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This revelation turns out to be precise once Marghe finds herself planetside.
Marghe is captured by an indigenous Jeep group known as the Echaridhe. While she
manages to escape, she loses access to Company’s vaccine, and becomes consumed with
fear that the virus will destroy her. With the aid of Thenike, an inhabitant of Jeep who
convinces Marghe that “she might stand a better chance of living if her mind was not
fighting her body, if she was struggling toward the possible, toward staying alive, rather
than the impossible, to keep the virus out” (199), Marghe is able to adapt to the planet’s
unique ecology. On Jeep, the virus is a fact of life, and the narratives of self-contained
immunity must be jettisoned. Instead, Marghe discovers that “Jeep the world, Jeep the
virus would become part of her now” (199). In naming both the planet and the infection
by the same term, Griffith is drawing attention to the fact that the contagious agent is also
the ecological system in which Marghe and the species who live on Jeep find themselves
enmeshed. The virus does not simply destroy, it maintains sociality.
Once Marghe has accepted the Jeep virus as part of her, Thenike remarks that “the
poisons fed to you as part of the vaccine are out of your system now … the virus has
cleaned you” (235). She is able to fully engage with the viral culture of Jeep. In
particular, Marghe is able to take part in rituals, such as “pattern singing” and
“deepsearch,” the latter being a person’s ability to “access the memories of her ancestors”
through a trance, and which acts as a “ritual of naming, of conception, of bonding” (125,
224). These are all ways in which, facilitated by the virus, the women of Jeep are able to
both “remember” their past and embody their future (212). They are ways of narrating

subject’s blood, marrow, lymph and intestinal flora and fauna and its replacement with normal healthy
tissues; reimmunization of subject with bacterial and viral agents commonly found in Earth-normal human
population” (2-3).
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oneself and one’s community outside of the immunizing mythologies of the Company.
As Thomas claims, “[w]ords are the vector for Marghe’s descent into deepsearch” (156),
making clear that the virally inflected practices on Jeep are ways of establishing an
alternative approach to narration.230 Ammonite offers a narrative that uses speculative
considerations of viral contamination to allow for a narrative focused on gender identity.
Bear and Griffith are both critically and commercially popular and enduring sf
writers, and I turn to them in this conclusion not to suggest that they have been
overlooked in the literature on viruses, but to point to how such major figures fit well into
further consideration of the notion of narrative immunity and the ways that this idea can
be extended and complicated. Narratives of viruses and immunities have long been
encoded into the DNA of sf, and trajectories that focus more specifically on posthuman
narration and genealogies of gender offer exciting pathways for this project to continue.
One of the most elegant phrases espousing the speculative ideal that I have
encountered comes at the closing of Bruno Latour’s polemical treatise We Have Never
Been Modern (1991). Having spent this volume exploring the ways that the ostensibly
rigid categories of subject and object melt away into a universe of “quasi-objects,”
hybrids that bridge these insufficient epistemic containers, Latour ends by suggesting that
“[o]thers will be able to convene the Parliament of Things” (145). This rich phrase,
pointing toward the ontological vista opened up when we dispense with outmoded
models of thought and identity, offers a perspective of looking at the world anew. The

Thomas suggests that the Jeep practice of deepsearch can be understood as a form of “Kristeva’s
conception of ‘semiotic’ language, which [Kristeva] associates with poetry, music, and feminine thought”
(156).
230
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virus—that prince of hybrids, neither alive nor dead—and the concept of immunity—its
comingling of myth and embodiment, self and other—offer powerful means of calling
such a parliament to order. Speculative fiction is essential for thinking through the ways
such parliaments of things can be conceived, and whether they will be used to tell
narratives of immunity, or open outward to more expansive visions of a narrative
community.
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